We next have shown that the text 'That from which these creatures are born,' &c., conveys the idea of the highest Brahman as that being which in sport, as it were, creates, sustains, and finally reabsorbs this entire universe, comprising within itself infinite numbers of variously constituted animated beings—moving and non-moving—, of objects of enjoyment for those beings, of means of enjoyment, and of abodes of enjoyment; and which is the sole cause of all bliss. We have established that this highest Brahman, which is the sole cause of the world, cannot be the object of the other means of knowledge, and hence is to be known through scripture only. We have pointed out that the position of scripture as an authoritative means of knowledge is established by the fact that all the Vednta-texts connectedly refer to the highest Brahman, which, although not related to any injunctions of action or abstention from action, by its own essential nature constitutes the highest end of man. We have proved that Brahman, which the Vednta-texts teach to be the sole cause of the world, must be an intelligent principle other than the non-sentient pradhna, since Brahman is said to think. We have declared that this intelligent principle is other than the so-called individual soul, whether in the state of bondage or that of release; since the texts describe it as in the enjoyment of supreme bliss, all- wise, the cause of fear or fearlessness on the part of intelligent beings, the inner Self of all created things, whether intelligent or non- intelligent, possessing the power of realising all its purposes, and so on.—We have maintained that this highest Being has a divine form, peculiar to itself, not made of the stuff of Prakriti, and not due to karman.—We have explained that the being which some texts refer to as a well-known cause of the world—designating it by terms such as ether or breath, which generally denote a special non-sentient being—is that same highest Self which is different from all beings, sentient or non- sentient.—We have declared that, owing to its connexion with heaven, this same highest Self is to be recognised in what the text calls a 'light,' said to possess supreme splendour, such as forms a special characteristic of the highest Being. We have stated that, as we recognise through insight derived from scripture, that same highest Person is denoted by terms such as Indra, and so on; as the text ascribes to that 'Indra' qualities exclusively belonging to the highest Self, such, e.g., as being the cause of the attainment of immortality.— And the general result arrived at was that the Vednta-texts help us to the knowledge of one being only, viz. Brahman, or the highest Person, or Nryana—of whom it is shown that he cannot possibly be the object of the other means of knowledge, and whom the possession of an unlimited number of glorious qualities proves to differ totally from all other beings whatsoever.
Now, although Brahman is the only object of the teaching of the Vednta- texts, yet some of these texts might give rise to the notion that they aim at setting forth (not Brahman), but some particular being comprised within either the pradhna or the aggregate of individual souls. The remaining Pdas of the first Adhyya therefore apply themselves to the task of dispelling this notion and proving that what the texts in question aim at is to set forth certain glorious qualities of Brahman. The second Pda discusses those texts which contain somewhat obscure references to the individual soul; the third Pda those which contain clear references to the same; and the fourth Pda finally those texts which appear to contain even clearer intimations of the individual soul, and so on.
1. Everywhere; because there is taught what is known.
We read in the Chndogya, 'Man is made of thought; according to what his thought is in this world, so will he be when he has departed this life. Let him form this thought: he who consists of mind, whose body is breath, whose form is light,' &c. (III, 14). We here understand that of the meditation enjoined by the clause 'let him form this thought' the object is the being said to consist of mind, to have breath for its body, &c. A doubt, however, arises whether the being possessing these attributes be the individual soul or the highest Self.—The Prvapakshin maintains the former alternative. For, he says, mind and breath are instruments of the individual soul; while the text 'without breath, without mind,' distinctly denies them to the highest Self. Nor can the Brahman mentioned in a previous clause of the same section ('All this indeed is Brahman') be connected as an object with the meditation enjoined in the passage under discussion; for Brahman is there referred to in order to suggest the idea of its being the Self of all—which idea constitutes a means for bringing about that calmness of mind which is helpful towards the act of meditation enjoined in the clause 'Let a man meditate with calm mind,' &c. Nor, again, can it be said that as the meditation conveyed by the clause 'let him form this thought' demands an object, Brahman, although mentioned in another passage, only admits of being connected with the passage under discussion; for the demand for an object is fully satisfied by the being made of mind, &c., which is mentioned in that very passage itself; in order to supply the object we have merely to change the case-terminations of the words 'manomayah prnasarrah,' &c. It having thus been determined that the being made of mind is the individual soul, we further conclude that the Brahman mentioned in the concluding passage of the section ('That is Brahman') is also the individual soul, there called Brahman in order to glorify it.
This prim facie view is set aside by the Stra. The being made of mind is the highest Self; for the text states certain qualities, such as being made of mind, &c., which are well known to denote, in all Vednta- texts, Brahman only. Passages such as 'He who is made of mind, the guide of the body of breath' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 7); 'There is the ether within the heart, and in it there is the Person, consisting of mind, immortal, golden' (Taitt. Up. I. 6, 1); 'He is conceived by the heart, by wisdom, by the mind. Those who know him are immortal' (Ka. Up. II, 6, 9); 'He is not apprehended by the eye nor by speech, but by a purified mind' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 8); 'The breath of breath' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 183); 'Breath alone is the conscious Self, and having laid hold of this body it makes it rise up' (Kau. Up. III, 3); 'All these beings merge into breath alone, and from breath they arise' (Ch. Up. I, 11, 5)—these and similar texts refer to Brahman as consisting of mind, to be apprehended by a purified mind, having breath for its body, and being the abode and ruler of breath. This being so, we decide that in the concluding passage, 'my Self within the heart, that is Brahman,' the word 'Brahman' has to be taken in its primary sense (and does not denote the individual soul). The text which declares Brahman to be without mind and breath, merely means to deny that the thought of Brahman depends on a mind (internal organ), and that its life depends on breath.
Or else we may interpret the Vedic text and the Stra as follows. The passage 'All this is Brahman; let a man meditate with a calm mind on this world as originating, ending, and breathing in Brahman,' conveys the imagination of meditation on Brahman as the Self of all. The subsequent clause 'Let him form the thought,' &c., forms an additional statement to that injunction, the purport of which is to suggest certain attributes of Brahman, such as being made of mind. So that the meaning of the whole section is 'Let a man meditate on Brahman, which is made of mind, has breath for its body, &c., as the Self of the whole world.'— Here a doubt presents itself. Does the term 'Brahman' in this section denote the individual soul or the highest Self?—The individual soul, the Prvapakshin maintains, for that only admits of being exhibited in co-ordination with the word 'all.' For the word 'all' denotes the entire world from Brahm down to a blade of grass; and the existence of Brahm and other individual beings is determined by special forms of karman, the root of which is the beginningless Nescience of the individual soul. The highest Brahman, on the other hand, which is all-knowing, all- powerful, free from all evil and all shadow of Nescience and similar imperfections, cannot possibly exist as the 'All' which comprises within itself everything that is bad. Moreover we find that occasionally the term 'Brahman' is applied to the individual soul also; just as the highest Lord (paramesvara) may be called 'the highest Self' (paramtman) or 'the highest Brahman.' That 'greatness' (brihattva; which is the essential characteristic of 'brahman') belongs to the individual soul when it has freed itself from its limiting conditions, is moreover attested by scripture: 'That (soul) is fit for infinity' (Svet. Up. V, 9). And as the soul's Nescience is due to karman (only), the text may very well designate it—as it does by means of the term 'tajjaln'—as the cause of the origin, subsistence, and reabsorption of the world. That is to say—the individual soul which, in its essential nature, is non-limited, and therefore of the nature of Brahman, owing to the influence of Nescience enters into the state of a god, or a man, or an animal, or a plant.
This view is rejected by the Stra. 'Everywhere,' i.e. in the whole world which is referred to in the clause 'All this is Brahman' we have to understand the highest Brahman—which the term 'Brahman' denotes as the Self of the world—, and not the individual soul; 'because there is taught what is known,' i.e. because the clause 'All this is Brahman'— for which clause the term 'tajjaln' supplies the reason—refers to Brahman as something generally known. Since the world springs from Brahman, is merged in Brahman, and depends on Brahman for its life, therefore—as the text says—'All this has its Self in Brahman'; and this shows to us that what the text understands by Brahman is that being from which, as generally known from the Vednta texts, there proceed the creation, and so on, of the world. That the highest Brahman only, all- wise and supremely blessed, is the cause of the origin, &c., of the world, is declared in the section which begins. 'That from which these beings are born,' &c., and which says further on, 'he knew that Bliss is Brahman, for from bliss these beings are born' (Taitt. Up. III, 6); and analogously the text 'He is the cause, the lord of lords of the organs,' &c. (Svet. Up. VI, 9), declares the highest Brahman to be the cause of the individual soul. Everywhere, in fact, the texts proclaim the causality of the highest Self only. As thus the world which springs from Brahman, is merged in it, and breathes through it, has its Self in Brahman, the identity of the two may properly be asserted; and hence the text—the meaning of which is 'Let a man meditate with calm mind on the highest Brahman of which the world is a mode, which has the world for its body, and which is the Self of the world'—first proves Brahman's being the universal Self, and then enjoins meditation on it. The highest Brahman, in its causal condition as well as in its so-called 'effected' state, constitutes the Self of the world, for in the former it has for its body all sentient and non-sentient beings in their subtle form, and in the latter the same beings in their gross condition. Nor is there any contradiction between such identity with the world on Brahman's part, and the fact that Brahman treasures within itself glorious qualities antagonistic to all evil; for the imperfections adhering to the bodies, which are mere modes of Brahman, do not affect Brahman itself to which the modes belong. Such identity rather proves for Brahman supreme lordly power, and thus adds to its excellences. Nor, again, can it rightly be maintained that of the individual soul also identity with the world can be predicated; for the souls being separate according to the bodies with which they are joined cannot be identical with each other. Even in the state of release, when the individual soul is not in any way limited, it does not possess that identity with the world on which there depends causality with regard to the world's creation, sustentation, and reabsorption; as will be declared in Stra IV, 4, 17. Nor, finally, does the Prvapakshin improve his case by contending that the individual soul may be the cause of the creation, &c., of the world because it (viz. the soul) is due to karman; for although the fact given as reason is true, all the same the Lord alone is the cause of the Universe.—All this proves that the being to which the text refers as Brahman is none other than the highest Self.
