Grace, Actual and Habitual
by Joseph Pohle
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Though the good works of the just derive a special intrinsic value from the godlike dignity of adoptive sonship, and, consequently, in actu primo, are truly meritorious prior to and apart from their acceptance by God, yet human service and divine remuneration are separated by such a wide gulf that, in order to make a good deed meritorious in actu secundo, the divine acceptance and promise of reward must be expressly superadded.

In regard to the relation between service and reward Catholic theologians are divided into three schools.

The Scotists(1310) hold that the condignitas of a good work rests entirely on God's gratuitous promise and free acceptance, without which even the most heroic act would be utterly devoid of merit, whereas with it even naturally good works may become meritorious. This rather shallow theory almost completely loses sight of the godlike dignity peculiar to the just in their capacity of "adopted children of God" and "temples of the Holy Ghost," and is unable to account for such important Biblical terms as "crown of justice," "prize of victory," "just judge," etc.

Suarez and his school contend that there is such a perfectly balanced equality between merit and reward that God is obliged in strict justice (ex obligatione iustitiae), prior to and apart from any formal act of acceptance or promise on His part, to reward good works by the beatific vision. This view is scarcely tenable because there is no common basis on which to construe a relation of strict justice between the Creator and His creatures,(1311) and moreover St. Paul expressly teaches that "The sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the glory to come."(1312)

Hence we prefer to hold with Lessius,(1313) Vasquez,(1314) and De Lugo(1315) that the condignitas or equality existing between merit and reward, owes its origin both to the intrinsic value of the good work itself and to the free acceptance and gratuitous promise of God. This solution duly respects the intrinsic value of merit in actu primo, without derogating from the sublime dignity of God, who rewards good works not because He is obliged to do so by the merits of a mere creature, but solely because He is bound by His own truthfulness and fidelity. Thus God's justice towards His creatures is placed upon a free basis, and there is no violation of justice (iniuria) on His part. "From the fact that our actions have no merit except on the supposition that God so ordained," says St. Thomas, "it does not follow that God is simply our debtor; He is His own debtor, i.e. He owes it to Himself to see that His commands are obeyed."(1316) This teaching can be proved from Sacred Scripture. Cfr. James I, 12: "He shall receive the crown of life, which God hath promised to them that love him."(1317) It is reechoed by St. Augustine: "God is made our debtor, not by receiving anything from us, but because it pleased Him to promise us something. For it is in a different sense that we say to a man: You are indebted to me because I have given you something, and: You owe this to me because you have promised it. To God we never say: Give back to me because I have given to Thee. What have we given to God, since it is from Him that we have received whatever we are and whatever good we possess? We have therefore given Him nothing.... In this manner, therefore, may we demand of God, by saying: Give me what Thou hast promised, because we have done what Thou didst command, and it is Thyself that hast done it because Thou hast aided our labors."(1318) The Tridentine Council seems to endorse this view when it says: "Life eternal is to be proposed to those ... hoping in God ... as a reward which is, according to the promise of God Himself, to be faithfully rendered to their good works and merits."(1319)

Section 3. The Objects Of Merit

After defining the existence of merit the Tridentine Council enumerates its objects as follows: "If anyone saith that the justified, by the good works which he performs, ... does not truly merit increase of grace, eternal life, and the attainment of that eternal life,—if it be so, however, that he depart in grace,—and also an increase of glory: let him be anathema."(1320) Hence merit calls for a threefold reward: (1) an increase of sanctifying grace; (2) heavenly glory; and (3) an increase of that glory. The expression "vere mereri" shows that all three of these objects can be merited in the true and strict sense of the term (de condigno). This is, however, no more than a theologically certain conclusion.

1. INCREASE OF SANCTIFYING GRACE.—The first grace of justification (gratia prima) can never be merited;(1321) hence the meaning of the above-quoted conciliar definition is that it can be increased by good works. This increase is technically called gratia secunda. All Scriptural texts which assert that sanctifying grace is unequal in different individuals, also prove that it can be increased or augmented by the performance of meritorious works.(1322)

a) No adult person can merit the first grace of assistance (gratia prima actualis), nor any one of the series of actual graces which follow it, and by which justification ultimately comes to pass. They are all purely gratuitous. Similarly, too, the first grace of justification (gratia prima habitualis) cannot be strictly merited by the sinner preparing for justification. This is the express teaching of Trent: "But we are therefore said to be justified freely, because that none of those things which precede justification—whether faith or works—merit the grace itself of justification; for, if it be a grace, it is not now by works; otherwise, as the same Apostle says, grace is no more grace."(1323) To deny this would not only imperil the dogma of the gratuity of grace (because if the first grace given before active justification could be strictly merited, this would necessarily involve the gratia prima actualis), but it would also start a vicious circle (because the gratia prima habitualis is an indispensable condition of merit). This explains why St. Paul and St. Augustine again and again insist on the gratuity both of the first grace of assistance and the grace of justification proper.(1324) "This grace of Christ," says St. Augustine, "without which neither infants nor adults can be saved, is not bestowed for any merits, but is given freely, on account of which it is also called grace. 'Being justified,' says the Apostle, 'freely through His blood.' "(1325)

In the light of this teaching it is easy to decide the question, raised by Vasquez, whether perfect contrition justifies the sinner merely per modum dispositionis or per modum causae formalis. Both contrition and charity, be they perfect or imperfect, are essentially acts that dispose the soul for justification.(1326) Hence, no matter how perfect, neither is capable of effecting justification itself by way of merit (merendo), nay, of entering even partially, as Vasquez would have it, into the formal cause of justification, because, according to the Tridentine Council, sanctifying grace and not perfect contrition is the unica causa formalis of justification.(1327)

b) In connection with the dogma just explained theologians discuss the question whether a just man may strictly (de condigno) merit the actual graces which God bestows on him. We must carefully distinguish between merely sufficient and efficacious graces. Theologians commonly hold(1328) that merely sufficient graces may be merited de condigno, not so efficacious graces, because the right to efficacious graces would necessarily include a strict right to final perseverance (donum perseverantiae), which lies outside the sphere of condign merit. Assuming that the justified could by good works strictly merit the prima gratia efficax (an impossible hypothesis, because merit presupposes efficacious grace), this would involve a similar claim to a second, third, fourth grace—and ultimately to the final grace of perseverance, which, in matter of fact, no man can merit. Not even heroic acts of virtue give a strict right to infallibly efficacious graces, or to final perseverance. Even the greatest saint is obliged to watch, pray, and tremble, lest he lapse from righteousness.(1329) For this reason the Tridentine Council mentions neither final perseverance nor efficacious graces among the objects of merit.(1330)

2. ETERNAL LIFE OR HEAVENLY GLORY.—The second object of merit is eternal life. The dogmatic proof for this assertion has been given above.(1331) Eternal life is described by the Tridentine Council(1332) both as a grace and as a reward.

a) In the canon quoted in the introduction of this Section the same Council(1333) enumerates four apparently separate and distinct objects of merit, viz.: increase of grace, eternal life, the attainment of eternal life, and increase of glory. Why the distinction between "eternal life" and the "attainment of eternal life"? Does this imply a twofold reward, and consequently a twofold object of merit? Theologians deny that such was the intention of the Council, because the right to a reward evidently coincides with the right to the payment of the same. An unattainable eternal life would be a chimera.(1334) Nevertheless, the distinction is not superfluous, since the attainment of eternal life does not coincide with the gaining of merit but must be put off until death, and even then depends upon the condition of the soul: "si tamen in gratia decesserit" (provided he depart in grace). With this last condition the holy Synod also wished to inculcate the salutary truth that the loss of sanctifying grace ipso facto entails the forfeiture of all previously acquired merits. Even the greatest saint, were he to die in the state of mortal sin, would enter eternity with empty hands and as an enemy of God. All his former merits would be cancelled. To revive them would require a new justification.(1335)

b) A close analysis of the Tridentine canon under review gives rise to another difficulty. Can the gloria prima be merited? In defining the gratia secunda as an object of strict merit, the Council expressly excludes the gratia prima. It makes no such distinction in regard to glory, but names both "eternal life" (gloria prima) and "increase of glory" (gloria secunda) as objects of merit. This naturally suggests the query: Why and to what extent can the just man merit the gloria prima, seeing that he is unable to merit the gratia prima? Some theologians(1336) contend that the justified are entitled to the gloria prima only as a heritage (titulo haereditatis), never as a reward (titulo mercedis). Because of its intimate causal connection with the gratia prima, which is beyond the reach of merit, the gloria prima, they argue, cannot be regarded as an object of merit except on the assumption that the merits which precede justification confer a claim to the gloria prima. This assumption is false, because without sanctifying grace no condign merits can be acquired.(1337) In spite of this difficulty, however, most theologians(1338) hold that, unlike the gratia prima, the gloria prima may under certain conditions be an object of strict merit. The main reason is that, as the state of glory is not a necessary requisite of the meritoriousness of good works, while the state of grace is, the former may positis ponendis be an effect of the meritum de congruo, though the latter may not. A mere statement of the problem shows that it cannot be satisfactorily solved unless we distinguish between and enter into a detailed examination of two distinct hypotheses. It is generally agreed that infants dying in the state of baptismal grace owe that grace, and the state of glory which they enjoy in Heaven, solely to God's mercy and have no claim to beatitude other than that of heredity (titulus hereditatis). Adults who preserve their baptismal innocence until death, manifestly cannot merit the gloria prima by their good works, because they already possess a legal title to it through Baptism.(1339) It follows that their good works increase, but do not merit, the gloria prima, to which these souls are already entitled titulo haereditatis. The case is quite different with catechumens and Christians guilty of mortal sin, who are justified by an act of perfect contrition before the reception of Baptism or the Sacrament of Penance. Of them it may be said, without fear of contradiction, that they merit for themselves de condigno, not indeed the first grace of justification, but the gloria prima, because perfect contrition, being an opus operans, at the very moment of its infusion becomes an opus meritorium entitled to eternal glory.(1340) As regards the great majority of adult Catholics who, because of defective preparation, never get beyond imperfect contrition (attritio), and therefore are not justified until they actually receive the Sacrament, it is certain that they owe whatever grace they possess and whatever glory they have a claim to, entirely to the opus operatum of the Sacrament.(1341)

3. INCREASE OF HEAVENLY GLORY.—The third object of merit, according to the Tridentine Council, is "increase of glory." This must evidently correspond to an increase of grace, which in its turn is conditioned upon the performance of additional good works. That there is a causal connection between meritorious works performed on earth and the glory enjoyed in Heaven is clearly taught by Holy Scripture. Cfr. Matth. XVI, 27: "For the Son of man shall ... render to every man according to his works."(1342) 1 Cor. III, 8: "And every man shall receive his own reward, according to his own labor."(1343) A further argument may be derived from the unequal apportionment of glory to the elect in Heaven.(1344) This inequality is based on inequality of grace, which in turn is owing to the fact that grace can be augmented by good works. Consequently, the inequality of glory depends ultimately on good works.(1345)

4. NOTE ON THE MERITUM DE CONGRUO.—Congruous, as distinguished from condign merit, gives no real claim to a reward, but only a quasi-claim based on equity (ex quadam aequitate, congruentia, decentia).

