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The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Ramanuja - Sacred Books of the East, Volume 48
by Trans. George Thibaut
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next.—The Jainas hold that the world comprises souls (jva), and non-souls (ajva), and that there is no Lord. The world further comprises six substances (dravya), viz. souls (jva), merit (dharma), demerit (adharma), bodies (pudgala), time (kla), and space (ksa). The souls are of three different kinds-bound (in the state of bondage), perfected by Yoga (Yogasiddha), and released (mukta). 'Merit' is that particular world-pervading substance which is the cause of the motion of all things moving; 'demerit' is that all-pervading substance which is the cause of stationariness, 'Body' is that substance which possesses colour, smell, taste, and touch. It is of two kinds, atomic or compounded of atoms; to the latter kind belong wind, fire, water, earth, the bodies of living creatures, and so on. 'Time' is a particular atomic substance which is the cause of the current distinction of past, present, and future. 'Space' is one, and of infinite extent. From among these substances those which are not atomic are comprehended under the term 'the five astikyas (existing bodies)'—the astikya of souls, the astikya of merit, the astikya of demerit, the astikya of matter, the astikya of space. This term 'astikya' is applied to substances occupying several parts of space.—They also use another division of categories which subserves the purpose of Release; distinguishing souls, non-souls, influx (srava), bondage, nijara, samvara, and Release. Release comprises the means of Release also, viz. perfect knowledge, good conduct, and so on. The soul is that which has knowledge, seeing, pleasure, strength (vrya) for its qualities. Non-soul is the aggregate of the things enjoyed by the souls. 'Influx' is whatever is instrumental towards the souls having the fruition of objects, viz. the sense-organs, and so on.—Bondage is of eight different kinds, comprising the four ghtikarman, and the four aghtikarman. The former term denotes whatever obstructs the essential qualities of the soul, viz. knowledge, intuition, strength, pleasure; the latter whatever causes pleasure, pain, and indifference, which are due to the persistence of the wrong imagination that makes the soul identify itself with its body.—'Decay' means the austerities (tapas), known from the teaching of the Arhat, which are the means of Release.—Samvara is such deep meditation (Samdhi) as stops the action of the sense-organs.—Release, finally, is the manifestation of the Self in its essential nature, free from all afflictions such as passion, and so on.—The atoms which are the causes of earth and the other compounds, are not, as the Vaiseshikas and others hold, of four different kinds, but have all the same nature; the distinctive qualities of earth, and so on, are due to a modification (parinma) of the atoms. The Jainas further hold that the whole complex of things is of an ambiguous nature in so far as being existent and non-existent, permanent and non-permanent, separate and non-separate. To prove this they apply their so-called sapta-bhang-nyya ('the system of the seven paralogisms')—'May be, it is'; 'May be, it is not'; 'May be, it is and is not'; 'May be, it is not predicable'; 'May be, it is and is not predicable'; 'May be, it is not, and is not predicable'; 'May be, it is and is not, and is not predicable.' With the help of this they prove that all things—which they declare to consist of substance (dravya), and paryya—to be existing, one and permanent in so far as they are substances, and the opposite in so far as they are paryyas. By paryya they understand the particular states of substances, and as those are of the nature of Being as well as Non-being, they manage to prove existence, non-existence, and so on.—With regard to this the Stra remarks that no such proof is possible,'Not so, on account of the impossibility in one'; i.e. because contradictory attributes such as existence and non-existence cannot at the same time belong to one thing, not any more than light and darkness. As a substance and particular states qualifying it—and (by the Jainas), called paryya—are different things (padrtha), one substance cannot be connected with opposite attributes. It is thus not possible that a substance qualified by one particular state, such as existence, should at the same time be qualified by the opposite state, i. e. non-existence. The non-permanency, further, of a substance consists in its being the abode of those particular states which are called origination and destruction; how then should permanency, which is of an opposite nature, reside in the substance at the same time? Difference (bhinnatva) again consists in things being the abodes of contradictory attributes; non-difference, which is the opposite of this, cannot hence possibly reside in the same things which are the abode of difference; not any more than the generic character of a horse and that of a buffalo can belong to one animal. We have explained this matter at length, when—under Stra I, 1—refuting the bhedbheda-theory. Time we are conscious of only as an attribute of substances (not as an independent substance), and the question as to its being and non-being, and so on, does not therefore call for a separate discussion. To speak of time as being and non-being in no way differs from generic characteristics (jti), and so on, being spoken of in the same way; for—as we have explained before—of jti and the like we are conscious only as attributes of substances.—But (the Jaina may here be supposed to ask the Vedntin), how can you maintain that Brahman, although one only, yet at the same time is the Self of all?—Because, we reply, the whole aggregate of sentient and non-sentient beings constitutes the body of the Supreme Person, omniscient, omnipotent, and so on. And that the body and the person embodied and their respective attributes are of totally different nature (so that Brahman is not touched by the defects of his body), we have explained likewise.—Moreover, as your six substances, soul, and so on, are not one substance and one paryya, their being one substance, and so on, cannot be used to prove their being one and also not one, and so on.—And if it should be said that those six substances are such (viz. one and several, and so on), each owing to its own paryya and its own nature, we remark that then you cannot avoid contradicting your own theory of everything being of an ambiguous nature. Things which stand to each other in the relation of mutual non-existence cannot after all be identical.—Hence the theory of the Jainas is not reasonable. Moreover it is liable to the same objections which we have above set forth as applying to all theories of atoms constituting the universal cause, without the guidance of a Lord.



33. And likewise non-entireness of the Self.

On your view there would likewise follow non-entireness of the Self. For your opinion is that souls abide in numberless places, each soul having the same size as the body which it animates. When, therefore, the soul previously abiding in the body of an elephant or the like has to enter into a body of smaller size, e. g. that of an ant, it would follow that as the soul then occupies less space, it would not remain entire, but would become incomplete.—Let us then avoid this difficulty by assuming that the soul passes over into a different state—which process is called paryya,—which it may manage because it is capable of contraction and dilatation.—To this the next Stra replies.



34. Nor also is there non-contradiction from paryya; on account of change, and so on.

Nor is the difficulty to be evaded by the assumption of the soul assuming a different condition through contraction or dilatation. For this would imply that the soul is subject to change, and all the imperfections springing from it, viz. non-permanence, and so on, and hence would not be superior to non-sentient things such as jars and the like.



35. And on account of the endurance of the final (size), and the (resulting) permanency of both; there is no difference.

The final size of the soul, i.e. the size it has in the state of Release, is enduring since the soul does not subsequently pass into another body; and both, i.e. the soul in the state of Release and the size of that soul, are permanent (nitya). From this it follows that that ultimate size is the true essential size of the soul and also belongs to it previously to Release. Hence there is no difference of sizes, and the soul cannot therefore have the size of its temporary bodies. The rhata theory is therefore untenable.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the impossibility in one.'



36. (The system) of the Lord (must be disregarded), on account of inappropriateness.

So far it has been shown that the doctrines of Kapila, Kanda, Sugata, and the Arhat must be disregarded by men desirous of final beatitude; for those doctrines are all alike untenable and foreign to the Veda. The Stras now declare that, for the same reasons, the doctrine of Pasupati also has to be disregarded. The adherents of this view belong to four different classes—Kplas, Klmukhas, Psupatas, and Saivas. All of them hold fanciful theories of Reality which are in conflict with the Veda, and invent various means for attaining happiness in this life and the next. They maintain the general material cause and the operative cause to be distinct, and the latter cause to be constituted by Pasupati. They further hold the wearing of the six so-called 'mudr' badges and the like to be means to accomplish the highest end of man.

Thus the Kplas say, 'He who knows the true nature of the six mudrs, who understands the highest mudr, meditating on himself as in the position called bhagsana, reaches Nirvna. The necklace, the golden ornament, the earring, the head-jewel, ashes, and the sacred thread are called the six mudrs. He whose body is marked with these is not born here again.'—Similarly the Klmukhas teach that the means for obtaining all desired results in this world as well as the next are constituted by certain practices—such as using a skull as a drinking vessel, smearing oneself with the ashes of a dead body, eating the flesh of such a body, carrying a heavy stick, setting up a liquor-jar and using it as a platform for making offerings to the gods, and the like. 'A bracelet made of Rudrksha-seeds on the arm, matted hair on the head, a skull, smearing oneself with ashes, &c.'—all this is well known from the sacred writings of the Saivas. They also hold that by some special ceremonial performance men of different castes may become Brhmanas and reach the highest srama: 'by merely entering on the initiatory ceremony (dksh) a man becomes a Brhmana at once; by undertaking the kpla rite a man becomes at once an ascetic.'

With regard to these views the Stra says 'of pati, on account of inappropriateness.' A 'not' has here to be supplied from Stra 32. The system of Pasupati has to be disregarded because it is inappropriate, i. e. because the different views and practices referred to are opposed to one another and in conflict with the Veda. The different practices enumerated above, the wearing of the six mudrs and so on, are opposed to each other; and moreover the theoretical assumptions of those people, their forms of devotion and their practices, are in conflict with the Veda. For the Veda declares that Nryana who is the highest Brahman is alone the operative and the substantial cause of the world, 'Nryana is the highest Brahman, Nryana is the highest Reality, Nryana is the highest light, Nryana is the highest Self'; 'That thought, may I be many, may I grow forth' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3); 'He desired, may I be many, may I grow forth' (Taitt. Up. II, 6, 1), and so on. In the same way the texts declare meditation on the Supreme Person, who is the highest Brahman, to be the only meditation which effects final release; cp. 'I know that great Person of sunlike lustre beyond the darkness. A man who knows him passes over death; there is no other path to go' (Svet. Up. III, 8). And in the same way all texts agree in declaring that the works subserving the knowledge of Brahman are only those sacrificial and other works which the Veda enjoins on men in the different castes and stages of life: 'Him Brhmanas seek to know by the study of the Veda, by sacrifice, by gifts, by penance, by fasting. Wishing for that world only, mendicants wander forth from their homes' (Bri. Up. XI, 4, 22). In some texts enjoining devout meditation, and so on, we indeed meet with terms such as Prajpati, Siva, Indra, ksa, Prna, &c., but that these all refer to the supreme Reality established by the texts concerning Nryana—the aim of which texts it is to set forth the highest Reality in its purity—, we have already proved under I, 1, 30. In the same way we have proved under S. I, 1, 2 that in texts treating of the creation of the world, such as 'Being only this was in the beginning,' and the like, the words Being, Brahman, and so on, denote nobody else but Nryana, who is set forth as the universal creator in the account of creation given in the text, 'Alone indeed there was Nryana, not Brahm, not Isna—he being alone did not rejoice' (Mahopanishad I).—As the Pasupati theory thus teaches principles, meditations and acts conflicting with the Veda, it must be disregarded.



