Lectures on Land Warfare; A tactical Manual for the Use of Infantry Officers
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VIII. Position of machine guns (Pill-boxes or other), mortars, etc.

IX. Condition of intervening ground and of the wire entanglements.

X. Effects of recent bombardments.

XI. Moral of the enemy.

RECONNAISSANCE FOR OCCUPATION.—In the Reconnaissance of a Position with a view to occupying it for the purposes of receiving attack, the points to be noted are:—

I. The best line for the establishment of a series of mutually supporting tactical points to be held by the infantry.


II. The best means of protecting the flanks.

III. The best position for the artillery and machine guns.

IV. The tactical key to the position.

V. The line from which attack may be expected.

VI. The best line for the counter-attack.

VII. The positions for the supports and reserves.

and, additionally, in the case of a War of Manoeuvre:—

VIII. The best position for the cavalry.

IX. Alternative positions in rear from which, after reorganisation, to recapture the front line, with the best line of withdrawal to them.

Additional information would be required in Position Warfare as to the best lines for avenues communicating from the old to the new position, and as to the time required to consolidate the new position against attack (including the conversion of the parados into parapet, etc.).



There are several reasons why darkness is preferable to daylight in certain military operations. Secrecy is usually the aim of all movement, and the increased power of observation due to the advent of the Air Service has caused an increase in the necessity for certain movements being made during the hours of darkness. In all Night Operations (except marches undertaken by night to avoid the heat of the day) surprise is the main object; secrecy of preparation is therefore essential, and steps must be taken to prevent discovery of the intended movement, and to prevent the information leaking out through the indiscretion of subordinates. Orders will be communicated beforehand only to those officers from whom action is required, and until the troops reach the position of assembly no more should be made known to them than is absolutely necessary. It may even be advisable, in order to deceive spies, that misleading orders should originally be given out. Secrecy of intention as well as of preparation is essential. Frederick the Great is reported to have said, "If I thought my coat knew my plans I would burn it!"

NIGHT MARCHES.—Night Marches are the movement of columns in march formation, and their object may be merely to avoid the heat of the day; but they are also one of the chief means by which a commander can outwit, deceive, and surprise the enemy—the principal aim of the strategist—by outflanking his position, by anticipating him in the occupation of a locality, or by eluding him by the secret withdrawal of a force which appeared to be in a situation favourable to his plans. {145} Forces may also be secretly concentrated to decide the issue of a battle that is imminent, or of a battle that has begun in daylight. Long marches of this nature rarely culminate in an attack, and when shorter movements are made with such an object in view, the "March" may be said to terminate when the Position of Assembly is reached, and from that point to become an "Advance" or an "Assault." There are certain essentials to success:—

I. Direction towards the objective must always be maintained. The route must therefore be reconnoitred beforehand, and marked by the Advanced Guard during the march, and if there are any intricacies in the route, such as deviations from a well-defined road, local guides should be secured. Across open country a general direction can be maintained by means of the stars, and when these are not visible, by the compass. (See Chapter VIII., "Manual of Map Reading.")

II. Protection against surprise attacks must be provided by Advanced, Flank, and Rear Guards, but (except in the obvious case of columns of mounted troops only) mounted troops will not be employed in this service. The Advanced Guard will be small, and will usually consist of Patrols within 100 yards of the column, followed by connecting files, with the rest of the Advanced Guard in collective formation. The Rear Guard will also be smaller and nearer than during a daylight march. Flanks will usually be protected by small bodies holding tactical positions, posted by the Advanced Guard, and withdrawn by the Rear Guard.

III. Secrecy must be maintained, and orders issued as late as possible, and the preparations carried on without ostentation. The march {146} itself must be conducted in absolute silence and without lights of any kind. Care must be taken to prevent or muffle sounds, and horses likely to neigh must be left with the train. In the case of a march to elude the enemy, Outposts will remain in position until daylight and will be secretly withdrawn, to rejoin the column at the first opportunity, and bivouac fires, etc., will be kept burning.