This second alternative interpretation of the Stra is preferred by most competent persons. The Vrittikra, e.g. says, 'That Brahman which the clause "All this is Brahman" declares to be the Self of all is the Lord.'
2. And because the qualities meant to be stated are possible (in Brahman).
The qualities about to be stated can belong to the highest Self only. 'Made of mind, having breath for its body,' &c. 'Made of mind' means to be apprehended by a purified mind only. The highest Self can be apprehended only by a mind purified by meditation on that Self, such meditation being assisted by the seven means, viz. abstention, &c. (see above, p. 17). This intimates that the highest Self is of pure goodness, precluding all evil, and therefore different in nature from everything else; for by the impure minded impure objects only can be apprehended.— 'Having the vital breath for its body' means—being the supporter of all life in the world. To stand in the relation of a body to something else, means to abide in that other thing, to be dependent on it, and to subserve it in a subordinate capacity, as we shall fully show later on. And all 'vital breath' or 'life' stands in that relation to the highest Self. 'Whose form is light'; i.e. who is of supreme splendour, his form being a divine one of supreme excellence peculiar to him, and not consisting of the stuff of Prakriti.—'Whose purposes are true'; i.e. whose purposes realise themselves without any obstruction. 'Who is the (or "of the") Self of ether'; i.e. who is of a delicate and transparent nature, like ether; or who himself is the Self of ether, which is the causal substance of everything else; or who shines forth himself and makes other things shine forth.—'To whom all works belong'; i.e. he of whom the whole world is the work; or he to whom all activities belong.— 'To whom all wishes belong'; i.e. he to whom all pure objects and means of desire and enjoyment belong. 'He to whom all odours and tastes belong'; i.e. he to whom there belong, as objects of enjoyment, all kinds of uncommon, special, perfect, supremely excellent odours and tastes; ordinary smells and tastes being negatived by another text, viz. 'That which is without sound, without touch, without taste,' &c. (Ka. Up. I, 3, 15).—'He who embraces all this'; i.e. he who makes his own the whole group of glorious qualities enumerated.—'He who does not speak,' because, being in possession of all he could desire, he 'has no regard for anything'; i.e. he who, in full possession of lordly power, esteems this whole world with all its creatures no higher than a blade of grass, and hence abides in silence.—All these qualities stated in the text can belong to the highest Self only.
3. But, on account of impossibility, not the embodied soul.
Those who fully consider this infinite multitude of exalted qualities will recognise that not even a shadow of them can belong to the individual soul—whether in the state of bondage or that of release— which is a thing as insignificant as a glow-worm and, through its connexion with a body, liable to the attacks of endless suffering. It is not possible therefore to hold that the section under discussion should refer to the individual soul.
4. And because there is (separate) denotation of the object and the agent.
The clause 'When I shall have departed from hence I shall obtain him' denotes the highest Brahman as the object to be obtained, and the individual soul as that which obtains it. This shows that the soul which obtains is the person meditating, and the highest Brahman that is to be obtained, the object of meditation: Brahman, therefore, is something different from the attaining soul.
5. On account of the difference of words.
The clause 'That is the Self of me, within the heart' designates the embodied soul by means of a genitive form, while the object of meditation is exhibited in the nominative case. Similarly, a text of the Vjasaneyins, which treats of the same topic, applies different terms to the embodied and the highest Self, 'Like a rice grain, or a barley grain, or a canary seed, or the kernel of a canary seed, thus that golden Person is within the Self' (Sat. Br. X, 6, 3, 2). Here the locative form, 'within the Self,' denotes the embodied Self, and the nominative, 'that golden Person,' the object to be meditated on.—All this proves the highest Self to be the object of meditation.
6. And on account of Smriti.
'I dwell within the hearts of all, from me come memory and knowledge, as well as their loss'; 'He who free from delusion knows me to be the highest Person'; 'The Lord, O Arjuna, is seated in the heart of all Beings, driving round by his mysterious power all beings as if mounted on a machine; to him fly for refuge' (Bha. Gi. XV, 15, 19; XVIII, 61). These Smriti-texts show the embodied soul to be the meditating subject, and the highest Self the object of meditation.
7. Should it be said that (the passage does) not (refer to Brahman) on account of the smallness of the abode, and on account of the denotation of that (viz. minuteness of the being meditated on); we say no, because (Brahman) has thus to be meditated upon, and because (in the same passage) it is said to be like ether.
It might be contended that, as the text 'he is my Self within the heart' declares the being meditated on to dwell within a minute abode, viz. the heart; and as moreover another text—'smaller than a grain of rice,' &c., declares it to be itself of minute size, that being cannot be the highest Self, but only the embodied soul. For other passages speak of the highest Self as unlimited, and of the embodied soul as having the size of the point of a goad (cp. e.g. Mu. Up. I, 1, 6, and Svet. Up. V, 8).—This objection the Stra rebuts by declaring that the highest Self is spoken of as such, i.e. minute, on account of its having to be meditated upon as such. Such minuteness does not, however, belong to its true nature; for in the same section it is distinctly declared to be infinite like ether—'greater than the earth, greater than the sky, greater than heaven, greater than all these worlds' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 3). This shows that the designation of the highest Self as minute is for the purpose of meditation only.—The connexion of the whole section then is as follows. The clause 'All this is Brahman; let a man meditate with calm mind on this world as beginning, ending, and breathing in Brahman,' enjoins meditation on Brahman as being the Self of all, in so far as it is the cause of the origin and destruction of all, and entering into all beings as their soul gives life to them. The next clause, 'Man is made of thought; according as his thought is in this world, so will he be when he has departed this life,' declares the attainment of the desired object to depend on the nature of the meditation; and the following clause, 'Let him therefore form the following thought,' thereupon repeats the injunction with a view to the declaration of details. The clause 'He who consists of mind,' &c., up to 'who is never surprised,' then states the nature and qualities, of the being to be meditated upon, which are to be comprised in the meditation. Next, the clause 'He is my Self,' up to 'the kernel of a canary seed,' declares that the highest Person, for the purpose of meditation, abides in the heart of the meditating devotee; representing it as being itself minute, since the heart is minute. After this the clause 'He also is my Self,' up to 'who is never surprised,' describes those aspects of the being meditated upon as within the heart, which are to be attained by the devotee. Next, the words 'this my Self within the heart is that Brahman' enjoins the reflection that the highest Brahman, as described before, is, owing to its supreme kindness, present in our hearts in order thereby to refresh and inspirit us. Then the clause 'When I shall have departed from hence I shall obtain him' suggests the idea that there is a certainty of obtaining him on the basis of devout meditation; and finally the clause 'He who has this faith has no doubt' declares that the devotee who is firmly convinced of his aim being attainable in the way described, will attain it beyond any doubt.—From all this it appears that the 'limitation of abode,' and the 'minuteness' ascribed to Brahman, are merely for the purpose of meditation.
8. Should it be said that there is attainment of fruition (of pleasure and pain); we reply, not so, on account of difference.
But, if the highest Brahman is assumed to dwell within bodies, like the individual soul, it follows that, like the latter, it is subject to the experience of pleasure and pain, such experience springing from connexion with bodies!—Of this objection the Stra disposes by remarking 'not so, on account of difference (of reason).' For what is the cause of experiences, pleasurable or painful, is not the mere dwelling within a body, but rather the subjection to the influence of good and evil deeds; and such subjection is impossible in the case of the highest Self to which all evil is foreign. Compare the scriptural text 'One of the two eats the sweet fruit, the other one looks on without eating' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1).—Here finishes the adhikarana of 'what is known everywhere.'
Well then, if the highest Self is not an enjoyer, we must conclude that wherever fruition is referred to, the embodied soul only is meant!—Of this view the next adhikarana disposes.
9. The eater (is the highest Self) on account of there being taken all that is movable and immovable.
We read in the Kathavall (I, 3, 25), 'Who then knows where he is to whom the Brahmans and Kshattriyas are but food, and death itself a condiment?' A doubt here arises whether the 'eater', suggested by the words 'food' and 'condiment,' is the individual soul or the highest Self.— The individual soul, the Prvapakshin maintains; for all enjoyment presupposes works, and works belong to the individual soul only.—Of this view the Stra disposes. The 'eater' can be the highest Self only, because the taking, i. e. eating, of the whole aggregate of movable and immovable things can be predicated of that Self only. 'Eating' does not here mean fruition dependent on work, but rather the act of reabsorption of the world on the part of the highest Brahman, i. e. Vishnu, who is the cause of the origination, subsistence, and final destruction of the universe. This appears from the fact that Vishnu is mentioned in the same section, 'He reaches the end of his journey, and that is the highest place of Vishnu' (Ka. Up. I, 3, 9). Moreover the clause 'to whom death is a condiment' shows that by the Brahmans and Kshattriyas, mentioned in the text, we have to understand the whole universe of moving and non-moving things, viewed as things to be consumed by the highest Self. For a condiment is a thing which, while itself being eaten, causes other things to be eaten; the meaning of the passage, therefore, is that while death itself is consumed, being a condiment as it were, there is at the same time eaten whatever is flavoured or made palatable by death, and that is the entire world of beings in which the Brahmans and Kshattriyas hold the foremost place. Now such eating of course is destruction or reabsorption, and hence such enjoyment—meaning general reabsorption—can belong to the highest Self only.