37. And on account of the impossibility of rulership.

Those who stand outside the Veda arrive through inference at the conclusion that the Lord is a mere operative cause. This being so, they must prove the Lord's being the ruler (of the material cause) on the basis of observation. But it is impossible to prove that the Lord is the ruler of the Pradhna in the same way as the potter e.g. is the ruler of the clay. For the Lord is without a body, while the power of ruling material causes is observed only in the case of embodied beings such as potters. Nor may you have recourse to the hypothesis of the Lord being embodied; for—as we have shown under I, 1, 3—there arise difficulties whether that body, which as body must consist of parts, be viewed as eternal or as non-eternal.



38. If you say, as in the case of the organs; we deny this, on account of enjoyment and so on.

It may possibly be said that, in the same way as the enjoying (individual) soul, although in itself without a body, is seen to rule the sense-organs, the body, and so on, the great Lord also, although without a body, may rule the Pradhna. But this analogy cannot be allowed 'on account of enjoyment,' and so on. The body's being ruled by the soul is due to the unseen principle in the form of good and evil works, and has for its end the requital of those works. Your analogy would thus imply that the Lord also is under the influence of an unseen principle, and is requited for his good and evil works.—The Lord cannot therefore be a ruler.



39. Finiteness or absence of omniscience.

'Or' here has the sense of 'and.' If the Lord is under the influence of the adrishta, it follows that, like the individual soul, he is subject to creation, dissolution, and so on, and that he is not omniscient. The Pasupati theory cannot therefore be accepted.—It is true that the Stra, 'but in case of conflict (with Scripture) it is not to be regarded' (P. M. S. I, 3, 3), has already established the non-acceptability of all views contrary to the Veda; the present adhikarana, however, raises this question again in order specially to declare that the Pasupati theory is contrary to the Veda. Although the Psupata and the Saiva systems exhibit some features which are not altogether contrary to the Veda, yet they are unacceptable because they rest on an assumption contrary to the Veda, viz. of the difference of the general, instrumental and material causes, and imply an erroneous interchange of higher and lower entities.— Here terminates the adhikarana of 'Pasupati.'



40. On account of the impossibility of origination.

The Stras now proceed to refute a further doubt, viz. that the Pakartra tantra—which sets forth the means of attaining supreme beatitude, as declared by the Lord (Bhagavat)—may also be destitute of authority, in so far, namely, as belonging to the same class as the tantras of Kapila and others. The above Stra raises the doubt.

The theory of the Bhgavatas is that from Vsudeva, who is the highest Brahman and the highest cause, there originates the individual soul called Sankarshana; from Sankarshana the internal organ called Pradyumna; and from Pradyumna the principle of egoity called Aniruddha. Now this theory implies the origination of the individual soul, and this is contrary to Scripture. For scriptural texts declare the soul to be without a beginning—cp. 'the intelligent one is not born and does not die' (Ka. Up. II, 18), and other texts.



41. And there is not (origination) of the instrument from the agent.

'The internal organ called Pradyumna originates from Sankarshana,' i. e. the internal organ originates from the individual soul which is the agent. But this is inadmissible, since the text 'from him there is produced breath, mind, and all sense-organs' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 3) declares that the mind also springs from none else but the highest Brahman. As the Bhgavata doctrine thus teaches things opposed to Scripture, its authoritativeness cannot be admitted.—Against these objections the next Stra declares itself.



42. Or, if they are of the nature of that which is knowledge and so on, there is no contradiction to that (i.e. the Bhgavata doctrine).

The 'or' sets aside the view previously maintained. By 'that which is knowledge and so on' [FOOTNOTE 524:1] we have to understand the highest Brahman. If Sankarshana, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha are of the nature of the highest Brahman, then truly there can be no objection to a body of doctrine which sets forth this relation. The criticism that the Bhgavatas teach an inadmissible origination of the individual soul, is made by people who do not understand that system. What it teaches is that the highest Brahman, there called Vsudeva, from kindness to those devoted to it, voluntarily abides in a fourfold form, so as to render itself accessible to its devotees. Thus it is said in the Paushkara- samhit, 'That which enjoins that Brahmanas have to worship, under its proper names, the fourfold nature of the Self; that is the authoritative doctrine.' That this worship of that which is of a fourfold nature means worship of the highest Brahman, called Vsudeva, is declared in the Stvata-samhit, 'This is the supreme sstra, the great Brahmopanishad, which imparts true discrimination to Brahmawas worshipping the real Brahman under the name of Vsudeva.' That highest Brahman, called Vsudeva, having for its body the complete aggregate of the six qualities, divides itself in so far as it is either the 'Subtle' (skshma), or 'division' (vyha), or 'manifestation' (vibhava), and is attained in its fulness by the devotees who, according to their qualifications, do worship to it by means of works guided by knowledge. 'From the worship of the vibhava-aspect one attains to the vyha, and from the worship of the vyha one attains to the "Subtile" called Vsudeva, i.e. the highest Brahman'—such is their doctrine. By the 'vibhava' we have to understand the aggregate of beings, such as Rama, Krishna, &c., in whom the highest Being becomes manifest; by the 'vyha' the fourfold arrangement or division of the highest Reality, as Vsudeva, Sankarshana, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha; by the 'Subtle' the highest Brahman itself, in so far as it has for its body the mere aggregate of the six qualities—as which it is called 'Vsudeva.' Compare on this point the Paushkara, 'That body of doctrine through which, by means of works based on knowledge, one fully attains to the imperishable highest Brahman, called Vsudeva,' and so on, Sankarshana, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha are thus mere bodily forms which the highest Brahman voluntarily assumes. Scripture already declares, 'Not born he is born in many ways,' and it is this birth—consisting in the voluntary assumption of bodily form, due to tenderness towards its devotees—which the Bhgavata system teaches; hence there lies no valid objection to the authoritativeness of that system. And as Sankarshana. Pradyumna, and Aniruddha are the beings ruling over the individual souls, internal organs and organs of egoity, there can be no objection to their being themselves denoted by those latter terms, viz. individual soul, and so on. The case is analogous to that of Brahman being designated, in some texts, by terms such as ether, breath, and the like.

[FOOTNOTE 524:1. Or 'by that which is knowledge and cause.']



43. And on account of contradiction.

The origination of the jva is, moreover, distinctly controverted in the books of the Bhgavatas also. Thus in the Parama-samhit 'The nature of Prakriti consists therein that she is non-sentient, for the sake of another, eternal, ever-changing, comprising within herself the three gunas and constituting the sphere of action and experience for all agents. With her the soul (purusha) is connected in the way of inseparable association; that soul is known to be truly without beginning and without end.' And as all Samhitas make similar statements as to the eternity of the soul, the Pakartra doctrine manifestly controverts the view of the essential nature of the jiva being something that originates. How it is possible that in the Veda as well as in common life the soul is spoken of as being born, dying, &c., will be explained under S. II, 3, 17. The conclusion, therefore, is that the Bhgavata system also denies the origination of the soul, and that hence the objections raised on this ground against its authoritativeness are without any force. Another objection is raised by some. Sndilya, they argue, is said to have promulgated the Pakartra doctrine because he did not find a sure basis for the highest welfare of man in the Veda and its auxiliary disciplines, and this implies that the Pakartra is opposed to the Veda.—his objection, we reply, springs from nothing else but the mere unreasoning faith of men who do not possess the faintest knowledge of the teachings of the Veda, and have never considered the hosts of arguments which confirm that teaching. When the Veda says, 'Morning after morning those speak untruth who make the Agnihotra offering before sunrise,' it is understood that the censure there passed on the offering before sunrise is really meant to glorify the offering after sunrise. We meet with a similar case in the 'bhma-vidy' (Ch. Up. VII, 2). There at the beginning Nrada says, 'I know the Rig-veda, the Yajur-veda, the Sma-veda, the tharvana as the fourth, the Itihsa- purna as the fifth,' and so on, enumerating all the various branches of knowledge, and finally summing up 'with all this I know the mantras only, I do not know the Self.' Now this declaration of the knowledge of the Self not being attainable through any branch of knowledge except the knowledge of the Bhman evidently has no other purpose but to glorify this latter knowledge, which is about to be expounded. Or else Nrada's words refer to the fact that from the Veda and its auxiliary disciplines he had not obtained the knowledge of the highest Reality. Analogous to this is the case of Sndilya's alleged objection to the Veda. That the Bhgavata doctrine is meant to facilitate the understanding of the sense of the Veda which by itself is difficult of comprehension, is declared in the Paramasamhita,'I have read the Vedas at length, together with all the various auxiliary branches of knowledge. But in all these I cannot see a clear indication, raised above all doubt, of the way to blessedness, whereby I might reach perfection'; and 'The wise Lord Hari, animated by kindness for those devoted to him, extracted the essential meaning of all the Vednta-texts and condensed it in an easy form.' The incontrovertible fact then is as follows. The Lord who is known from the Vednta-texts, i.e. Vsudeva, called there the highest Brahman—who is antagonistic to all evil, whose nature is of uniform excellence, who is an ocean, as it were, of unlimited exalted qualities, such as infinite intelligence, bliss, and so on, all whose purposes come true—perceiving that those devoted to him, according as they are differently placed in the four castes and the four stages of life, are intent on the different ends of life, viz. religious observances, wealth, pleasure, and final release; and recognising that the Vedas—which teach the truth about his own nature, his glorious manifestations, the means of rendering him propitious and the fruits of such endeavour—are difficult to fathom by all beings other than himself, whether gods or men, since those Vedas are divided into Rik, Yajus, Sman, and Atharvan; and being animated by infinite pity, tenderness, and magnanimity; with a view to enable his devotees to grasp the true meaning of the Vedas, himself composed the Pakartra-sstra. The author of the Stras (Vysa)—who first composed the Stras, the purport of which it is to set forth the arguments establishing the Vednta doctrine, and then the Bhrata-samhit (i.e. the Mahbhrata) in a hundred thousand slokas in order to support thereby the teaching of the Veda—himself says in the chapter called Mokshadharma, which treats of knowledge, 'If a householder, or a Brahmakrin, or a hermit, or a mendicant wishes to achieve success, what deity should he worship?' and so on; explains then at great length the Pakartra system, and then says, 'From the lengthy Bhrata story, comprising one hundred thousand slokas, this body of doctrine has been extracted, with the churning-staff of mind, as butter is churned from curds—as butter from milk, as the Brahmana from men, as the ranyaka from the Vedas, as Amrita from medicinal herbs.—This great Upanishad, consistent with the four Vedas, in harmony with Snkhya and Yoga, was called by him by the name of Pakartra. This is excellent, this is Brahman, this is supremely beneficial. Fully agreeing with the Rik, the Yajus, the Sman, and the Atharvn-giras, this doctrine will be truly authoritative.' The terms Snkhya and Yoga here denote the concentrated application of knowledge and of works. As has been said, 'By the application of knowledge on the part of the Snkhya, and of works on the part of the Yogins.' And in the Bhshmaparvan we read, 'By Brahmanas, Kshattriyas, Vaisyas and Sdras, Mdhava is to be honoured, served and worshipped—he who was proclaimed by Sankarshana in agreement with the Stvata law.'—How then could these utterances of Bdaryana, the foremost among all those who understand the teaching of the Veda, be reconciled with the view that in the Stras he maintains the non- authoritativeness of the Stvata doctrine, the purport of which is to teach the worship of, and meditation on, Vsudeva, who is none other than the highest Brahman known from the Vednta-texts?