IV. Connection.—Every commander must have and must maintain a fixed place in the column, and an orderly officer must be detached from each unit to headquarters, so that instructions may be conveyed to such commanders at all times. Units must be closed up, and the usual distances lessened or dispensed with, and connection must be maintained between units and their sub-divisions. The pace should be uniform, but not more than 2 miles an hour can be expected on a dark night, including halts. The time and periods of halts should be arranged before starting, and units must regain any distance lost before halting. After crossing or clearing an obstacle the column should advance its own length and then be halted until reported to be closed up again, and staff officers should be detailed to superintend these matters. In addition to these general principles there are certain axioms, which must become "rules of thumb" with all concerned:—

An officer must march in rear of each unit.

All ranks must be informed what to do in case of alarm or attack.

Fire will not be opened without orders.

Magazines will be charged, but no cartridge placed in the chamber.

There must be absolute silence, no smoking, no lights.


When halted, men may lie down in their places, but must not quit the ranks.

NIGHT ADVANCES.—Night advances are the movement of deployed troops to gain ground towards the hostile position with a view to delivering an assault at dawn. They may take place as a preliminary to an engagement, or to continue one already begun with increased prospects of success. In the first case they are usually the sequel to a Night March, and in either case they are generally followed by an attack at dawn. Surprise is the main object, even when they are undertaken for the purpose of gaining ground difficult to cross in daylight, from which to renew an engagement, as frequently happens during a campaign in a War of Manoeuvre, while such advances are common features of Position Warfare. In any case the ground won must be consolidated immediately, as a counter-attack at or before dawn may always be expected, and if the ground offers difficulties for entrenching, the necessary materials must be carried by the troops. Successive advances of this nature may enable the troops to reach a jumping-off place for the final assault, and such advances may be made on successive nights, the ground won being defended meanwhile against counter-attacks. Unless troops are already deployed for the advance, a Position of Assembly will need to be selected, with a further Position of Deployment; but these positions sometimes coincide. The deployment will be, as a rule, into shallow columns on a narrow frontage at deploying intervals, in order that the final deployment of the leading columns into the Forward Troops of the Attack may take place without delay when the moment for the assault arrives. On reaching the objective of the advance these columns would deploy into line, and each unit would entrench itself on the new position. As it is essential for success that direction should be maintained and connection preserved, the ground over which the advance is to be made must be {148} examined beforehand and landmarks noted, and touch must be kept by means of ropes or any available device. Care must also be taken in consolidating the position that the entrenchments have a general alignment towards the enemy and that they are so sited as to protect from enfilade fire.

Night Assaults.—Night Assaults are delivered by troops already deployed into attack formation. It is an established tactical principle that "when the conditions of the fire-fight are likely to be favourable, it is probably better to accept the inevitable casualties that must result from a struggle for fire supremacy, rather than adopt the undoubted hazards of a night assault." These conditions are frequently so unfavourable in Position Warfare, owing to the strength of consolidated positions and to the increasing accuracy and density of artillery fire, that assaults are made of necessity in the hours of darkness, in preference to those of daylight. During the Battle of the Somme (July 1-17, 1916) a night advance was made by seven divisions on a front of about 4 miles. The troops moved out in the early hours of July 14, for a distance of about 1,400 yards, and lined up in the darkness below a crest some 300 to 500 yards from the enemy's trenches. Their advance was covered by strong patrols and their correct deployment had been ensured by white tapes laid out on the ground earlier in the night of July 13-14. The whole movement was carried out unobserved and without touch being lost in any case. The assault was delivered at 3.25 a.m., when there was just sufficient light to be able to distinguish friend from foe at short range, and along the whole front attacked the troops were preceded by an effective artillery barrage. They swept over the enemy's first-line trenches and consolidated their position in the defences beyond.

