But if all individual souls are equal in so far as being alike parts of Brahman, alike actuated by Brahman, and alike knowing subjects, what is the reason that, as Scripture teaches, some of them are allowed to read the Veda and act according to its injunctions, while others are excluded therefrom; and again that some are to see, feel, and so on, while others are excluded from these privileges?—This question is answered by the next Stra.
47. Permission and exclusion (result) from connexion with a body; as in the case of light and so on.
Although all souls are essentially of the same nature in so far as they are parts of Brahman, knowing subjects and so on, the permissions and exclusions referred to are possible for the reason that each individual soul is joined to some particular body, pure or impure, whether of a Brhmana or Kshattriya or Vaisya or Sdra, and so on. 'As in the case of fire and so on.' All fire is of the same kind, and yet one willingly fetches fire from the house of a Brhmana, while one shuns fire from a place where dead bodies are burnt. And from a Brhmana one accepts food without any objection, while one refuses food from a low person.
48. And on account of non-connectedness there is no confusion.
Although the souls, as being parts of Brahman and so on, are of essentially the same character, they are actually separate, for each of them is of atomic size and resides in a separate body. For this reason there is no confusion or mixing up of the individual spheres of enjoyment and experience. The Strakra introduces this reference to an advantage of his own view of things, in order to intimate that the views of the soul being Brahman deluded or else Brahman affected by a limiting adjunct are on their part incapable of explaining how it is that the experiences of the individual Self and the highest Self, and of the several individual Selfs, are not mixed up.
But may not, on the view of the soul being Brahman deluded, the distinction of the several spheres of experience be explained by means of the difference of the limiting adjuncts presented by Nescience?—This the next Stra negatives.
49. And it is a mere apparent argument.
The argumentation by which it is sought to prove that that being whose nature is constituted by absolutely uniform light, i.e. intelligence, is differentiated by limiting adjuncts which presuppose an obscuration of that essential nature, is a mere apparent (fallacious) one. For, as we have shown before, obscuration of the light of that which is nothing but light means destruction of that light.—If we accept as the reading of the Stra 'bhsh' (in plural) the meaning is that the various reasons set forth by the adherents of that doctrine are all of them fallacious. The 'and' of the Stra is meant to point out that that doctrine, moreover, is in conflict with texts such as 'thinking himself to be different from the Mover'(Svet. Up. I, 6); 'there are two unborn ones, one a ruler, the other not a ruler' (I, 9); 'of those two one eats the sweet fruit' (V, 6); and others. For even if difference is due to updhis which are the figment of Nescience, there is no escaping the conclusion that the spheres of experience must be mixed up, since the theory admits that the thing itself with which all the limiting adjuncts connect themselves is one only.
But this cannot be urged against the theory of the individual soul being Brahman in so far as determined by real limiting adjuncts; for on that view we may explain the difference of spheres of experience as due to the beginningless adrishtas which are the cause of the difference of the limiting adjuncts!—To this the next Stra replies.
50. On account of the non-determination of the adrishtas.
As the adrishtas also which are the causes of the series of updhis have for their substrate Brahman itself, there is no reason for their definite allotment (to definite individual souls), and hence again there is no definite separation of the spheres of experience. For the limiting adjuncts as well as the adrishtas cannot by their connexion with Brahman split up Brahman itself which is essentially one.
51. And it is thus also in the case of purposes and so on.
For the same reason there can be no definite restriction in the case of purposes and so on which are the causes of the, different adrishtas. (For they also cannot introduce plurality into Brahman that is fundamentally one.)
52. Should it be said (that that is possible) owing to the difference of place; we deny this, on account of (all updhis) being within (all places).
Although Brahman is one only and not to be split by the several limiting adjuncts with which it is connected, yet the separation of the spheres of enjoyment is not impossible since the places of Brahman which are connected with the updhis are distinct.—This the Stra negatives on the ground that, as the updhis move here and there and hence all places enter into connexion with all updhis, the mixing up of spheres of enjoyment cannot be avoided. And even if the updhis were connected with different places, the pain connected with some particular place would affect the whole of Brahman which is one only.—The two Stras II, 3, 32 and 37 have stated an objection against those who, without taking their stand on the Veda, held the view of an all-pervading soul. The Stras II, 3, 50 and ff., on the other hand, combat the view of those who, while basing their doctrine on the Veda, teach the absolute unity of the Self.— Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the part.'
1. Thus the prnas.
After having taught that Ether and all the other elements are effects, and hence have originated, the Stras had shown that the individual soul, although likewise an effect, does not originate in the sense of undergoing a change of essential nature; and had in connexion therewith clearly set forth wherein the essential nature of the soul consists. They now proceed to elucidate the question as to the origination of the instruments of the individual soul, viz. the organs and the vital breath.
The point here to be decided is whether the organs are effects as the individual soul is an effect, or as ether and the other elements are. As the soul is, thus the prnas are, the Prvapakshin maintains. That means— as the soul is not produced, thus the organs also are not produced—For the latter point no less than the former is directly stated in Scripture; the wording of the Stra 'thus the prnas' being meant to extend to the case of the prnas also, the authority of Scripture to which recourse was had in the case of the soul.—But what is the scriptural text you mean?
'Non-being, truly this was in the beginning. Here they say, what was that? Those Rishis indeed were that Non-being, thus they say. And who were those Rishis? The prnas indeed were those Rishis.' This is the passage which declares that before the origination of the world the Rishis existed. As 'prnh' is in the plural, we conclude that what is meant is the organs and the vital air. Nor can this text be interpreted to mean only that the prnas exist for a very long time (but are not uncreated); as we may interpret the texts declaring Vyu and the atmosphere (antariksha) to be immortal: 'Vyu and the atmosphere are immortal'; 'Vyu is the deity that never sets' (Bri. Up. II, 3, 3; I, 5, 22). For the clause 'Non-being indeed was this in the beginning' declares that the prnas existed even at the time when the entire world was in the pralaya state. Those texts, then, which speak of an origination of the prnas must be explained somehow, just as we did with the texts referring to the origination of the individual soul.
To this the Siddhntin replies, 'the prnas also originate in the same way as ether, and so on.'—Why?—Because we have scriptural texts directly stating that before creation everything was one, 'Being only this was in the beginning,' 'The Self only was this in the beginning.' And moreover, the text 'from that there is produced the prna and the mind and all organs'(Mu. Up. II, 3, 1) declares that the organs originated; they therefore cannot have existed before creation. Nor is it permissible to ascribe a different meaning to the texts which declare the origination of the sense-organs—as we may do in the case of the texts declaring the origination of the soul. For we have no texts directly denying the origination of the sense-organs, or affirming their eternity, while we have such texts in the case of the individual soul. In the text quoted by the Prvapakshin, 'Non-being indeed was this in the beginning,' &c., the word prna can denote the highest Self only; for from texts such as 'All these beings indeed enter into breath alone, and from breath they arise'(Ch. Up. I, 11, 5), the word prna is known to be one of the designations of the highest Self. And as to the clause 'the prnas indeed are those Rishis,' we remark that the term Rishi may properly be applied to the all-seeing highest Self, but not to the non- intelligent organs.
But how then is the plural form 'the Rishis are the prnas' to be accounted for? This the next Stra explains.
2. (The scriptural statement of the plural) is secondary, on account of impossibility; and since (the highest Self) is declared before that.
The plural form exhibited by the text must be taken (not in its literal, but) in a secondary figurative sense, since there is no room there for a plurality of things. For Scripture declares that previous to creation the highest Self only exists.
3. On account of speech having for its antecedent that.
For the following reason also the word 'prna,' in the text quoted, can denote Brahman only. Speech, i.e. the names which have for their object all things apart from Brahman, presupposes the existence of the entire universe of things—ether, and so on—which is the object of speech. But, as according to the text 'this was then non-differentiated; it was thereupon differentiated by names and forms,' then (i.e. before the differentiation of individual things), no things having name and form existed, there existed also no effects of speech and the other organs of action and sensation, and hence it cannot be inferred that those organs themselves existed.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the origination of the prnas.'
4. (They are seven) on account of the going of the seven and of specification.
The question here arises whether those organs are seven only, or eleven— the doubt on this point being due to the conflicting nature of scriptural texts.—The Prvapakshin maintains the former alternative.— On what grounds?—'On account of going, and of specification.' For the text refers to the 'going,' i.e. to the moving about in the different worlds, together with the soul when being born or dying, of seven prnas only, 'seven are these worlds in which the prnas move which rest in the cave, being placed there as seven and seven' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 8)—where the repetition 'seven and seven' intimates the plurality of souls to which the prnas are attached. Moreover those moving prnas are distinctly specified in the following text, 'when the five instruments of knowledge stand still, together with the mind (manas), and when the buddhi does not move, that they call the highest "going"' (gati—Ka. Up. II, 6, 10). The 'highest going' here means the moving towards Release, all movement within the body having come to an end. As thus the text declares that at the time of birth and death seven prnas only accompany the soul, and as, with regard to the condition of final concentration, those prnas are distinctly specified as forms of knowledge (jnni), we conclude that the prnas are the seven following instruments of the soul—the organs of hearing, feeling, seeing, tasting and smelling, the buddhi and the manas. In various other passages indeed, which refer to the prnas, higher numbers are mentioned, viz. up to fourteen, speech, the hands, the feet, the anus, the organ of generation, the ahankra and the kitta being added to those mentioned above; cp. e.g. 'there are eight grahas' (Bri. Up. III, 2, i); 'Seven are the prnas of the head, two the lower ones '(Taitt. Samh. V, 3, 2, 5). But as the text says nothing about those additional organs accompanying the soul, we assume that they are called prnas in a metaphorical sense only, since they all, more or less, assist the soul.—This view the next Stra sets aside.