But other passages in the Mahbhrata, such as 'There is the Snkhya, the Yoga, the Pakartra, the Vedas, and the Pasupata doctrine; do all these rest on one and the same basis, or on different ones?' and so on, declare that the Snkhya and other doctrines also are worthy of regard, while yet in the Srraka Stras those very same doctrines are formally refuted. Why, therefore, should not the same hold good in the case of the Bhgavata doctrine?—Not so, we reply. In the Mahbhrata also Bdarayana applies to the Snkhya and other doctrines the same style of reasoning as in the Stras. The question, asked in the passage quoted, means 'Do the Snkhya, the Yoga, the Pasupata, and the Pakartra set forth one and the same reality, or different ones? If the former, what is that reality? If the latter, they convey contradictory doctrines, and, as reality is not something which may be optionally assumed to be either such or such, one of those doctrines only can be acknowledged as authoritative, and the question then arises which is to be so acknowledged?'—The answer to the question is given in the passage beginning, 'Know, O royal Sage, all those different views. The promulgator of the Snkhya is Kapila,' &c. Here the human origin of the Snkhya, Yoga, and Psupata is established on the ground of their having been produced by Kapila, Hiranyagarbha, and Pasupati. Next the clause 'Aparntatamas is said to be the teacher of the Vedas' intimates the non- human character of the Vedas; and finally the clause 'Of the whole Pakartra, Nryana himself is the promulgator' declares that Nryana himself revealed the Pakartra doctrine. The connected purport of these different clauses is as follows. As the systems of human origin set forth doctrines mutually contradictory, and, moreover, teach what is in conflict with the matter known from the Veda—which, on account of its non-human character, is raised above all suspicion of error and other imperfections—they cannot be accepted as authoritative with regard to anything not depending on human action and choice. Now the matter to be known from the Veda is Nryana, who is none other than the highest Brahman. It hence follows that the entities set forth in those different systems—the pradhna, the soul (purusha), Pasupati, and so on—have to be viewed as real only in so far as Nryana, i.e. the highest Brahman, as known from the Vednta-texts, constitutes their Self. This the text directly declares in the passage, 'In all those doctrines it is seen, in accordance with tradition and reasoning, that the lord Narayawa is the only basis.' This means—'To him who considers the entities set forth in those systems with the help of argumentation, it is evident that Nryana alone is the basis of all those entities.' In other words, as the entities set forth in those systems are not Brahman, any one who remembers the teaching of texts such as 'all this indeed is Brahman,' 'Nryana is all,' which declare Brahman to be the Self of all, comes to the conclusion that Nryana alone is the basis of those entities. As thus it is settled that the highest Brahman, as known from the Vednta- texts, or Nryana, himself is the promulgator of the entire Pakartra, and that this system teaches the nature of Nryana and the proper way of worshipping him, none can disestablish the view that in the Pakartra all the other doctrines are comprised. For this reason the Mahbhrata says, 'Thus the Snkhya-yoga and the Veda and the ranyaka, being members of one another, are called the Pakartra,' i.e. the Snkhya, the Yoga, the Vedas, and the ranyakas, which are members of one another because they are one in so far as aiming at setting forth one Truth, together are called the Pakartra.—The Snkhya explains the twenty-five principles, the Yoga teaches certain practices and means of mental concentration, and the ranyakas teach that all the subordinate principles have their true Self in Brahman, that the mental concentration enjoined in the Yoga is a mode of meditation on Brahman, and that the rites and works which are set forth in the Veda are means to win the favour of Brahman—thus giving instruction as to Brahman's nature. Now all these elements, in their inward connexion, are clearly set forth in the Pakartra by the highest Brahman, i.e. Nryana, himself. The Srraka Sstra (i.e. the Vednta) does not disprove the principles assumed by the Snkhyas, but merely the view of their not having Brahman for their Self; and similarly in its criticism on the Yoga and Psupata systems, it merely refutes the view of the Lord being a mere instrumental cause, the erroneous assumptions as to the relative position of higher and lower entities, and certain practices not warranted by the Veda; but it does not reject the Yoga itself, nor again the lord Psupati. Hence Smriti says,' The Snkhya, the Yoga, the Pakartra, the Vedas, and the Psupata doctrine—all these having their proof in the Self may not be destroyed by arguments.' The essential points in all these doctrines are to be adopted, not to be rejected absolutely as the teaching of Jina. or Sugata is to be rejected. For, as said in the Smriti text quoted above, in all those doctrines it is seen, according to tradition and reasoning, that the lord Nryana is the only basis.'—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the impossibility of origination.'



THIRD PDA.

1. Not Ether; on account of the absence of scriptural statement.

We have demonstrated that the Snkhya-system and other systems standing outside the Veda are untenable since they rest on fallacious reasoning and are self-contradictory. In order to prove that our own view is altogether free from all objections of this kind, we shall now explain in detail the mode in which this world, with all its sentient and non- sentient beings, is produced by Brahman, whom we hold to be the general creator.

The first doubt here presenting itself is whether Ether be something produced or not.—The Prvapakshin maintains that it is not produced, since there is no scriptural statement to that effect. A scriptural statement may be expected with regard to what is possible; but what is impossible—as e.g. the origination of a sky-flower or of Ether—cannot possibly be taught by Scripture. For the origination of Ether, which is not made up of parts and is all pervasive, cannot be imagined in any way. For this very reason, i.e. the impossibility of the thing, the Chandogya, in its account of creation, mentions the origination of fire, water, &c. only (but not of Ether)—'It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth,' 'It sent forth fire,' and so on. When therefore the Taittirya, the Atharvana, and other texts tell us that Ether did originate—'From that Self sprang Ether' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'From him is born breath, mind, and all organs of sense, Ether, air, light, water,' &c. (Mu. Up. II, 1, 4)—such statements are contrary to sense, and hence refute themselves.— To this the Stra replies.



2. But there is.

But there is origination of Ether. For Scripture, which is concerned with matters transcending sense perception, is able to establish the truth even of the origination of Ether, although this be not proved by other means of knowledge. And in a matter known from Scripture a contradictory inference, such as that Ether cannot originate because it is without parts, is not of sufficient force. That the non- originatedness of the Self also does not rest on its being without parts will be shown further on.—Here the Prvapakshin raises an objection.



3. It has a secondary sense, on account of impossibility and of the text.

It is reasonable to assume that in passages such as 'From that Self there sprang Ether.' the origination of Ether is not to be taken in its literal sense; for according to the Chndogya-text 'it sent forth fire.' Brahman engaged in creation first produces fire, and fire thus having the first place, the text cannot possibly mean to say that Ether also was produced. Moreover, there is another text, viz.'Vyu and antariksha (i.e. Ether), this is the Immortal,' according to which Ether is immortal, i. e. non-produced.—But how can one and the same word viz. it 'sprang' (i.e. originated), be taken in a metaphorical sense with reference to Ether, and in its literal sense with reference to fire, and so on?—To this the next Stra replies.