10. And on account of the topic of the whole section.
Moreover the highest Brahman constitutes the topic of the entire section. Cp. 'The wise who knows the Self as great and omnipresent does not grieve' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 22); 'That Self cannot be gained by the Veda, nor by understanding, nor by much learning. He whom the Self chooses, by him the Self can be gained; the Self chooses him as his own' (I, 2, 23).— Moreover, the clause (forming part of the text under discussion),'Who knows him (i.e. the being which constitutes the topic of the section) where he is?' clearly shows that we have to recognise here the Self of which it had previously been said that it is hard to know unless it assists us with its grace.
To this conclusion a new objection presents itself.—Further on in the same Upanishad (I, 3, 1) we meet with the following text: 'There are two, drinking their reward in the world of their own works, entered into the cave, dwelling on the highest summit; those who know Brahman call them shade and light, likewise those householders who perform the Trinakiketa- sacrifice.' Now this text clearly refers to the individual soul which enjoys the reward of its works, together with an associate coupled to it. And this associate is either the vital breath, or the organ of knowledge (buddhi). For the drinking of 'rita' is the enjoyment of the fruit of works, and such enjoyment does not suit the highest Self. The buddhi, or the vital breath, on the other hand, which are instruments of the enjoying embodied soul, may somehow be brought into connexion with the enjoyment of the fruit of works. As the text is thus seen to refer to the embodied soul coupled with some associate, we infer, on the ground of the two texts belonging to one section, that also the 'eater' described in the former text is none other than the individual soul.—To this objection the next Stra replies.
11. The 'two entered into the cave' are the two Selfs; on account of this being seen.
The two, entered into the cave and drinking their reward, are neither the embodied soul together with the vital breath, nor the embodied soul together with the buddhi; it is rather the embodied Self and the highest Self which are designated by those terms. For this is seen, i.e. it is seen that in that section the individual Self and the highest Self only are spoken of as entered into the cave. To the highest Self there refers I, 2, 12, 'The wise who by meditation on his Self recognises the Ancient who is difficult to see, who has entered into the dark, who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the abyss, as God, he indeed leaves joy and sorrow far behind.' And to the individual soul there refers I, 4, 7, 'Who is together with the vital breath, who is Aditi, who is made of the deities, who entering into the cave abides therein, who was born variously through the elements.' Aditi here means the individual soul which enjoys (atti) the fruits of its works; which is associated with the vital breath; which is made of the deities, i.e. whose enjoyment is dependent on the different sense-organs; which abides in the hollow of the heart; and which, being connected with the elementary substances, earth, and so on, is born in various forms—human, divine, &c.—That the text speaks of the two Selfs as drinking their reward (while actually the individual soul only does so) is to be understood in the same way as the phrase 'there go the umbrella-bearers' (one of whom only carries the umbrella). Or else we may account for this on the ground that both are agents with regard to the drinking, in so far as the 'drinking' individual soul is caused to drink by the highest Self.
12. And on account of distinctive qualities.
Everywhere in that section we meet with statements of distinctive attributes of the two Selfs, the highest Self being represented as the object of meditation and attainment, and the individual Self as the meditating and attaining subject. The passage 'When he has known and understood that which is born from Brahman, the intelligent, to be divine and venerable, then he obtains everlasting peace' (I, 1, 17) refers to the meditating individual soul which recognises itself as being of the nature of Brahman. On the other hand, I, 3, 2, 'That which is a bridge for sacrificers, the highest imperishable Brahman for those who wish to cross over to the fearless shore, the Nkiketa, may we be able to know that,' refers to the highest Self as the object of meditation; 'Nkiketa' here meaning that which is to be reached through the Nkiketa-rite. Again, the passage 'Know the Self to be sitting in the chariot and the body to be the chariot' (I, 3, 3) refers to the meditating individual soul; and the verse, I, 3, 9, 'But he who has understanding for his charioteer, and holds the reins of the mind, he reaches the end of his journey, and that is the highest place of Vishnu.' refers to the embodied and the highest Selfs as that which attains and that which is to be attained. And in the text under discussion also (I, 3, 1), the two Selfs are distinctly designated as light and shade, the one being all-knowing, the other devoid of knowledge.
But, a new objection is raised, the initial passage, I, 1, 20, 'That doubt which there is when a man is dead—some saying, he is; others, he is not,' clearly asks a question as to the true nature of the individual soul, and we hence conclude that that soul forms the topic of the whole chapter.—Not so, we reply. That question does not spring from any doubt as to the existence or non-existence of the soul apart from the body; for if this were so the two first boons chosen by Nkiketas would be unsuitable. For the story runs as follows: When the sacrifice offered by the father of Nkiketas—at which all the possessions of the sacrificer were to be given to the priests—is drawing towards its close, the boy, feeling afraid that some deficiency on the part of the gifts might render the sacrifice unavailing, and dutifully wishing to render his father's sacrifice complete by giving his own person also, repeatedly asks his father, 'And to whom will you give me'? The father, irritated by the boy's persistent questioning, gives an angry reply, and in consequence of this the boy goes to the palace of Yama, and Yama being absent, stays there for three days without eating. Yama on his return is alarmed at this neglect of hospitality, and wishing to make up for it allows him to choose three boons. Nkiketas, thereupon, full of faith and piety, chooses as his first boon that his father should forgive him. Now it is clear that conduct of this kind would not be possible in the case of one not convinced of the soul having an existence independent of the body. For his second boon, again, he chooses the knowledge of a sacrificial fire, which has a result to be experienced only by a soul that has departed from the body; and this choice also can clearly be made only by one who knows that the soul is something different from the body. When, therefore, he chooses for his third boon the clearing up of his doubt as to the existence of the soul after death (as stated in v. 20), it is evident that his question is prompted by the desire to acquire knowledge of the true nature of the highest Self—which knowledge has the form of meditation on the highest Self—, and by means thereof, knowledge of the true nature of final Release which consists in obtaining the highest Brahman. The passage, therefore, is not concerned merely with the problem as to the separation of the soul from the body, but rather with the problem of the Self freeing itself from all bondage whatever—the same problem, in fact, with which another scriptural passage also is concerned, viz. 'When he has departed there is no more knowledge' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 12). The full purport of Nkiketas' question, therefore, is as follows: When a man qualified for Release has died and thus freed himself from all bondage, there arises a doubt as to his existence or non-existence—a doubt due to the disagreement of philosophers as to the true nature of Release; in order to clear up this doubt I wish to learn from thee the true nature of the state of Release.— Philosophers, indeed, hold many widely differing opinions as to what constitutes Release. Some hold that the Self is constituted by consciousness only, and that Release consists in the total destruction of this essential nature of the Self. Others, while holding the same opinion as to the nature of the Self, define Release as the passing away of Nescience (avidy). Others hold that the Self is in itself non- sentient, like a stone, but possesses, in the state of bondage, certain distinctive qualities, such as knowledge, and so on. Release then consists in the total removal of all these qualities, the Self remaining in a state of pure isolation (kaivalya). Others, again, who acknowledge a highest Self free from all imperfection, maintain that through connexion with limiting adjuncts that Self enters on the condition of an individual soul; Release then means the pure existence of the highest Self, consequent on the passing away of the limiting adjuncts. Those, however, who understand the Vednta, teach as follows: There is a highest Brahman which is the sole cause of the entire universe, which is antagonistic to all evil, whose essential nature is infinite knowledge and blessedness, which comprises within itself numberless auspicious qualities of supreme excellence, which is different in nature from all other beings, and which constitutes the inner Self of all. Of this Brahman, the individual souls—whose true nature is unlimited knowledge, and whose only essential attribute is the intuition of the supreme Self— are modes, in so far, namely, as they constitute its body. The true nature of these souls is, however, obscured by Nescience, i.e. the influence of the beginningless chain of works; and by Release then we have to understand that intuition of the highest Self, which is the natural state of the individual souls, and which follows on the destruction of Nescience.—When Nkiketas desires Yama graciously to teach him the true nature of Release and the means to attain it, Yama at first tests him by dwelling on the difficulty of comprehending Release, and by tempting him with various worldly enjoyments. But having in this way recognised the boy's thorough fitness, he in the end instructs him as to the kind of meditation on the highest Self which constitutes knowledge of the highest Reality, as to the nature of Release—which consists in reaching the abode of the highest Self—, and as to all the required details. This instruction begins, I, 2, 12, 'The Ancient one who is difficult to see,' &c., and extends up to I, 3, 9. 'and that is the highest place of Vishnu.'—It thus is an established conclusion that the 'eater' is no other than the highest Self.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the eater.'
13. (The Person) within the eye (is the highest Self) on account of suitability.
The Chandogas have the following text: 'The Person that is seen within the eye, that is the Self. This is the immortal, the fearless, this is Brahman' (Ch. Up. IV, 15, 1). The doubt here arises whether the person that is here spoken of as abiding within the eye is the reflected Self, or some divine being presiding over the sense of sight, or the embodied Self, or the highest Self.—It is the reflected Self, the Prvapakshin maintains; for the text refers to the person seen as something well known, and the expression, 'is seen,' clearly refers to something directly perceived. Or it may be the individual soul, for that also may be referred to as something well known, as it is in special connexion with the eye: people, by looking into the open eye of a person, determine whether the living soul remains in him or is departing. Or else we may assume that the Person seen within the eye is some particular divine being, on the strength of the scriptural text, Bri. Up. V, 5, 2, 'He (the person seen within the sun) rests with his rays in him (the person within the eye).' Any of these beings may quite suitably be referred to as something well known.—Of these alternatives the Stra disposes by declaring that the Person within the eye is the highest Self. For the text goes on to say about the Person seen within the eye, 'They call him Samyadvma, for all blessings go towards him. He is also Vman, for he leads all blessings. He is also Bhman, for he shines in all worlds.' And all these attributes can be reconciled with the highest Self only.
14. And on account of the statement as to abode, and so on.
Abiding within the eye, ruling the eye, and so on are predicated by scripture of the highest Self only, viz. in Bri. Up. III, 7, 18, 'He who dwells within the eye, who rules the eye within.' We therefore recognise that highest Self in the text, 'That Person which is seen within the eye.' The argument founded on reference to 'something well known' thus suits the highest Self very well; and also the clause which denotes immediate perception ('is seen') appears quite suitable, since the highest Self is directly intuited by persons practising mystic concentration of mind (Yoga).