5. But the hands and so on also; (since they assist the soul) abiding (in the body). Hence (it is) not so.
The organs are not seven only, but eleven, since the hands and the rest also contribute towards the experience and fruition of that which abides in the body, i.e. the soul, and have their separate offices, such as seizing, and so on. Hence it is not so, i.e. it must not be thought that the hands and the rest are not organs. Buddhi, ahankra and kitta, on the other hand, are (not independent organs but) mere designations of the manas, according as the latter is engaged in the functions of deciding (adhyavasya), or misconception (abhimna), or thinking (kint). The organs therefore are eleven. From this it follows that in the passage 'Ten are these prnas in man, and tman is the eleventh' (Bri. Up. II, 4, ii), the word tman denotes the manas. The number eleven is confirmed by scriptural and Smriti passages, cp. 'the ten organs and the one' (Bha. G. XIII, 5); 'ten are the vaikrika beings, the manas is the eleventh,' and others. Where more organs are mentioned, the different functions of the manas are meant; and references to smaller numbers are connected with special effects of the organs, such as accompanying the soul, and the like.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the going of the seven.'
6. And (they are) minute.
As the text 'these are all alike, all infinite' (Bri. Up. I, 5, 13), declares speech, mind, and breath to be infinite, we conclude that the prnas are all-pervading.—To this the Stra replies, that they are minute; for the text 'when the vital breath passes out of the body, all the prnas pass out after it' (Bri. Up. V, 4, 2), proves those prnas to be of limited size, and as when passing out they are not perceived by bystanders, they must be of minute size—The text which speaks of them as infinite is a text enjoining meditation ('he who meditates on them as infinite'), and infinity there means only that abundance of activities which is an attribute of the prna to be meditated on.
7. And the best.
By 'the best' we have to understand the chief vital air (mukhya prna), which, in the colloquy of the prnas, is determined to be the best because it is the cause of the preservation of the body. This chief vital air the Prvapakshin maintains to be something non-created, since Scripture (Ri. Samh. V, 129, 2), 'By its own law the One was breathing without wind,' shows that an effect of it, viz. the act of breathing, existed even previously to creation, at the time of a great pralaya; and because texts declaring it to have been created—such as 'from him is born breath' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 3)—may be interpreted in the same way as the texts declaring that the soul is something created (sec p. 540 ff.).— To this the reply is that, since this view contradicts scriptural statements as to the oneness of all, previous to creation; and since the Mundaka-text declares the prna to have been created in the same way as earth and the other elements; and since there are no texts plainly denying its createdness, the chief vital air also must be held to have been created. The words 'the One was breathing without wind' by no means refer to the vital breath of living creatures, but intimate the existence of the highest Brahman, alone by itself; as indeed appears from the qualification 'without wind.'—That the vital breath, although really disposed of in the preceding Stras, is specially mentioned in the present Stra, is with a view to the question next raised for consideration.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the minuteness of the prnas.'
8. Neither air nor function, on account of its being stated separately.
Is this main vital breath nothing else but air, the second of the elements? Or is it a certain motion of the air? Or is it air that has assumed some special condition?—The first alternative may be adopted, on account of the text 'prna is air.'—Or, since mere air is not called breath, while this term is generally applied to that motion of air which consists in inhalation and exhalation, we may hold that breath is a motion of air.—Of both these views the Stra disposes by declaring 'not so, on account of separate statement.' For in the passage 'From him there is produced breath, mind, and all sense-organs, ether and air,' &c, breath and air are mentioned as two separate things. For the same reason breath also cannot be a mere motion or function of air; for the text does not mention any functions of fire and the other elements, side by side with these elements, as separate things (and this shows that breath also cannot, in that text, be interpreted to denote a function of air). The text 'prna is air,' on the other hand, intimates (not that breath is identical with air, but) that breath is air having assumed a special form, not a thing altogether different from it, like fire. In ordinary language, moreover, the word breath does not mean a mere motion but a substance to which motion belongs; we say,'the breath moves to and fro in inhalation and exhalation.'
Is breath, which we thus know to be a modification of air, to be considered as a kind of elementary substance, like fire, earth, and so on? Not so, the next Stra replies.
9. But like the eye and the rest, on account of being taught with them, and for other reasons.
Breath is not an element, but like sight and the rest, a special instrument of the soul. This appears from the fact that the texts mention it together with the recognised organs of the soul, the eye, and so on; so e.g. in the colloquy of the prnas. And such common mention is suitable in the case of such things only as belong to one class.—The 'and for other reasons' of the Stra refers to the circumstance of the principal breath being specially mentioned among the organs comprised under the term 'prna'; cp. 'that principal breath' (Ch. Up. I, 2, 7); 'that central breath' (Bri. Up. I, 5, 21).—But if the chief breath is, like the eye and the other organs, an instrument of the soul, there must be some special form of activity through which it assists the soul, as the eye e.g. assists the soul by seeing. But no such activity is perceived, and the breath cannot therefore be put in the same category as the organs of sensation and action!—To this objection the next Stra replies.
10. And there is no objection on account of its not having an activity (karana); for (Scripture) thus declares.
The karana of the Stra means kriy, action. The objection raised on the ground that the principal breath does not exercise any form of activity helpful to the soul, is without force, since as a matter of fact Scripture declares that there is such an activity, in so far as the vital breath supports the body with all its organs. For the text (Ch. Up. V, 1, 7 ff.) relates how on the successive departure of speech, and so on, the body and the other organs maintained their strength, while on the departure of the vital breath the body and all the organs at once became weak and powerless.—The conclusion therefore is that the breath, in its fivefold form of prna, apna, and so on, subserves the purposes of the individual soul, and thus occupies the position of an instrument, no less than the eye and the other organs.
But as those five forms of breath, viz. prna, udna, &c., have different names and functions they must be separate principles (and hence there is not one principal breath)! To this the next Stra replies.
11. It is designated as having five functions like mind.
As desire, and so on, are not principles different from mind, although they are different functions and produce different effects—according to the text, 'Desire, purpose, doubt, faith, want of faith, firmness, absence of firmness, shame, reflection, fear—all this is mind' (Bri. Up. I, 5, 3); so, on the ground of the text, 'prna, apna, vyna, udna, samna—all this is prna' (ibid.), apna and the rest must be held to be different functions of prna only, not independent principles.—Here terminates the adhikarana of what is 'a modification of air.'
12. And (it is) minute.
This prna also is minute, since as before (i.e. as in the case of the organs) the text declares it to pass out of the body, to move, and so on, 'him when he passes out the prna follows after' (Bri. Up. V, 4, 2). A further doubt arises, in the case of prna, owing to the fact that in other texts it is spoken of as of large extent, 'It is equal to these three worlds, equal to this Universe' (Bri. Up. I, 3, 22); 'On prna everything is founded'; 'For all this is shut up in prna.' But as the texts declaring the passing out, and so on, of the prna, prove it to be of limited size, the all-embracingness ascribed to prna in those other texts must be interpreted to mean only that the life of all living and breathing creatures depends on breath.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the minuteness of the best.'
13. But the rule (over the prnas) on the part of Fire and the rest, together with him to whom the prna belong (i.e. the soul), is owing to the thinking of that (viz. the highest Self); on account of scriptural statement.
It has been shown that the prnas, together with the main prna, originate from Brahman, and have a limited size. That the prnas are guided by Agni and other divine beings has also been explained on a previous occasion, viz. under S. II, 1, 5. And it is known from ordinary experience that the organs are ruled by the individual soul, which uses them as means of experience and fruition. And this is also established by scriptural texts, such as 'Having taken these prnas he (i.e. the soul) moves about in his own body, according to his pleasure'(Bri. Up. II, 1, 18). The question now arises whether the rule of the soul and of the presiding divine beings over the prnas depends on them (i.e. the soul and the divinities) only, or on some other being.— On them only, since they depend on no one else!—Not so, the Stra declares. The rule which light, and so on, i.e. Agni and the other divinities, together with him to whom the prnas belong i.e. the soul, exercise over the prnas, proceeds from the thinking of that, i.e. from the will of the highest Self.—How is this known?—'From scriptural statement.' For Scripture teaches that the organs, together with their guiding divinities and the individual soul, depend in all their doings on the thought of the highest Person. 'He, who abiding within Fire, rules Fire from within.—He, who abiding within the air—within the Self— within the eye, and so on' (Bri. Up III, 7); 'From fear of it the wind blows, from fear of it the sun rises, from fear of it Agni and Indra, yea Death runs as the fifth' (Taitt. Up. II, 8, 1); 'By the command of that Imperishable one, sun and moon stand, held apart'(Bri Up III, 8, 9).
14. And on account of the eternity of this.
As the quality, inhering in all things, of being ruled by the highest Self, is eternal and definitely fixed by being connected with his essential nature, it is an unavoidable conclusion that the rule of the soul and of the divinities over the organs depends on the will of the highest Self. The text, 'Having sent forth this he entered into it, having entered into it he became sat and tyat' (Taitt. Up. II, 6), shows that the entering on the part of the highest Person into all things, so as to be their ruler, is connected with his essential nature. Similarly Smriti says, 'Pervading this entire Universe by a portion of mine I do abide' (Bha. G. X, 42).—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the rule of Fire and the rest.'