4. There may be (a double sense) of the one (word), as in the case of the word 'Brahman.'

Since in the clause 'from that Self there sprang Brahman,' the word 'sprang' cannot be taken in its literal senbe, it may be used there in a secondary sense; while the same word as connected with the subsequent clauses 'from Vyu Agni,' &c., may have its primary sense. This would be analogous to the use of the word Brahman in Mu. Up. I, 1. There in the clause 'From him is born that Brahman, name, form, and matter' (9). the word Brahman is used in a secondary sense, i.e. denotes the Pradhna; while in the same chapter, in the clause 'Brahman swells by means of brooding' (8), the same word denotes Brahman in its primary sense. It is true indeed that in this latter case the word 'Brahman' occurs twice; while in the Taitt. text the word 'sambhta' occurs once only, and has to be carried over from the first clause into the subsequent ones; but this makes no difference, for, in the case of such carrying over of a word, no less than in the case of actual repetition, the general denotation of the word is repeated.—The next Stra refutes this objection.



5. The non-abandonment of the promissory statement (results) from non- difference.

It is not appropriate to assume, from deference to the Chndogya-text, a secondary meaning for those other texts also which declare Ether to have originated. For the Chndogyaitself virtually admits the origination of Ether; in so far, namely, as the clause 'that by which the non-heard is heard,' &c., declares that through the knowledge of Brahman everything is known. This declaration is not abandoned, i.e. is adhered to, only if the Ether also is an effect of Brahman and thus non-different from it.



6. (As follows also) from (other) texts.

That Ether is an originated thing follows from other clauses also in the Chndogya: 'Being only this was in the beginning, one without a second' affirms the oneness of everything before creation, and 'In that all this has its Self implies that everything is an effect of, and hence non- different from, Brahman.—Nor does the statement as to the creation of fire, 'it sent forth fire,' exclude the creation of Ether. For the first place which there is assigned to fire rests only thereon that no mention is made of the creation of Ether, and this has no force to negative the creation of Ether as positively stated in other texts.



7. But the division (origination) extends over all effects; as in ordinary life.

The 'but' has the sense of 'and.' As the clause 'In that all this has its Self' and similar ones directly state that Ether also is a creation of Brahman, the division, i.e. the origination of Ether from Brahman, is implicitly declared thereby. As in ordinary life. When in ordinary life somebody has said 'all these men are the sons of Devadatta,' it is known that any particulars which may afterwards be given about the descent of some of them are meant to apply to all.—In accordance with this our conclusion we interpret the text 'Air and Ether, this is the Immortal,' as asserting only that air and Ether continue to exist for a long time, as the Devas do.



8. Hereby air is explained.

The same argumentation explains the origination of air also. That a special Stra is devoted to the origination of air—instead of disposing in one Stra of Ether and air—is for the sake of Stra 10, which states that 'hence (i.e. from air) there originated fire.'



9. But there is non-origination of that which is (only); on account of impossibility.

The 'but' has an affirmative sense. There is non-origination of that which is, i.e. of Brahman only; of whatever is different from Brahman non-origination cannot possibly be established. This means—the origination of Ether and air has been proved only in order to illustrate a general truth. Only that which is, i.e. Brahman, which is the general cause, cannot originate. Whatever is other than Brahman, i. e. the entire world comprising the Unevolved, the great principle (mahat), ahankra, the tanmtras, the sense-organs, the Ether, the air, and so on, cannot possibly be shown to be non-originated, since its being an effect is proved by the text declaring that everything is known through one thing, and in other ways.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the Ether.'



10. Fire (is produced) thence, for thus Scripture declares.

It has been stated that everything different from Brahman is the effect of Brahman. The doubt now arises whether the more remote effects of Brahman originate, each of them, only from that substance which is their immediately antecedent cause or from Brahman in the form of that substance.—The decision is that they originate from those substances only; for the text 'from air fire' directly states the origination of fire from air.



11. Water (from fire).

Water also originates 'thence,' i. e from fire; for so the texts declare 'From fire water' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1); 'that sent forth water' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3).



12. Earth (from water).

Earth originates from water; for so the texts declare 'From water earth' (Taitt Up. II. 1, 1). 'It (water) sent forth food' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3). But how can the word 'food' denote earth?—To this the next Stra replies.



13. Earth on account of the subject-matter, the colour, and other texts.

That the word 'food' denotes the earth is to be inferred from the fact that the section in which the word occurs has for its subject-matter the creation of the elements; as everything eatable is a product of the earth, the term denoting the effect is there applied to denote the cause. In the same chapter, where the colour of the elements is mentioned ('The red colour of a flame is the colour of fire, the white one that of water, the black one that of food '), the collocation of words clearly shows that 'food' means something of the same kind as fire and water, viz. the elements of earth. And there are other texts also which treat of the same topic and declare the origination of earth from water, cp. Taitt. Up. II, 1, 'from fire sprang water, from water earth.' All this proves that the term 'food' denotes earth, and that hence earth originates from water.

Fire and the other substances, the origination of which has been detailed, are mentioned merely as instances, and it must be understood that also other entities, such as the 'Mahat,' and so on, originate only from the immediately preceding cause, in agreement with scriptural statements. And texts such as 'From him is born breath, mind, and all organs of sense, ether, air, light, water, and the earth, the support of all' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 3); 'From him is born that Brahman, name, form, and food' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9); 'From that Self there sprang ether' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1); 'It (i.e. that which is) sent forth fire' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3)— (which seems to teach the direct origination from Brahman of the different elements, and so on)—may be interpreted on the understanding of Brahman being their mediate cause also.—This prim facie view the next Stra disposes of.



14. But he; from the inferential mark supplied by their reflection.

The 'but' indicates the setting aside of the prim facie view raised. Of all effected things, the Mahat, and so on, the highest Person himself, in so far as embodied in the immediately preceding substance, is the direct cause.—How is this known?—'From the inferential mark supplied by the reflection of them.' By 'reflection' the Stra means the resolve expressed in the recurring phrase, 'May I be many'; 'That fire thought, may I be many'; 'That water thought, may I be many' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3; 4). As these texts declare that there was thought in the form of a resolve of self-multiplication—which thought can belong to a Self only, we conclude that also the Mahat, the ahankra, the Ether, and so on, accomplish the sending forth of their respective effects only after similar thought, and such thought can belong only to the highest Brahman embodied in the Mahat, ahankra, and so on. That the highest Brahman is embodied in all beings and constitutes their Self, is directly stated in the antarymin-brhmana, 'He who abiding in the earth; abiding in water; abiding in fire,' &c. &c. (Bri. Up. III, 7, 3 ff.); and likewise in the Subla-Up, 'Whose body is the earth,' &c. &c., up to 'Whose body is the Unevolved.' The Prvapakshin had maintained that the creation, from Brahman, of breath, and so on, which is declared in texts such as 'From him are born breath, mind,' &c., may be understood as a mediate creation. This point is taken up by the next Stra.



15. But the order of succession (which is stated) in reverse order (of the true one) is possible, (only if the origination of all effects is) thence (i.e. from Brahman).

The 'but' has an asseverative sense. The direct origination from Brahman of all effects—which in passages such as the one quoted by the Prvapakshin is stated in a form the reverse of the (true) order of origination according to which the Unevolved, the Mahat, the ahankra, Ether, and so on, succeed each other—is possible only on the supposition of the origination of each effect being really from Brahman itself in the form of a special causal substance. To understand the causality of Brahman as a merely mediate one would be to contradict all those statements of immediate origination. Texts such as the one quoted thus confirm the conclusion that everything originates from Brahman directly.



16. If it be said that knowledge and mind (which are mentioned) between (breath and the elements) (are stated) in order of succession, owing to an inferential mark of this; we say, not so, on account of non- difference.

'Knowledge' in the Stra denotes the means of knowledge, i.e. the sense- organs.—An objection is raised against the conclusion arrived at under the preceding Stra. We cannot, the opponent says, admit the conclusion that the passage from the Mundka Up. 'from him is born breath, mind,' &c., declares the immediate origination from Brahman of all things, and that hence the passage confirms the view, first suggested by the inferential mark of 'thought' (see above, S. 14), that everything springs from Brahman direct. For the purport of the text is to state a certain order of succession, and we hence conclude that all the beings mentioned were successively created. In the second half of the text we recognise the series of ether, air, fire, &c., which is known to us from other texts, and from the fact of their being exhibited in one and the same text we conclude that knowledge and mind—which are mentioned between breath on the one side and the elements on the other—must be viewed as created in that order. The text therefore in no way confirms the direct origination of everything from Brahman. To this the Stra replies, 'Not so, on account of non-difference.' The first words of the text 'from him is born' connect themselves equally with breath, and knowledge, and mind, and the scries of elements beginning with ether; and the meaning of the whole therefore is to declare that all the entities spring directly from Brahman, not to teach the order of succession in which they are produced. It moreover cannot have the purport of teaching a certain order of succession, because the order stated contradicts the order established by other scriptural passages; such as the one beginning 'the earth is merged in water,' and ending 'darkness becomes one.' We hence hold to the conclusion that all effects originate from Brahman only, in so far as embodied in the Unevolved, and so on, and that the terms 'fire' and so on denote Brahman, which is the Self of all those substances.—But to interpret all these words as denoting Brahman is to set aside their special denotative power as established by etymology!—To this objection the next Stra replies.



17. But that which abides in the things movable and immovable, i.e. the terms denoting those things, are non-secondary (i.e. of primary denotative power, viz. with regard to Brahman); since (their denotative power) is effected by the being of that (i.e. Brahman).

The 'but' sets aside the objection raised. (The prim facie view here is as follows.) As Brahman, which has all things for its modes, is not the object of Perception and the other means of knowledge which give rise to the apprehension of the things only which are Brahman's modes, and as hence, previously to the study of the Vednta-texts, the idea of that to which the modes belong (i.e. of Brahman) does not arise, and as the knowledge of all words finally denoting Brahman depends on the existence of the idea of that to which the modes belong (i. e. Brahman); all the individual words are used in worldly language only separately to denote special things. In other words, as the terms 'fire' and so on have denotative power with regard to particular things only, their denotative power with regard to Brahman is secondary, indirect only.—Of this view the Stra disposes by saying 'that which abides in the moving and the non-moving,' &c. The meaning is—the terms which abide in, i.e. are connected with, the different moving and non-moving things, and hence denote those things, possess with regard to Brahman a denotative power which is not 'bhkta,' i.e. secondary or figurative, but primary and direct. 'Why so?' Because the denotative power of all words is dependent on the being of Brahman. For this we know from the scriptural passage which tells how names and forms were evolved by Brahman.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'fire.'