15. And on account of the text referring only to what is characterised by pleasure.
The Person abiding within the eye is the highest Person, for the following reason also. The topic of the whole section is Brahman characterised by delight, as indicated in the passage 'Ka (pleasure) is Brahman, Kha (ether) is Brahman' (Ch. Up. IV,10, 5). To that same Brahman the passage under discussion ('The Person that is seen in the eye') refers for the purpose of enjoining first a place with which Brahman is to be connected in meditation, and secondly some special qualities—such as comprising and leading all blessings—to be attributed to Brahman in meditation.—The word 'only' in the Stra indicates the independence of the argument set forth.
But—an objection is raised—between the Brahman introduced in the passage 'Ka is Brahman,'&c., and the text under discussion there intervenes the vidy of the Fires (Ch. Up. IV, 11-13), and hence Brahman does not readily connect itself with our passage. For the text says that after the Fires had taught Upakosala the knowledge of Brahman ('Breath is Brahman, Ka is Brahman,' &c.), they taught him a meditation on themselves ('After that the Grhapatya fire taught him,' &c., Ch. Up. IV, 11, 1). And this knowledge of the Fires cannot be considered a mere subordinate part of the knowledge of Brahman, for the text declares that it has special fruits of its own—viz. the attainment of a ripe old age and prosperous descendants, &c.—which are not comprised in the results of the knowledge of Brahman, but rather opposed to them in nature.—To this we make the following reply. As both passages (viz. IV, 10, 5, 'Breath is Brahman,' &c.; and IV, 15, 1, 'this is Brahman') contain the word Brahman, and as from the words of the Fires, 'the teacher will tell you the way,' it follows that the knowledge of Brahman is not complete before that way has been taught, we determine that the knowledge of the Fires which stands between the two sections of the knowledge of Brahman is a mere subordinate member of the latter. This also appears from the fact that the Grhapatya fire begins to instruct Upakosala only after he has been introduced into the knowledge of Brahman. Upakosala moreover complains that he is full of sorrows (I, 10, 3), and thus shows himself to be conscious of all the sufferings incidental to human life-birth, old age, death, &c.—which result from man being troubled by manifold desires for objects other than the attainment of Brahman; when therefore the Fires conclude their instruction by combining in saying, 'This, O friend, is the knowledge of us and the knowledge of the Self which we impart to thee,' it is evident that the vidy of the Fires has to be taken as a subordinate member of the knowledge of the Self whose only fruit is Release. And from this it follows that the statement of the results of the Agnividy has to be taken (not as an injunction of results-phalavidhi—but) merely as an arthavda (cp. P. M. S. IV, 3, 1). It, moreover, is by no means true that the text mentions such fruits of the Agnividy as would be opposed to final Release; all the fruits mentioned suit very well the case of a person qualified for Release. 'He destroys sin' (Ch. Up. IV, 11, 2; 12, 2; 13, 2), i.e. he destroys all evil works standing in the way of the attainment of Brahman. 'He obtains the world,' i. e. all impeding evil works having been destroyed he obtains the world of Brahman. 'He reaches his full age,' i.e. he fully reaches that age which is required for the completion of meditation on Brahman. 'He lives long,' i.e. he lives unassailed by afflictions until he reaches Brahman. 'His descendants do not perish,' i.e. his pupils, and their pupils, as well as his sons, grandsons, &c., do not perish; i. e. they are all knowers of Brahman, in agreement with what another text declares to be the reward of knowledge of Brahman—'In his family no one is born ignorant of Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9). 'We guard him in this world and the other,' i.e. we Fires guard him from all troubles until he reaches Brahman.—The Agnividy thus being a member of the Brahmavidy, there is no reason why the Brahman introduced in the earlier part of the Brahmavidy should not be connected with the latter part—the function of this latter part being to enjoin a place of meditation (Brahman being meditated on as the Person within the eye), and some special qualities of Brahman to be included in the meditation.—But (an objection is raised) as the Fires tell Upakosala 'the teacher will tell you the way,' we conclude that the teacher has to give information as to the way to Brahman only; how then can his teaching refer to the place of meditation and the special qualities of Brahman?—We have to consider, we reply, in what connexion the Fires address those words to Upakosala. His teacher having gone on a journey without having imparted to him the knowledge of Brahman, and Upakosala being dejected on that account, the sacred fires of his teacher, well pleased with the way in which Upakosala had tended them, and wishing to cheer him up, impart to him the general knowledge of the nature of Brahman and the subsidiary knowledge of the Fires. But remembering that, as scripture says, 'the knowledge acquired from a teacher is best,' and hence considering it advisable that the teacher himself should instruct Upakosala as to the attributes of the highest Brahman, the place with which it is to be connected in meditation and the way leading to it, they tell him 'the teacher will tell you the way,' the 'way' connoting everything that remains to be taught by the teacher. In agreement herewith the teacher—having first said, 'I will tell you this; and as water does not cling to a lotus leaf, so no evil clings to one who knows it'—instructs him about Brahman as possessing certain auspicious attributes, and to be meditated upon as abiding within the eye, and about the way leading to Brahman.—It is thus a settled conclusion that the text under discussion refers to that Brahman which was introduced in the passage 'Ka is Brahman,' and that hence the Person abiding within the eye is the highest Self.
But—an objection is raised—how do you know that the passage 'Ka (pleasure) is Brahman, Kha (ether) is Brahman' really refers to the highest Brahman, so as to be able to interpret on that basis the text about the Person within the eye? It is a more obvious interpretation to take the passage about Ka and Kha as enjoining a meditation on Brahman viewed under the form of elemental ether and of ordinary worldly pleasure. This interpretation would, moreover, be in agreement with other similarly worded texts (which are generally understood to enjoin meditation on Brahman in a definite form), such as 'Name is Brahman', 'Mind is Brahman.'
16. For that very reason that (ether) is Brahman.
Because the clause 'What is Ka the same is Kha' speaks of ether as characterised by pleasure, the ether which is denoted by 'Kha' is no other than the highest Brahman. To explain. On the Fires declaring 'Breath is Brahman, Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman,' Upakosala says, 'I understand that breath is Brahman, but I do not understand Ka and Kha.' The meaning of this is as follows. The Fires cannot speak of meditation on Brahman under the form of breath and so on, because they are engaged in giving instruction to me, who am afraid of birth, old age, death, &c., and desirous of final Release. What they declare to me therefore is meditation on Brahman itself. Now here Brahman is exhibited in co- ordination with certain well-known things, breath and so on. That Brahman should be qualified by co-ordination with breath is suitable, either from the point of view of Brahman having the attribute of supporting the world, or on account of Brahman being the ruler of breath, which stands to it in the relation of a body. Hence Upakosala says, 'I understand that breath is Brahman.' With regard to pleasure and ether, on the other hand, there arises the question whether they are exhibited in the relation of qualifying attributes of Brahman on the ground of their forming the body of Brahman, and hence being ruled by it, or whether the two terms are meant to determine each other, and thus to convey a notion of the true nature of Brahman being constituted by supreme delight. On the former alternative the declaration of the Fires would only state that Brahman is the ruler of the elemental ether and of all delight depending on the sense-organs, and this would give no notion of Brahman's true nature; on the latter alternative the Fires would declare that unlimited delight constitutes Brahman's true nature. In order to ascertain which of the two meanings has to be taken, Upakosala therefore says, 'I do not understand Ka and Kha.' The Fires, comprehending what is in his mind, thereupon reply, 'What is Ka the same is Kha, what is Kha the same is Ka,' which means that the bliss which constitutes Brahman's nature is unlimited. The same Brahman therefore which has breath for its attribute because breath constitutes its body, is of the nature of unlimited bliss; the text therefore adds, 'They taught him that (viz. Brahman) as breath and as ether.' What the text, 'Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman,' teaches thus is Brahman as consisting of unlimited bliss, and this Brahman is resumed in the subsequent text about the Person seen within the eye. That Person therefore is the highest Self.
17. And on account of the statement of the way of him who has heard the Upanishads.
Other scriptural texts give an account of the way—the first station of which is light—that leads up to the highest Person, without any subsequent return, the soul of him who has read the Upanishads, and has thus acquired a knowledge of the true nature of the highest Self. Now this same way is described by the teacher to Upakosala in connexion with the instruction as to the Person in the eye, 'They go to light, from light to day,' &c. This also proves that the Person within the eye is the highest Self.
18. Not any other, on account of non-permanency of abode, and of impossibility.
As the reflected Self and the other Selfs mentioned by the Prvapakshin do not necessarily abide within the eye, and as conditionless immortality and the other qualities (ascribed in the text to the Person within the eye) cannot possibly belong to them, the Person within the eye cannot be any Self other than the highest Self. Of the reflected Self it cannot be said that it permanently abides within the eye, for its presence there depends on the nearness to the eye of another person. The embodied Self again has its seat within the heart, which is the root of all sense-organs, so as to assist thereby the activities of the different senses; it cannot therefore abide within the eye. And with regard to the divinity the text says that 'he rests with his rays in him, i.e. the eye': this implies that the divine being may preside over the organ of sight although itself abiding in another place; it does not therefore abide in the eye. Moreover, non-conditioned immortality and similar qualities cannot belong to any of these three Selfs. The Person seen within the eye therefore is the highest Self.
We have, under S. I, 2, 14, assumed as proved that the abiding within the eye and ruling the eye, which is referred to in Bri. Up. III, 7, 18 ('He who dwells in the eye,' &c.), can belong to the highest Self only, and have on that basis proved that the Self within the eye is the highest Self.—Here terminates the adhikarana of that 'within.'—The next Stra now proceeds to prove that assumption.
19. The internal Ruler (referred to) in the clauses with respect to the gods, with respect to the worlds, &c. (is the highest Self), because the attributes of that are designated.