Hence congruous merit and condign merit are not species of the same genus, but merely analogous terms. Because of the ambiguity of the word "equity" Dominicus Soto, Becanus, and a few other Scholastics rejected the use of the term meritum de congruo in theology. But this was a mistake. The Fathers engaged in the Semipelagian controversy, notably St. Augustine,(1346) did not assert that the justifying faith of the sinner is entirely without merit. The requisites of congruous merit are identical with those of condign merit(1347) in all respects except one,—the meritum de congruo does not require the state of grace.

a) According to the common opinion, from which but few theologians dissent,(1348) a Christian in the state of mortal sin can, from the moment he begins to cooeperate with supernatural grace, merit de congruo by good works, and obtain by prayer the dispositions necessary for justification, and ultimately justification itself.

"Prayer relies on mercy," says St. Thomas, "condign merit on justice. And therefore man obtains from the divine mercy many things by prayer which he does not merit in strict justice."(1349) This teaching is based partly on Holy Scripture and partly on the writings of St. Augustine, and is confirmed by certain utterances of the Council of Trent. By conscientiously preparing himself with the aid of actual grace, the sinner probably merits an additional claim (in equity) to justification. Cfr. Ps. L, 19: "A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit: a contrite and humbled heart, O God, thou wilt not despise."(1350) Dan. IV, 24: "Redeem thou thy sins with alms, and thy iniquities with works of mercy to the poor: perhaps he [God] will forgive thy offences."(1351) St. Augustine says: "The remission of sins itself is not without some merit, if faith asks for it. Nor is that faith entirely unmeritorious by which the publican was moved to say: 'God, be merciful to me, a sinner,' and then went away justified through the merit of faithful humility."(1352)

b) By good works the just may merit for themselves, not in strict justice (de condigno), but as a matter of equity (de congruo), final perseverance, conversion from mortal sin, spiritual favors for others, and also such temporal blessings as may be conducive to eternal salvation.

α) It is a theologically certain conclusion, accepted by all theologians without exception, that the grace of final perseverance (donum perseverantiae) cannot be merited in the strict sense (de condigno). Most authors hold, however, that it can be merited de congruo. This meritum is technically called meritum de congruo fallibili. Those who deny that it can be merited at all, admit that it can be infallibly obtained by fervent and unremitting prayer.(1353)

β) It is impossible to answer with anything like certainty the question whether the just man is able to merit for himself in advance the grace of conversion against the eventuality of a future lapse into mortal sin. Following the lead of Albertus Magnus, St. Thomas takes a negative view,(1354) on the ground that mortal sin interrupts the state of grace and annihilates all former merits. In another passage of his writings, however, the Angelic Doctor says: "There are two kinds of merit, one based on justice, and this is called condign; and another based solely upon mercy, and this is called congruous. Of the latter St. Paul says that it is just, i.e. congruous, that a man who has performed many good works should merit.... And in this wise God does not forget our work and love."(1355) Scotus,(1356) Bonaventure,(1357) and Suarez(1358) regard this as "a pious and probable opinion," well supported by Holy Scripture. The prophet Jehu said to Josaphat, King of Juda: "Thou helpest the ungodly, and thou art joined in friendship with them that hate the Lord, and therefore thou didst deserve indeed the wrath of the Lord; but good works are found in thee."(1359) To this argument add the following consideration: If previous mortal sin does not prevent those acts whereby man is disposed for justification from being at least to a limited extent meritorious, there is no reason to assume that merits cancelled by subsequent mortal sin will not be imputed to the sinner, with due regard, of course, to a certain proportion between past merits and future sins.(1360) To pray for the grace of conversion against the eventuality of future mortal sin, is always good and useful,(1361) because it cannot but please God to know that we sincerely desire to be restored to His friendship if we should ever have the misfortune of losing it.(1362)

γ) The just man may congruously merit for others whatever he is able to merit for himself, e.g. the grace of conversion, final perseverance, and also the first prevenient grace (gratia prima praeveniens), which no man in the state of original sin is able to merit for himself.(1363) The reason for this, according to St. Thomas, is the intimate relation of friendship which sanctifying grace establishes between the just man and God.(1364) However, as Sylvius rightly observes, it is not in the power of the just to obtain by this friendship favors which would involve the abrogation of the divinely established order of salvation. Such a favor would be, for example, the justification of a sinner without the medium of grace, or of a child without the agency of Baptism. An unreasonable petition deserves no consideration, even if made by a friend. What may be obtained by the merit of good works may be even more effectively obtained by prayer for others. The Apostle St. James teaches: "Pray for one another that you may be saved; for the continual prayer of a just man availeth much."(1365) This consoling truth is confirmed by the dogma of the Communion of Saints, by many illustrious examples from the Bible(1366) and ecclesiastical history,(1367) and by the traditional practice of the Church in praying God to give strength and perseverance to the faithful and the grace of conversion to the heathen and the sinner.(1368)

δ) A final question remains to be answered: Can the just congruously merit such temporal blessings as good health, a comfortable living, and success in business? They can, but only in so far as these favors are conducive to eternal salvation; for otherwise they would not be graces. St. Thomas seems to go even further than this by describing temporal favors as objects of condign merit when they are conducive to salvation, and of congruous merit when they bear no relation to that end.(1369) We have no space left to enter into an argument on this point, but in conclusion wish to call attention to two important facts: first, that prayer is more effective than good works in obtaining temporal as well as spiritual favors; and secondly, that we should not strive with too much anxiety for earthly goods, but direct our thoughts, desires, prayers, and actions to God, the Infinite Good, who has promised to be our "exceeding great reward."(1370)

READINGS:—St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 1a 2ae, qu. 114, art. 1 sqq.—Billuart, De Gratia, diss. 8, art. 1-5.—*Bellarmine, De Iustificatione, V, 1-22.—*Suarez, Opusc. de Divina Iustitia.—IDEM, De Gratia, l. XII, cap. 1 sqq.—Oswald, Lehre von der Heiligung, d. i. Gnade, Rechtfertigung, Gnodenwahl, 7, 3rd ed., Paderborn 1885.—Tepe, Institutiones Theologicae, Vol. III, pp. 223 sqq., Paris 1896.—*Heinrich-Gutberlet, Dogmatische Theologie, Vol. VIII, 473 sqq., Mainz 1897.—Chr. Pesch, Praelectiones Dogmaticae, Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 215 sqq., Freiburg 1908.—*S. Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, pp. 594 sqq., Freiburg 1901.—Kneib, Die Lohnsucht der christlichen Moral, Vienna 1904.—I. J. Remler, C. M., Supernatural Merit, St. Louis 1914.—A. Devine, C. P., The Sacraments Explained, 3rd ed., London 1905, pp. 74-89.—L. Labauche, S. S., God and Man, pp. 254-270, N. Y. 1916. (On merit in general see M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. I, Dublin 1909, pp. 544 sqq.)—B. J. Otten, S. J., A Manual of the History of Dogmas, Vol. II, St. Louis 1918, pp. 249 sqq.

On the Protestant idea of the fruits of justification see Moehler, Symbolik, 21 sqq. (English edition, pp. 157 sqq.).



Acceptance of good works by God, 419 sqq.

Actual Grace, 3 sqq.; Its nature, 5 sqq.; Its relation to habitual Grace, 14 sqq.; Definition of, 15; Its two-fold causality, 15 sqq.; Division of, 19 sqq.; Properties of, 49 sqq.; Necessity of, 50 sqq.; Gratuity of, 131 sqq.; Universality of, 152 sqq.; Its relation to free-will, 222 sqq.; As a requisite of supernatural merit, 413 sqq.

Actus humanus, 412.

Adoption, 357.

Adoptive sonship, 155, 356 sqq.

Adults, all receive sufficient grace, 167 sqq.

Affectus credulitatis, 105.

Albertus Magnus, 206, 432.

Alexander VIII, 179 sq.

Alexander of Hales, 206.

Aloysius, St., 211.

Alphonsus, St., 415.

Alvarez, 30, 216, 242, 243.

Ambrose, St., 69, 102, 158, 209, 319, 349, 404.

Amor affectivus et effectivus, 68.

Amsdorf, 291.

Anabaptists, 322.

Aquaviva, 260, 262.

Aristotle, 26, 31, 333, 353.

Arnauld, 180.

Athanasius, St., 341 sq., 373, 374.

Attributes, Divine, 344 sq.

"Auctorem Fidei," Bull, 74 sq.

Augustine, St., 7, 8, 9, 17, 20, 22, 23, 24 sq., 27, 29, 31, 33, 34, 36, 37, 39, 42, 43, 47, 56, 59 sqq., 66, 70, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85, 89, 91, 92, 97, 98, 100, 102, 103, 105, 107, 108 sq., 112, 118 sq., 126, 127, 138, 140, 141, 144, 146, 159 sqq., 171, 174, 177, 188, 189 sq., 191 sq., 194, 197, 203 sq., 210, 215, 228 sqq., 249, 252, 253, 254, 259, 262, 264, 289, 308, 319 sq., 337 sq., 339, 342, 343, 350, 368, 373 sq., 375, 383, 387, 394, 404, 421, 424 sq., 430, 431.

Augustinianism, 147, 200, 232 sqq.


Baius and Bajanism, 55, 56, 60, 61, 62, 67, 70, 74 sqq., 147, 417.

Ballerini, 415.

Banez, 232 sqq., 246, 255.

Baptism, 163 sqq., 279, 306, 308 sq., 314, 315, 318, 319, 330 sq., 394, 428, 434.

Barnabas, Epistle of, 318.

Basil, St., 346, 349, 373.

Beatitudes, 402, 416.

Beauty, Supernatural, an effect of sanctifying grace, 349 sqq.

Becanus, 206.

Beghards, 399.

Beguins, 399.

Bellarmine, 163, 203, 210, 260, 263, 319, 330, 334, 337, 414.

Benedict XIV, 249.

Bernard, St., 37, 230.

Berti, 249.

Beza, 214.

Biel, Gabriel, 63, 211.

Billuart, 31, 211, 216, 238, 242.

Bonaventure, St., 210, 365, 433.

Boniface II, 99.

Book of Life, The, 192 sq.

Book of Torgau, 292.

Butzer, 292, 322.


Caesarius of Arles, St., 99.

Cajetan, 165.

Calvin and Calvinism, 44, 153, 156, 206, 212, 213, 214, 218, 221, 223 sq., 228, 285, 302, 310, 392, 399.

Camerarius, 204.

Cano, Melchior, 363.

Capacity for grace, 133 sqq., 145 sqq.