15. They, with the exception of the best, are organs, on account of being so designated.
Are all principles called prnas to be considered as 'organs' (indriyni), or is the 'best,' i.e. the chief prna, to be excepted?— All of them, without exception, are organs; for they all are called prnas equally, and they all are instruments of the soul.—Not so, the Stra replies. The 'best' one is to be excepted, since only the prawas other than the best are designated as organs. Texts such as 'the organs are ten and one' (Bha. G. XIII, 5) apply the term 'organ' only to the senses of sight and the rest, and the internal organ.
16. On account of scriptural statement of difference, and on account of difference of characteristics.
Texts such as 'from him is born prna, and the internal organ, and all organs' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 3) mention the vital breath separately from the organs, and this shows that the breath is not one of the organs. The passage indeed mentions the internal organ (manas) also as something separate; but in other passages the manas is formally included in the organs, 'the (five) organs with mind as the sixth' (Bha. G. XV, 7). That the vital breath differs in nature from the organ of sight and the rest, is a matter of observation. For in the state of deep sleep the function of breath is seen to continue, while those of the eye, and so on, are not perceived. The work of the organs, inclusive of the manas, is to act as instruments of cognition and action, while the work of breath is to maintain the body and the organs. It is for the reason that the subsistence of the organs depends on breath, that the organs themselves are called prnas. Thus Scripture says, 'they all became the form of that (breath), and therefore they are called after him prnas' (Bri. Up. I, 5, 21). 'They became its form' means—they became its body, their activity depended on it.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the organs.'
17. But the making of names and forms (belongs) to him who renders tripartite, on account of scriptural teaching.
The Stras have shown that the creation of the elements and organs in their collective aspect (samashti) and the activity of the individual souls proceed from the highest Self; and they have also further confirmed the view that the rule which the souls exercise over their organs depends on the highest Self. A question now arises with regard to the creation of the world in its discrete aspect (vyashti), which consists in the differentiation of names and forms (i.e. of individual beings). Is this latter creation the work of Hiranyagarbha only, who represents the collective aggregate of all individual souls; or, fundamentally, the work of the highest Brahman having Hiranyagarbha for its body—just as the creation of water e.g. is the work of the highest Brahman having sire for its body?—The Prvapakshin maintains the former alternative. For, he says, the text 'Having entered with this living- soul-self (anena jvent-man), let me differentiate names and forms' (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2), declares the jva-soul to be the agent in differentiation. For the resolve of the highest deity is expressed, not in the form 'let me differentiate names and forms by myself (svena rpena), but 'by this soul-self,' i.e. by a part of the highest Self, in the form of the individual soul.—But on this interpretation the first person in 'vykaravni' (let me enter), and the grammatical form of 'having entered,' which indicates the agent, could not be taken in their literal, but only in an implied, sense—as is the case in a sentence such as 'Having entered the hostile army by means of a spy, I will estimate its strength' (where the real agent is not the king, who is the speaker, but the spy).—The cases are not analogous, the Prvapakshin replies. For the king and the spy are fundamentally separate, and hence the king is agent by implication only. But in the case under discussion the soul is a part, and hence contributes to constitute the essential nature of, the highest Self; hence that highest Self itself enters and differentiates in the form of the soul. Nor can it be said that the instrumental case ('with this soul-self') has the implied meaning of association ('together with this soul-self'); for if a case can be taken in its primary sense, it is not proper to understand it in a sense which has to be expressed by means of a preposition. But the third case, jvena, cannot here be understood even in its primary sense, i.e. that of the instrument of the action; for if Brahman is the agent in the acts of entering and differentiating, the soul is not that which is most suitable to accomplish the end of action (while yet grammar defines the instrumental case—karana—on this basis). Nor can it be said that the activity of the soul comes to an end with the entering, while the differentiation of names and forms is Brahman's work, for the past participle (pravisya) indicates (according to the rules of grammar) that the two actions—of entering and differentiating—belong to the same agent. And although the soul as being a part of the highest Self shares in its nature, yet in order to distinguish it from the highest Self, the text by means of the clause 'with that living Self refers to it as something outward (not of the nature of the Self). The agent in the action of differentiation of names and forms therefore is Hiranyagarbha. Smriti texts also ascribe to him this activity; cp.'he in the beginning made, from the words of the Veda, the names and forms of beings, of the gods and the rest, and of actions.'
Against this view the Stra declares itself. The differentiation of names and forms belongs to him who renders tripartite, i.e. the highest Brahman; since it is assigned by Scripture to the latter only. For the text 'That divinity thought, let me, having entered these three beings with this living-soul-self, differentiate names and forms—let me make each of these three tripartite,' shows that all the activities mentioned have one and the same agent. But the rendering tripartite cannot belong to Brahma (Hiranyagarbha), who abides within the Brahma-egg, for that egg itself is produced from fire, water, and earth, only after these elements have been rendered tripartite; and Smriti says that Brahm himself originated in that egg, 'in that egg there originated Brahm, the grandfather of all the worlds.' As thus the action of rendering tripartite can belong to the highest Brahman only, the differentiation of names and forms, which belongs to the same agent, also is Brahman's only.—But how then does the clause 'with that living-soul-self' fit in?— The co-ordination 'with that soul, with the Self,' shows that the term 'soul' here denotes the highest Brahman as having the soul for its body; just as in the clauses 'that fire thought'; 'it sent forth water'; 'water thought,' and so on, what is meant each time is Brahman having fire, water, and so on, for its body. The work of differentiating names and forms thus belongs to the highest Brahman which has for its body Hiranyagarbha, who represents the soul in its aggregate form. On this view the first person (in 'let me differentiate') and the agency (conveyed by the form of 'pravisya') may, without any difficulty, be taken in their primary literal senses; and the common agency, implied in the connexion of pravisya and vykaravni, is accounted for. The view here set forth as to the relation of Brahman and Hiranyagarbha also explains how the accounts of Hiranyagarbha's (Brahm's) creative activity can say that he differentiated names and forms.
The whole passus beginning 'that divinity thought,' therefore has the following meaning—'Having entered into those three beings, viz. Fire, Water, and Earth, with my Self which is qualified by the collective soul (as constituting its body), let me differentiate names and forms, i.e. let me produce gods and all the other kinds of individual beings, and give them names; and to that end, since fire, water, and earth have not yet mutually combined, and hence are incapable of giving rise to particular things, let me make each of them tripartite, and thus fit them for creation.'—The settled conclusion then is, that the differentiation of names and forms is the work of the highest Brahman only.
But, an objection is raised, the fact that the differentiation of names and forms must be due to the same agent as the rendering tripartite, does not after all prove that the former is due to the highest Self. For the rendering tripartite may itself belong to the individual soul. For the text relates how, after the creation of the cosmic egg, a process of tripartition was going on among the individual living beings created by Brahm. 'Learn from me, my friend, how those three beings having reached man become tripartite, each of them. The earth when eaten is disposed of in three ways; its grossest portion becomes feces, its middle portion flesh, its subtlest portion mind,' and so on. Similarly, in the preceding section, it is described how the process of tripartition goes on in the case of fire, sun, moon, and lightning, which all belong to the world created by Brahm, 'the red colour of burning fire is the colour of fire,' &c. And the text moreover states the original tripartition to have taken place after the differentiation of names and forms: 'That divinity having entered into these three beings differentiated names and forms. Each of these (beings) it rendered tripartite.'—To this objection the next Stra replies.
18. Flesh is of earthy nature; in the case of the two others also according to the text.
The view that the description of tripartition, given in the passage 'each of these he made tripartite,' refers to a time subsequent to the creation of the mundane egg and to the gods created by Brahm, cannot be upheld. For from it there would follow that, as in the passage 'earth when eaten is disposed of in three ways,' &c., flesh is declared to be more subtle than feces, and mind yet subtler, it would have to be assumed—in agreement with the nature of the causal substance—that flesh is made of water and manas of fire [FOOTNOTE 581:1]. And similarly we should have to assume that urine—which is the grossest part of water drunk (cp. VI, 5, 2)—is of the nature of earth, and breath, which is its subtlest part, of the nature of fire. But this is not admissible; for as the text explicitly states that earth when eaten is disposed of in three ways, flesh and mind also must be assumed to be of an earthy nature. In the same way we must frame our view concerning 'the two others,' i.e. water and fire, 'according to the text.' That means—the three parts into which water divides itself when drunk, must be taken to be all of them modifications of water, and the three parts of fire when consumed must be held to be all of them modifications of fire. Thus feces, flesh and mind are alike transformations of earth; urine, blood and breath transformations of water; bones, marrow and speech transformations of fire.
This moreover agrees with the subsequent statement (VI, 5, 4), 'For, truly, mind consists of earth, breath of water, speech of fire.' The process of tripartition referred to in VI, 3, 4, is not therefore the same as the one described in the section that tells us what becomes of food when eaten, water when drunk, &c. Were this (erroneous) assumption made, and were it thence concluded that mind, breath and speech—as being the subtlest created things—are made of fire, this would flatly contradict the complementary text quoted above ('mind consists of earth,' &c.). When the text describes how earth, water and fire, when eaten, are transformed in a threefold way, it refers to elements which had already been rendered tripartite; the process of tripartition must therefore have taken place before the creation of the cosmic egg. Without such tripartition the elements would be incapable of giving rise to any effects; such capability they acquire only by being mutually conjoined, and that is just the process of tripartition. In agreement herewith Smriti says, 'Separate from each other, without connexion, those elements with their various powers were incapable of producing creatures. Bul having combined completely, entered into mutual conjunction, abiding one within the other, the principles—from the highest Mahat down to individual things—produced the mundane egg.'— When the text therefore says (VI, 3, 3) 'The divinity having entered into those three beings with that soul-self differentiated names and forms; he made each of these tripartite,' the order in which the text mentions the activities of differentiation and tripartition is refuted by the order demanded by the sense [FOOTNOTE 583:1].—The text then proceeds to exemplify the process of tripartition, by means of burning fire, the sun and lightning, which indeed are things contained within the mundane egg (while yet the tripartition of elements took place before the egg, with all its contents, was created); but this is done for the information of Svetaketu, who himself is a being within the mundane egg, and has to be taught with reference to things he knows.