The Vjasaneyins, of the Knwa as well as the Mdhyandina branch, have the following text: 'He who dwelling in the earth is within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth is, who rules the earth within, he is thy Self, the ruler within, the Immortal.' The text thereupon extends this teaching as to a being that dwells in things, is within them, is not known by them, has them for its body and rules them; in the first place to all divine beings, viz. water, fire, sky, air, sun, the regions, moon, stars, ether, darkness, light; and next to all material beings, viz. breath, speech, eye, ear, mind, skin, knowledge, seed—closing each section with the words, 'He is thy Self, the ruler within, the Immortal.' The Mdhyandinas, however, have three additional sections, viz. 'He who dwells in all worlds,' &c.; 'he who dwells in all Vedas,' &c.; 'He who dwells in all sacrifices'; and, moreover, in place of 'He who dwells in knowledge' (vijna) they read 'He who dwells in the Self.'—A doubt here arises whether the inward Ruler of these texts be the individual Self or the highest Self.
The individual Self, the Prvapakshin maintains. For in the supplementary passage (which follows upon the text considered so far) the internal Ruler is called the 'seer' and 'hearer,' i.e. his knowledge is said to depend on the sense-organs, and this implies the view that the 'seer' only (i.e. the individual soul only) is the inward Ruler; and further the clause 'There is no other seer but he' negatives any other seer.
This view is set aside by the Stra. The Ruler within, who is spoken of in the clauses marked in the text by the terms 'with respect of the gods,' 'with respect of the worlds,' &c., is the highest Self free from all evil, Nryana. The Stra purposely joins the two terms 'with respect to the gods' and 'with respect to the worlds' in order to intimate that, in addition to the clauses referring to the gods and beings (bhta) exhibited by the Knva-text, the Mdhyandina-text contains additional clauses referring to the worlds, Vedas, &c. The inward Ruler spoken of in both these sets of passages is the highest Self; for attributes of that Self are declared in the text. For it is a clear attribute of the highest Self that being one only it rules all worlds, all Vedas, all divine beings, and so on. Uddlaka asks, 'Dost thou know that Ruler within who within rules this world and the other world and all beings? &c.—tell now that Ruler within'; and Yjavalkya replies with the long passus, 'He who dwells in the earth,' &c., describing the Ruler within as him who, abiding within all worlds, all beings, all divinities, all Vedas, and all sacrifices, rules them from within and constitutes their Self, they in turn constituting his body. Now this is a position which can belong to none else but the highest Person, who is all-knowing, and all whose purposes immediately realise themselves. That it is the highest Self only which rules over all and is the Self of all, other Upanishad-texts also declare; cp. e.g. 'Entered within, the ruler of creatures, the Self of all'; 'Having sent forth this he entered into it. Having entered it he became sat and tyat,' &c. (Taitt. Up. II, 6). Similarly the text from the Subla-Up., which begins, 'there was not anything here in the beginning,' and extends up to 'the one God, Nryana,' shows that it is the highest Brahman only which rules all, is the Self of all, and has all beings for its body. Moreover, essential immortality (which the text ascribes to the Ruler within) is an attribute of the highest Self only.—Nor must it be thought that the power of seeing and so on that belongs to the highest Self is dependent on sense-organs; it rather results immediately from its essential nature, since its omniscience and power to realise its purposes are due to its own being only. In agreement herewith scripture says, 'He sees without eyes, he hears without ears, without hands and feet he grasps and hastes' (Svet. Up. III, 19). What terms such as 'seeing' and 'hearing' really denote is not knowledge in so far as produced by the eye and ear, but the intuitive presentation of colour and sound. In the case of the individual soul, whose essentially intelligising nature is obscured by karman, such intuitive knowledge arises only through the mediation of the sense-organs; in the case of the highest Self, on the other hand, it springs from its own nature.—Again, the clause 'there is no other seer but he' means that there is no seer other than the seer and ruler described in the preceding clauses. To explain. The clauses 'whom the earth does not know,' &c., up to 'whom the Self does not know' mean to say that the Ruler within rules without being perceived by the earth, Self, and the other beings which he rules. This is confirmed by the subsequent clauses, 'unseen but a seer', 'unheard but a hearer,' &c. And the next clauses, 'there is no other seer but he,' &c., then mean to negative that there is any other being which could be viewed as the ruler of that Ruler. Moreover, the clauses 'that is the Self of thee,' 'He is the Self of thee' exhibit the individual Self in the genitive form ('of thee'), and thus distinguish it from the Ruler within, who is declared to be their Self.
20. And not that which Smriti assumes, on account of the declaration of qualities not belonging to that; nor the embodied one.
'That which Smriti assumes' is the Pradhna; the 'embodied one' is the individual soul. Neither of these can be the Ruler within, since the text states attributes which cannot possibly belong to either. For there is not even the shadow of a possibility that essential capability of seeing and ruling all things, and being the Self of all, and immortality should belong either to the non-sentient Pradhna or to the individual soul.—The last two Stras have declared that the mentioned qualities belong to the highest Self, while they do not belong to the individual soul. The next Stra supplies a new, independent argument.
21. For both also speak of it as something different.
Both, i.e. the Mdhyandinas as well as the Knvas, distinguish in their texts the embodied soul, together with speech and other non-intelligent things, from the Ruler within, representing it as an object of his rule. The Mdhyandinas read, 'He who dwells in the Self, whom the Self does not know,' &c.; the Knvas, 'He who dwells within understanding', &c. The declaration of the individual Self being ruled by the Ruler within implies of course the declaration of the former being different from the latter.
The conclusion from all this is that the Ruler within is a being different from the individual soul, viz. the highest Self free from all evil, Nryana.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the internal Ruler'.
22. That which possesses the qualities of invisibility, &c., on account of the declaration of attributes.
The tharvanikas read in their text, 'The higher knowledge is that by which that Indestructible is apprehended. That which is invisible, unseizable, without origin and qualities, &c., that it is which the wise regard as the source of all beings'; and further on, 'That which is higher than the high Imperishable' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 5, 6; II, 1, 2). The doubt here arises whether the Indestructible, possessing the qualities of imperceptibility, &c., and that which is higher than the Indestructible, should be taken to denote the Pradhna and the soul of the Snkhyas, or whether both denote the highest Self.—The Prvapakshin maintains the former alternative. For, he says, while in the text last discussed there is mentioned a special attribute of an intelligent being, viz. in the clause 'unseen but a seer', no similar attribute is stated in the former of the two texts under discussion, and the latter text clearly describes the collective individual soul, which is higher than the imperishable Pradhna, which itself is higher than all its effects. The reasons for this decision are as follows:—Colour and so on reside in the gross forms of non-intelligent matter, viz. the elements, earth, and so on. When, therefore, visibility and so on are expressly negatived, such negation suggests a non-sentient thing cognate to earth, &c., but of a subtle kind, and such a thing is no other than the Pradhna. And as something higher than this Pradhna there are known the collective souls only, under whose guidance the Pradhna gives birth to all its effects, from the so-called Mahat downwards to individual things. This interpretation is confirmed by the comparisons set forth in the next sloka, 'As the spider sends forth and draws in its threads, as plants spring from the earth, as hair grows on the head and body of the living man, thus does everything arise here from the Indestructible.' The section therefore is concerned only with the Pradhna and the individual soul.
This prim facie view is set aside by the Stra. That which possesses invisibility and the other qualities stated in the text, and that which is higher than the high Indestructible, is no other than the highest Self. For the text declares attributes which belong to the highest Self only, viz. in I, 1, 9, 'He who knows all, cognises all,' &c. Let us shortly consider the connexion of the text. The passage beginning 'the higher knowledge is that by which the Indestructible is apprehended' declares an indestructible being possessing the attributes of invisibility and so on. The clause 'everything arises here from the Indestructible' next declares that from that being all things originate. Next the sloka, 'He who knows all and cognises all,' predicates of that Indestructible which is the source of all beings, omniscience, and similar qualities. And finally the text, 'That which is higher than the high Indestructible,' characterises that same being—which previously had been called invisible, the source of beings, indestructible, all- knowing, &c.—as the highest of all. Hence it is evident that in the text 'higher than the high Indestructible' the term 'Indestructible' does not denote the invisible, &c. Indestructible, which is the chief topic of the entire section; for there can of course be nothing higher than that which, as being all-knowing, the source of all, &c., is itself higher than anything else. The 'Indestructible' in that text therefore denotes the elements in their subtle condition.