Capacity of nature, 50 sqq.

Carthage, Councils of, 25, 28, 85, 116.

Cassian, John, 97, 142.

Castelein, 195.

Catharinus, 204, 211, 382.

Causality of Grace, 15 sqq.

Celestine I, St., 89, 90, 99, 104.

Celestius, 83, 85, 86.

Cercia, 203.

Certainty regarding justification, 379 sqq.

Charismata, 13.

Charity, 29, 56, 60, 67 sqq., 78, 336 sqq., 352, 363 sqq., 390, 395, 413 sqq., 417.

Children, see Infants.

Christ, The Grace of, 10, 70, 226.

Chrysostom, St., 91, 102 sqq., 141, 171, 178, 181, 209, 318, 349, 380.

Clement of Alexandria, 308.

Clement of Rome, 181.

Clement V, 331.

Clement VIII, 255, 261.

Clement XI, 74, 180.

Cogitatio congrua, 69 sqq., 94.

Concupiscence, 64, 120.

Condignitas (equality) between merit and reward, 417 sqq.

Condign Merit, 132 sq., 397 sq., 407 sqq.

Congregatio de Auxiliis, 255, 261.

Congruism, 261 sqq.

Congruous Grace, 262 sqq.

Congruous Merit, 132, 397, 407 sqq., 430 sqq.

Conversion, 174 sqq., 297, 432 sq.

Cooeperating Grace, 32 sqq.

Cyprian, St., 102, 126.

Cyril of Alexandria, St., 349, 360, 373.


D'Argentre, 198.

Definition of Grace, 5 sqq.

Deharbe, 328.

Deification of man, 341 sq., 405.

Delectatio victrix, 27, 225, 249 sqq.

De Lemos, 216, 236.

De Lugo, 72, 363, 415, 420.

Despair, 179.

"De Vocatione Omnium Gentium," 170, 182.

Diospolis, Council of, 8, 85, 136, 141.

Dordrecht, Synod of, 213.

Dorner, 293.

Durandus, 63.


Eck, Johann, 132.

Efficacious Grace, 41 sqq.

Efficacy, Threefold, 265 sq.

Elect, Number of the, 194 sq.

Ephesus, Ecumenical Council of, 86.

Ephrem, St., 109.

Estius, 216.

Eternal life, 426 sqq.

Eucharist, The Holy, 360.

External and Internal Grace, 11 sqq.


Facienti quod est in se Deus non denegat gratiam, 147 sqq.

Faith, 62, 73, 100 sqq., 272, 274 sqq., 298 sqq., 363 sq., 390 sq., 395.

Fides explicita—implicita, 184 sqq., 279.

Fiduciary faith, 274 sqq., 310 sq.

Filiatio adoptiva, 110.

Final perseverance, see Perseverance.

Flacius, 291.

Florence, Council of, 164.

Fonseca, 257.

Francis de Sales, St., 207, 256.

Franzelin, 203.

Frassen, 206.

Freedom a requisite of merit, 411 sqq.

Free-will, 32 sqq.; How Grace cooeperates with, 40 sq.; Its relation to Grace, 222 sqq.

Friendship, 353.

Friendship of God, an effect of sanctifying grace, 351 sqq.

Fulgentius, St., 23, 182, 215, 278.


Gazzaniga, 216, 236.

Gelasius, Pope, 170.

Gifts of the Holy Ghost, 369 sq.

Glory, 426 sqq.

Glossner, 149.

God, The Grace of, 10.

Godts, 195.

Gomarus, 213.

Gonet, 204 sq., 216, 218, 219 sq., 345.

Good intention, 411, 414.

Good works, Merit of, 397 sqq.

Gotti, 30, 185, 216.

Gottschalk, 212.

Goudin, 216.

Grace of justification, 313.

Granderath, 361.

Gratia antecedens—concomitans, 35.

Gratia congrua—incongrua, 262 sqq.

Gratia efficax ab extrinseco sive per accidens, 255 sqq., 268.

Gratia efficax ab intrinseco sive per se, 232 sqq., 267, 268.

Gratia est in nobis, sed sine nobis, 37.

Gratia gratis data, 12 sqq.

Gratia gratum faciens, 12 sqq.

Gratia inspirationis, 23.

Gratia magna, 252 sq.

Gratia orationis, 43.

Gratia parva (of Jansenius) 44, 252 sq.

Gratia prima, 136 sqq., 388 sqq., 424, 427 sqq.

Gratia sanans s. medicinalis, 16, 91, 114.

Gratia secunda, 388 sqq.

Gratia vocans, 32, 35, 111.

Gratuity of Grace, 131 sqq.

Graveson, 216.

Gregory of Nazianzus, 102, 159, 308.

Gregory the Great, St., 38, 290, 308, 368, 380, 394.

Grotius, Hugo, 294.

Gutberlet, 165, 205.


Habits, 333 sqq.

"Half-Melanchthonians," 292.

Harnack, 295, 296, 319, 381.

Heathens, The, receive sufficient grace for salvation, 179 sqq.

Henno, 324.

Henry of Ghent, 210.

Hilary, St., 97, 99, 209.

Holy Ghost, 331 sq., 335, 346, 361 sq., 368, 369 sq.

Hope, 363 sqq., 390, 396.

Hurter, 375.

Hus, 212.

Hypostatic Union, 12, 150, 345.


Ignatius of Antioch, St., 404.

Illuminating grace of the intellect, 19 sqq.

Imputation, Lutheran theory of, 313 sqq.

Incarnation, Dogma of the, 282 sqq.

Incompatibility of Grace and sin, 323 sqq.

Increase of glory, 429 sq.

Increase of sanctifying grace, 384 sqq., 423 sqq., 429.

"Indiculus," 99.

Infants, Unbaptized, 163 sqq., Baptized, 406.

Infralapsarians, 156, 213.

Inhabitatio Spiritus Sancti, 361 sq., 370 sqq.

Innocent I, 8, 9, 85, 154.

Innocent X, 168, 226.

Innocent XI, 73, 183, 281, 402.

Intensio gratiae, 389.

Irenaeus, St., 47, 90, 404.

Isaias, 178.


Jacob and Esau, 201 sq.

James, St., 286, 287, 288, 289, 294, 403, 434.

Jansenius and Jansenism, 44, 52, 55, 62, 74, 77, 79, 80, 153 sq., 168, 171, 180, 212, 218, 221, 222, 223, 224 sqq., 249, 252, 281, 411, 417.

Jehu, 433.

Jerome, St., 58, 109, 354, 380, 387, 394, 412.

Jews, 137, 155, 195, 282, 367.

John a S. Thoma, 216.

John the Baptist, St., 116.

Joseph, St., 116, 211.

Jovinian, 387, 394.

Julian of Eclanum, 83, 85.

Justification, 36, 73, 97, 113 sq., 136 sqq.; Process of, 272 sqq.; Necessity of faith for, 274 sqq.; Necessity of other preparatory acts, 285 sqq.; The state of, 300 sqq.; The nature of, 301 sqq.; Negative element, 302 sqq.; Positive element, 310 sqq.; Sanctifying Grace the sole formal cause of, 322 sqq.; Qualities of, 378 sqq.; Increase of Grace, 388; Fruits of, 397 sqq.

Justin Martyr, St., 102, 308.


Klee, 164.

Κοινωνία θείας φύσεως, 345.

Krogh-Tonning, 293.


Lateran, Fourth Council of the, 179, 400.

Law of grace, 405.

Lessius, 150, 206, 211, 221, 262, 337, 420.

Liberty, see Freedom.

Liebermann, 89.

Logos, The Divine, 358, 359 sq.

Log-stick-and-stone theory, 291, 292.

Lucidus, 212.

Lumen gloriae, 345.

Luther, 52, 74, 132, 223, 285, 288, 291, 293, 295, 302, 310, 322, 384, 389, 392, 399, 407.


Maldonatus, 203, 204.

Mary, B. V., 64, 116, 211, 384, 389, 391.

Massillon, 194.

Melanchthon, 292, 310.

Mennonites, 322.

Mercy, Works of, 416.

Merely sufficient Grace, 41 sqq.

Merit, 128, 131 sqq., 397 sqq., 430.

Meritum de congruo, 430 sqq.

Meritum naturae, 138.

Mezzofanti, Cardinal, 54.

Mileve, Council of, 85, 114, 116.

Modernism, 54.

Molina and Molinism, 65, 148, 200, 217, 255 sqq., 337.

Molinos, M. de, 401.

Moral virtues, Infused, 366 sqq.

Mortal sin, 97, 106 sqq., 392 sqq.


Nabuchodonosor, 58.

Natural and Supernatural Grace, 7 sqq.

Nature, Capacity of, 50 sqq.

Necessitas antecedens peccati, 120 sqq.

Necessitas medii—praecepti, 279 sqq.


Obduracy, 175 sq.

Objects of merit, 423 sqq.

Obstinacy, 178 sq.

Occasionalists, 406.

Ockam, 211.

Opera steriliter bona, 57, 81 sq.

Orange, Second Council of, 20, 44, 86, 92, 99, 100, 106, 110, 123, 136, 139, 143, 213, 400.

Origen, 77.

Original sin, 303, 434.

Orosius, 182.

Osiander, 292.

Osorius, 204.

Oswald, 104, 203.


Palmieri, 61, 72, 103, 116.

Pantheism, 343.

Passaglia, 158, 375.

Passions, The, 28.

Paul, St., 12, 13, 16, 21, 22, 27, 57, 64, 65, 68, 88, 100 sq., 105, 107, 125, 137, 146, 157 sq., 166, 169 sq., 180, 189, 191, 201 sq., 207, 227 sq., 259, 269, 276, 277, 281 sq., 283, 288 sq., 314, 316, 317, 318, 319 sq., 351, 383, 393, 402, 407, 420, 424.

Paul V, 256, 261.

Pelagius and Pelagianism, 56, 64, 66, 71, 79, 82 sqq., 89, 97, 103, 114, 119, 136, 141, 170, 190, 197, 228, 308.

Penance, Sacrament of, 395, 428.

Perrone, 18.

Perseverance, Final, 123 sqq., 425 sq., 432 sqq.

Pesch, Chr., 68, 72, 248.

Petavius, 203, 204, 361, 375.

Peter Lombard, 331.

Peter, St., 171, 184.

Pfeffinger, 292.

Piccolomini, 262.

Pighius, 204.

Πίστις, 277 sq., 290.

Pistoia, Council of, 71, 74.

Pius V, 165.

Pius VI, 71, 73.

Platel, 72.

Plato, 350.

Pneumatomachians, 373.

Polycarp, St., 290.

Pomponazzi, 52.

Postlapsarians, 213.

Potentia obedientialis, 19, 30, 40.

Praeambula fidei, 52, 102, 105.

Praemotio moralis, 249, 253.

Praemotio physica, 233 sqq., 248.