18. Not the Self, on account of scriptural statement, and on account of the eternity (which results) from them.

The Stras so far have stated that this entire world, from Ether downwards, originates from the highest Brahman. It now becomes a matter for discussion whether the individual soul also originates in the same way or not.—It does so originate, the Prvapakshin maintains. For on this assumption only the scriptural statement as to the cognition of all things through the cognition of one thing holds good, and moreover Scripture declares that before creation everything was one. Moreover, there are texts directly stating that the soul also was produced in the same way as Ether and other created things.

'Prajpati sent forth all creatures'; 'All these creatures have their root in the True, they abide in the True, they rest on the True' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 6); 'From whence these beings are produced' (Taitt. Up. III, 1, 1). As these passages declare the origination of the world inclusive of sentient beings, we conclude that the souls also originate. Nor must this be objected to on the ground than from the fact that Brahman is eternal, and the other fact that texts such as 'That art them' teach the soul to be of the nature of Brahman, it follows that the soul also is eternal. For if we reasoned in this style we should have to admit also that the Ether and the other elements are eternal, since texts such as 'in that all this has its Self' and 'all this indeed is Brahman 'intimate them also to be of the nature of Brahman. Hence the individual soul also originates no less than Ether and the rest.—To this the Stra replies, 'Not the Self, on account of scriptural statement.' The Self is not produced, since certain texts directly deny its origination; cp. 'the intelligent one is not born nor does he die' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 18); 'There are two unborn ones, one intelligent and strong, the other non- intelligent and weak' (Svet. Up. I, 9). And the eternity of the soul is learned from the same texts, cp. 'There is one eternal thinker,' &c. (Ka. Up. II,5, 13); 'Unborn, eternal, everlasting is that ancient one; he is not killed though the body is killed' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 18).—For these reasons the soul is not produced.

But how then about the declaration that through the cognition of one thing everything is known?-There is no difficulty here, since the soul also is an effect, and since effect and cause are non-different.—But this implies that the soul is an originated thing just like Ether and so on!—Not so, we reply. By a thing being an effect we mean its being due to a substance passing over into some other state; and from this point of view the soul also is an effect. There is, however, the difference, that the 'other condition' which is represented by the soul is of a different kind from that which constitutes non-sentient things, such as Ether and so on. The 'otherness' on which the soul depends consists in the contraction and expansion of intelligence; while the change on which the origination of Ether and so on depends is a change of essential nature. And change of the latter kind is what we deny of the soul. We have shown that there are three entities of distinct nature, viz. objects of fruition, enjoying subjects, and a Ruler; that origination and so on which are characteristic of the objects do not belong to the subjects, and that the latter are eternal; that the characteristic qualities of the objects and likewise those of the subjects—viz. liability to pain and suffering—do not belong to the Ruler; that the latter is eternal, free from all imperfections, omniscient, immediately realising all his purposes, the Lord of the lords of the organs, the highest Lord of all; and that sentient and non-sentient beings in all their states constitute the body of the Lord while he constitutes their Self. While Brahman thus has for its modes (prakra) the sentient and non-sentient beings in which it ever is embodied, during certain periods those beings abide in so subtle a condition as to be incapable of receiving designations different from that of Brahman itself; Brahman then is said to be in its causal state. When, on the other hand, its body is constituted by all those beings in their gross state, when they have separate, distinct names and forms, Brahman is said to be in its effected condition. When, now, Brahman passes over from the causal state into the effected state, the aggregate of non-sentient things which in the causal state were destitute of name and form undergoes an essential change of nature—implying the possession of distinct names and so on— so as to become fit to constitute objects of fruition for sentient beings; the change, on the other hand, which the sentient beings (the souls) undergo on that occasion is nothing more than a certain expansion of intelligence (or consciousness), capacitating them to experience the different rewards or punishments for their previous deeds. The ruling element of the world, i.e. the Lord, finally, who has the sentient and non-sentient beings for his modes, undergoes a change in so far as he is, at alternating periods, embodied in all those beings in their alternating states. The two modes, and he to whom the modes belong, thus undergo a common change in so far as in the case of all of them the causal condition passes over into a different condition.

It is with reference to this change undergone by one substance in passing over into a different state that the Chandogya says that through the knowledge of one thing everything is known, and illustrates this by the case of the lump of clay (knowing which we know all things made of clay). Texts such as 'Prajpati sent forth the creatures,' which declare the origination of the soul, really mean only to state that the souls are by turns associated with or dissociated from bodies—the effect of which is that their intelligence is either contracted or expanded. Texts again which deny the origination of the soul and affirm its permanency ('He is not born and does not die,' &c.) mean to say that the soul does not, like the non-sentient element of creation, undergo changes of essential nature. And finally there are texts the purport of which it is to declare the absence of change of essential nature as well as of alternate expansion and contraction of intelligence—cp. 'That is the great unborn Self, undecaying, undying, immortal, Brahman' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 25); 'the eternal thinker,' &c. (Ka. Up. II, 5, 13); such texts have for their subject the highest Lord.—All this also explains how Brahman, which is at all times differentiated by the sentient and non-sentient beings that constitute its body, can be said to be one only previous to creation; the statement is possible because at that time the differentiation of names and forms did not exist. That that which makes the difference between plurality and unity is the presence or absence of differentiation through names and forms, is distinctly declared in the text, 'Now all this was undifferentiated. It became differentiated by form and name' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 7).—Those also who hold that the individual soul is due to Nescience; and those who hold it to be due to a real limiting adjunct (updhi); and those who hold that Brahman, whose essential nature is mere Being, assumes by itself the threefold form of enjoying subjects, objects of enjoyment, and supreme Ruler; can all of them explain the unity which Scripture predicates of Brahman in the pralaya state, only on the basis of the absence of differentiation by names and forms; for according to them also (there is no absolute unity at any time, but) either the potentiality of Nescience, or the potentiality of the limiting adjunct, or the potentialities of enjoying subjects, objects of enjoyment, and supreme Ruler persist in the pralaya condition also. And, moreover, it is proved by the two Stras, II, 1, 33; 35, that the distinction of the several individual souls and the stream of their works are eternal.

There is, however, the following difference between those several views. The first-mentioned view implies that Brahman itself is under the illusive influence of beginningless Avidy. According to the second view, the effect of the real and beginningless limiting adjunct is that Brahman itself is in the state of bondage; for there is no other entity but Brahman and the adjunct. According to the third view, Brahman itself assumes different forms, and itself experiences the various unpleasant consequences of deeds. Nor would it avail to say that that part of Brahman which is the Ruler is not an experiencing subject; for as Brahman is all-knowing it recognises the enjoying subject as non- different from itself, and thus is itself an enjoying subject.— According to our view, on the other hand, Brahman, which has for its body all sentient and non-sentient beings, whether in their subtle or their gross state, is always—in its effected as well as in its causal condition free from all shadow of imperfection, and a limitless ocean as it were of all exalted qualities. All imperfections, and suffering, and all change belong not to Brahman, but only to the sentient and non- sentient beings which are its modes. This view removes all difficulties.— Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the Self.'



19. For this very reason (the individual soul is) a knower.

It has been shown that, different therein from Ether and the rest, the soul is not produced. This leads to the consideration of the soul's essential nature. Is that essential nature constituted by mere intelligence as Sugata and Kapila hold; or is the soul as Kanda thinks, essentially non-intelligent, comparable to a stone, while intelligence is merely an adventitious quality of it; or is it essentially a knowing subject?—The soul is mere intelligence, the Prvapakshin maintains; for the reason that Scripture declares it to be so. For in the antarymin- brhmana the clause which in the Mdhyandina-text runs as follows, 'he who abides in the Self,' is in the text of the Knvas represented by the clause 'he who abides in knowledge.' Similarly the text 'knowledge performs the sacrifice and all sacred acts' (Taitt. Up. II, 5, I) shows that it is knowledge only which is the true nature of the active Self. And Smriti texts convey the same view, as e.g. 'it in reality is of the nature of absolutely spotless intelligence.' A second Prvapakshin denies the truth of this view. If, he says, we assume that the Self's essential nature consists either in mere knowledge or in its being a knowing subject, it follows that as the Self is omnipresent there must be consciousness at all places and at all times. On that doctrine we, further, could not account for the use of the instruments of cognition (i.e. the sense-organs, &c.); nor for the fact that in the states of deep sleep, swoon and so on, the Self although present is not observed to be conscious, while on the other hand consciousness is seen to arise as soon as the conditions of the waking state are realised. We therefore conclude that neither intelligence or consciousness, nor being a knowing agent, constitutes the essence of the soul, but that consciousness is a mere adventitious or occasional attribute. And the omnipresence of the Self must needs be admitted since its effects are perceived everywhere. Nor is there any valid reason for holding that the Self moves to any place; for as it is assumed to be present everywhere the actual accomplishment of effects (at certain places only) may be attributed to the moving of the body only.—Scripture also directly declares that in the state of deep sleep there is no consciousness, 'I do not indeed at the present moment know myself, so as to be able to say "that am I," nor do I know those beings.' Similarly Scripture declares the absence of consciousness in the state of final release, 'when he has departed there is no consciousness' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 12); where the Self is spoken of as having knowledge for its essential nature, the meaning only is that knowledge constitutes its specific quality, and the expression is therefore not to be urged in its literal sense.