On the night of February 10-11, 1917, the 32nd Division attacked and captured 1,500 yards of trench {149} line at the foot of the Serre Hill. The division formed up after dark and the attack began at 8.30 p.m., the objective was captured, and at 5 a.m. a determined counter-attack was repulsed. The capture of the Vimy Ridge by Canadian troops was due to an assault launched some time before dawn on April 9, 1917: and the British victory of Messines (June 7, 1917) to an assault launched at 3.10 a.m. In the latter case the Wytschaete-Messines position, "one of the Germans' most important strongholds on the Western Front, consisted of forward defences with an elaborate and intricate system of well-wired trenches and strong points, forming a defensive belt over a mile in depth, and the Germans had omitted no precautions to make the position impregnable" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatches). Nineteen deep mines under this position were fired at 3.10 a.m., and this was the signal for the assault, which was immediately successful and was carried out under intense artillery protecting fire. By nightfall of June 7 the whole position had been recaptured, heavy losses inflicted, and over 7,000 prisoners taken at a comparatively slight cost, by the II. Army, under General Sir H. C. O. Plumer. During the German offensive in 1918 a counter-attack by three brigades was launched by night against the village of Villers Bretonneux. The attack was launched at 10 p.m. on the night of April 24-25. By daybreak the village was surrounded, and by the afternoon it was entirely recaptured with upwards of 1,000 prisoners. Among the offensive operations which preceded the general advance of the Allies in July, 1918, was a highly successful night attack by the 2nd Australian Division, on a front of about 2 miles, south of Morlancourt (June 10, 1918). At 4.35 a.m. on May 12, 1864, one of General Ulysses Grant's Corps, under General Hancock, assaulted "the Salient," part of General Robert Lee's entrenchments in The Wilderness of Virginia (Spottsylvania). 20,000 men were assembled and a night advance was made, {150} directed by compass, on an unusually dark and stormy night, with part of the line of the advance densely wooded. The assault was ordered for 4 a.m., but a dense fog delayed the signal until 4.35 a.m. When the order was given, one of the divisions had some difficulty in making its way through a wood and marsh, but contrived to keep up with the others, and reached the abattis at the same time. The assault resulted in the capture of 4,000 prisoners and inflicted losses with the bayonet of over 2,000, with a total loss to the assailants of about 2,000. This manoeuvre consisted of a night march by compass of a whole corps to a Position of Assembly within 1,200 yards of the hostile outposts, of an advance before dawn, and of a final assault of 20,000 troops. The captured salient was afterwards retaken by the Confederates by a decisive counter-attack, rendered possible by the provision, in rear of the salient, of a second line of entrenchments (see Battle of Spottsylvania).

Owing to the risks of confusion and the limitations imposed on the attacking movement, Night Assaults do not now carry the same comparative advantages over Daylight Attacks as was the case before the introduction of Smoke. Hence they will be restricted to attacks on a very limited objective, as in the case of raids or attempts to capture special tactical localities. But by employing Smoke only two elements of Surprise can be achieved. The direction and weight of the blow are concealed, but the appearance of Smoke will warn the enemy to expect an attack, and the time of the blow is thus revealed. Smoke will probably be employed extensively in modern warfare and, except against an ill-trained and undisciplined enemy, assaults by night will generally be undertaken to gain tactical points, to drive in advanced troops and Outposts, to capture advanced and detached posts, to rush an isolated force guarding a bridge or defile, and in carrying out enterprises of a similar nature, in order to gain advantages {151} for further operations in daylight. When more important assaults are made, a larger force than a brigade will seldom be thrown against a single objective, although a series of objectives may be simultaneously attacked with success over a wide front. A Night Assault was delivered by two Federal brigades on the Confederate bridgehead at Rappahannock Station (November 7, 1863). One of the brigades was ultimately repulsed, but the other penetrated the Confederate position and cut off the retreat. Upwards of 1,500 of the defenders were captured or killed, and the small remnant evacuated the bridgehead. In the Second Afghan War, General Sir F. Roberts marched up to the high passes leading out of the Kurram into the interior of Afghanistan, with a column of 3,200 all ranks and 13 guns. He was opposed by the Amir's force of about 18,000 men with 11 guns at Peiwar Kotal (December 2, 1878). Sir F. Roberts detached the greater part of his force to occupy the heights on the flank of the Afghan position and attacked at daylight. The Night March and subsequent attack were completely successful. The enemy was defeated with great loss and all his guns captured, the British losses being 20 killed and 78 wounded. Tel-el-Kebir was an example of a Night March in battle formation of a force of 11,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry, and 60 guns, to attack an entrenched position at dawn, the object being to surprise the enemy and to cross the danger zone without exposing the assaulting troops to a prolonged fire action. It resulted in a victory which decided the Egyptian campaign, and added the Nile Valley to the British Empire. Sir Garnet Wolesley's force advanced in four columns marching abreast, with its left resting on the railway, and was successfully carried out, the troops reaching a position, varying from 300 to 900 yards distance from the objective, the assault being delivered at the conclusion of the march. The Egyptian Army, under Arabi Pasha, fought steadily, and again and again renewed the fight, after falling back {152} within their entrenchments, but their flank was turned and the whole position captured. The British loss was only 459 all ranks, and the Egyptians lost upwards of 2,500 killed and wounded, the remaining 23,000 being dispersed or captured. A daylight advance and assault of so strong a position could not have been successfully carried through at so small a cost to the attacking troops. In the South African War there were two examples of the unsuccessful Night Attack. Major-General Gatacre essayed a Night March followed by a Night Attack upon the Boers' position at Stormberg (December 10, 1899), but he was misled by his guides in unknown ground and was himself surprised by the Boers and forced to retire with a loss of over 700 officers and other ranks. On the following day Lord Methuen delivered an attack upon Cronje's position between the Upper Modder River and the Kimberley road. In a Night Attack on Magersfontein Hill (December 11, 1899) the Highland Brigade came under heavy fire while still in assembly formation and lost its Brigadier (A. G. Wauchope) and 750 officers and other ranks. In the later stages of the South African War, however, Night Marches followed by Raids were employed with marked success, particularly in the Eastern Transvaal in November and December, 1901.