Prayer, 43, 91, 127 sqq., 133, 142 sqq., 266 sqq., 431, 433, 435.

Predestinarianism, Heretical, 212.

Predestination, 152, 187 sqq.; ante praevisa nierita, 199 sqq.; post praevisa merita, 206 sqq.

Predestinationism, Orthodox, 199 sqq.

Prevenient Grace, 32 sqq.

Priesthood, 13.

Properties of sanctifying Grace, 378 sqq.

Prosper, St., 25, 37, 59, 77, 97, 99, 100, 159, 182, 192, 215.

Protagoras, 350.


Qualitates Fluentes, 29 sqq.

Qualities, 333 sq.

Quasi-Merit, 134.

Quesnel, 53, 72, 74 sqq., 180.

Quietists, 343, 401.


Re-Creation, 315, 339.

Regeneration, 314 sq., 329, 339, 341, 346.

Repentance, 176.

Reprobation, 152, 178, 212 sqq.

Requisites of supernatural merit, 410 sqq.

Ripalda, 65, 69, 71 sqq., 128, 145, 149, 330, 342, 345, 363.

Roman Catechism, 333, 340, 349, 363.


Saints absolutely predestined, 211; Favored by God, 419.

Salmeron, 337.

Salutary acts, 82 sqq.

Sanctification, Internal, 323, 347, 348.

Sanctifying Grace, 271 sqq.; Genesis of, 272 sqq.; The sole formal cause of justification, 322 sqq.; Nature of, 328 sqq.; A permanent quality of the soul, 328 sqq.; An infused habit, 333 sqq.; Not identical with charity, 336 sqq.; A participation of the soul in the divine nature, 340 sqq.; The effects of, 347 sqq.; Sanctity, 347 sqq.; Supernatural beauty, 349 sqq.; Divine friendship, 351 sqq.; Adoptive sonship, 356 sqq.; Supernatural concomitants, 362 sqq.; Properties of, 378 sqq.; Admits of degrees and therefore can be increased, 384 sqq.; Lost by mortal sin, 392 sqq.; Fruits of, 397 sqq.; As a requisite of merit, 418 sq.; Increased by merit, 424 sqq.

Sanctity, an effect of sanctifying Grace, 347 sqq.

Sardagna, 337.

Scheeben, 361, 375.

Schrader, 375.

Scientia media, 245, 253, 257 sq., 266.

Scotus and the Scotists, 10, 63, 67, 94, 210, 325, 332, 337, 419, 433.

"Seed of God," Why grace is called the, 409.

Self-righteousness, 406 sq.

Semipelagianism, 97 sqq., 139 sqq., 146, 148, 170, 190, 197, 226, 228, 239.

Sensitive sphere, Graces of the, 26 sqq.

Sinners, Ordinary and obdurate, 172 sqq.

Sin, Incompatible with Grace, 323 sqq.; Is sanctifying Grace diminished by venial sin? 388 sq.

Sins of malice, 247.

Society of Jesus, 260 sqq., 325.

Socinianism, 292.

Socrates, 25.

Sola fides theory, 286 sqq.

Soto, Dominicus, 211, 363, 430.

Stapleton, 206.

Stoics, 64, 387.

Strengthening Grace of the will, 23 sqq.

Suarez, 63, 96, 116, 122, 128, 150, 218, 219, 257, 262, 325, 330, 334, 346, 359, 362, 363, 365, 390 sq., 415, 420, 433.

Sufficient Grace, 41 sqq., 167 sqq.

Supererogation, Works of, 411.

Supernatural character of merit, 413 sqq.

Sylvius, 216, 434.

Syncretism, 267 sqq.

Synergist dispute, 292.


Temporal blessings, 435.

Temptations, 65 sqq.

Tepe, 68, 72, 81.

Tertullian, 179.

Θείωσις, 341, 376.

Theodoret, 209.

Theological systems devised to harmonize the dogmas of grace and free-will, 231 sqq.; Thomism, 232 sqq.; Augustinianism, 248 sqq.; Molinism, 255 sqq.; Congruism, 261 sqq.; Syncretism, 267 sqq.

Thomas, St., 27, 32, 34, 52, 53, 62, 70, 93, 121, 149, 161, 165, 178, 185, 194, 210, 232, 298, 331, 332, 334, 338, 339, 345, 349, 357, 365, 368 sq., 387, 409, 414, 419, 421, 431, 432, 435.

Thomism and the Thomists, 11, 29, 200, 203, 216, 219, 232 sqq., 325, 332, 389, 413, 414.

Toletus, 204, 206.

Tournely, 207, 337.

Traditionalism, 52.

Trent, Council of, 34, 35, 36, 38, 45, 74, 86, 94, 106, 107, 111, 115 sq., 122, 123, 124, 125, 136, 153, 165, 168, 182, 188, 213, 224, 227, 243 sq., 247, 265, 272, 275, 285, 295 sqq., 303, 307, 311 sqq., 319, 322 sq., 324, 325, 329 sq., 331, 335, 338, 352, 361, 363, 365, 383, 385, 391, 392, 400, 401, 407 sq., 415, 421 sq., 423, 425, 426, sqq., 431.

Trinity, Dogma of the, 282 sqq.


Ultricuria, Nicholas de, 52.

Unbelief, 97.

"Unigenitus," Constitution, 74.


Vasquez, 69 sqq., 72, 94, 133, 149, 262, 337, 363, 415, 418, 420, 425.

Vatican Council, 51, 54, 73, 183, 244 sq., 265.

Vega, 122.

Venial sin, Possibility of avoiding, 117 sqq.; Is sanctifying Grace diminished by? 388 sq.

Vienne, Council of, 331, 363.

Vital acts of the soul, 27 sqq.

Vitelleschi, 262.

Vocation, The grace of, 190, 196.

Voluntas salvifica Dei, 152 sqq.


Wiclif, 212.

Will to save, God's, 152 sqq.


Ysambert, 211.


Zosimus, 85.

Zwingli, 298.


1 The Fathers and the Schoolmen "do not emphasize the difference, and frequently speak of habitual and actual grace as of one whole. Controversial reasons account for this discrepancy, which readers of the older theologians should constantly bear in mind." (Wilhelm-Scannell, Manual of Catholic Theology, Vol. II, p. 229, 2nd ed., London 1901.)

2 The asterisk before an author's name indicates that his treatment of the subject is especially clear and thorough. As St. Thomas is invariably the best guide, the omission of the asterisk before his name never means that we consider his work inferior to that of other writers. There are vast stretches of theology which he scarcely touched.

3 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural, pp. 181 sqq., St. Louis 1912.

4 Theologiae Graecorum Patrum Vindicatae circa Universam Materiam Gratiae Libri III, I, 4, Paris 1646.

5 "The same name is loosely applied to the act of 'blessing' the food before taking it, which is properly the function of a priest, but which is suitably performed by every Christian." (Hunter, Outlines of Dogmatic Theology, Vol. III, p. 6.) Cfr. S. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 1a 2ae, qu. 110, art. 1: "Secundum communem loquendi modum tripliciter gratia accipi consuevit: uno modo pro dilectione alicuius...; secundo sumitur pro aliquo dono gratis dato...; tertio modo sumitur pro recompensatione beneficii gratis dati, secundum quod dicimur agere gratias beneficiorum."

6 Rom. XI, 6: "Si autem gratia, iam non ex operibus; alioquin gratia iam non est gratia."

7 Tract. in Ioannem, III, n. 9: "Quid est gratia? Gratis data. Quid est gratis data? Donata, non reddita."

8 Debitum naturae.

9 Epistula ad Innocent., n. 2: "Nam si intellexissent illi episcopi, eam illum dicere gratiam, quam etiam cum impiis habemus, cum quibus homines sumus, negare vero eam qua Christiani et filii Dei sumus, quis eum patienter ... ante oculos suos ferret? Quapropter non culpandi sunt iudices, qui ecclesiastica consuetudine nomen gratiae [i.e. christianae] audierunt."

10 On the difference between these two categories see Pohle-Preuss, God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural, pp. 180 sqq.

11 Epist. ad Innocent., l.c.: "Etsi quadam non improbanda ratione dicitur gratia Dei qua creati sumus [gratia naturalis], ... alia est tamen, qua praedestinati vocamur, iustificamur, glorificamur [gratia supernaturalis]."

12 Epist. ad Sixt., 194, n. 8: "Haec est enim gratia, quam in libris Dei legere et populis praedicare catholici antistites consueverunt, et gratia quam commendat Apostolus non est ea qua creati sumus, ut homines essemus, sed qua iustificati sumus, quum mali homines essemus."

13 St. Augustine, Ep., 217: "Hoc [scil. credere] opus est gratiae, non naturae. Opus est, inquam, gratiae quam nobis attulit secundus Adam, non naturae quam totam perdidit in seipso Adam."

14 Gratia est donum gratis datum supernaturale.

15 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, Soteriology. A Dogmatic Treatise on the Redemption, pp. 24 sqq., St. Louis 1914.

16 Gratia est donum gratis datum, supernaturale, ex meritis Christi.

17 Cfr. St. Augustine, Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagianorum, IV, 15.

18 Cfr. Rom. III, 21 sqq.; Gal. II, 16.

19 Gratia est donum gratis datum, supernaturale, internum, ex meritis Christi.

20 St. Matthew X, 8: "Infirmos curate, mortuos suscitate, leprosos mundate, daemones eiicite: gratis accepistis, gratis date (δωρεὰν δότε)."—The name "gratuitously given," as Fr. Hunter observes (Outlines, III, 10), is "tautological and not particularly expressive," and "helps in no way to indicate what is the nature of the graces which it is intended to exclude. These are such as, for want of a better word, we call ingratiating: the Latin name used by theologians (gratum faciens) denotes that they make a man pleasing to God, grateful to Him, if we understand grateful of that which gives pleasure, and not in its commoner sense, which is nearly the same as thankful."

21 For a list of the charismata see 1 Cor. XII, 4 sqq. Cfr. Englmann, Von den Charismen im allgemeinen und von dem Sprachencharisma im besonderen, Ratisbon 1848; Cornely, Comment. in S. Pauli Priorem Epistolam ad Corinthios, pp. 410 sqq., Paris 1890; Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 243 sqq., Freiburg 1908.

22 1 Cor. XII, 31: "Aemulamini autem charismata meliora, et adhuc excellentiorem viam vobis demonstro."

23 Caritas, ἀγάπη.

24 1 Cor. XIII, 1 sqq. Cfr. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 111, art. 5: "Unaquaeque virtus tanto excellentior est, quanto ad altius bonum ordinatur. Semper autem finis potior est his, quae sunt ad finem [i.e. media]. Gratia autem gratum faciens ordinat hominem immediate ad coniunctionem ultimi finis; gratiae autem gratis datae ordinant hominem ad quaedam praeparatoria finis ultimi, sicut per prophetiam et miracula et huiusmodi homines inducuntur ad hoc quod ultimo fini coniungantur. Et ideo gratia gratum faciens est multo excellentior quam gratia gratis data."