But, a final objection is raised, as on this view of the matter the elements—earth, water and fire—which are eaten and drunk, are already tripartite, each of them containing portions of all, and thus are of a threefold nature, how can they be designated each of them by a simple term—earth, water, fire?—To this the next Stra replies.
[FOOTNOTE 581:1. I.e. if the tripartition of earth (i. e. solid food) when eaten, which is described in VI, 5, 1, were the same tripartition which is described in VI, 3, 3-4, we should have to conclude that the former tripartition consists, like the latter, in an admixture to earth of water and fire.]
[FOOTNOTE 583:1. That means—in reality the tripartition of the elements came first, and after that the creation of individual beings.]
19. But on account of their distinctive nature there is that designation, that designation.
Each element indeed is of a threefold nature, owing to the primary tripartition; but as in each mixed element one definite element prevails— so that each element has a distinctive character of its own—a definite designation is given to each.—The repetition (of 'that designation') in the Stra indicates the completion of the adhyya.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the fashioning of names and forms.'
1. In obtaining another of that, it goes enveloped, (as appears) from question and explanation.
That the Vednta-texts establish as the proper object of meditation, on the part of all men desirous of Release, the highest Brahman, which is the only cause of the entire world, which is not touched by even a shadow of imperfection, which is an ocean, as it were, of supremely exalted qualities, and which totally differs in nature from all other beings—this is the point proved in the two previous adhyyas; there being given at the same time arguments to disprove the objections raised against the Vednta doctrine on the basis of Smriti and reasoning, to refute the views held by other schools, to show that the different Vednta-texts do not contradict each other, and to prove that the Self is the object of activities (enjoined in injunctions of meditation, and so on). In short, those two adhyyas have set forth the essential nature of Brahman. The subsequent part of the work now makes it its task to enquire into the mode of attaining to Brahman, together with the means of attainment. The third adhyya is concerned with an enquiry into meditation—which is the means of attaining to Brahman; and as the motive for entering on such meditation is supplied by the absence of all desire for what is other than the thing to be obtained, and by the desire for that thing, the points first to be enquired into are the imperfections of the individual soul—moving about in the different worlds, whether waking or dreaming or merged in dreamless sleep, or in the state of swoon; and those blessed characteristics by which Brahman is raised above all these imperfections. These are the topics of the first and second pdas of the adhyya.
The first question to be considered is whether the soul, when moving from one body into another, is enveloped by those subtle rudiments of the elements from which the new body is produced, or not. The Prvapakshin maintains the latter alternative; for, he says, wherever the soul goes it can easily provide itself there with those rudiments. Other reasons supporting this prim facie view will be mentioned and refuted further on.—The Stra states the view finally accepted, 'In obtaining another "of that" it goes enveloped.' The 'of that' refers back to the form, i.e. body, mentioned in II, 4, 17. The soul when moving towards another embodiment goes enveloped by the rudiments of the elements. This is known 'from question and explanation,' i.e. answer. Question and answer are recorded in the 'Knowledge of the five fires' (Ch. Up. V, 3-10), where Pravhana, after having addressed to Svetaketu several other questions, finally asks 'Do you know why in the fifth libation water is called man?' In answer to this last question the text then explains how the Devas, i.e. the prnas attached to the soul, offer into the heavenly world, imagined as a sacrificial fire, the oblation called sraddh; how this sraddh changes itself into a body con sisting of amrita, which body is called moon; how the same prnas offer this body of amrita in Parjanya, imagined as a fire, whereupon the body so offered becomes rain; how the same prnas throw that rain on to the earth, also imagined as a sacrificial fire, whereupon it becomes food; how this food is then offered into man, also compared to fire, where it becomes seed; and how, finally, this seed is offered into woman, also compared to a fire, and there becomes an embryo. The text then goes on, 'Thus in the fifth oblation water becomes purushavakas,' i.e. to be designated by the term man. And this means that the water which, in a subtle form, was throughout present in the previous oblations also, now, in that fifth oblation, assumes the form of a man.—From this question and answer it thus appears that the soul moves towards a new embodiment, together with the subtle rudiments from which the new body springs.—But the words, 'water becomes purushavakas,' only intimate that water assumes the form of a man, whence we conclude that water only invests the soul during its wanderings; how then can it be held that the soul moves invested by the rudiments of all elements?—To this question the next Stra replies.
2. But on account of (water) consisting of the three elements; on account of predominance.
Water alone could not produce a new body; for the text Ch. Up. VI, 3, 4, 'Each of these he made tripartite,' shows that all the elements were' made tripartite to the end of producing bodies. That the text under discussion mentions water only, is due to the predominance of water; and that among the elements giving rise to a new body water predominates, we infer from the fact that blood and the other humours are the predominating element in the body.
3. And on account of the going of the prnas.
That the soul goes embedded in the subtle rudiments of the elements follows therefrom also that when passing out of the old body it is said to be followed by the prnas, 'when he thus passes out, the chief prna follows after him,' &c. (Bri. Up. V, 4, 2). Compare also Smriti: 'It draws to itself the organs of sense, with the mind for the sixth. When the Ruler (soul) obtains a new body, and passes out of another, he takes with him those organs and then moves on, as the wind takes the odours from their abodes (the flowers)' (Bha. G. XV, 8). But the prnas cannot move without a substrate, and hence we must admit that the rudiments of the elements—which are their substrate—are also moving.
4. If it be said (that it is not so) on account of scriptural statement as to going to Agni and the rest; we say no, on account of the secondary nature (of the statement).
But the text, 'when the speech of the dead person enters into fire,' &c. (Bri. Up. III, 2, 13). declares that when a person dies his organs go into fire, and so on; they cannot therefore accompany the soul. Hence the text which asserts the latter point must be explained in some other way!—Not so, the Stra replies. The text stating that the organs go to fire, and so on, cannot be taken in its literal sense; for it continues, 'the hairs of the body enter into herbs, the hair of the head into trees' (which manifestly is not true, in its literal sense). The going of speech, the eye, and so on, must therefore be understood to mean that the different organs approach the divinities (Agni and the rest) who preside over them.
5. Should it be said, on account of absence of mention in the first (reply); we say no, for just that (is meant), on the ground of fitness.
An objection is raised to the conclusion arrived at under III, 1, 1; on the ground that in the first oblation, described in Ch. Up. V, 4, 2, as being made into the heavenly world, water is not mentioned at all as the thing offered. The text says, 'on that altar the gods offer sraddh'; and by sraddh (belief) everybody understands a certain activity of mind. Water therefore is not the thing offered.—Not so, we reply. It is nothing else but water, which there is called sraddh. For thus only question and answer have a sense. For the question is, 'Do you know why in the fifth libation water is called man?' and at the outset of the reply sraddh is mentioned as constituting the oblation made into the heavenly world viewed as a fire. If here the word sraddh did not denote water, question and answer would refer to different topics, and there would be no connexion. The form in which the final statement is introduced (iti tu pakamym, &c., 'but thus in the fifth oblation,' &c.), moreover, also intimates that sraddh means water. The word 'iti,' thus, here intimates that the answer is meant to dispose of the question, 'Do you know how?' &c. Sraddh becomes moon, rain, food, seed, embryo in succession, and thus the water comes to be called man. Moreover, the word sraddh is actually used in the Veda in the sense of 'water'; 'he carries water, sraddh indeed is water' (Taitt. Samh. I, 6, 8, 1). Aad what the text says as to king Soma (the moon) originating from sraddh when offered, also shows that sraddh must mean water.
6. 'On account of this not being stated by Scripture'; not so, on account of those who perform sacrifices and so on being understood.
But, a further objection is raised, in the whole section under discussion no mention at all is made of the soul; the section cannot therefore prove that the soul moves, enveloped by water. The text speaks only of different forms of water sraddh and the rest.—This, the Stra points out, is not so, on account of those who perform sacrifices being understood. For further on in the same chapter it is said, that those who, while destitute of the knowledge of Brahman, practise sacrifices, useful works and alms, reach the heavenly world and become there of the essence of the moon (somarjnah); whence, on the results of their good works being exhausted, they return again and enter on a new embryonic state (Ch. Up. V, 10). Now in the preceding section (V, 9) it is said that they offer sraddh in the heavenly world, and that from that oblation there arises the king Soma—an account which clearly refers to the same process as the one described in V, 10. We herefrom infer that what is meant in V, 9 is that that being which was distinguished by a body of sraddh, becomes a being distinguished by a body of the nature of the moon. The word body denotes that the nature of which it is to be the attribute of a soul, and thus extends in its connotation up to the soul. The meaning of the section therefore is that it is the soul which moves enveloped by water and the other rudimentary elements.—But the phrase 'him the gods eat' (V, 10, 4) shows that the king Soma cannot be the soul, for that cannot be eaten!—To this the next Stra replies.