Except when the assaulting troops are already in position, it will be necessary to choose Positions of Assembly and of Deployment, and to precede the advance in the preliminary stages by lines of scouts, ahead and on the flanks, within 100 yards of the following troops. On arrival at the jumping-off place these advanced scouts will await the arrival of the assaulting force, and they should be directed to mark the ground for the various units. A scout from each Forward Platoon can thus mark the inner flank on which his Platoon will rest, and the direction of the whole line will be assured.

The troops will usually advance, during the earlier {153} stages, in shallow columns on narrow frontages, at deploying intervals, and may maintain this formation until the halted line of scouts is reached. Owing to the frequent necessity for halts to correct intervals, etc., and the inherent difficulties of movements by night in open formations, no greater rate than 1 mile an hour can be counted on. When several objectives are in view a corresponding series of Positions of Assembly and Deployment will be required, and care must be taken that the various advancing forces do not converge.

Owing to the difficulty of recognition, a distinguishing mark will usually be worn by the troops engaged, a watchword will usually be adopted and made known to all ranks, and the commander and staff should wear easily distinguishable badges. If hostile patrols are encountered it is essential that they should be silenced, and any one encountered who is deficient of the badge and ignorant of the watchword should be similarly treated.

The risk of an assault being held up by unforeseen obstacles must also be provided against, and Engineers or Pioneer Infantry should be present for removing such obstacles. If fire is opened by the enemy it is clear that all hope of surprise has vanished, and the troops must then press on at all costs; for if they advance as rapidly as possible they have a reasonable prospect of achieving their object, whereas a halt will increase the enemy's power of resistance, and withdrawal will almost certainly end in disaster.

In order that secrecy may be observed, details of the assault will usually be withheld from all except superior commanders from whom action is required, until the Position of Assembly is reached; but before the troops leave that position all ranks must be made to understand the objective in general, the particular task of the unit, and the formation to be adopted at the Position of Deployment. In addition to this information, and to a knowledge of the general tactical principles involved, {154} there are certain axioms which must become "rules of thumb" with all ranks:—

Fire must not be opened without orders.

Magazines must be charged but no cartridge placed in the chamber.

Until daylight the bayonet only to be used.

Absolute silence to be maintained until the signal for the assault is given.

No smoking; no lights.

If obstacles are encountered each man will lie down in his place until they are removed.

If hostile fire is opened, all ranks must press on at once with the utmost spirit and determination and overpower the enemy with the bayonet.