25 Gratia est donum gratis datum, supernaturale, internum, gratum faciens, ex meritis Christi.

26 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural, pp. 229 sq.

27 Ibid., pp. 298 sq.

28 Ep. ad Simplician., I, 9, 22: "Voluntas ipsa, nisi aliquid occurrerit quod delectet et invitet animum, moveri nullo modo potest; hoc autem, ut occurrat, non est in hominis potestate."

29 Enchiridion, c. 98: "Quis tam impie desipiat, ut dicat, Deum malas hominum voluntates, quas voluerit, quando voluerit, ubi voluerit, in bonum non posse convertere?"

30 "Domine, ... ad te nostras etiam rebelles compelle propitius voluntates." For a full treatment of God's moral causality the student is referred to Ripalda, De Ente Supernaturali, disp. 109, sect. 2 sq.

31 Cfr. D. Palmieri, De Gratia Divina Actuali, thes. 15.

32 Causa formalis.

33 Causa efficiens.

34 Causa meritoria.

35 Causa materialis.

36 Causalitas moralis.

37 Causalitas physica.

38 Causa finalis inadaequata.

39 Causa finalis adaequata.

40 On the potentia obedientialis see Pohle-Preuss, God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural, pp. 188 sqq.

41 Can. 7, quoted by Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 180.

42 Supra, p. 11.

43 "Lex Domini immaculata, convertens animas, ... praeceptum Domini lucidum, illuminans oculos."

44 "Christus passus est pro nobis, vobis relinquens exemplum, ut sequamini vestigia eius."

45 De Spiritu et Litera, c. 34: "Visorum suasionibus agit Deus, ut velimus et ut credamus, sive extrinsecus per evangelicas exhortationes sive intrinsecus, ubi nemo habet in potestate, quid ei veniat in mentem."

46 2 Cor. III, 4 sq.: "Fiduciam autem talem habemus per Christum ad Deum; non quod sufficientes simus cogitare aliquid a nobis quasi ex nobis, sed sufficientia nostra ex Deo est."

47 1 Cor. III, 6: "Ego plantavi, Apollo rigavit; sed Deus incrementum dedit (ἀλλὰ ὁ θεὸς ηὔξανεν). Itaque neque qui plantat est aliquid neque qui rigat, sed qui incrementum dat, Deus (ὁ αὐξάνων θεός)."

48 De Gratia Christi, c. 19: "Ipse in bonis arboribus cooperatur fructum, qui et forinsecus rigat atque excolit per quemlibet ministrum et per se dat intrinsecus incrementum." Cfr. also Eph. I, 17 sq., Acts XXVI, 16 sqq., 2 Cor. IV, 6, 1 John II, 20 and 27.

49 Cfr. Mazzella, De Gratia, disp. 1, art. 1, 4, 3rd ed., Rome 1882.

50 Tract. in Ioa., III, 13: "Magisteria forinsecus adiutoria quaedam sunt et admonitiones; cathedram in coelo habet, qui corda tenet."

51 L.c.: "Interior magister est, qui docet; Christus docet, inspiratio ipsius docet."

52 Ep. 17 de Incarn. et Grat. n. 67: "Frustra [divinus sermo] exterioribus auribus sonat, nisi Deus spiritali munere auditum hominis interioris aperiat." Other Patristic texts will be found in the classic work of Ripalda, De Ente Supernaturali, disp. 101, sect. 3-4.

53 It is to be noted, however, that the term gratia inspirationis, both in the writings of St. Augustine and in the decrees of Trent (Sess. VI, can. 3), sometimes also denotes the immediate illuminating grace of the mind.

54 De Gratia Christi, c. 12: "Qua gratia agitur, non solum ut facienda noverimus, verum etiam ut cognita faciamus, nec ut solum diligenda credamus, verum etiam ut credita diligamus."

55 Op. cit., c. 26: "Cognitionem et dilectionem, sicut sunt discernenda, discernat, quia scientia inflat, quando caritas aedificat.... Et quum sit utrumque donum Dei, sed unum minus, alterum maius, non sic iustitiam nostram super laudem iustificatoris extollat, ut horum duorum quod minus est divino tribuat adiutorio, quod autem maius est humano usurpet arbitrio."

56 He applies a variety of practically synonymous terms to the strengthening grace of the will, for instance: delectatio coelestis, spiritus caritatis, inspiratio dilectionis, bona voluntas, voluptas, sanctum desiderium, inspiratio suavitatis, cupiditas boni, etc.

57 Canon 4: "Quisquis dixerit, eandem gratiam Dei per Iesum Christum D. N. propter hoc tantum adiuvare ad non peccandum, quia per ipsam nobis aperitur el revelatur intelligentia mandatorum, ut sciamus quid appetere et quid vitare debeamus, non autem per illam nobis praestari ut quod faciendum cognoverimus, etiam facere diligamus atque valeamus, a. s.; ... quum sit utrumque donum Dei, et scire quid facere debeamus et diligere ut faciamus." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 104.)

58 Contra Collator., c. VII, 2: "Trahit timor; principium enim sapientiae timor Domini (Prov. I, 7). Trahit laetitia, quoniam laetatus sum in his, quae dicta sunt mihi: in domum Domini ibimus (Ps. CXXI, 1). Trahit desiderium, quoniam concupiscit et deficit anima mea in atria Domini (Ps. LXXXIII, 3). Trahunt delectationes: quam dulcia enim faucibus meis eloquia tua, super mel et favum ori meo (Ps. CXVIII, 103). Et quis perspicere aut enarrare possit, per quos affectus visitatio Dei animum ducat humanum?" Cfr. Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, thes. 11; Palmieri, De Gratia Divina Actuali, thes. 8.

59 De Anima, I, 8: Ἄνευ φαντάσματος οὐκ ἔστι νοεῖν.

60 De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione, II, 19, 33: "... ut suave faciat, quod non delectabat."

61 2 Cor. XII, 9: "Sufficit tibi gratia mea." For further information on this point the student is referred to Ripalda, De Ente Supernaturali, disp. 44, sect. 9.

62 In Psalmos, 102, n. 16: "Vocat [Deus] per intimam cognitionem."—Tract. in Ioa., 26, n. 7: "Videte quomodo trahit Pater, docendo delectat."

63 Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 110, art. 2.

64 S. Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 25, art. 2.

65 "... quum sit utrumque donum Dei, et scire quid facere debeamus, et diligere ut faciamus." (V. supra, p. 25.)

66 "Amor Dei propter se super omnia."

67 V. infra, Part II, Ch. I.

68 Cfr., e.g., De Trinitate, VIII, 10: "Quid est dilectio vel caritas, quam tantopere Scriptura divina laudat et praedicat, nisi amor boni?"—Contra Duas Epistolas Pelag., II, 9, 21: "Quid est boni cupiditas nisi caritas?"—De Gratia Christi, c. 21: "Quasi vero aliud sit bona voluntas quam caritas."

69 It should also be noted that in Augustine's writings inspiratio caritatis, as an immediate grace of the will, is not necessarily identical with the infusion of theological love.

70 E.g. Berti, De Theol. Discipl., XIV, 7.

71 Cfr. Alvarez, De Aux., disp. 67, n. 6.

72 Alvarez, op. cit., disp. 74.—Cfr. John VI, 44: "Nemo potest venire ad me, nisi Pater, qui misit me, traxerit eum." Apoc. III, 20: "Ecce sto ad ostium et pulso; si quis audierit vocem meam et aperuerit mihi ianuam, intrabo ad illum."

73 Comment. in Summam Theol. S. Thomae Aquinatis, p. 2, tr. 6, qu. 2, art. 2, 2.

74 V. supra, Nos. 1 and 2.

75 Ad Simplic., I, 2, n. 21: "Quis potest credere, nisi aliqua vocatione, h. e. aliqua rerum testificatione tangatur? Quis habet in potestate tali viso attingi mentem suam, quo eius voluntas moveatur ad fidem?"

76 Cfr. Suarez, De Div. Grat., III, 4: "In Conciliis et Patribus nullum vestigium talis gratiae invenimus, quin potius ipsam inspirationem ponunt ut gratiam primam et praeterea indicant immediate infundi ab ipso Spiritu Sancto et non mediante aliqua qualitate."

77 De Gratia, diss. 4, art. 2.

78 Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 110, art. 2: "In eo, qui dicitur gratiam Dei habere, significatur esse quidam effectus gratuitae Dei voluntatis. Dictum est autem supra (qu. 109, art. 1), quod dupliciter ex gratuita Dei voluntate homo adiuvatur: uno modo inquantum anima hominis movetur a Deo ad aliquid cognoscendum vel volendum vel agendum; et hoc modo ipse gratuitus effectus in homine non est qualitas, sed motus quidam animae; actus enim moventis in moto est motus, ut dicitur (Phys. 1, 3, text. 18). Alio modo adiuvatur homo ex gratuita Dei voluntate, secundum quod aliquod habituale donum a Deo animae infunditur ... et sic donum gratiae qualitas quaedam est."—Cfr. Palmieri, De Gratia Div. Actuali, thes. 16; Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 23 sqq.; Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, pp. 220 sqq. The Thomistic doctrine on this point is viewed with favor by several Molinist theologians, e.g., Platel (De Gratia, n. 547) and Gutberlet (Dogmatische Theologie, Vol. VIII, pp. 25 sq., Mainz 1897).

79 De Peccat. Merit. et Rem., II, 18: "Quoniam quod a Deo nos avertimus nostrum est, et haec est voluntas mala; quod vero ad Deum nos convertimus nisi ipso excitante et adiuvante non possumus, et haec est voluntas bona."

80 De Grat. et Lib. Arbitr., c. 17, 33: "Ipse ut velimus, operatur incipiens, qui volentibus cooperatur perficiens."—On certain differences of opinion on this point between Suarez (De Div. Motione, III, 5) and St. Thomas (Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 111, art. 2), see Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, pp. 252 sqq.

81 Cfr. Ps. LVIII, 11; XXII, 6.

82 Enchiridion, c. 32: "Nolentem praevenit, ut velit; volentem subsequitur, ne frustra velit."

83 Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, cap. 5: "Declarat praeterea, ipsius justificationis exordium in adultis a Dei per Iesum Christum praeveniente gratia sumendum esse, h. e. ab eius vocatione, qua nullis eorum existentibus meritis vocantur." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 797.)