7. Or it is metaphorical, on account of their not knowing the Self. For thus Scripture declares.
He who performs sacrifices, and so on, and thus does not know the Self, is here below and in yonder world a mere means of enjoyment for the devas. He serves them here, by propitiating them with sacrifices, and so on; and when the gods, pleased with his service, have taken him up into yonder world, he there is a common means of enjoyment for them (since they are gratified by the presence of a faithful servant). That those not knowing the Self serve and benefit the gods, Scripture explicitly declares, 'He is like a beast for the devas' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 10). Smriti also declares, that while those who know the Self attain to Brahman, those who do not know it are means of enjoyment for the devas, 'To the gods go the worshippers of the gods, and they that are devoted to me go to me' (Bha. G. VII, 23). When Scripture speaks of the soul being eaten by the gods, it therefore only means that the soul is to them a source of enjoyment. That eating the soul means no more than satisfaction with it, may also be inferred from the following scriptural passage, 'The gods in truth do not eat nor do they drink; by the mere sight of that amrita they are satisfied.'—It thus remains a settled conclusion that the soul moves enveloped by the subtle rudiments of the elements.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the obtaining of another body.'
8. On the passing away of the works, with a remainder, according to Scripture and Smriti; as it went and not so.
The text declares that those who only perform sacrifices and useful works ascend by the road of the fathers, and again return to the earth when they have fully enjoyed the fruit of their works, 'having dwelt there yvat samptam, they return by the same way' (Ch. Up. V, 10, 5). The question here arises whether the descending soul carries a certain remainder (anusaya) of its works or not.—It does not, since it has enjoyed the fruit of all its works. For by 'anusaya' we have to understand that part of the karman which remains over and above the part retributively enjoyed; but when the fruit of the entire karman has been enjoyed, there is no such remainder. And that this is so we learn from the phrase 'yvat samptam ushitv,' which means 'having dwelt there as long as the karman lasts' (sampatanty anena svargalokam iti samptah). Analogously another text says, 'Having obtained the end of whatever deed he does on earth, he again returns from that world to this world to action' (Bri. Up. V, 4, 6).—Against this prim facie view the Stra declares 'with a remainder he descends, on account of what is seen, i.e. scriptural text, and Smriti.' The scriptural text is the one 'Those whose conduct has been good' (V, 10, 7), which means that among the souls that have returned, those whose karman is good obtain a good birth as Brhmanas or the like, while those whose karman is bad are born again as low creatures-dogs, pigs, Kndlas, and the like. This shows that the souls which have descended are still connected with good or evil karman. Smriti also declares this: 'Men of the several castes and orders, who always stand firm in the works prescribed for them, enjoy after death the rewards of their works, and by virtue of a remnant (of their works) they are born again in excellent countries, castes and families, endowed with beauty, long life, learning in the Vedas, wealth, good conduct, happiness and wisdom. Those who act in a contrary manner perish' (Gautama Dha. S. XI, 29); 'Afterwards when a man returns to this world he obtains, by virtue of a remainder of works, birth in a good family, beauty of form, beauty of complexion, strength, aptitude for learning, wisdom, wealth, and capacity for fulfilling his duties. Therefore, rolling like a wheel (from the one to the other), in both worlds he dwells in happiness' (past. Dha. S. II, 1, 2, 3). The clause 'as long as his works last' (yvat-samptam) refers to that part of his works only which was performed with a view to reward (as promised for those works by the Veda); and the same holds true with regard to the passage 'whatever work man does here on earth' (Bri. Up. V, 4, 6). Nor is it possible that works, the fruit of which has not yet been enjoyed, and those the result of which has not been wiped out by expiatory ceremonies, should be destroyed by the enjoyment of the fruits of other works. Hence those who have gone to that world return with a remnant of their works, 'as they went and not so'—i.e. in the same way as they ascended and also in a different way. For the ascent takes place by the following stages—smoke, night, the dark half of the moon, the six months of the sun's southern progress, the world of the fathers, ether, moon. The descent, on the other hand, goes from the place of the moon, through ether, wind, smoke, mist, cloud. The two journeys are alike in so far as they pass through ether, but different in so far as the descent touches wind, and so on, and does not touch the world of the fathers, and other stages of the ascent.
9. 'On account of conduct'; not so, since (karana) connotes works; thus Krshnjini thinks.
In the phrases 'those whose works were good' (ramanya-karanh), and 'those whose works were bad' (kapy-karanh), the word karana does not denote good and evil works (i.e. not such works as the Veda on the one hand enjoins as leading to certain rewards, and on the other prohibits, threatening punishment), for, in Vedic as well as ordinary language, the term karana is generally used in the sense of kra, i.e. general conduct. In ordinary speech such words as kra, sla, vritta are considered synonymous, and in the Veda we read 'whatever works (karmni) are blameless, those should be regarded, not others. Whatever our good conduct (su-karitni) was, that should be observed by thee, nothing else' (Taitt. Up. I, 11, 2)—where 'works' and 'conduct' are distinguished. Difference in quality of birth therefore depends on conduct, not on the remainder of works performed with a view to certain results.—This prim facie view the Stra sets aside, 'not so, because the scriptural term karana connotes works; thus the teacher Krshnjini thinks.' For mere conduct does not lead to experiences of pleasure and pain; pleasure and pain are the results of works in the limited sense.
10. 'There is purposelessness'; not so, on account of the dependence on that.
But if conduct has no result, it follows that good conduct, as enjoined in the Smritis, is useless!—Not so, we reply; for holy works enjoined by the Veda depend on conduct, in so far as a man of good conduct only is entitled to perform those works. This appears from passages such as the following: 'A man who is not pure is unfit for all religious work,' and 'Him who is devoid of good conduct the Vedas do not purify.' Krshnjini's view thus is, that the karana of the text implies karman.
11. But only good and evil works, thus Bdari thinks.
As the verb -kar takes karman for its object (punyam karm karati, &c.), and as the separate denotation (i.e. the use of apparently equivalent words, viz. kar and karman) can be accounted for on the ground that one of them refers to works established by manifest texts, and the other to texts inferred from actually existing rules of good conduct; and as, when the primary meaning is possible, no secondary meaning must be adopted; nothing else but good and evil works (in the Vedic sense) are denoted by the word karana: such is the opinion of the teacher Bdari. This opinion of Bdari, the author of the Stra states as representing his own. On the other hand, he adopts the view of Krshnajini in so far as he considers such items of virtuous conduct as the Sandhy—which are enjoined by scriptural texts, the existence of which is inferred on the basis of conduct as enjoined by Smriti—to have the result of qualifying the agent for the performance of other works.—The conclusion therefore is that the souls descend, carrying a remnant of their works.— Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the passing of works.'
12. Of those also who do not perform sacrifices (the ascent) is declared by Scripture.
It has been said that those who perform only sacrifices, and so on, go to the moon and thence return with a remainder of their works. The question now arises whether those also who do not perform sacrifices go to the moon. The phrase 'who do not perform sacrifices' denotes evil- doers of two kinds, viz. those who do not do what is enjoined, and those who do what is forbidden.—These also go to the moon, the Prvapakshin maintains; for the text contains a statement to that effect, 'All who depart from this world go to the moon' (Ka. Up. I, 2)—where it is said that all go, without any distinction. So that those who perform good works and those who perform evil works, equally go to the moon.—This the next Stra negatives.
13. But of the others having enjoyed in Samyamana, there is ascent and descent; as such a course is declared.
Of the others, i.e. those who do not perform sacrifices, and so on, there is ascent to the moon and descent from there, only after they have in the kingdom of Yama suffered the punishments due to their actions. For the text declares that evil-doers fall under the power of Yama, and have to go to him, 'He who thinks, this is the world there is no other, falls again and again under my sway' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 6); 'the son of Vivasvat, the gathering place of men' (Rik Samh. X, 14, 1); 'King Yama,' and other texts.
14. Smriti texts also declare this.
That all beings are under the sway of Yama, Parsara also and other Smriti writers declare, 'And all these pass under the sway of Yama.'
15. Moreover there are seven.
The Smritis moreover declare that there are seven hells, called Raurava, and so on, to which evil-doers have to go.—But how do they, if moving about in those seven places, reach the palace of Yama?
16. On account of his activity there also, there is no contradiction.
As their going to those seven places also is due to the command of Yama, there is no contradiction.—Thus those also who do not perform sacrifices, and so on, after having gone to the world of Yama, and there undergone punishments according to the nature of their works, later on ascend to the moon and again descend from there.—Of this conclusion the next Stra disposes.
17. But, of knowledge and work—as these are the leading topics.
The 'but' sets aside the view developed so far. It cannot be admitted that those also who do not perform sacrifices, and so on, reach the moon; because the path of the gods and the path of the fathers are meant for the enjoyment of the fruits 'of knowledge and work.'That is to say—as those who do not perform sacrifices cannot ascend by the path of the gods, since they are destitute of knowledge; so they also cannot go by the path of the fathers, since they are destitute of meritorious works. And that these two paths are dependent respectively on knowledge and works, we know from the fact that these two are the leading topics. For knowledge forms the leading topic with regard to the path of the gods, 'Those who know this, and those who in the forest follow faith and austerities, go to light,' &c.; and works have the same position with regard to the path of the fathers, "they who living in a village perform sacrifices, &c. go to the smoke," &c. The text, 'all those who depart from this world go to the moon,' must therefore be interpreted to mean 'all those who perform sacrifices go to the moon.'—But if evil-doers do not go to the moon, the fifth oblation cannot take place, and no new body can be produced. For the text says, 'In the fifth oblation water is called man,' and, as we have shown, that fifth oblation presupposes the soul's going to the moon. In order, therefore, to understand how in their case also a new embodiment is possible, it must needs be admitted that they also ascend to the moon.—To this the next Stra replies.