Close country has a marked influence on Tactics owing to the restrictions it imposes on view and on movement. Forest, jungle, and bush, mountains and ravines, rivers and streams are natural obstacles, while cultivation adds woods and plantations, fences and hedges, high growing crops, farm houses, villages and towns, with sunken roads below the surface of the adjoining land, and civilisation brings in its train a network of railways and canals with embankments and bridges, and the natural difficulties of close country are thereby increased. The obstruction to movement is more or less constant, except in "continental" climates, where frost and snow render movement possible in winter over the deepest rivers or marshes, and over roads and tracks which are scarcely practicable in the summer season. The obstruction to view is greater when trees and hedges are in leaf than when the leaves have fallen.

When the advantages and disadvantages of fighting in close country are weighed in the balance there appears to be a distinct tendency in favour of the Attack over the Defence.

An Attacking force can usually obtain cover in the early stages of the action and loss can therefore be avoided in approaching the objective, while the screening of its movements and dispositions generally enables the Attacking force to surprise the Defence as to the direction and weight of the blow to be delivered. Troops fighting in close country are often unable to see what is going on around them, and the "sense of security" is lessened by the knowledge that a flank may be successfully assailed without warning. This favours the {156} Attack more than the Defence, as the counter-attack, which is the soul of all defensive operations, requires previous organisation to be thoroughly effective.

SAVAGE WARFARE.—In Savage Warfare the inherent difficulties of fighting in close country are often increased by the disparity of numbers on the side of the civilised troops and by the fanatical courage of the savages. Discipline, self-reliance, vigilance, and judgment in the application of the Principles of War, are required to overcome these added difficulties. A vigorous offensive, Strategical as well as Tactical, is always the best method of conducting operations in Savage Warfare, and for the purpose of Protection vigilance must be exercised to an even greater degree than in any other form of warfare. At Isandhlwana (January 22, 1879) the British camp at the foot of Isandhlwana Hill was surprised and overwhelmed by a Zulu Army, 10,000 strong, and almost the whole of the garrison killed; and yet in the evening of the same day 120 all ranks (40 sick being included in that number) beat off the repeated attacks of 4,000 Zulus at Rorke's Drift. In the operations after the fall of Khartoum a desert column under Major-General Sir J. McNeill was surprised in dense bush while constructing a zeriba at Tofrik (March 22, 1885), but after twenty minutes' fierce fighting the Mahdist Arabs were driven off with more than 1,000 killed. In the operations in Upper Egypt against the invading Mahdists a vigorous strategical and tactical offensive led to the Battle of Toski (August 3, 1889) and resulted in the defeat and complete destruction of the invaders, with but slight loss to the Anglo-Egyptian force under General Sir F. W. Grenfell. At the beginning of the Christian Era three well-disciplined Roman legions were decoyed into the fastnesses of the Teutoberger Wald (A.D. 9) and there attacked and annihilated by the Cherusci, a Saxon tribe, under their king Arminius, and this defeat of Quintilius Varus is included by Sir Edward Creasey among the {157} "Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World." Fighting in close country against more or less savage tribes is frequently the task of British troops in East and West Africa, while the Indian Frontier constantly requires to be defended by expeditions against tribal levies in hilly and mountainous districts. In "Field Service Regulations" (Part II.), 1921, the peculiarities of various savage races by whom the Outposts of the British Empire are liable to be assailed are carefully noted.

IN CIVILIZED WARFARE.—The military history of Europe and America abounds with accounts of fierce fighting in close country. In all ages woods and villages play an important part in war. They form natural magnets for troops operating in their neighbourhood. The fact of their being easily visible, and named on maps, causes them to be adopted as objectives in the Attack or as boundaries in the Defence, and in all operations troops are instinctively drawn towards them in search of cover, or to obtain water, supplies, and shelter. Their situation is also likely to make them of tactical importance, as woods are frequently on the slopes of hills and may be occupied in a defensive scheme to force an assailant to deploy before reaching the main position, while villages are naturally situated on roads, which must be guarded as they are the normal avenues of approach for all troops. In Position Warfare the wood and the village are of the highest importance, and whenever they are situated along the alignment, or near the front, of a defensive position, they may always be assumed to be occupied and strongly organised as part of a series of mutually supporting tactical points. The names of woods, large and small, and of the most insignificant villages, were of everyday occurrence in reports on the fighting on the Western Front in the Great War as the scene of furious encounters, of attacks and counter-attacks, and there are 67 references to copses, woods, and forests in Marshal Haig's Dispatches. It {158} appears, however, to be generally admitted that close country in general, and woods and villages in particular, favour Delaying Action rather than a protracted Defence, and in Position Warfare the advantages are therefore in favour of the Attack on account of the facilities offered for surprise through the concealment of movement.