23. Not the two others, on account of distinction and statement of difference.
The section distinguishes the indestructible being, which is the source of all, &c., from the Pradhna as well as the individual soul, in so far, namely, as it undertakes to prove that by the cognition of one thing everything is known; and it moreover, in passages such as 'higher than the high Indestructible,' explicitly states the difference of the indestructible being from those other two.—The text first relates that Brahm told the knowledge of Brahman, which is the foundation of the knowledge of all, to his eldest son Atharvan: this introduces the knowledge of Brahman as the topic of the section. Then, the text proceeds, in order to obtain this knowledge of Brahman, which had been handed down through a succession of teachers to Angiras, Saunaka approached Angiras respectfully and asked him: 'What is that through which, if known, all this is known?' i.e. since all knowledge is founded on the knowledge of Brahman, he enquires after the nature of Brahman. Angiras replies that he who wishes to attain Brahman must acquire two kinds of knowledge, both of them having Brahman for their object: an indirect one which springs from the study of the sstras, viz. the Veda, Siksh, Kalpa, and so on, and a direct one which springs from concentrated meditation (yoga). The latter kind of knowledge is the means of obtaining Brahman, and it is of the nature of devout meditation (bhakti), as characterised in the text 'He whom the Self chooses, by him the Self can be gained' (III, 2, 3). The means again towards this kind of knowledge is such knowledge as is gained from sacred tradition, assisted by abstention and the other six auxiliary means (sec above, p. 17); in agreement with the text, 'Him the Brahmattas seek to know by the study of the Veda, by sacrifice, by gifts, by penance, by fasting' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22).—Thus the Reverend Parsara also says, 'The cause of attaining him is knowledge and work, and knowledge is twofold, according as it is based on sacred tradition or springs from discrimination.' The Mundaka-text refers to the inferior kind of knowledge in the passage 'the lower knowledge is the Rig-veda,' &c., up to 'and the dharma- sstras'; this knowledge is the means towards the intuition of Brahman; while the higher kind of knowledge, which is called 'upsan,' has the character of devout meditation (bhakti), and consists in direct intuition of Brahman, is referred to in the clause 'the higher knowledge is that by which the Indestructible is apprehended.' The text next following, 'That which is invisible, &c., then sets forth the nature of the highest Brahman, which is the object of the two kinds of knowledge previously described. After this the passage 'As the spider sends forth and draws in its thread' declares that from that indestructible highest Brahman, as characterised before, there originates the whole universe of things, sentient and non-sentient. The next soka (tapas kyate, &c.) states particulars about this origination of the universe from Brahman. 'Brahman swells through brooding'; through brooding, i.e. thought—in agreement with a later text, 'brooding consists of thought'—Brahman swells, i.e. through thought in the form of an intention, viz. 'may I become many,' Brahman becomes ready for creation. From it there springs first 'anna,' i.e. that which is the object of fruition on the part of all enjoying agents, viz. the non-evolved subtle principles of all elements. From this 'anna' there spring successively breath, mind, and all other effected things up to work, which is the means of producing reward in the form of the heavenly world, and Release. The last sloka of the first chapter thereupon first states the qualities, such as omniscience and so on, which capacitate the highest Brahman for creation, and then declares that from the indestructible highest Brahman there springs the effected (krya) Brahman, distinguished by name and form, and comprising all enjoying subjects and objects of enjoyment.—The first sloka of the second chapter declares first that the highest Brahman is absolutely real ('That is true'), and then admonishes those who desire to reach the indestructible highest Self, which possesses all the blessed qualities stated before and exists through itself, to turn away from other rewards and to perform all those sacrificial works depending on the three sacred fires which were seen and revealed by poets in the four Vedas and are incumbent on men according to caste and srama. The section 'this is your path' (I, 2, 1) up to 'this is the holy Brahma-world gained by your good works' (I, 2, 6) next states the particular mode of performing those works, and declares that an omission of one of the successive works enjoined in Druti and Smriti involves fruitlessness of the works actually performed, and that something not performed in the proper way is as good as not performed at all. Stanzas 7 and ff. ('But frail in truth are those boats') declare that those who perform this lower class of works have to return again and again into the Samsra, because they aim at worldly results and are deficient in true knowledge. Stanza 8 ('but those who practise penance and faith') then proclaims that works performed by a man possessing true knowledge, and hence not aiming at worldly rewards, result in the attainment of Brahman; and stanzas 12 a, 13 ('having examined all these worlds') enjoin knowledge, strengthened by due works, on the part of a man who has turned away from mere works, as the means of reaching Brahman; and due recourse to a teacher on the part of him who is desirous of such knowledge.—The first chapter of the second section of the Upanishad (II, 1)then clearly teaches how the imperishable highest Brahman, i.e. the highest Self—as constituting the Self of all things and having all things for its body—has all things for its outward form and emits all things from itself. The remainder of the Upanishad ('Manifest, near,' &c. ) teaches how this highest Brahman, which is imperishable and higher than the soul, which itself is higher than the Unevolved; which dwells in the highest Heaven; and which is of the nature of supreme bliss, is to be meditated upon as within the hollow of the heart; how this meditation has the character of devout faith (bhakti); and how the devotee, freeing himself from Nescience, obtains for his reward intuition of Brahman, which renders him like Brahman.
It thus clearly appears that 'on account of distinction and statement of difference' the Upanishad does not treat of the Pradhna and the soul. For that the highest Brahman is different from those two is declared in passages such as 'That heavenly Person is without body; he is both without and within, not produced, without breath and without mind, pure, higher than what is higher than the Imperishable' (II, 1, 2); for the last words mean 'that imperishable highest Self possessing invisibility and similar qualities, which is higher than the aggregate of individual souls, which itself is higher than the non-evolved subtle elements.' The term 'akshara' (imperishable) is to be etymologically explained either as that which pervades (asnute) or that which does not pass away (a- ksharati), and is on either of these explanations applicable to the highest Self, either because that Self pervades all its effects or because it is like the so-called Mahat (which is also called akshara), free from all passing away or decaying.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'invisibility and so on.'
24. And on account of the description of its form.
'Fire is his head, his eyes the sun and the moon, the regions his ears, his speech the Vedas disclosed, the wind his breath, his heart the universe; from his feet came the earth; he is indeed the inner Self of all things' (II, 1, 4)—the outward form here described can belong to none but the highest Self; that is, the inner Self of all beings. The section therefore treats of the highest Self.
25. Vaisvnara (is the highest Self), on account of the distinctions qualifying the common term.
The Chandogas read in their text, 'You know at present that Vaisvnara Self, tell us that,' &c., and further on, 'But he who meditates on the Vaisvnara Self as a span long,' &c. (Ch. Up. V, 11, 6; 18, 1). The doubt here arises whether that Vaisvnara Self can be made out to be the highest Self or not. The Prvapakshin maintains the latter alternative. For, he says, the word Vaisvnara is used in the sacred texts in four different senses. It denotes in the first place the intestinal fire, so in Bri. Up, V, 9, 'That is the Vaisvnara fire by which the food that is eaten is cooked, i.e. digested. Its noise is that which one hears when one covers one's ears. When man is on the point of departing this life he does not hear that noise.'—It next denotes the third of the elements, so in Ri. Samh. X, 88, 12, 'For the whole world the gods have made the Agni Vaisvnara a sign of the days.'—It also denotes a divinity, so Ri. Samh. I, 98, 1, 'May we be in the favour of Vaisvnara, for he is the king of the kings,' &c. And finally it denotes the highest Self, as in the passage, 'He offered it in the Self, in the heart, in Agni Vaisvnara'; and in Pra. Up. I, 7, 'Thus he rises as Vaisvnara, assuming all forms, as breath of life, as fire.'—And the characteristic marks mentioned in the introductory clauses of the Chandogya-text under discussion admit of interpretations agreeing with every one of these meanings of the word Vaisvnara.
Against this prim facie view the Stra declares itself. The term 'Vaisvnara' in the Chndogya-text denotes the highest Self, because the 'common' term is there qualified by attributes specially belonging to the highest Self. For the passage tells us how Aupamanyava and four other great Rhshis, having met and discussed the question as to what was their Self and Brahman, come to the conclusion to go to Uddlaka because he is reputed to know the Vaisvnara Self. Uddlaka, recognising their anxiety to know the Vaisvnara Self, and deeming himself not to be fully informed on this point, refers them to Asvapati Kaikeya as thoroughly knowing the Vaisvnara Self; and they thereupon, together with Uddlaka, approach Asvapati. The king duly honours them with presents, and as they appear unwilling to receive them, explains that they may suitably do so, he himself being engaged in the performance of a religious vow; and at the same time instructs them that even men knowing Brahman must avoid what is forbidden and do what is prescribed. When thereupon he adds that he will give them as much wealth as to the priests engaged in his sacrifice, they, desirous of Release and of knowing the Vaisnara Self, request him to explain that Self to them. Now it clearly appears that as the Rishis are said to be desirous of knowing—that Brahman which is the Self of the individual souls ('what is our Self, what is Brahman'), and therefore search for some one to instruct them on that point, the Vaisvnara Self—to a person acquainted with which they address themselves—can be the highest Self only. In the earlier clauses the terms used are 'Self' and 'Brahman,' in the later 'Self' and 'Vaisvnara'; from this it appears also that the term 'Vaisvnara,' which takes the place of 'Brahman,' denotes none other but the highest Self. The results, moreover, of the knowledge of the Vaisvnara Self, which are stated in subsequent passages, show that the Vaisvnara Self is the highest Brahman. 'He eats food in all worlds, in all beings, in all Selfs'; 'as the fibres of the Ishk reed when thrown into the fire are burnt, thus all his sins are burned' (V, 18, I; 24, 3).
The next Stra supplies a further reason for the same conclusion.
26. That which the text refers to is an inferential mark—thus.
The text describes the shape of Vaisvnara, of whom heaven, &c., down to earth constitute the several limbs; and it is known from Scripture and Smriti that such is the shape of the highest Self. When, therefore, we recognise that shape as referred to in the text, this supplies an inferential mark of Vaisvnara being the highest Self.—The 'thus' (iti) in the Stra denotes a certain mode, that is to say, 'a shape of such a kind being recognised in the text enables us to infer that Vaisvnara is the highest Self.' For in Scripture and Smriti alike the highest Person is declared to have such a shape. Cp. e.g. the text of the tharvanas. 'Agni is his head, the sun and moon his eyes, the regions his cars, his speech the Vedas disclosed, the wind his breath, his heart the Universe; from his feet came the earth; he is indeed the inner Self of all things' (Mu. Up. II, I, 4). 'Agni' in this passage denotes the heavenly world, in agreement with the text 'that world indeed is Agni.' And the following Smrriti texts: 'He of whom the wise declare the heavenly world to be the head, the ether the navel, sun and moon the eyes, the regions the ears, the earth the feet; he whose Self is unfathomable is the leader of all beings'; and 'of whom Agni is the mouth, heaven the head, the ether the navel, the earth the feet, the sun the eye, the regions the ear; worship to him, the Self of the Universe!'—Now our text declares the heavenly world and so on to constitute the head and the other limbs of Vaisvnara. For Kaikeya on being asked by the Rishis to instruct them as to the Vasvnara Self recognises that they all know something about the Vaisvnara Self while something they do not know (for thus only we can explain his special questions), and then in order to ascertain what each knows and what not, questions them separately. When thereupon Aupamanyava replies that he meditates on heaven only as the Self, Kaikeya, in order to disabuse him from the notion that heaven is the whole Vaisvnara Self, teaches him that heaven is the head of Vaisvnara, and that of heaven which thus is a part only of Vaisvnara, Sutejas is the special name. Similarly he is thereupon told by the other Rishis that they meditate only on sun, air, ether, and earth, and informs them in return that the special names of these beings are 'the omniform,' 'he who moves in various ways,' 'the full one,''wealth and 'firm rest,' and that these all are mere members of the Vaisvnara Self, viz. its eyes, breath, trunk, bladder, and feet. The shape thus described in detail can belong to the highest Self only, and hence Vaisvnara is none other but the highest Self.