18. Not in the case of the third (place), as it is thus perceived.
The third 'place' does not, for the origination of a new body, depend on the fifth oblation. The term,'the third place,' denotes mere evil-doers. That these do not, for the origination of a new body, depend on the fifth oblation, is seen from Scripture. For, in answer to the question 'Do you know why that world never becomes full?' the text says, 'On neither of these two ways are those small creatures continually returning, of whom it may be said, Live and die. This is the third place. Therefore that world never becomes full.' As this passage states that in consequence of 'the third place' (i.e. the creatures forming a third class) not ascending to and descending from the heavenly world that world never becomes full, it follows that that third place does not, for the origination of bodies, depend on the fifth oblation. The clause, 'in the fifth oblation,' moreover, merely states that the connexion of water with the fifth fire is the cause of the water 'being called man' (i. e. becoming an embryo), but does not deny the origination of embryos in other ways; for the text contains no word asserting such a limitation.
19. It moreover is recorded, in the world.
Smriti, moreover, states that the bodies of some specially meritorious persons, such as Draupad, Dhrishtadyumna and others, were formed independently of the fifth oblation' (i.e. sexual union).
20. And on account of its being seen.
And it is seen in Scripture also, that the bodies of some beings originate independently of the fifth oblation: 'Of all beings there are indeed three origins only, that which springs from an egg, that which springs from a living being, that which springs from a germ' (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 1). It is observed that from among these beings those springing from a germ and those springing from heat originate without that fifth oblation.—But the text quoted does not refer to the creatures springing from heat; for it says that there are three origins only!—To this the next Stra replies.
21. The third term includes that which springs from heat.
Creatures sprung from heat are included in the third term—viz. that which springs from a germ—which is exhibited in the text quoted. The settled conclusion therefore is that the evil-doers do not go to the moon.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'those who do not perform sacrifices.'
22. There is entering into similarity of being with those, there being a reason.
The text describes the manner in which those who perform sacrifices, and so on, descend from the moon as follows: 'They return again that way as they came, to the ether, from the ether to the air. Then having become air they become smoke, having become smoke they become mist,' &c. The doubt here arises whether the soul when reaching ether, and so on, becomes ether in the same sense as here on earth it becomes a man or other being, or merely becomes similar to ether, and so on.—The former view is the true one; for as the soul in the sraddh state becomes the moon, so it must likewise be held to become ether, and so on, there being no reason for a difference in the two cases.—This prim facie view the Stra sets aside. The descending soul enters into similarity of being with ether, and so on; since there is a reason for this. When the soul becomes a man or becomes the moon, there is a reason for that, since it thereby becomes capacitated for the enjoyment of pain and pleasure. But there is no similar reason for the soul becoming ether, and so on, and hence the statement that the soul becomes ether, and so on, can only mean that, owing to contact with them, it becomes similar to them.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'entering into similarity of being.'
23. Not very long; on account of special statement.
Does the soul in its descent through ether, and so on, stay at each stage for a not very long time, or is there nothing to define that time?— It stays at each stage for an indefinite time, there being nothing to define the time.—
Not so, the Stra decides. For there is a special statement, i.e. the text says that when the soul has become rice or grain or the like, the passing out of that stage is beset with difficulties. From this we infer that as there is no such statement concerning the earlier stages, the soul stays at each of them for a short time only.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the not very long time.'
24. Into (plants) animated by other souls, because the statement is as in the previous cases.
The text declares that 'he descending souls are born as rice, corn,' &c., 'they are born here as rice, corn, herbs, trees,' &c. The question here is whether the souls cling to plants animated by other souls which have those plants for their bodies; or whether the descending souls themselves are born with those plants for their bodies.—The latter view is the right one; for the text says, 'they are born as rice, grain,' and so on, and this expression is of the same kind as when we say 'he is born as a man, as a deva,' and so on. The text therefore means that the souls are embodied in the different plants.—This view the Stra rejects. The souls merely cling to those plants which constitute the bodies of other souls; 'since the statement is as in the previous cases,' i.e. because the text only says that the souls become plants as it had previously been said that they become ether, and so on. Where the text means to say that the soul enters on the condition of an enjoying soul (i.e. of a soul assuming a new body for the purpose of retributive enjoyment), it refers to the deeds which lead to such enjoyment; so e. g. in the passage, 'Those whose works have been good obtain a good birth,' & c. But in the text under discussion there is no such reference to karman. For those works—viz. sacrifices and the like—which were undertaken with a view to reward, such as enjoyment of the heavenly world, are, in the case of the descending souls, completely wiped out by the enjoyment of the heavenly world (which precedes the descent of the souls); and those works on the other hand, the action of which has not yet begun, lead to the embodiments mentioned further on ('Those whose works are good'). And in the interval between those two conditions no new karman originates. When, therefore, the text says that the souls are born as plants, the statement cannot be taken in its literal sense.
25. It is unholy. Not so, on the ground of Scripture.
The conclusion arrived at above cannot be accepted, since there is a reason why the descending soul should enter on the condition of an enjoying soul. Such works as sacrifices, the fruit of which is the enjoyment of the heavenly world, are mixed with evil, for they imply injury to living beings as in the case of the goat offered to Agnshomau. And such injury is evil as it is forbidden by texts such as 'let him not harm any creature.' Nor can it be said that the injunctions of sacrificing animals constitute exceptions to the general rule of not harming any creature.—For the two injunctions refer to different things. The injunction to kill the goat for Agnshomau intimates that the killing of the animal subserves the accomplishment of the sacrifice, while the injunction not to 'harm' teaches that such harming has disastrous consequences. Should it be said that the prohibition of harming does not refer to such actions as the sacrifice of the goat which proceed on the basis of scriptural injunction, but only to such actions as spring from natural passion or desire (rga); we remark that in the case of sacrifices also the action is equally prompted by natural desire. Injunctions such as 'He who desires the heavenly world is to sacrifice', teach that sacrifices are to be undertaken by persons desirous of certain pleasant results, and such persons having thus learned by what means the result is to be accomplished proceed to action from the natural desire of the result. This applies to the killing of the goat also which is offered to Agnshomau; man learns from Scripture that such actions help to accomplish the sacrifice which effects the result, and then performs those actions from natural desire. The case in no way differs from that of harm done in ordinary life—where the agent always is prompted by natural desire, having somehow arrived at the conclusion that his action will accomplish something aimed at by himself. The same holds good with regard to works of permanent obligation. Men learn from Scripture that through the performance of the special duties of their caste they attain happiness of the highest kind, and then apply themselves to their duties from a natural desire of such happiness, and therefore such works also are mixed with evil. Hence the souls of those who have performed sacrifices, and so on, which contain an element of evil, at first experience in the heavenly world that result which is to be enjoyed there, and then embodying themselves in non-moving things such as plants, experience the fruit of that part of their actions which is of a harmful nature. That embodiment in non-moving beings is the result of evil deeds Smriti declares: 'Owing to those defects of work which are due to the body, a man becomes a non-moving being.' From all this it follows that the souls embody themselves in plants to the end of enjoying the fruits of their works.—To this the Stra replies—it is not so, on account of scriptural statement. For Scripture declares that the killing of sacrificial animals makes them to go up to the heavenly world, and therefore is not of the nature of harm. This is declared in the text, 'The animal killed at the sacrifice having assumed a divine body goes to the heavenly world'; 'with a golden body it ascends to the heavenly world.' An action which is the means of supreme exaltation is not of the nature of harm, even if it involves some little pain; it rather is of beneficial nature.—With this the mantra also agrees: 'Thou dost not die, thou goest to the gods on easy paths; where virtuous men go, not evil-doers, there the divine Savitri may lead thee.' An act which has a healing tendency, although it may cause a transitory pain, men of insight declare to be preservative and beneficial.
26. After that conjunction with him who performs the act of generation.
The declaration that the descending souls become rice plants, and so on, cannot be taken literally for that reason also, that the text afterwards declares them to become those who perform the act of generation: 'Whoever the being may be that eats the food and begets offspring, that being he (i.e. the soul that has descended) becomes.' Now the meaning of this latter text can only be that the soul enters into conjunction with the creature which eats the grain; and hence we have to interpret the previous text, as to the soul's becoming a plant, in the same way.
27. From the yoni the body.
Only after having reached a yoni the soul, affected with a remnant of its works, obtains a new body, and only in a body there can be the enjoyment of pleasure and pain. When, therefore, previous to that the soul is said to reach ether, wind, and so on, this can only mean that it enters into conjunction with them.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'that animated by another soul.'
1. In the intermediate sphere the creation (is effected by the soul); for (Scripture) says (so).
So far it has been shown that the soul in the waking state suffers affliction since, in accordance with its deeds, it goes, returns, is born, and so on. Next an enquiry is instituted into its condition in the state of dream. With reference to the state of dreaming Scripture says, 'There are no chariots in that state, no horses, no roads; then he creates chariots, horses and roads. There are no blessings, no happiness, no joys; then he himself creates blessings, happiness, joys, and so on. For he is the creator' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 10). A doubt here arises whether this creation of chariots and the rest is accomplished by the individual soul, or by the Lord.—'The creation in the intermediate state' is due to the individual soul only. 'The intermediate state' means the sphere of dreams, in agreement with the passage 'There is a third intermediate state, the place of dreams' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 1). And that creation is effected by the soul only; for what is referred to in the passages 'he creates,' 'For he is the maker,' is none other but the dreaming soul.