There are many instances of successful Delaying Action in woods and villages. Some of the characteristics of such fighting were exemplified in the Franco-Prussian War. At the Battle of Gravelotte (August 18, 1870) the Bois de Vaux, on the left of the French position, induced Marshal Bazaine to mass his reserves on that flank, as it appeared to invite attack; whereas he was defeated by a turning movement on the other flank. During an attack through the Bois de Vaux a Prussian infantry battalion became so scattered that all cohesion was lost, a common danger in wood fighting. At the earlier Battle of Spicheren (August 6, 1870), however, two battalions maintained their order and cohesion in Pfaffen Wood, and by moving through it in narrow columns were able to debouch in good order. A tendency to loss of discipline through loss of control was exemplified at the same battle. Other Prussian troops had captured Gifert Wood and the officers were unable to organise an attack on a further position through the reluctance of the troops to leave the shelter of the wood. At the Battle of Worth (August 6, 1870) two French battalions held up the attack of 18,000 Prussians for over an hour in the Niederwald, although no fortifications were employed; the difficulty of debouching from a captured wood was then experienced by the Prussians, as the farther edge was kept under heavy fire by French troops in the neighbouring Elsasshausen Copse. A decisive counter-attack cannot usually be organised in such warfare, although Lee managed to employ 17,000 troops for that purpose with complete success at the Battle of the Wilderness (May 5-6, 1864). Local {159} counter-attacks, however, are the normal incidents of defensive operations in woods, and in the Niederwald, at the Battle of Worth, several spirited counter-attacks were made by the 96th French Regiment.

Villages are even more attractive to troops than woods, and they figure in all battles as local centres of resistance. One of the most spirited defences of a village took place at the Battle of Sedan (September 1, 1870) when a heroic struggle was maintained by French marine infantry in the village of Bazeilles, and after the white flag had been hoisted over the Fortress of Sedan the fight was stubbornly maintained at the village of Balan, the second line of defence of the Bazeilles position. Visitors to the battlefield of Sedan are shown a little inn with the title, A La Derniere Cartouche, in commemoration of the struggle. A highly successful Night Attack was made by the French on the village of Noisseville (August 31, 1870), the normal difficulties of defending the village being increased by the surprise and the darkness.

THE ATTACK ON WOODS.—The opening stages of the attack on a wood resemble those in the attack on any other position, but once the outer fringe is gained the potential advantages offered by the narrow field of view and fire must be exploited to the full and surprise at weak points must be achieved. Flank attacks are exceptionally deadly under these circumstances, as they may succeed before the other defending troops are aware of the threatened attack, but the utmost precaution is necessary to avoid traps, and scouts must precede all movement, while advances must be made by rapid bounds to avoid aimed fire at close range. Supports and reserves must follow close to the forward troops in order to preserve cohesion and to afford immediate help. Machine guns and light mortars are of very great value to give close support, the latter taking the place of artillery and inflicting losses on {160} stockaded defenders. Small woods should usually be attacked from the flanks under heavy fire from artillery until the attack turns inwards, while machine guns and Lewis guns are posted to prevent reinforcements reaching the wood and to cut off the retreat of the defenders. During the German counter-attacks at Cambrai (November 30-December 4, 1917) Tanks were effectively employed in wood and village fighting, and were in a great measure responsible for the capture of Gauche Wood, acting in co-operation with dismounted Indian cavalry of the 5th Cavalry Division and with the Guards' Division; but although they reached the outskirts of Villers Guislain they were forced to withdraw, as the supporting infantry were unable to co-operate owing to the fire of the enemy's machine guns. At the Battle of Messines (June 7, 1917) a tank enabled the infantry to proceed with the advance by overcoming the machine guns posted in Fanny's Farm. Generally speaking, however, tanks are unable to manoeuvre in woods, owing to the many insuperable obstructions, and their sphere of usefulness is limited by the availability of rides or other cleared avenues of approach. During the fighting for the interior of the wood "reconnaissance during battle" is of the highest importance, and the flanks of the attacking force will need to be specially guarded, on account of the liability to counter-attack. Touch must also be kept, to avoid loss of direction. In the advance from the captured position great tactical skill is required, and if the defenders have established a fire position within close range it may only be possible to issue from the wood when co-operating troops have cleared or neutralised that position. It may even be necessary to hold the rear edge against counter-attack and to debouch, after reorganisation, from both flanks or from the opposite edge, to advance in two bodies against the flanks of the fire position under harassing fire from the troops in the further edge. If the fire position is to be carried by direct assault, or if {161} it can be got under control and the advance is to be continued, the successful troops must be reorganised within the wood (care being taken to avoid concentration in salients) and must deploy before advancing, to bound forward in one rush until clear of the wood.