Against all this the Stra declares 'for this very reason a knower.' This Self is essentially a knower, a knowing subject; not either mere knowledge or of non-sentient nature.—Why?—'For this very reason,' i.e. on account of Scripture itself. 'For this reason' refers back to the 'on account of Scripture' in the preceding Stra. For in the Chndogya, where the condition of the released and the non-released soul is described, the text says 'He who knows, let me smell this, he is the Self—with the mind seeing those pleasures he rejoices-the devas who are in the world of Brahman—whose desires are true, whose purposes are true— not remembering the body into which he was born' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 4-5; 1, 5; 12, 3). And elsewhere 'The seer does not see death' (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2). Similarly we read in the Vjasaneyaka, in reply to the question 'Who is that Self?'—'He who is within the heart, surrounded by the Prnas, the person of light, consisting of knowledge' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 7); 'By what should one know the knower?' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15); 'That person knows.' And 'for he is the knower, the hearer, the smeller, the taster, the perceiver, the thinker, the agent—he the person whose Self is knowledge'; and 'thus these sixteen parts of that seer' (Pra. Up. IV, 9; VI, 5). To the objection that if being a cognising subject constituted the essential nature of the Self it would follow that as the Self is omnipresent, there would be consciousness always and everywhere, the next Stra replies.



20. On account of (its) passing out, moving and returning.

The Self is not omnipresent, but on the contrary, of atomic size (anu).— How is this known?—Since Scripture says that it passes out, goes and returns. Its passing out is described in the following passage 'by that light this Self departs, either through the eye, or through the skull, or through other parts of the body' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 2). Its going in the following text 'all those who pass away out of this world go to the moon,' and its returning in the text 'from that world he comes again into this world, for action.' All this going, and so on, cannot be reconciled with the soul being present everywhere.



21. And on account of the latter two (being effected) through the Self.

The 'and' has affirming power. The 'passing out' might somehow be reconciled with a non-moving Self (such as the omnipresent Self would be) if it were taken in the sense of the Self separating from the body; but for the going and returning no analogous explanation is possible. They, therefore, must be taken as effected by the Self itself (which, then, cannot be omnipresent and non-moving).



22. If it be said that (the soul) is not atomic, on account of scriptural statement of (what is) not that; we say no, on account of the other one being the topic.

The passage 'He who is within the heart, surrounded by the Prnas, the person consisting of knowledge' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 7) introduces as the topic of discussion the personal Self, and further on in the same chapter we read 'the unborn Self, the great one' (IV, 4, 22). The personal Self, being expressly called great, cannot, therefore, be atomic!—Not so, we reply. 'Since the other one is the topic.' In the second text quoted that Self which is other than the personal Self—i.e. the highest Self (prja) constitutes the topic. In the beginning of the chapter, indeed, the individual Self is introduced, but later on, between the two texts quoted, the instruction begins to concern itself with the highest Self, 'he by whom there is known the Self of intelligence' (pratibuddha tm; IV, 4, 13). It is this latter Self which, in 22 is called great, not the individual Self.



23. And on account of the very word, and of measure.

Scripture directly applies the word 'anu' to the individual Self, 'By thought is to be known that atomic Self into which Breath has entered fivefold' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 9).—By the term 'unmna' in the Stra we have to understand measurement by selection of comparative instances. Scripture declares the minuteness of the individual Self by reference to things which are like atoms in size, 'The individual soul is to be known as part of the hundredth part of the point of a hair divided a hundred times, and yet it is to be infinite' (Svet. Up. V, 9); 'that lower one is seen of the measure of the point of a goad' (V, 8). For these reasons also the individual Self must be viewed as atomic.—But this conflicts with the fact that sensation extends over the whole body!—This objection the next Stra refutes by means of an analogous instance.



24. There is no contradiction, as in the case of sandal-ointment.

As a drop of sandal-ointment, although applied to one spot of the body only, yet produces a refreshing sensation extending over the whole body; thus the Self also, although dwelling in one part of the body only, is conscious of sensations taking place in any part of the body.



25. Should it be said (that this is not so) on account of specialisation of abode; we say no, on account of the acknowledgment (of a place of the Self), viz. in the heart.

There is a difference. The drop of ointment can produce its effect as at any rate it is in contact with a definite part of the body. But we know of no such part in the case of the soul!—Not so, we reply. Scripture informs us that the Self abides in a definite part of the body, viz. the heart. 'For that Self is in the heart, there are a hundred and one veins.' And in reply to the question 'What is that Self?' the text has 'He who is within the heart, surrounded by the Prnas, the Person of light, consisting of knowledge' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 7).—The parallel case of the sandal-ointment is referred to in order to point out that the Self abides in some particular part of the body; while the ointment is not bound to any special place.—In the next Stra the Strakra proceeds to state how, according to his own view, the Self, although abiding in one spot only, gives rise to effects extending over the whole body.



26. Or on account of its quality as light.

The 'or' is meant to set aside the view previously stated. The Self extends through the whole body by means of its quality, viz. knowledge or consciousness. 'As light.' As the light of things abiding in one place—such as gems, the sun, and so on—is seen to extend to many places, so the consciousness of the Self dwelling in the heart pervades the entire body. That the knowledge of the knowing subject may extend beyond its substrate, as the light of a luminous body does, we have already explained under the first Stra.—But it has been said that the Self is mere knowledge; how then can knowledge be said to be a quality— which is something different from the essential nature of a thing?—This the next Stra explains.



27. There is distinction as in the case of smell; and thus Scripture declares.

Just as smell, which is perceived as a quality of earth, is distinct from earth; thus knowledge of which we are conscious as the quality of a knowing subject—which relation expresses itself in judgments such as 'I know'—is different from the knowing subject. Scriptural texts also prove this relation, as e.g. 'This Person knows.'



28. On account of the separate statement.

Scripture even states quite directly that knowledge is something distinct from the knowing subject, viz. in the passage 'For there is not known any intermission of the knowing of the knower' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 30).—It has been said that in passages such as 'he who abiding in knowledge' (Bri. Up. III, 7, 22); 'Knowledge performs the sacrifice' (Taitt. Up. II, 5, 1); 'having knowledge for its nature, absolutely free from stain,'Scripture speaks of the Self as being mere knowledge (not a knower). This point the next Stra elucidates.



29. But (the Self) is designated as that because it has that quality (viz. knowledge) for its essential quality; as in the case of the intelligent (prja) Self.

The 'but' discards the objection. Because that quality, viz. the quality of knowledge, is the essential quality, therefore the Self is, in the passages quoted, designated as knowledge. For knowledge constitutes the essential quality of the Self. Similarly, the intelligent highest Self is occasionally called 'Bliss,' because bliss is its essential quality. Compare 'If that bliss existed not in the ether' (Taitt. Up. II, 7, 1); 'He perceived that bliss is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. III, 6, 1). That bliss is the essential attribute of Brahman is proved by texts such as 'That is one bliss of Brahman'; 'He who knows the bliss of Brahman is afraid of nothing' (Taitt. Up. II, 4, 1).—Or else the analogous case to which the Stra refers may be that of the intelligent Brahman being designated by the term 'knowledge,' in texts such as 'Truth, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1). That knowledge is the essential quality of Brahman is known from passages such as 'together with the intelligent Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1); 'He who is all-knowing' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9).



30. And there is no objection, since (the quality of knowledge) exists wherever the Self is; this being observed.

Since knowledge is an attribute which is met with wherever a Self is, there is no objection to the Self being designated by that attribute. Similarly we observe that special kinds of cows, as e.g. hornless ones, are designated by the term 'cow,' since the quality of possessing the generic character of cows is met with everywhere in connexion with the essential character of such animals with mutilated horns; since in fact that quality contributes to define their essential character. The 'and' of the Stra is meant to suggest a further argument, viz. that to apply to the Self the term 'knowledge' is suitable for that reason also that like knowledge the Self is self-illuminated. The objection that knowledge or consciousness cannot be an attribute inseparably connected with the essential nature of the Self as there is no consciousness in deep sleep and similar states is taken up in the next Stra.



31. Since there may be manifestation of that which exists; as in the case of virile power and so on.

The 'but' is meant to set the raised objection aside. The case may be that while consciousness is present also in deep sleep, and so on, it is manifested in the waking state only; whence there would be no objection to viewing consciousness as an essential attribute of the Self. 'As in the case of virile power and the like.' Special substances such as the virile element are indeed present in the male child already, but then are not manifest, while later on they manifest themselves with advancing youth; but all the same the possession of those substances is essential to the male being, not merely adventitious. For to be made up of seven elementary substances (viz. blood, humour, flesh, fat, marrow, bone, and semen) is an essential, property of the body. That even in deep sleep and similar states the 'I' shines forth we have explained above. Consciousness is always there, but only in the waking state and in dreams it is observed to relate itself to objects. And that to be a subject of cognition, and so on, are essential attributes of the Self, we have also proved before. The conclusion, therefore, is that to be a knowing subject is the essential character of the Self. And that Self is of atomic size. The text 'when he has departed there is no consciousness' (samj; Bri. Up. II, 4, 12) does not declare that the released Self has no consciousness; but only that in the case of that Self there is absent that knowledge (experience) of birth, death, and so on, which in the Samsra state is caused by the connexion of the Self with the elements—as described in the preceding passage, 'that great being having risen from out these elements again perishes after them.' For the text as to the absence of samj after death must be interpreted in harmony with other texts describing the condition of the released soul, such as 'the seeing one does not see death nor illness nor pain; the seeing one sees everything and obtains everything everywhere' (Ch. Up. VII, 25, 2); 'not remembering that body into which he was born— seeing these pleasures with the mind he rejoices' (VIII, 12, 3; 5).

The Stras now proceed to refute the doctrine of the Self being (not a knower) but mere knowledge, and being omnipresent.