2. And some (state the soul to be) the shaper; and sons, and so on.
And the followers of one skh state in their text that the dreaming soul is the shaper of its desires: 'He, the person who is awake in those who sleep, shaping one desired thing (kma) after the other.' The term 'kma' there denotes not mere desires, but such things as sons and the like which are objects of desire. For sons and so on are introduced as 'kmas' in previous passages: 'Ask for all kmas according to thy wish'; 'Choose sons and grandsons living a hundred years' (Ka. Up. I, 1, 25; 23). The individual soul thus creates chariots, and so on, in its dreams. That the soul has the power of realising all its wishes is known from the declaration of Prajpati. It is therefore able to create, even in the absence of special instruments.—This view is set aside by the next Stra.
3. But it is mere My; on account of the true nature (of the soul) not being fully manifested.
The things appearing in dreams-chariots, lotus tanks, and so on—are absolute My, i.e. things created by the Supreme Person. For the term 'My' denotes wonderful things, as appears from passages such as 'She was born in the race of Janaka, appearing like the wonderful power of the divine being in bodily shape' (devamy). The sense of the passage 'there are no chariots,' &c. then is—there are no chariots and horses to be perceived by any other person but the dreaming one; and then 'he creates chariots,' &c.—i. e. the Supreme Person creates things to be perceived by the dreamer and persisting for a certain time only. Those things therefore are of a wonderful nature (but not illusions). And the creation of such wonderful things is possible for the Supreme Person who can immediately realise all his wishes; but not for the individual soul. The latter also, indeed, fundamentally possesses that power; but as in the Samsra state the true nature of the soul is not fully manifested, it is then incapable of accomplishing such wonderful creations. The text 'the person shaping one desired thing after the other' declares the Supreme Person to be the creator, for the clauses immediately preceding and following that text (viz. 'He who is awake in those who sleep'; and 'that is the Bright, that is Brahman, that alone is called the Immortal; all worlds are contained in it and no one goes beyond'—Ka. Up. II, 5, 8) mention attributes distinctively characteristic of the Supreme Person. And the Bri. Up. text, 'For he is the maker,' must therefore, in agreement with the Katha-text, also be understood as declaring that it is the Supreme Person only that creates the things seen in a dream.—But if it is the true nature of the soul to be free from all imperfections, and so on, why then does this not manifest itself?—To this the next Stra replies.
4. But owing to the wish of the highest it is hidden; for from that are its bondage and the opposite state.
The but sets the objection aside. Owing to the wish of the highest, i. e. the Supreme Person, the essential nature of the individual soul is hidden. The Supreme Person hides the true, essentially blessed, nature of the soul which is in a state of sin owing to the endless chain of karman. For this reason we find it stated in Scripture that the bondage and release of the soul result from the wish of the Supreme Person only 'when he finds freedom from fear and rest in that invisible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported; then he has gone to fearlessness '; 'for he alone causes blessedness'; 'from fear of it the wind blows' (Taitt. Up. II, 7, 8).
5. Or that (results) also from connexion with the body.
The obscuration of the soul's true nature results either from the soul's connexion with the body or from its connexion with the power of matter in a subtle state. As long as the creation lasts, the soul is obscured by its connexion with matter in the form of a body; at the time of a pralaya, on the other hand, by its connexion with matter of so exceedingly subtle a kind as not to admit of differentiation by means of name and form. As thus its true nature is not manifest, the soul is unable to create, in dreams, chariots, lotus tanks, and so on, by its mere wish. And what the texts say about a being that is awake in those who sleep and is the abode of all worlds ('in that all the worlds abide, and no one goes beyond it'—Ka. Up. II, 4, 9) can apply to the Supreme Person only. The things seen by an individual soul in its dreams therefore are specially created by the Supreme Person, and are meant by him to be a retribution—whether reward or punishment—for deeds of minor importance: they therefore last for the time of the dream only, and are perceived by that one soul only.
6. And it is suggestive, according to Scripture; this the experts also declare.
The things seen in dreams are not created by the wish of the individual soul for this reason also, that according to Scripture dreams are prophetic of future good or ill fortune. 'When a man engaged in some work undertaken for some special wish sees a woman in his dream, he may infer success from his dream vision.' Those also who understand the science of dreams teach that dreams foreshadow good and evil fortune. But that which depends on one's own wish can have no prophetic quality; and as ill fortune is not desired the dreamer would create for himself only such visions as would indicate good fortune. Hence the creation which takes place in dreams can be the Lord's work only.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the intermediate state.'
7. The absence of that takes place in the nds and in the Self, according to scriptural statement.
Next the state of deep dreamless sleep is enquired into. Scripture says, 'When a man is asleep, reposing and at perfect rest, so that he sees no dream, then he lies asleep in those nds' (Ch. Up. VIII, 6, 3); 'When he is in profound sleep and is conscious of nothing, there are seventy- two thousand veins called hita which from the heart spread through the pericardium. Through them he moves forth and rests in the pericardium' (Bri. Up. II, 1, 19). 'When a man sleeps here, he becomes united with the True' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 1). These texts declare the veins, the pericardium, and Brahman to be the place of deep sleep; and hence there is a doubt whether each of them in turns, or all of them together, are that place. There is an option between them, since they are not in mutual dependence, and since the sleeping soul cannot at the same time be in several places!—To this the Stra replies—the absence of dreams, i.e. deep sleep takes place in the veins, in the pericardium, and in the highest Self together; since these three are declared by Scripture. When different alternatives may be combined, on the ground of there being different effects in each case, it is improper to assume an option which implies sublation of some of the alternatives. And in the present case such combination is possible, the veins and the pericardium holding the position of a mansion, as it were, and a couch within the mansion, while Brahman is the pillow, as it were. Thus Brahman alone is the immediate resting-place of the sleeping soul.
8. Hence the awaking from that.
Since Brahman alone directly is the place of deep sleep, Scripture is able to declare that the souls awake from that, i.e. Brahman; compare 'Having come back from the True they do not know that they come from the True' (Ch. Up. VI, 10, 2), and other texts.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the absence of that.'
9. But the same, on account of work, remembrance, text, and injunction.
Does the same person who had gone to sleep rise again at the time of waking, or a different one?—Since the soul in deep sleep frees itself from all limiting adjuncts, unites itself with Brahman, and thus being in no way different from the released soul, is no longer in any way connected with its previous body, organs, and so on; the person rising from sleep is a different one.—This view the Stra sets aside, saying 'but the same.' For there remains the work, i.e. the good and evil deeds previously done by the sleeper, for which the same person has to undergo retribution before the knowledge of truth arises. There is next remembrance—'I, the waking person, am the same as I who was asleep.' Scripture also declares this: 'Whatever these creatures are here, whether a lion, or tiger, or wolf, &c., that they become again' (Ch. Up. VI, 10, 2). And, lastly, the injunctions which enjoin certain acts for the sake of final Release would be purportless if the person merged in deep sleep attained Release. Nor can it be said that the sleeping soul is free from all limiting adjuncts and manifests itself in its true nature (so as not to be different from the released soul). For with regard to the sleeping person the text says,'In truth he thus does not know himself that he is I, nor does he know anything that exists. He is gone to utter annihilation. I see no good in this' (Ch. Up. VIII, ii, 1); while, on the other hand, the texts, 'Having approached the highest light he manifests himself in his true nature; he moves about there laughing, playing, delighting himself; 'He becomes a Self-ruler; he moves about in all the worlds according to his wish'; 'The seeing one sees everything, and attains everything everywhere' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3; VII, 25, 2; 26, 2), declare that the released soul is all-knowing, and so on. What is true about the sleeping person is that he is still comprised within the Samsra, but for the time having put off all instruments of knowledge and action and become incapable of knowledge and enjoyment repairs to the place of utter rest, i.e. the highest Self, and having there refreshed himself, again rises to new enjoyment of action.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'work, remembrance, text, and injunction.'
10. In the swooning person there is half-combination; this being the remaining (hypothesis).
With regard to a person lying in a swoon or stunned, the question arises whether that state of swoon is one of the other states, viz. deep sleep and so on, or whether it is a special condition of its own.—The former alternative must be accepted. For the term 'swoon' may be explained as denoting either deep sleep or some other acknowledged state, and there is no authority for assuming an altogether different new state.—This view the Stra sets aside. The condition of a swooning person consists in reaching half, viz. of what leads to death; for this is the only hypothesis remaining. A swoon cannot be either dreaming or being awake; for in a swoon there is no consciousness. And as it is different in character as well as in the occasions giving rise to it from deep sleep and death, it cannot be either of those two states; for there are special circumstances occasioning a swoon, such as a blow on the head. The only possible alternative then is to view a swoon as a state in which there is made a half-way approach to death. For while death consists in the complete cessation of the soul's connexion with the body or organs of any kind, a swoon consists in the soul's remaining connected with the subtle body and organs only. Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the swooning person.'
11. Not on account of place even (is there any imperfection) of the Highest; for everywhere (it is described) as having twofold characteristics.