84 Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 111, art. 3: "Sicut gratia dividitur in operantem et cooperantem secundum diversos effectus, ita etiam in praevenientem et subsequentem, qualitercumque gratia accipiatur (i.e. sive habitualis sive actualis). Sunt autem quinque effectus gratiae in nobis, quorum primus est ut anima sanetur; secundus ut bonum velit; tertius est ut bonum quod vult efficaciter operetur; quartus est ut in bono perseveret; quintus est ut ad gloriam perveniat. Et ideo gratia, secundum quod causat in nobis primum effectum, vocatur praeveniens respectu secundi effectus; et prout causat in nobis secundum, vocatur subsequens respectu primi effectus. Et sicut unus effectus est posterior uno effectu et prior alio, ita gratia potest dici praeveniens et subsequens secundum eundem effectum respectu diversorum."

85 Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, cap. 16: "Iesus Christus in ipsos iustificatos iugiter virtutem influit, quae virtus bona eorum opera semper antecedit et comitatur et subsequitur."

86 On the distinction to be drawn between the various members of these pairs, whether it be real or merely logical, theologians differ. Cfr. Palmieri, De Div. Grat., thes. 18; Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 17 sqq.; Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, pp. 241 sqq.

87 V. supra, Nos. 1 and 4.

88 Sess. VI, cap. 5 and can. 4, quoted in Denzinger-Bannwart's Enchiridion, n. 797 and 814.

89 Ad Simplic., I, qu. 2, n. 22: "Voluntas ipsa, nisi aliquid occurrerit, quod delectet atque invitet animum, moveri nullo modo potest; hoc autem ut occurrat, non est in hominis potestate."

90 Contr. Collator., c. VII, 2: "Et quis perspicere aut enarrare possit, per quos affectus visitatio Dei animum ducat humanum, ut quae fugiebat sequatur, quae oderat diligat, quae fastidiebat esuriat, ac subita commutatione mirabili quae clausa ei fuerant sint aperta, quae onerosa levia, quae amara sint dulcia, quae obscura sint lucida?"

91 Cfr. M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. I, pp. 30 sqq., Dublin 1909.

92 Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagian., II, 9, 21: "Multa Deus facit in homine bona, quae non facit homo; nulla vero facit homo, quae non facit Deus, ut faciat homo."

93 De Gratia et Lib. Arbitr., c. 17, n. 33: "Ut ergo velimus, sine nobis operatur; quum autem volumus et sic volumus ut faciamus, nobiscum cooperatur; tamen sine illo vel operante ut velimus, vel cooperante quum volumus, ad bona pietatis opera nihil valemus."

94 De Gratia et Lib. Arbitr., c. 14: "Si ergo Deus tria haec, h. e. bonum cogitare, velle, perficere, operatur in nobis (2 Cor. III, 5; Phil. II, 13), primum profecto sine nobis, secundum nobiscum, tertium per nos facit. Siquidem immittendo bonam cogitationem, nos praevenit; immutando etiam malam voluntatem sibi per consensum iungit; ministrando et consensui facultatem foris per apertum opus nostrum internus opifex innotescit. Sane ipsi nos praevenire nequaquam possumus. Qui autem bonum neminem invenit, neminem salvat, quem non praevenit. A Deo ergo sine dubio nostrae fit salutis exordium, nec per nos utique nec nobiscum. Verum consensus et opus, etsi non ex nobis, non iam tamen sine nobis."—On the misinterpretation of this text by the Jansenists, see Palmieri, De Gratia Divina Actuali, pp. 84 sq.

95 Moral., XVI, 10: "Superna pietas prius agit in nobis aliquid sine nobis [gratia praeveniens], ut subsequente libero arbitrio bonum, quod appetimus, agat nobiscum [gratia cooperans]."

96 Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, c. 16: "Tanta est [Dei] erga homines bonitas, ut eorum velit esse merita quae sunt ipsius dona." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 810.)

97 De Grat. et Lib. Arbitr., c. 16, 32: "Certum enim est nos mandata servare, si volumus; sed quia praeparatur voluntas a Domino, ab illo petendum est, ut tantum velimus quantum sufficit, ut volendo faciamus. Certum est nos velle, quum volumus; sed ille facit ut velimus bonum, de quo dictum est quod paulo ante posui (Prov. VIII, 35): Praeparatur voluntas a Domino; de quo dictum est (Ps. XXXVI, 32): A Domino gressus hominis dirigentur et viam eius volet; de quo dictum est (Phil. II, 13): Deus est qui operatur in nobis et velle. Certum est nos facere quum facimus; sed ille facit ut faciamus, praebendo vires efficacissimas voluntati, qui dixit (Ezech. XXXVI, 27): Faciam ut in iustificationibus meis ambuletis et iudicia mea observetis et faciatis. Quum dicit: Faciam ut faciatis, quid aliud dicit nisi (Ezech. XI, 19): Auferam a vobis cor lapideum, unde non faciebatis, (Ezech. XXXVI, 26), et dabo vobis cor carneum, unde facitis."—On the subject of this paragraph see Palmieri, op. cit., thes. 10, and Chr. Pesch, op. cit., pp. 14 sqq.

98 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural, pp. 67 sqq.

99 Cfr. Palmieri, De Div. Grat. Actuali; thes. 17, and Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 28 sqq.

100 V. infra, Ch. III, Sect. 2.

101 De Grat. et Lib. Arbitr., c. 16, 32: "Certum est nos facere, quum facimus; sed ille facit ut faciamus, praebendo vires efficacissimas voluntati."

102 De Corrept. et Grat., c. 11: "Acceperat posse, si vellet [gratia sufficiens]; sed non habuit velle [gratia efficax] quod posset, nam si habuisset, perseverasset." Cfr. Palmieri, De Div. Grat. Actuali, thes. 11.

103 De Nat. et Grat., 43: "Nam Deus impossibilia non iubet, sed iubendo monet, et facere quod possis, et petere quod non possis, et adiuvat ut possis."

104 De Gratia Christi, IV, 10: "... ita inefficax, ex qua operatio ne possit quidem sequi, nisi eius inefficacia per aliam suppleatur."

105 "Illud a recentioribus prolatum gratiae sufficientis genus, quo adiuvante nullum unquam opus factum est aut fiet unquam, videtur monstrum quoddam singulare gratiae, solummodo peccatis faciendis maiorique damnationi accersendae serviens." (De Grat. Christi, III, 3).

106 "Gratia sufficiens statui nostro non tam utilis quam perniciosa est, sic ut proinde merito possimus petere: A gratia sufficienti libera nos, Domine." This assertion was condemned by Pope Alexander VIII in 1690. It is convincingly refuted by Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, pp. 354 sqq.

107 "Hoc etiam secundum fidem catholicam credimus, quod accepta per baptismum gratia omnes baptizati Christo auxiliante et cooperante, quae ad salutem pertinent, possint et debeant, si fideliter laborare voluerint, adimplere." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 200.)

108 Sess. VI, can. 4: "Si quis dixerit, liberum hominis arbitrium a Deo motum et excitatum nihil cooperari Deo, ... neque posse dissentire, si velit, anathema sit." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 814.)

109 Is. V, 4: "Quid est, quod debui ultra facere vineae meae et non feci ei? An quod exspectavi, ut faceret uvas et fecit labruscas?"

110 Prov. I, 24: "Vocavi et renuistis, extendi manum meam et non fuit qui adspiceret."

111 Matth. XI, 21.

112 Cfr. Matth. XXIII, 37; Acts VII, 51; 1 Cor. X, 13; 2 Cor. VI, 1; 1 Thess. V, 19.

113 Contra Haer., IV, 37, 1: "Illud autem quod dicit (Matth. XXIII, 37): Quoties volui colligere filios tuos, et noluisti, veterem libertatem hominis manifestat, quia liberum eum fecit Deus ab initio.... Vis enim a Deo non fit, sed bona sententia adest illi semper. Et propter hoc consilium quidem bonum dat omnibus.... Et qui operantur quidem illud [gratia efficax], gloriam et honorem percipient, quoniam operati sunt bonum, quum possint non operari illud; hi autem, qui illud non operantur, indicium iustum excipient Dei, quoniam non sunt operati bonum [gratia inefficax], quum possint operari illud [gratia vere et mere sufficiens]."

114 "Gratia Dei ... quae hominum adiuvat voluntates: qua ut non adiuventur, in ipsis itidem causa est, non in Deo." De Peccat. Mer. et Rem., II, 17.

115 De Lib. Arbitr., III, 16: "Ex eo quod non accepit, nullus reus est; ex eo autem quod non facit quod debet, iuste reus est. Debet autem [facere], si accepit et voluntatem liberam et sufficientissimam facultatem." On the Jansenist distortions of St. Augustine's teaching see Palmieri, De Gratia Divina Actuali, thes. 48. The doctrine of the Greek Fathers is thoroughly rehearsed by Isaac Habert, Theol. Patr. Graec., II, 6 sq.

116 Conc. Vat., Sess. III, De Revel., can. 1: "Si quis dixerit, Deum unum et verum, Creatorem et Dominum nostrum, per ea, quae facta sunt, naturali rationis humanae lumine certo cognosci non posse, anathema sit."

117 Conc. Vat., Sess. III, cap. 4: "Hoc quoque perpetuus Ecclesiae catholicae consensus tenuit et tenet, duplicem esse ordinem cognitionis, non solum principio, sed obiecto etiam distinctum: principio quidem, quia in altero naturali ratione et altero fide divina cognoscimus; obiecto autem, quia praeter ea, ad quae naturalis ratio pertingere potest, credenda nobis proponuntur mysteria in Deo abscondita, quae, nisi revelata divinitus, innotescere non possunt." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1795.)

118 Nicholas d'Autricourt, a master in the University of Paris, in 1348, was compelled by the Sorbonne and the Apostolic See to retract a number of propositions taken from his writings which were infected with scepticism. These propositions, most of which had been censured as heretical, and some as merely false, may be found in Natalis Alexander, Hist. Eccles., ed. Bing., XV, 195, and also, with some explanatory remarks, in Denifle-Chatelain, Chartularium Univ. Paris., II, 1, Paris 1891.

119 "Klotz-, Stock- und Steintheorie."

120 On Traditionalism, see Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 44 sqq., 2nd ed., St. Louis 1914.

121 Wisd. XIII, 1 sqq.; Rom. I, 20 sq.; Rom. II, 14 sq. Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, op. cit., pp. 17 sqq.

122 Ibid., pp. 38 sqq.

123 Summa Theol., 1a, qu. 2, art. 2, ad 1: "Deum esse et alia huiusmodi ... non sunt articuli fidei, sed praeambula ad articulos; sic enim fides praesupponit cognitionem naturalem, sicut gratia naturam et perfectio perfectibile."

124 Luther's Werke, ed. Walch, XII, 400, Halle 1742: "Alles, was sie oertert und schleusst, so gewisslich falsch und irrig ist, als Gott lebt."

125 Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, cap. 1 and canon 5.

126 On the vulnera naturae cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural, pp. 298 sqq., St. Louis 1912. Already St. Augustine observed: "Ad miseriam iustae damnationis pertinet ignorantia et difficultas, quam patitur homo ab exordio nativitatis suae, nec ab isto malo nisi Dei gratia liberatur." (Retract., I. 9.)