The next Stra meets a further doubt as to this decision not yet being well established.
27. Should it be said that it is not so, on account of the word, &c., and on account of the abiding within; we say, no; on account of meditation being taught thus, on account of impossibility; and because they read of him as person.
An objection is raised. Vaisvnara cannot be ascertained to be the highest Self, because, on the account of the text and of the abiding within, we can understand by the Vaisvnara in our text the intestinal fire also. The text to which we refer occurs in the Vaisvnara-vidy of the Vjasaneyins, 'This one is the Agni Vaisvnara,' where the two words 'Agni' and 'Vaisvnara' are exhibited in co-ordination. And in the section under discussion the passage, 'the heart is the Grhapatya fire, the mind the Anvhrya-pakana fire, the mouth the havanya fire' (Ch. Up. V, 18, 2), represents the Vaisvnara in so far as abiding within the heart and so on as constituting the triad of sacred fires. Moreover the text, 'The first food which a man may take is in the place of Soma. And he who offers that first oblation should offer it to Prna' (V, 19, 1), intimates that Vaisvnara is the abode of the offering to Prna. In the same way the Vjasaneyins declare that Vaisvnara abides within man, viz. in the passage 'He who knows this Agni Vaisvnara shaped like a man abiding within man.' As thus Vaisvnara appears in co-ordination with the word 'Agni,' is represented as the triad of sacred fires, is said to be the abode of the oblation to Breath, and to abide within man, he must be viewed as the intestinal fire, and it is therefore not true that he can be identified with the highest Self only.
This objection is set aside by the Stra. It is not so 'on account of meditation (on the highest Self) being taught thus,' i.e. as the text means to teach that the highest Brahman which, in the manner described before, has the three worlds for its body should be meditated upon as qualified by the intestinal fire which (like other beings) constitutes Brahman's body. For the word 'Agni' denotes not only the intestinal fire, but also the highest Self in so far as qualified by the intestinal fire.— But how is this to be known?—'On account of impossibility;' i.e. because it is impossible that the mere intestinal fire should have the three worlds for its body. The true state of the case therefore is that the word Agni, which is understood to denote the intestinal fire, when appearing in co-ordination with the term Vaisvnara represented as having the three worlds for his body, denotes (not the intestinal fire, but) the highest Self as qualified by that fire viewed as forming the body of the Self. Thus the Lord also says, 'As Vaisvnara fire I abide in the body of living creatures and, being assisted by breath inspired and expired, digest the fourfold food' (Bha G. XIV, 15). 'As Vaisvnara fire' here means 'embodied in the intestinal fire.'—The Chndogya text under discussion enjoins meditation on the highest Self embodied in the Vaisvnara fire.—Moreover the Vjasaneyins read of him, viz. the Vaisvnara, as man or person, viz. in the passage 'That Agni Vaisvnara is the person' (Sa. Br. X, 6, 1, 11). The intestinal fire by itself cannot be called a person; unconditioned personality belongs to the highest Self only. Compare 'the thousand-headed person' (Ri. Samh.), and 'the Person is all this' (Sve. Up. III, 15).
28. For the same reasons not the divinity and the element.
For the reasons stated Vaisvnara can be neither the deity Fire, nor the elemental fire which holds the third place among the gross elements.
29. Jaimini thinks that there is no objection to (the word 'Agni') directly (denoting the highest Self).
So far it has been maintained that the word 'Agni,' which stands in co- ordination with the term 'Vaisvnara,' denotes the highest Self in so far as qualified by the intestinal fire constituting its body; and that hence the text under discussion enjoins meditation on the highest Self. Jaimini, on the other hand, is of opinion that there is no reasonable objection to the term 'Agni,' no less than the term: 'Vaisvnara,' being taken directly to denote the highest Self. That is to say—in the same way as the term 'Vaisvnara,' although a common term, yet when qualified by attributes especially belonging to the highest Self is known to denote the latter only as possessing the quality of ruling all men; so the word 'Agni' also when appearing in connexion with special attributes belonging to the highest Self denotes that Self only. For any quality on the ground of which 'Agni' may be etymologically explained to denote ordinary fire—as when e.g. we explain 'agni' as he who 'agre nayati'— may also, in its highest non-conditioned degree, be ascribed to the supreme Self. Another difficulty remains. The passage (V, 18, 1) 'yas tv etam evam prdesamtram abhivimnam,' &c. declares that the non-limited highest Brahman is limited by the measure of the pradesas, i.e. of the different spaces-heaven, ether, earth, &c.—which had previously been said to constitute the limbs of Vaisvnara. How is this possible?
30. On account of definiteness; thus smarathya opines.
The teacher smarathya is of opinion that the text represents the highest Self as possessing a definite extent, to the end of rendering the thought of the meditating devotee more definite. That is to say—the limitation due to the limited extent of heaven, sun, &c. has the purpose of rendering definite to thought him who pervades (abhi) all this Universe and in reality transcends all measure (vimna).—A further difficulty remains. For what purpose is the highest Brahman here represented like a man, having a head and limbs?—This point the next Stra elucidates.
31. On account of meditation, Bdari thinks.
The teacher Bdari thinks that the representation in the text of the supreme Self in the form of a man is for the purpose of devout meditation. 'He who in this way meditates on that Vaisvnara Self as "prdesamtra" and "abhivimna," he eats food in all worlds, in all beings, in all Selfs.' What this text enjoins is devout meditation for the purpose of reaching Brahman. 'In this way' means 'as having a human form.' And 'the eating' of food in all worlds, &c. means the gaining of intuitional knowledge of Brahman which abides everywhere and is in itself of the nature of supreme bliss. The special kind of food, i.e. the special objects of enjoyment which belong to the different Selfs standing under the influence of karman cannot be meant here; for those limited objects have to be shunned by those who desire final release. A further question arises. If Vaisvnara is the highest Self, how can the text say that the altar is its chest, the grass on the altar its hairs, and so on? (V, 18, 2.) Such a statement has a sense only if we understand by Vaisvnara the intestinal fire.—This difficulty the next Stra elucidates.
32. On account of imaginative identification, thus Jaimini thinks; for thus the text declares.
The teacher Jaimini is of opinion that the altar is stated to be the chest of Vaisvnara, and so on, in order to effect an imaginative identification of the offering to Prna which is daily performed by the meditating devotees and is the means of pleasing Vaisvnara, having the heaven and so on for his body, i.e. the highest Self, with the Agnihotra- offering. For the fruit due to meditation on the highest Self, as well as the identity of the offering to breath with the Agnihotra, is declared in the following text, 'He who without knowing this offers the Agnihotra—that would be as if removing the live coals he were to pour his libation on dead ashes. But he who offers this Agnihotra with a full knowledge of its purport, he offers it in all worlds, in all beings, in all Selfs. As the fibres of the Ishk reed when thrown into the fire are burnt, thus all his sins are burnt.' (V, 24, 1-3.)
33. Moreover, they record him in that.
They (i.e. the Vjasaneyins) speak of him, viz. Vaisvnara who has heaven for his head, &c.—i.e. the highest Self—as within that, i.e. the body of the devotee, so as to form the abode of the oblation to Prna; viz. in the text,'Of that Vaisvnara Self the head is Sutejas,' and so on. The context is as follows. The clause 'He who meditates on the Vaisvnara Self as prdesamtra,' &c. enjoins meditation on the highest Self having the three worlds for its body, i.e. on Vaisvnara. The following clause 'he eats food in all worlds' teaches that the attaining of Brahman is the reward of such meditation. And then the text proceeds to teach the Agnihotra offered to Prna, which is something subsidiary to the meditation taught. The text here establishes an identity between the members—fire, sun, &c.—of the Vaisvnara enjoined as object of meditation (which members are called Sutejas, Visvarpa, &c. ), and parts—viz. head, eye, breath, trunk, bladder, feet—of the worshipper's body. 'The head is Sutejas'—that means: the head of the devotee is (identical with) heaven, which is the head of the highest Self; and so on up to 'the feet,' i.e. the feet of the devotee are identical with the earth, which constitutes the feet of the highest Self, The devotee having thus reflected on the highest Self, which has the three worlds for its body, as present within his own body, thereupon is told to view his own chest, hair, heart, mind and mouth as identical with the altar, grass and the other things which are required for the Agnihotra; further to identify the oblation to Prna with the Agnihotra, and by means of this Prna-agnihotra to win the favour of Vaisvnara, i. e. the highest Self. The final—conclusion then remains that Vaisvnara is none other than the highest Self, the supreme Person.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'Vaisvnara.'
1. The abode of heaven, earth, &c. (is the highest Self), on account of terms which are its own.
The followers of the Atharva-veda have the following text, 'He in whom the heaven, the earth and the sky are woven, the mind also, with all the vital airs, know him alone as the Self, and leave off other words; he is the bank (setu) of the Immortal' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 5). The doubt here arises whether the being spoken of as the abode of heaven, earth, and so on, is the individual soul or the highest Self.