32. There would result permanent consciousness or non-consciousness, or else limitative restriction to either.

On the other view, i.e. on the view of the Self being omnipresent and mere knowledge, it would follow either that consciousness and also non- consciousness would permanently take place together everywhere; or else that there would be definite permanent restriction to either of the two, i.e. either permanent consciousness or permanent non-consciousness.—If the omnipresent Self, consisting of mere knowledge only, were the cause of all that actual consciousness and non-consciousness on the part of Selfs which takes place in the world, it might be conceived either as the cause of both—i.e. consciousness and non-consciousness—and this would mean that there is everywhere and at all times simultaneous consciousness and non-consciousness. If, on the other hand, it were the cause of consciousness only, there would never and nowhere be unconsciousness of anything; and if it were the cause of non- consciousness only, there would never and nowhere be consciousness of anything. On our view, on the other hand, the actually perceived distribution of consciousness and non-consciousness explains itself, since we hold the Self to abide within bodies only, so that naturally consciousness takes place there only, not anywhere else.—The view, finally (held by the Vaiseshikas), of the consciousness of the Self depending on its organs (mind, senses, &c.; while the omnipresent Self is, apart from those organs, non-sentient, jada), results in the same difficulties as the view criticised above; for as all the Selfs are omnipresent they are in permanent conjunction with all organs; and moreover it would follow that the adrishtas (due to the actions of the different bodies) could not thus be held apart (but would cling to all Selfs, each of which is in contact with all bodies).

Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the knower.'



33. (The soul is) an agent, on account of Scripture (thus) having a purport.

It has been shown that the individual Self is a knowing subject and atomic. Now the question arises whether that Self is an agent or, being itself non-active, erroneously ascribes to itself the activity of the non-sentient gunas. The prim facie answer is that the individual Self is not an agent, since the sacred texts concerned with the Self declare that the Self does not act, while the gunas do act. Thus, e.g. in the Kathavall, where the text at first denies of the individual Self all the attributes of Prakriti, such as being born, ageing and dying ('he is not born, he does not die'), and then also denies that the Self is the agent in acts such as killing and the like, 'If the slayer thinks that he slays, if the slain thinks that he is slain, they both do not understand; for this one does not slay, nor is that one slain' (I, 2, 19). This means—if one thinks the Self to be the slayer one does not know the Self. And the Lord himself teaches that non-agency is the essential nature of the individual soul, and that it is mere delusion on the Self's part to ascribe to itself agency. 'By the attributes (guna) of Prakriti, actions are wrought all round.' He who is deluded by self- conceit thinks 'I am the agent'; 'when the seer beholds no other agent than the gunas'; 'Prakriti is said to be the cause of all agency of causes and effects, whilst the soul is the cause of all enjoyment of pleasure and pain' (Bha. G. III, 27; XIV, 19; XIII, 20).—The soul, therefore, is an enjoyer only, while all agency belongs to Prakriti—To this the Stra replies, 'an agent, on account of Scripture thus having a meaning.' The Self only is an agent, not the gunas, because thus only Scripture has a meaning. For the scriptural injunctions, such as 'he who desires the heavenly world is to sacrifice,' 'He who desires Release is to meditate on Brahman,' and similar ones, enjoin action on him only who will enjoy the fruit of the action—whether the heavenly world, or Release, or anything else. If a non-sentient thing were the agent, the injunction would not be addressed to another being (viz. to an intelligent being—to which it actually is addressed). The term 'sstra' (scriptural injunction) moreover comes from ss, to command, and commanding means impelling to action. But scriptural injunctions impel to action through giving rise to a certain conception (in the mind of the being addressed), and the non-sentient Pradhna cannot be made to conceive anything. Scripture therefore has a sense only, if we admit that none but the intelligent enjoyer of the fruit of the action is at the same time the agent. Thus the Prva Mimamsa declares 'the fruit of the injunction belongs to the agent' (III, 7, 18). The Prvapakshin had contended that the text 'if the slayer thinks, &c.,' proves the Self not to be the agent in the action of slaying; but what the text really means is only that the Self as being eternal cannot be killed. The text, from Smriti, which was alleged as proving that the gunas only possess active power, refers to the fact that in all activities lying within the sphere of the samsara, the activity of the Self is due not to its own nature but to its contact with the different gunas. The activity of the gunas, therefore, must be viewed not as permanent, but occasional only. In the same sense Smriti says 'the reason is the connexion of the soul with the guwas, in its births, in good and evil wombs' (Bha. G. XIII, 21). Similarly it is said there (XVIII, 16) that 'he who through an untrained understanding looks upon the isolated Self as an agent, that man of perverted mind does not see'; the meaning being that, since it appears from a previous passage that the activity of the Self depends on five factors (as enumerated in sl. 16), he who views the isolated Self to be an agent has no true insight.



34. On account of taking and the declaration as to its moving about.

The text beginning 'And as a great king,' &c., declares that 'the Self taking the pranas moves about in its own body, according to its pleasure' (Bri. Up. II, 1, 18), i.e. it teaches that the Self is active in taking to itself the prnas and moving about in the body.



35. And on account of the designation (of the Self as the agent) in actions. If not so, there would be change of grammatical expression.

Because in the text 'Knowledge performs the sacrifice, it performs all works' (Taitt. Up. II, 5) the Self is designated as the agent in all worldly and Vedic works, for this reason also the Self must be held to be an agent. And should it be said that the word 'knowledge' in that text denotes not the Self, but the internal organ or buddhi, we point out that in that case there would be a change of grammatical expression, that is to say, as the buddhi is the instrument of action, the text would exhibit the instrumental case instead of the nominative case 'by knowledge, and so on' (vijnena instead of vijnam).



36. (There would be) absence of definite rule, as in the case of consciousness.

The Stra points out a difficulty which arises on the view of the Self not being an agent. Stra 32 has declared that if the Self were all- pervading it would follow that there would be no definite determination with regard to consciousness. Similarly, if the Self were not an agent but all activity belonged to Prakriti it would follow that as Prakriti is a common possession of all souls, all actions would result in enjoyment (experience) on the part of all souls, or else on the part of none; for as each Self is held to be omnipresent, they are all of them in equal proximity to all parts of the Pradhna. For the same reason it could not be maintained that the distribution of results between the different souls depends on the different internal organs which are joined to the souls; for if the souls are omnipresent, no soul will be exclusively connected with any particular internal organ.



37. On account of the inversion of power.

If the internal organ were the agent, then—since it is impossible that a being other than the agent should be the enjoyer of the fruit of the action—the power of enjoyment also would belong to the internal organ, and would consequently have to be denied of the Self. But if this were so, there would be no longer any proof for the existence of the Self; for they expressly teach that 'the person (i.e. the soul) exists, on account of the fact of enjoyment.'



38. And on account of the absence of samdhi.

If the internal organ were the agent, it would be such even in that final state of meditation, called samdhi, which is the instrument of Release. But that state consists therein that the meditating being realises its difference from Prakriti, and this is a conception which Prakriti itself (of which the internal organ is only a modification) cannot form. The Self alone, therefore, is the agent. But this would imply that the activity of the Self is never at rest! Of this difficulty the next Stra disposes.



39. And as the carpenter, in both ways.

The Self, although always provided with the instruments of action, such as the organ of speech, and so on, acts when it wishes to do so, and does not act when it does not wish to do so. Just as a carpenter, although having his axe and other implements ready at hand, works or does not work just as he pleases. If the internal organ, on the contrary, were essentially active, it would constantly be acting, since as a non- intelligent being it could not be influenced by particular reasons for action, such as the desire for enjoyment.

Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the agent.'



40. But from the highest, this being declared by Scripture.

Is the activity of the individual soul independent (free), or does it depend on the highest Self? It is free; for if it were dependent on the highest Self, the whole body of scriptural injunctions and prohibitions would be unmeaning. For commandments can be addressed to such agents only as are capable of entering on action or refraining from action, according to their own thought and will.

This prim facie view is set aside by the Stra. The activity of the individual soul proceeds from the highest Self as its cause. For Scripture teaches this. 'Entered within, the ruler of creatures, the Self of all'; 'who dwelling in the Self is different from the Self, whom the Self does not know, whose body the Self is, who rules the Self from within, he is thy Self, the inward ruler, the immortal one.' Smriti teaches the same, 'I dwell within the heart of all; memory and knowledge as well as their loss come from me'(Bha. G. XV, 15); 'The Lord, O Arjuna, dwells in the heart of all creatures, whirling, by his mysterious power, all creatures as if mounted on a machine' (Bha. G. XVIII, 61).—But this view implies the meaninglessness of all scriptural injunctions and prohibitions!—To this the next Stra replies.



41. But with a view to the efforts made (the Lord makes the soul act) on account of the (thus resulting) non-meaninglessness of injunctions and prohibitions and the rest.

The inwardly ruling highest Self promotes action in so far as it regards in the case of any action the volitional effort made by the individual soul, and then aids that effort by granting its favour or permission (anumati); action is not possible without permission on the part of the highest Self. In this way (i.e. since the action primarily depends on the volitional effort of the soul) injunctions and prohibitions are not devoid of meaning. The 'and the rest' of the Stra is meant to suggest the grace and punishments awarded by the Lord.—The case is analogous to that of property of which two men are joint owners. If one of these wishes to transfer that property to a third person he cannot do so without the permission of his partner, but that that permission is given is after all his own doing, and hence the fruit of the action (reward or anything) properly belongs to him only.—That, in the case of evil actions, allowance of the action on the part of one able to stop it does not necessarily prove hardheartedness, we have shown above when explaining the Snkhya doctrine.—But there is a scriptural text.—'He (the Lord) makes him whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds do a good deed, and the same makes him whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds do a bad deed' (Kau. Up. III, 8)—which means that the Lord himself causes men to do good and evil actions, and this does not agree with the partial independence claimed above for the soul.—The text quoted, we reply, does not apply to all agents, but means that the Lord, wishing to do a favour to those who are resolved on acting so as fully to please the highest Person, engenders in their minds a tendency towards highly virtuous actions, such as are means to attain to him; while on the other hand, in order to punish those who are resolved on lines of action altogether displeasing to him, he engenders in their minds a delight in such actions as have a downward tendency and are obstacles in the way of the attainment of the Lord. Thus the Lord himself says, 'I am the origin of all, everything proceeds from me; knowing this the wise worship me with love. To them ever devoted, worshipping me in love, I give that means of wisdom by which they attain to me. In mercy only to them, dwelling in their hearts, do I destroy the darkness born of ignorance, with the brilliant light of knowledge' (Bha. G. X, 8; 10-11). And further on the Lord—after having described 'demoniac' people, in the passus beginning 'they declare the world to be without a Truth, without a resting-place, without a Ruler,' and ending 'malignantly hating me who abides in their own bodies and those of others'—declares, 'These evil and malign haters, most degraded of men, I hurl perpetually into transmigrations and into demoniac wombs' (XVI, 8- 19).