127 Propos. 41: "Omnis cognitio Dei etiam naturalis, etiam in philosophis ethnicis, non potest venire nisi a Deo; et sine gratia non producit nisi praesumptionem, vanitatem et oppositionem ad ipsum Deum loco affectuum adorationis, gratitudinis et amoris." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1391.)

128 On the debitum naturae cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural, pp. 184 sq.

129 Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 2, art. 4.

130 Conc. Vatic., Sess. III, De Revel., cap. 2: "Ut ea, quae in rebus divinis humanae rationi per se impervia non sunt, in praesenti quoque generis humani conditione ab omnibus expedite, firma certitudine et nullo admixto errore cognosci possint."

131 Cfr. Chastel, S. J., De la Valeur de la Raison Humaine, Paris 1854; O. Willmann, Geschichte des Idealismus, Vol. III, 2nd ed., pp. 811 sqq., Braunschweig 1908; Bellarmine, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, V, 1 sqq.

132 The only dissenting voice is that of Cardinal Cajetan.

133 Mezzofanti spoke perfectly thirty-eight languages, thirty others less perfectly, and was more or less familiar with fifty dialects. Cfr. U. Benigni in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. X, p. 271.

134 On the question whether grace can enable a man to acquire an unlimited, universal knowledge, see Pohle-Preuss, Christology, pp. 258 sqq., St. Louis 1913. Cfr. also St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 109, art. 1, and Palmieri, De Gratia Divina Actuali, thes. 19.

135 Prop. Baii Damn., 27: "Liberum arbitrium sine gratiae Dei adiutorio nonnisi ad peccandum valet." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1027.)

136 Prop. Baii Damn., 37: "Cum Pelagio sentit, qui boni aliquid naturalis, i.e. quod ex naturae solis viribus ortum ducit, agnoscit." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1037.)

137 Prop. Baii Damn., 25: "Omnia opera infidelium sunt peccata et philosophorum virtutes sunt vitia." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1025.)

138 Prop. Damn. ab Alex. VIII: "Necesse est infidelem in omni opere peccare." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1298.)

139 Matth. V, 46 sq.

140 Mercedem, μισθόν.

141 Salutaveritis, ὰσπάσησθε.

142 Ethnici, οἱ ἐθνικοί.

143 Rom. II, 14 sqq.

144 Gentes, ἔθνη.

145 That is, the Mosaic law.

146 Naturaliter, φύσει.

147 Naturaliter, φύσει.

148 "Quae legis sunt, faciunt."

149 Rom. I, 21 sqq.

150 For other germane texts see Ezech. XXIX, 18 sqq.; Rom. I, 21.

151 πᾶν δὲ ὅ οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως, ἁμαρτία ἐστιν.

152 πίστις = συνείδησις.

153 Cfr. also 1 Cor. VIII, 10 sqq. For a fuller explanation see Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. III, pp. 954 sqq.

154 Ezech. XXIX, 20: "And for the service that he hath done me against it [the city of Tyre], I have given him the land of Egypt, because he hath labored for me, saith the Lord God."

155 In Ezech., XXIX, 20: "Ex eo quod Nabuchodonosor accepit mercedem boni operis, intelligimus etiam ethnicos, si quid boni fecerint, non absque mercede Dei iudicio praeteriri."

156 In Gal., I, 15: "Multi absque fide et evangelio Christi vel sapienter faciunt aliquid vel sancte, ut parentibus obsequantur, ut inopi manum porrigant, non opprimant vicinos, non aliena diripant."

157 De Spiritu et Litera, c. 28: "Sicut enim non impediunt a vita aeterna iustum quaedam peccata venialia, sine quibus haec vita non ducitur, sic ad salutem aeternam nihil prosunt impio aliqua bona opera, sine quibus difficillime vita cuiuslibet pessimi hominis invenitur."

158 Ep., 144, 2.

159 Confess., VI, 10.

160 Ep., 138, c. 3: "Deus enim sic ostendit in opulentissimo et praeclaro imperio Romanorum, quantum valerent civiles etiam sine vera religione virtutes, ut intelligeretur hac addita fieri homines cives alterius civitatis, cuius rex veritas, cuius lex caritas, cuius modus aeternitas."

161 De Spiritu et Litera, c. 3, n. 5: "Neque liberum arbitrium quidquam nisi ad peccandum valet, si lateat veritatis via."

162 Sent. ex August., n. 106: "Omnis vita infidelium peccatum est et nihil est bonum sine summo bono. Ubi enim deest agnitio summae et incommutabilis veritatis, falsa virtus est etiam in optimis moribus."

163 What Augustine himself observes of the literary style of St. Cyprian (Ep., 93, c. 10, n. 39): "Habet quandam propriam faciem, qua possit agnosci," applies in an even truer sense to his own writings.

164 Cfr. Enchirid., c. 30.

165 Cfr. De Correptione et Gratia, c. 9, n. 20 sqq.

166 For a fuller and more adequate treatment of this question see J. Ernst, Werke und Tugenden der Unglaeubigen nach Augustinus, Freiburg 1871; Ripalda, De Ente Supernaturali, t. III, Cologne 1648; S. Dechamps, De Haeresi Ianseniana, Paris 1645; and, more briefly, Palmieri, De Gratia Divina Actuali, thes. 21.

167 Palmieri, l.c., thes. 20. Concerning the effects of original sin on free-will, see Pohle-Preuss, God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural, pp. 291 sq.

168 On this distinction see supra, pp. 15 sqq.

169 Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 10, art. 4: "Bona opera, ad quae sufficit bonum naturae, aliqualiter operari possunt [infideles]. Unde non oportet quod in omni suo opere peccent; sed quandocunque aliquod opus operantur ex infidelitate, tunc peccant."

170 Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, can. 7: "Si quis dixerit, opera omnia quae ante iustificationem fiunt, quacunque ratione facta sint, vere esse peccata vel odium Dei mereri, aut quanto vehementius quis nititur se disponere ad gratiam, tanto eum gravius peccare, anathema sit." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 817.)

171 V. infra, No. 3.

172 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural, pp. 226 sqq.

173 "Propositio temeraria et errori proxima."

174 Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, cap. 13: "Verumtamen qui se existimant stare, videant ne cadant, et cum timore ac tremore salutem suam operentur.... Formidare enim debent ... de pugna, quae superest cum carne, cum mundo, cum diabolo, in qua victores esse non possunt, nisi cum Dei gratia Apostolo obtemperent dicenti: Debitores etc." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 806.)

175 Rom. VII, 22 sqq.

176 Rom. VII, 24 sq.

177 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, Mariology, pp. 80 sqq., St. Louis 1914.

178 Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 109, art. 5; Heinrich-Gutberlet, Dogmatische Theologie, Vol. VIII, 416, Mainz 1897.

179 De Ente Supernaturali, disp. 114, sect. 18.

180 Concord., art. 13, disp. 19.

181 Cfr. Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., Vol. V, pp. 87 sqq.

182 Cfr. the following passage from the Tridentine Council: "... cum timore ac tremore salutem suam operentur in laboribus, in vigiliis, in eleemosynis, in orationibus et oblationibus, in ieiuniis et castitate."

183 De Natura et Gratia, c. 48, n. 62: "Fideles enim orantes dicunt: Ne nos inferas in tentationem. Si adest possibilitas, ut quid orant? Aut a quo malo se liberari orant nisi maxime de corpore mortis huius?... de vitiis carnalibus, unde non liberatur homo sine gratia Salvatoris.... Orare sinatur, ut sanetur. Quid tantum de naturae possibilitate praesumitur? Vulnerata, sauciata, vexata, perdita est; vera confessione, non falsa defensione opus habet." The necessity of grace, and of prayer to obtain grace, is admirably and exhaustively treated by Suarez, De Necessitate Gratiae, I, 23, sqq. Cfr. also Bellarmine, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, V, 7 sqq.

184 Comment. in Quatuor Libros Sent., III, dist. 27, qu. unica: "Ratio recta docet, solum summum bonum infinitum esse summe diligendum et per consequens voluntas hoc potest ex puris naturalibus; nihil enim potest intellectus recte dictare, in quod dictatum non possit voluntas rationalis naturaliter tendere."

185 Comment. in Summam Theol. S. Thomae Aqu., 2a 2ae, qu. 171, art. 2.

186 Comment. in Summam Theol. S. Thomae Aqu., 2a 2ae, qu. 24, art. 2.

187 De Natura et Gratia, I, 21.

188 Concord., qu. 14, art. 13, disp. 14.

189 De Gratia, I, 33.

190 De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, VI, 7: "Existimamus non posse Deum sine ope ipsius diligi neque ut auctorem naturae neque ut largitorem gratiae et gloriae, neque perfecte neque imperfecte ullo modo, ... quicquid aliqui minus considerate in hac parte scripserint." On the attitude of St. Thomas (Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 109, art. 3) cfr. Billuart, De Gratia, diss. 3, art. 4.

191 It is not true, as Bellarmine argues, that the amor Dei naturalis at its highest would result in justification.

192 Prop. Baii Damn., 34: "Distinctio illa duplicis amoris, naturalis videlicet, quo Deus amatur ut auctor naturae, et gratuiti, quo Deus amatur ut beatificator, vana est et commentitia." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1034).—36: "Amor naturalis, qui ex viribus naturae exoritur, ex sola philosophia per elationem praesumptionis humanae cum iniuria crucis Christi defenditur a nonnullis doctoribus." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1036.)

193 Cfr. Conc. Arausic. II, a. 529, can. 25: "Prorsus donum Dei est diligere Deum."

194 Cfr. Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, can. 3.

195 Praelect. Dogm., Vol. V, pp. 73 sqq.

196 Instit. Theolog., Vol. III, pp. 19 sqq.

197 Rom. I, 21.

198 Rom. I, 25.

199 In Epist. ad Roman., I, 18: "Potuerunt enim id per legem naturae apprehendere, fabrica mundi testificante auctorem Deum solum diligendum, quod Moyses literis tradidit; sed impii facti sunt non colendo Creatorem et iniustitia in eis apparet, dum videntes dissimulabant a veritate, non fatentes unum Deum."

200 Comment. in Summam Theol. S. Thomae Aqu., 1a 2ae, disp. 189 sq.

201 De Ente Supernaturali, disp. 20.

202 Op. cit.

203 To admit the possibility of true actus humani that are neither good nor bad, but ethically indifferent, is to escape the error of Baius that "Free-will without the aid of divine grace avails for nothing but sin." (Prop. Damn., 27.)

204 We should not, however, apply the ecclesiastical censures pronounced against Baius to the writings of Vasquez. This, as Schiffini convincingly shows (De Gratia Divina, pp. 159 sqq.), would be an injustice.