The Prvapakshin maintains the former alternative. For, he remarks, in the next sloka, 'where like spokes in the nave of a wheel the arteries meet, he moves about within, becoming manifold,' the word 'where' refers back to the being which in the preceding sloka had been called the abode of heaven, earth, and so on, the clause beginning with 'where' thus declaring that that being is the basis of the arteries; and the next clause declares that same being to become manifold or to be born in many ways. Now, connexion with the arteries is clearly characteristic of the individual soul; and so is being born in many forms, divine and so on. Moreover, in the very sloka under discussion it is said that that being is the abode of the mind and the five vital airs, and this also is a characteristic attribute of the individual soul. It being, on these grounds, ascertained that the text refers to the individual soul we must attempt to reconcile therewith, as well as we can, what is said about its being the abode of heaven, earth, &c.
This prim facie view is set aside by the Stra. That which is described as the abode of heaven, earth, &c. is none other than the highest Brahman, on account of a term which is 'its own,' i.e. which specially belongs to it. The clause we have in view is 'he is the bank of the Immortal.' This description applies to the highest Brahman only, which alone is, in all Upanishads, termed the cause of the attainment of Immortality; cp. e.g. 'Knowing him thus a man becomes immortal; there is no other path to go' (Sve. Up. III, 8). The term 'setu' is derived from si, which means to bind, and therefore means that which binds, i.e. makes one to attain immortality; or else it may be understood to mean that which leads towards immortality that lies beyond the ocean of samsra, in the same way as a bank or bridge (setu) leads to the further side of a river.—Moreover the word 'Self (tman) (which, in the text under discussion, is also applied to that which is the abode of heaven, earth, &c.), without any further qualification, primarily denotes Brahman only; for 'tman' comes from p, to reach, and means that which 'reaches' all other things in so far as it rules them. And further on (II, 2, 7) there are other terms, 'all knowing,' 'all cognising,' which also specially belong to the highest Brahman only. This Brahman may also be represented as the abode of the arteries; as proved e.g. by Mahnr. Up. (XI, 8-12), 'Surrounded by the arteries he hangs ... in the middle of this pointed flame there dwells the highest Self.' Of that Self it may also be said that it is born in many ways; in accordance with texts such as 'not born, he is born in many ways; the wise know the place of his birth.' For in order to fit himself to be a refuge for gods, men, &c. the supreme Person, without however putting aside his true nature, associates himself with the shape, make, qualities and works of the different classes of beings, and thus is born in many ways. Smriti says the same: 'Though being unborn, of non-perishable nature, the Lord of all beings, yet presiding over my Prakriti I am born by my own mysterious power' (Bha. G. IV, 6). Of the mind also and the other organs of the individual soul the highest Self is strictly the abode; for it is the abode of everything.—The next Stra supplies a further reason.
2. And on account of its being declared that to which the released have to resort.
The Person who is the abode of heaven, earth, and so on, is also declared by the text to be what is to be reached by those who are released from the bondage of Samsra existence. 'When the seer sees the brilliant maker and Lord as the Person who has his source in Brahman, then possessing true knowledge he shakes off good and evil, and, free from passion, reaches the highest oneness' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 3). 'As the flowing rivers disappear in the sea, losing their name and form, thus a wise man freed from name and form goes to the divine Person who is higher than the high' (III, 2, 8). For it is only those freed from the bondage of Samsra who shake off good and evil, are free from passion, and freed from name and form.
For the Samsra state consists in the possession of name and form, which is due to connexion with non-sentient matter, such connexion springing from good and evil works. The Person therefore who is the abode of heaven, earth, &c., and whom the text declares to be the aim to be reached by those who, having freed themselves from good and evil, and hence from all contact with matter, attain supreme oneness with the highest Brahman, can be none other than this highest Brahman itself.
This conclusion, based on terms exclusively applicable to the highest Brahman, is now confirmed by reference to the absence of terms specially applicable to the individual soul.
3. Not that which is inferred, on account of the absence of terms denoting it, and (so also not) the bearer of the Prnas (i. e. the individual soul).
As the section under discussion does not treat of the Pradhna, there being no terms referring to that, so it is with regard to the individual soul also. In the text of the Stra we have to read either anumnam, i. e. 'inference,' in the sense of 'object of inference,' or else numnam, 'object of inference'; what is meant being in both cases the Pradhana inferred to exist by the Snkhyas.
4. On account of the declaration of difference.
'On the same tree man sits immersed in grief, bewildered by "ans"; but when he sees the other one, the Lord, contented, and his glory; then his grief passes away' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 2). This, and similar texts, speak of that one, i.e. the one previously described as the abode of heaven, earth, &c., as different from the individual soul.—The text means—the individual soul grieves, being bewildered by her who is not 'sa,' i.e. Prakriti, the object of fruition. But its grief passes away when it sees him who is other than itself, i.e. the beloved Lord of all, and his greatness which consists in his ruling the entire world.
5. On account of the subject-matter.
It has been already shown, viz. under I, 2, 21, that the highest Brahman constitutes the initial topic of the Upanishad. And by the arguments set forth in the previous Stras of the present Pda, we have removed all suspicion as to the topic started being dropped in the body of the Upanishad.
6. And on account of abiding and eating.
'Two birds, inseparable friends, cling to the same tree. One of them eats the sweet fruit; without eating, the other looks on' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1). This text declares that one enjoys the fruit of works while the other, without enjoying, shining abides within the body. Now this shining being which does not enjoy the fruit of works can only be the being previously described as the abode of heaven, earth, &c., and characterised as all knowing, the bridge of immortality, the Self of all; it can in no way be the individual Self which, lamenting, experiences the results of its works. The settled conclusion, therefore, is that the abode of heaven, earth, and so on, is none other than the highest Self.— Here terminates the adhikarana of 'heaven, earth, and so on.'
7. The bhman (is the highest Self), as the instruction about it is additional to that about serenity.
The Chandogas read as follows: 'Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, knows nothing else, that is fulness (bhman). Where one sees something else, hears something else, knows something else, that is the Little' (Ch. Up. VII, 23, 24).
The term 'bhman' is derived from bahu (much, many), and primarily signifies 'muchness.' By 'much' in this connexion, we have however to understand, not what is numerous, but what is large, for the text uses the term in contrast with the 'Little' (alpa), i.e. the 'Small.' And the being qualified as 'large,' we conclude from the context to be the Self; for this section of the Upanishad at the outset states that he who knows the Self overcomes grief (VII, 1, 3), then teaches the knowledge of the bhman, and concludes by saying that 'the Self is all this' (VII, 25, 2).
The question now arises whether the Self called bhman is the individual Self or the highest Self.—The Prvapakshin maintains the former view. For, he says, to Narada who had approached Sanatkumra with the desire to be instructed about the Self, a series of beings, beginning with 'name' and ending with 'breath,' are enumerated as objects of devout meditation; Nrada asks each time whether there be anything greater than name, and so on, and each time receives an affirmative reply ('speech is greater than name,' &c.); when, however, the series has advanced as far as Breath, there is no such question and reply. This shows that the instruction about the Self terminates with Breath, and hence we conclude that breath in this place means the individual soul which is associated with breath, not a mere modification of air. Also the clauses 'Breath is father, breath is mother,' &c. (VII, 15, 1), show that breath here is something intelligent. And this is further proved by the clause 'Slayer of thy father, slayer of thy mother,' &c. (VII, 15, 2; 3), which declares that he who offends a father, a mother, &c., as long as there is breath in them, really hurts them, and therefore deserves reproach; while no blame attaches to him who offers even the grossest violence to them after their breath has departed. For a conscious being only is capable of being hurt, and hence the word 'breath' here denotes such a being only. Moreover, as it is observed that also in the case of such living beings as have no vital breath (viz. plants), suffering results, or does not result, according as injury is inflicted or not, we must for this reason also decide that the breath spoken of in the text as something susceptible of injury is the individual soul. It consequently would be an error to suppose, on the ground of the comparison of Prna to the nave of a wheel in which the spokes are set, that Prna here denotes the highest Self; for the highest Self is incapable of being injured. That comparison, on the other hand, is quite in its place, if we understand by Prna the individual soul, for the whole aggregate of non-sentient matter which stands to the individual soul in the relation of object or instrument of enjoyment, has an existence dependent on the individual soul. And this soul, there called Prna, is what the text later on calls Bhman; for as there is no question and reply as to something greater than Prna, Prna continues, without break, to be the subject-matter up to the mention of bhman. The paragraphs intervening between the section on Prna (VII, 15) and the section on the bhman (VII, 23 ff.) are to be understood as follows. The Prna section closes with the remark that he who fully knows Prna is an ativdin, i.e. one who makes a final supreme declaration. In the next sentence then, 'But this one in truth is an ativdin who makes a supreme statement by means of the True,' the clause 'But this one is an ativdin' refers back to the previously mentioned person who knows the Prna, and the relative clause 'who makes,' &c., enjoins on him the speaking of the truth as an auxiliary element in the meditation on Prna. The next paragraph, 'When one understands the truth then one declares the truth,' intimates that speaking the truth stands in a supplementary relation towards the cognition of the true nature of the Prna as described before. For the accomplishment of such cognition the subsequent four paragraphs enjoin reflection, faith, attendance on a spiritual guide, and the due performance of sacred duties. In order that such duties may be undertaken, the next paragraphs then teach that bliss constitutes the nature of the individual soul, previously called Prna, and finally that the Bhman, i.e. the supreme fulness of such bliss, is the proper object of inquiry. The final purport of the teaching, therefore, is that the true nature of the individual soul, freed from Nescience, is abundant bliss—a conclusion which perfectly agrees with the initial statement that he who knows the Self passes beyond sorrow. That being, therefore, which has the attribute of being 'bhman,' is the individual Self. This being so, it is also intelligible why, further on, when the text describes the glory and power of the individual Self, it uses the term 'I'; for 'I' denotes just the individual Self: 'I am below, I am above, &c., I am all this' (VII, 25, 1). This conclusion having been settled, all remaining clauses must be explained so as to agree with it.