The different states of the individual soul have been discussed, to the end that an insight into their imperfections may give rise to indifference towards all worldly enjoyments. Next now, in order to give rise to the desire of attaining to Brahman, the Stras proceed to expound how Brahman's nature is raised above all imperfections and constituted by mere blessed qualities. The following point requires to be considered first. Do those imperfections which cling to the individual soul in consequence of its different states—viz. the waking state, dreams, deep sleep, swoon, departure from the body—affect also the highest Brahman which as its inner Ruler abides within the soul in those different states, or not?—They do affect it, since Brahman abides within the bodies which are in those different states.—But Stras such as I, 2, 8 have already declared that the highest Brahman, because not subject to the influence of karman, is free from all imperfections; how then can imperfections cling to it for the reason that it is connected with this or that place?—In the following way. As was shown under III, 2, 6, works give rise to imperfection and suffering in so far as they cause the connexion of the soul with a body. The efficient cause therein is the imperfection inherent in the connexion with a body; for otherwise the works themselves would directly give rise to pain, and what then would be the use of the connexion with a body? Hence, even in the case of a being not subject to karman, its connexion with various unholy bodies will cause imperfection and suffering. And even when such a being voluntarily enters into such bodies in order to rule them, connexion with imperfections is unavoidable; no less than to be immersed in blood and purulent matter, even if done voluntarily, will make a man unclean. Although therefore Brahman is the sole cause of the world and a treasure- house of all blessed qualities, yet it is affected by the imperfections springing therefrom that, as declared by Scripture, it abides within matter, bodies, and their parts, and thus is connected with them (cp. 'he who abides within earth, within the soul, within the eye, within the seed,' &c., Bri. Up. III, 7, 3).
Of this prim facie view the Stra disposes by saying—'Not even from place, such as earth, soul, &c., is there possible for the highest Self a shadow even of imperfection; since everywhere in Scripture as well as Smriti Brahman is described as having characteristics of a double kind; viz. on the one hand freedom from all imperfections, and on the other possession of all blessed qualities. For Scripture says that the Supreme Person is free from evil, free from old age, free from death, free from grief, free from hunger and thirst; that all his wishes realise themselves, that all its purposes realise themselves' (Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 5)—And Smriti says, 'He comprises within himself all blessed qualities, by a particle of his power the whole mass of beings is supported. In him there are combined energy, strength, might, wisdom, valour, and all other noble qualities. He is the Highest of the high, no pain or other imperfections affect him, the Lord of all, high or low. From all evil he is free, he whose name is Vishnu, the highest abode.' These and other passages teach that Brahman possesses the double characteristics stated above.
12. Should it be said 'on account of difference'; not so, because with reference to each the text says what is not that.
But, an objection is raised, we observe, that the individual soul also, although in reality possessing the same twofold attributes, viz. freedom from all evil and so on, as we learn from the teaching of Prajpati (Ch. Up. VIII, 7), yet is affected with imperfections owing to the fact that it is connected with bodies, divine, human, and so on, and thus undergoes a variety of conditions. Analogously we cannot avoid the conclusion that the inner Ruler also, although in reality possessing those same twofold attributes, is also affected by imperfection, because through its connexion with those different bodies it likewise undergoes a variety of conditions.—This objection the Stra sets aside in the words, 'not so, because with reference to each the text says what is not that,' i.e. what is contrary. For where the text says that the inner Ruler dwells within the earth, within the soul, within the eye, and so on, it concludes each clause by saying, 'that is thy Self, the inner Ruler, the immortal one,' i.e. declares the inner Ruler to be immortal, and thus denies of him any imperfections due to his connexion with the bodies which he voluntarily enters in order to rule them. The true (perfect) nature of the individual soul, on the other hand, is obscured as long as it is connected with a body, as we have explained under III, 2, 5.—But, as the Prvapakshin has pointed out, even if the highest Self voluntarily enters into bodies, it cannot escape connexion with the imperfections which depend on the essential nature of those bodies.—Not so, we reply. The fact is, that not even non-sentient things are, essentially or intrinsically, bad; but in accordance with the nature of the works of those beings which are under the rule of karman, one thing, owing to the will of the Supreme Person, causes pain to one man at one time and pleasure at another time, and causes pleasure or pain to one person and the opposite to another person. If the effects of things depended on their own nature only, everything would at all times be productive for all persons, either of pleasure only or of pain only. But this is not observed to be the case. In agreement herewith Smriti says, 'Because one and the same thing causes pain and pleasure and envy and wrath, the nature of a thing cannot lie in itself. As the same thing which erst gave rise to love causes pain later on, and that which once caused anger now causes satisfaction, nothing is in itself of the nature either of pleasure or of pain.' To the soul therefore which is subject to karman the connexion with different things is the source of imperfection and suffering, in agreement with the nature of its works; while to the highest Brahman, which is subject to itself only, the same connexion is the source of playful sport, consisting therein that he in various ways guides and rules those things.
13. Some also (teach) thus.
Moreover, the followers of one skh explicitly teach that the connexion with one and the same body is for the individual soul a source of disadvantage, while for the highest Brahman it is nothing of the kind, but constitutes an accession of glory in so far as it manifests him as a Lord and Ruler, 'Two birds, inseparable friends, cling to the same tree. One of them eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on without eating' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1).—But the text, 'Having entered by means of that jva- self I will differentiate names and forms,' teaches that the differentiation of names and forms depends on the entering into the elements of the jva-soul whose Self is Brahman, and this implies that Brahman also, as the Self of the individual soul, possesses definite shapes, divine, human, and so on, and is to be denominated by the corresponding names. Brahman thus falls within the sphere of beings to which injunctions and prohibitions are addressed—such as 'a Brhmana is to sacrifice'—and hence necessarily is under the power of karman.—To this the next Stra replies.
14. For (Brahman is) without form merely, since it is the principal agent with regard to that.
Brahman, although by entering into bodies, human, divine, and so on, it becomes connected with various forms, yet is in itself altogether devoid of form, and therefore does not share that subjection to karman which in the case of the soul is due to its embodiedness.—Why?—Because as it is that which brings about names and forms it stands to them in the relation of a superior (pradhna). For the text, 'The Ether (Brahman) indeed is the accomplisher of names and forms; that which is without these two is Brahman,' teaches that Brahman, although entering into all beings, is not touched by name and form, but is that which brings about name and form.—But, an objection is raised, if Brahman is the inner ruler of beings in so far as he has them for its body, how can it be said that it is altogether destitute of form?—There is a difference, we reply. The individual soul is connected with the shape of the body in which it dwells because it participates in the pleasures and pains to which the body gives rise; but as Brahman does not share those pleasures and pains, it has no shape or form. And the scriptural injunctions and prohibitions apply to those only who are under the power of karman. The highest Brahman therefore is like a being without form, and hence, although abiding within all things, free from all imperfection and endowed with all blessed qualities.
But, an objection is raised, texts such as 'the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman' suggest a Brahman whose nature is constituted exclusively by non-differentiated light; while at the same time a Brahman endowed with qualities—such as omniscience, being the cause of the world, being the inner Self of all, having the power of immediately realising its wishes and purposes—is expressly negatived by texts such as 'not so, not so' (Bri. Up. II, 3, 6), and therefore must be held to be false. How then can it be maintained that Brahman possesses the 'twofold characteristics' mentioned under Stra 11?—To this the next Stra replies.
15. And in the same way as (a Brahman) consisting of light; (the texts thus) not being devoid of meaning.
In order that texts such as 'the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman' may not be devoid of meaning, we have to admit that light (intelligence) constitutes the essential nature of Brahman. But analogously we have also to admit that Brahman possesses the 'twofold characteristics'; for otherwise the texts declaring it to be free from all imperfections, all- knowing, the cause of the world, and so on, would in their turn be devoid of meaning.
16. And (the text) says so much only.
Moreover the text 'the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman' only teaches that Brahman has light for its essential nature, and does not negative those other attributes of Brahman—omniscience, being the cause of the world, &c.—which are intimated by other texts. What is the object of the negation in 'not so, not so' will be shown further on.
17. (This Scripture) also shows, and it is also stated in Smriti.
That Brahman is a treasure as it were of all blessed qualities and free from all imperfections, the whole body of Vednta-texts clearly declares: 'That highest great lord of lords, that highest deity of deities'; 'He is the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and there is of him neither parent nor lord '; 'There is no effect and no cause known of him, no one is seen like unto him or higher. His high power is revealed as manifold, as essential action of knowledge and strength' (Svet. Up. VI, 7-9); 'He who is all-knowing, whose brooding consists of knowledge' (Mu. I, 1,9); 'From fear of him the wind blows, from fear of him the sun moves'; 'That is one bliss of Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 8); 'That from which all speech with the mind turns away, not having reached it, knowing the bliss of that Brahman man fears nothing' (Taitt. Up. II, 9); 'He who is without parts, without action, tranquil, without fault, without taint' (Svet. Up. VI, 19).—And Smriti: 'He who knows me to be unborn and without a beginning, the Supreme Lord of the worlds'; 'Pervading this entire universe, by one part of mine I do abide'; 'With me as supervisor Prakriti brings forth the universe of the movable and the immovable, and for this reason the world does ever move round'; 'But another is the Supreme Person, who is called the Supreme Spirit, who pervading the three worlds supports them—the eternal Lord' (Bha. G. X, 3; 42; IX, 10; XV, 17); 'The all-working, all-powerful one, rich in knowledge and strength, who becomes neither less nor more, who is self- dependent, without beginning, master of all; who knows neither weariness nor exhaustion, nor fear, wrath and desire; the blameless one, raised above all, without support, imperishable.'—As thus Brahman in whatever place it may abide has the 'twofold characteristics,' the imperfections dependent on those places do not touch it.