205 Suarez, De Gratia, I, 8, 46: "... quia secundum Augustini et divi Thomae sententiam communis a theologis probatam non datur in voluntate libere operante actus indifferens in individuo, et ideo iuxta veram theologiam recte sequitur, si liberum arbitrium potest sine gratia non male operari, posse etiam bene."

206 Supra, p. 8.

207 "Qua vero parte inter dominantem cupiditatem et caritatem dominantem nulli ponuntur affectus medii, a natura ipsa insiti suapteque natura laudabiles ... falsa, alias damnata." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1524.)

208 De Ente Supernaturali, disp. 20, sect. 2: "Quotiescunque homo agit quod sibi datum est, ut actum virtutis naturalem efficiat, iam adesse antecedenter Deum auxilio intrinsece supernaturali gratiae, ... ita [ut] nullus sit conatus moraliter bonus naturae, quem aliqua gratia supernaturalis non praeveniat."

209 This must be kept in mind in judging Ripalda's famous thesis: "Ad quodlibet bonum opus morale sive ad quemlibet virtutis moralis actum necessarium esse per se naturae rationali elevatae auxilium theologicum gratiae." (Ibid., sect. 3.)

210 He urges the supernatural character, in principle, of the present economy of salvation; the practical identity of the naturally good with the supernaturally salutary acts of the will, which he claims is taught in Sacred Scripture (cfr. Acts XIV, 14 sqq.; Rom. I, 19 sqq.), and also by St. Augustine and his disciples Prosper and Orosius; the merciful dispensation of grace towards heathens, unbelievers, and sinners (v. infra, Sect. 3, Art. 2); the universal belief of Christians in the salutary effects of all good works, including those of the purely natural order, etc. For a discussion of these arguments consult Palmieri, De Gratia Divina Actuali, pp. 254 sqq.

211 Synopsis de Gratia, n. 530.

212 Praelect. Dogmat., Vol. V, p. 72.

213 De Virtute Fidei Divinae, disp. 12, sect. 2.

214 Instit. Theolog., Vol. III, pp. 22 sq., 248 sqq.

215 De Gratia Div. Actuali, p. 268: "Si tamen ad solos fideles coarctetur, quum nulla argumenta obstent et pro hac hypothesi maxime valeant rationes Ripaldae, eam censemus veram esse."

216 V. supra, No. 1.

217 Cfr. Mazzella, De Gratia Christi, disp. 2, art. 9.

218 V. supra, p. 71.

219 "Fides late dicta ex testimonio creaturarum similive motivo ad iustificationem sufficit." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1173.)

220 Conc. Vat., Sess. III, De Fide, can. 2: "Si quis dixerit, ... ad fidem divinam non requiri, ut revelata veritas propter auctoritatem Dei revelantis credatur, anathema sit." On this whole dispute cfr. Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, pp. 156 sqq. The arguments adduced by the defenders of Ripalda's opinion can be studied in Palmieri, De Gratia Divina Actuali, pp. 265 sqq. Cfr. also Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. III, pp. 996 sqq. A difficulty arises from the twenty-second canon of the Second Council of Orange (A. D. 529): "Nemo habet de suo nisi mendacium et peccatum." But this canon was probably never approved by the Holy See. It is ably discussed by Gutberlet in his continuation of Heinrich's Dogmatische Theologie, Vol. VIII, 415.

221 "Ex viribus suis [natura] coram Deo nihil nisi peccare potest." (Solida Declar., I, 22.) Cfr. J. A. Moehler, Symbolik, 6-7 (English tr. by J. B. Robertson, Symbolism, 5th ed., London 1906, pp. 54 sqq.)

222 Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, can. 7: "Si quis dixerit, opera omnia, quae ante iustificationem fiunt, ... vere esse peccata, ... anathema sit."

223 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural, pp. 183 sqq., et passim.

224 A. D. 1585-1638. Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, op. cit., pp. 223 sqq.

225 On this important document (issued A. D. 1713) see A. Schill, Die Konstitution Unigenitus, Freiburg 1876; Thuillier, La Seconde Phase du Jansenisme, Paris 1901; M. Ott, art. "Unigenitus" in Vol. XV of the Catholic Encyclopedia.

226 Prop. Damn., 38.

227 Prop. Damn., 44.

228 "Doctrina synodi de duplici amore enuntians, hominem sine gratia esse sub virtute peccati ipsumque in eo statu per generalem cupiditatis dominantis influxum omnes suas actiones inficere et corrumpere—quatenus insinuat, in homine, dum est sub servitute sive in statu peccati, ... sic dominari cupiditatem ut per generalem huius influxum omnes illius actiones in se inficiantur et corrumpantur, aut opera omnia quae ante iustificationem fiunt, quacunque ratione fiant, sint peccata, quasi in omnibus suis actibus peccator serviat dominanti cupiditati: falsa, perniciosa, inducens in errorem a Tridentino damnatum ut haereticum, iterum in Baio damnatum art. 40." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1523).

229 Prop. Damn., 59: "Oratio impiorum est novum peccatum, et quod Deus illis concedit, est novum in eos iudicium." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1409.)

230 This passage, and the meaning it evidently bears in the context of St. Matthew's Gospel, is thoroughly discussed by Suarez, De Gratia, I, 4. Cfr. also J. B. Faure, Notae in Enchiridion S. August., c. 15. Other Scriptural texts distorted by the Jansenists are quoted and explained in their true sense by Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. III, pp. 923 sqq.

231 Hom. in Is., 5, n. 2.

232 "Scimus autem quia peccatores Deus non audit."

233 Tract. in Ioa., 44, n. 13: "Adhuc inunctus loquitur; nam et peccatores exaudit Deus. Si enim peccatores Deus non exaudiret, frustra ille publicanus oculos in terram demittens et pectus suum percutiens diceret: Domine, propitius esto mihi peccatori [Luc. XVIII, 13]."

234 Contr. Collat., n. 36: "Naturae humanae, cuius creator est Deus, etiam post praevaricationem manet substantia, manet forma, manet vita et sensus et ratio ceteraque corporis et animi bona, quae etiam malis vitiosisque non desunt. Sed non illis veri boni perceptio est, quae mortalem vitam honestare possunt, aeternam conferre non possunt." For additional Patristic texts in confirmation of our thesis see Ripalda, De Ente Supernaturali, t. III, disp. 20, sect. 4.

235 Enchiridion, c. 117, n. 31: "Regnat carnalis cupiditas, ubi non est Dei caritas."

236 De Gratia Christi, c. 26: "Ubi non est dilectio, nullum bonum opus imputatur, non recte bonum opus vocatur, quia omne quod non est ex fide peccatum est et fides per dilectionem operatur."

237 De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, c. 18: "Praecepta dilectionis, i.e. caritatis, tanta et talia sunt, ut quidquid se putaverit homo facere bene, si fiat sine caritate, nullo modo fiat bene."

238 Cfr. supra, p. 29.

239 Proposit. Baii Damn., 38: "Omnis amor creaturae rationalis aut vitiosa est cupiditas qua mundus diligitur, quae a Ioanne prohibetur, aut laudabilis caritas qua per Spiritum Sanctum in corde diffusa Deus amatur." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1038.)

240 Prop. Quesnelli Damn., 45: "Amore Dei in corde peccatorum non amplius regnante necesse est, ut in eo carnalis regnet cupiditas omnesque actiones eius corrumpat." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1395.)

241 Infra, Ch. III, Sect. 1.

242 Especially against Julian of Eclanum. Cfr. Contra Iulianum, IV, 3.

243 Matth. VI, 24.

244 Retract., I, 15: "Quando peccatum tale est, ut idem sit poena peccati, quantum est quod valet voluntas sub dominante cupiditate, nisi forte, si pia est, ut oret auxilium?"

245 Prop. Baii Damn., 40: "In omnibus suis actibus peccator servit dominanti cupiditati." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1040.)

246 De Spiritu et Litera, c. 27, n. 48: "Si hi qui naturaliter, quae legis sunt, faciunt, nondum sunt habendi in numero eorum quos Christi iustificat gratia [Rom. II, 24], sed in eorum potius, quorum (etiam impiorum nec Deum verum veraciter iusteque colentium) quaedam tamen facta vel legimus vel novimus vel audimus, quae secundum iustitiae regulam non solum vituperare non possumus, verum etiam merito recteque laudamus; quamquam si discutiantur, quo fine fiant, vix inveniuntur quae iustitiae debitam laudem defensionemve mereantur."

247 Serm. de Temp., 349, c. 1, 1 sq.: "Caritas alia est divina, alia humana; alia est humana licita, alia illicita.... Prius ergo loquor de humana licita, quae non reprehenditur; deinde de humana illicita, quae damnatur; tertio de divina, quae nos perducit ad regnum.... Licitam ergo caritatem habete; humana est, sed ut dixi licita, sed ita licita ut, si defuerit, reprehendatur. Liceat vobis humana caritate diligere coniuges, diligere filios, diligere amicos vestros, diligere cives vestros. Sed videtis istam caritatem esse posse et impiorum, i.e. paganorum, Iudaeorum, haereticorum. Quis enim eorum non amat uxorem, filios, fratres, vicinos, affines, amicos? Haec ergo humana est. Si ergo tali quisque crudelitate effertur, ut perdat etiam humanum dilectionis affectum, et non amat filios suos, ... nec inter homines numerandus est." (Migne, P. L., XXXIX, 1529.)

248 Institutiones Theologicae, Vol. III, p. 23.

249 As explained above, pp. 71 sqq.

250 Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1524. On the teaching of St. Augustine, see J. Mausbach, Die Ethik des hl. Augustinus, Vol. II, pp. 260 sqq., Freiburg 1909.

251 Cfr. supra, Art. 1.

252 On these and similar formulas see Palmieri, De Gratia Divina Actuali, thes. 22.

253 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural, pp. 218 sqq.

254 For details of his life see J. Pohle, art. "Pelagius and Pelagianism" in Vol. XI of the Catholic Encyclopedia.

255 Impeccantia, ἀναμαρτησία.

256 Cfr. St. Augustine, De Haeres. ad Quodvultdeum, n. 88.

257 "Hoc est occultum et horrendum virus haeresis vestrae, ut velitis gratiam Christi in exemplo eius esse, non in dono eius, dicentes quia per eius imitationem fiunt iusti, non per subministrationem Spiritus Sancti." (S. Aug., Opus Imperf. contr. Iulian., II, 146.)

258 On the regnum coelorum in contradistinction to vita aeterna, in the teaching of Pelagius, see St. Augustine, De Pecc. Mer. et Rem., I, 18 sqq.

259 V. infra, Sect. 2.

260 V. supra, p. 8.

261 e.g. Petavius, De Pelag. et Semipelag., c. 8 sq.; Wirceburg., De Gratia, n. 182; Palmieri, De Gratia Div. Actuali, pp. 140 sqq.

262 Among them Suarez, Prolegom. de Gratia, c. 3, and J. Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. III, pp. 739 sq.

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