Here terminates the adhikarana of 'that which depends on the Highest.'



42. (The soul is) a part, on account of the declarations of difference and otherwise; some also record (that Brahman is of) the nature of slaves, fishermen, and so on.

The Stras have declared that the individual soul is an agent, and as such dependent on the highest Person. The following question now arises— Is the individual soul absolutely different from Brahman? or is it nothing else than Brahman itself in so far as under the influence of error? or is it Brahman in so far as determined by a limiting adjunct (updhi)? or is it a part (amsa) of Brahman?—The doubt on this point is due to the disagreement of the scriptural texts.—But this whole matter has already been decided under S. II, 1, 22.—True. But as a difficulty presents itself on the ground of the conflicting nature of the texts— some asserting the difference and some the unity of the individual soul and Brahman—the matter is here more specially decided by its being proved that the soul is a part of Brahman. As long as this decision remains unsettled, the conclusions arrived at under the two Stras referred to, viz. that the soul is non-different from Brahman and that Brahman is 'additional' to the soul, are without a proper basis.

Let it then first be said that the soul is absolutely different from Brahman, since texts such as 'There are two, the one knowing, the other not knowing, both unborn, the one strong, the other weak' (Svet. Up. I, 9) declare their difference. Texts which maintain the non-difference of a being which is knowing and another which is not knowing, if taken literally, convey a contradiction—as if one were to say, 'Water the ground with fire'!-and must therefore be understood in some secondary metaphorical sense. To hold that the individual soul is a part of Brahman does not explain matters; for by a 'part' we understand that which constitutes part of the extension of something. If, then, the soul occupied part of the extension of Brahman, all its imperfections would belong to Brahman. Nor can the soul be a part of Brahman if we take 'part' to mean a piece (khanda); for Brahman does not admit of being divided into pieces, and moreover, the difficulties connected with the former interpretation would present themselves here also. That something absolutely different from something else should yet be a part of the latter cannot in fact be proved.

Or else let it be said that the soul is Brahman affected by error (bhrama). For this is the teaching of texts such as 'Thou art that'; 'this Self is Brahman.' Those texts, on the other hand, which declare the difference of the two merely restate what is already established by perception and the other means of knowledge, and therefore are shown, by those texts the purport of which it is to teach non-duality not established by other means, to lie—like perception and the other means of knowledge themselves—within the sphere of Nescience.

Or let it be assumed, in the third place, that the individual soul is Brahman as determined by a beginningless limiting adjunct (updhi). For it is on this ground that Scripture teaches the Self to be Brahman. And that updhi must not be said to be a mere erroneous imagination, for on that view the distinction of bondage, release, and so on, would be impossible.

Against all these views the Stra declares that the soul is a part of Brahman; since there are declarations of difference and also 'otherwise,' i.e. declarations of unity. To the former class belong all those texts which dwell on the distinction of the creator and the creature, the ruler and the ruled, the all-knowing and the ignorant, the independent and the dependent, the pure and the impure, that which is endowed with holy qualities and that which possesses qualities of an opposite kind, the lord and the dependent. To the latter class belong such texts as 'Thou art that' and 'this Self is Brahman.' Some persons even record that Brahman is of the nature of slaves, fishermen, and so on. The tharvanikas, that is to say, have the following text,' Brahman are the slaves. Brahman are these fishers,' and so on; and as Brahman there is said to comprise within itself all individual souls, the passage teaches general non-difference of the Self. In order, then, that texts of both these classes may be taken in their primary, literal sense, we must admit that the individual soul is a part of Brahman. Nor is it a fact that the declarations of difference refer to matters settled by other means of knowledge, such as perception and so on, and on that account are mere reiterations of something established otherwise (in consequence of which they would have no original proving force of their own, and would be sublated by the texts declaring non-duality). For the fact that the soul is created by Brahman, is ruled by it, constitutes its body, is subordinate to it, abides in it, is preserved by it, is absorbed by it, stands to it in the relation of a meditating devotee, and through its grace attains the different ends of man, viz. religious duty, wealth, pleasure and final release—all this and what is effected thereby, viz. the distinction of the soul and Brahman, does not fall within the cognisance of perception and the other means of proof, and hence is not established by something else. It is therefore not true that the texts declaring the creation of the world, and so on, are mere reiterations of differences established by other means of authoritative knowledge, and hence have for their purport to teach things that are false.—[Nor will it do to say that the texts declaring duality teach what indeed is not established by other means of knowledge but is erroneous.] 'Brahman conceives the thought of differentiating itself, forms the resolution of becoming many, and accordingly creates the ether and the other elements, enters into them as individual soul, evolves all the different forms and names, takes upon himself all the pleasures and pains which spring from experiencing the infinite multitude of objects thus constituted, abides within and inwardly rules all beings, recognises itself in its jva- condition to be one with the universal causal Brahman, and finally accomplishes its release from the samsra and the body of sacred doctrine by which this release is effected'—all this the Veda indeed declares, but its real purport is that all this is only true of a Brahman under the influence of an illusion, and therefore is unreal!— while at the same time Brahman is defined as that the essential nature of which is absolutely pure intelligence! Truly, if such were the purport of the Veda, what more would the Veda be than the idle talk of a person out of his mind!

Nor finally is there any good in the theory of the soul being Brahman in so far as determined by a limiting adjunct. For this view also is in conflict with the texts which distinguish Brahman as the ruling and the soul as the ruled principle, and so on. One and the same Devadatta does not become double as it were—a ruler on the one hand and a ruled subject on the other—because he is determined by the house in which he is, or by something else.

In order to be able to account for the twofold designations of the soul, we must therefore admit that the soul is a part of Brahman.



43. And on account of the mantra.

'One part (quarter) of it are all beings, three feet (quarters) of it are the Immortal in heaven' (Ch. Up. III, 12, 6)—on account of this mantra also the soul must be held to be a part of Brahman. For the word 'foot' denotes a part. As the individual souls are many the mantra uses the plural form 'all beings.' In the Stra (42) the word 'part' is in the singular, with a view to denote the whole class. For the same reason in II, 3, 18 also the word 'atman' is in the singular. For that the individual Selfs are different from the Lord, and are many and eternal, is declared by texts such as 'He who, eternal and intelligent, fulfils the desires of many who likewise are eternal and intelligent' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 13). Since thus the plurality of the eternal individual Selfs rests on good authority, those who have an insight into the true nature of Selfs will discern without difficulty different characteristics distinguishing the individual Selfs, although all Selfs are alike in so far as having intelligence for their essential nature. Moreover the Stra II, 3, 48 directly states the plurality of the individual Selfs.



44. Moreover it is so stated in Smriti.

Smriti moreover declares the individual soul to be a part of the highest Person, 'An eternal part of myself becomes the individual soul (jva) in the world of life' (Bha. G. XV, 7). For this reason also the soul must be held to be a part of Brahman.

But if the soul is a part of Brahman, all the imperfections of the soul are Brahman's also! To this objection the next Stra replies.



45. But as in the case of light and so on. Not so is the highest.

The 'but' discards the objection. 'Like light and so on.' The individual soul is a part of the highest Self; as the light issuing from a luminous thing such as fire or the sun is a part of that body; or as the generic characteristics of a cow or horse, and the white or black colour of things so coloured, are attributes and hence parts of the things in which those attributes inhere; or as the body is a part of an embodied being. For by a part we understand that which constitutes one place (desa) of some thing, and hence a distinguishing attribute (viseshna) is a part of the thing distinguished by that attribute. Hence those analysing a thing of that kind discriminate between the distinguishing clement or part of it, and the distinguished element or part. Now although the distinguishing attribute and the thing distinguished thereby stand to each other in the relation of part and whole, yet we observe them to differ in essential character. Hence there is no contradiction between the individual and the highest Self—the former of which is a viseshana of the latter—standing to each other in the relation of part and whole, and their being at the same time of essentially different nature. This the Stra declares 'not so is the highest,' i.e. the highest Self is not of the same nature as the individual soul. For as the luminous body is of a nature different from that of its light, thus the highest Self differs from the individual soul which is a part of it. It is this difference of character—due to the individual soul being the distinguishing clement and the highest Self being the substance distinguished thereby—to which all those texts refer which declare difference. Those texts, on the other hand, which declare non-difference are based on the circumstance that attributes which are incapable of separate existence are ultimately bound to the substance which they distinguish, and hence are fundamentally valid. That in declarations such as 'Thou art that' and 'this Self is Brahman,' the words thou and Self, no less than the words that and Brahman, denote Brahman in so far as having the individual souls for its body, and that thus the two sets of words denote fundamentally one and the same thing, has been explained previously.



46. And Smriti texts declare this.

That the world and Brahman stand to each other in the relation of part and whole, the former being like the light and the latter like the luminous body, or the former being like the power and the latter like that in which the power inheres, or the former being like the body and the latter like the soul; this Parsara also and other Smriti writers declare, 'As the light of a fire which abides in one place only spreads all around, thus this whole world is the power (sakti) of the highest Brahman.' The 'and' in the Stra implies that scriptural texts also ('of whom the Self is the body' and others) declare that the individual Self is a part of Brahman in so far as it is its body.

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