DEFENCE OF A WOOD.—The outer edge of a wood is particularly vulnerable, but some portions of it must of necessity be occupied for purposes of observation and resistance (particularly at night), while the unoccupied portions are heavily entangled and made subject to enfilade fire from the occupied positions, machine and Lewis guns being particularly suitable for the defensive positions, in concealed and strengthened emplacements. The perimeter should be divided into sections garrisoned by complete units under definite commanders. Lines of defence must also be established in the interior, and lateral communications opened up through the trees, with easily distinguished marks to direct troops issuing to counter-attacks, and time will be saved by making several tracks rather than one wide road. The second line of defence should contain an all-round defensive position from which all avenues of approach can be swept by machine and Lewis guns, and this position should also provide facilities for sorties to counter-attack. If the wood is too far from the Outpost Zone of the defence to serve as a factor in the scheme steps must be taken to neutralise the advantages offered to an attacking force in a concealed avenue of approach, either by the use of gas, or by bringing such a fire on the exits from the wood that a debouching enemy may suffer heavy loss or annihilation. In most cases, an attacking force will be harassed, and a show of opposition will be made, in such a wood by fighting patrols, and obstacles can be placed in the near edge, with entanglements outside, so planned as to induce the attacking force to collect in lanes enfiladed by machine guns.


THE ATTACK ON VILLAGES.—There are three phases in the attack on a village as in the attack on a wood. In the fight for the outer edge, the front will probably be harassed by a fire attack, while one or both flanks are assaulted by all four sections of the platoon, under cover of fire from machine guns and Lewis guns.

The second phase may require reorganisation before the attack on the village itself, during which, reconnaissance, co-operation, and dispatch of information, are of the highest importance. All captured points must be immediately consolidated and the attack must be prosecuted with the utmost vigour. Troops must be trained to enter buildings from the rear, and to advance along the right edge of roads, close to the walls and buildings there, to make hostile fire difficult without undue exposure. Light mortars and rifle bombs, which can be fired into windows partially barricaded, or to fall behind street barricades, are an important adjunct to the rifle and bayonet, and machine guns and Lewis guns will have many opportunities in assisting or repelling a counter-attack and of keeping down the enemy's fire from a commanding position at the end of a street. The Tank is at its best in this form of warfare, as it can surmount or demolish almost any street barricade, and can be followed up at once by the infantry, but it must always be regarded as an auxiliary to the infantry, and not as a principal.

In the third phase, the advance from the captured village, while the supports are "mopping up" such of the garrison as have survived the capture, previous reorganisation and deployment will probably be as essential as in wood fighting, and during all the phases of the struggle in woods and villages sudden counter-attacks must always be expected and local reserves to repel them must be provided. In issuing from the village, rapid bounds to points from which the fire positions in rear can be brought under control will also be required.


DEFENCE OF A VILLAGE.—It is difficult to avoid the inclusion of villages in a scheme of defence on account of the facilities afforded for water, cover, and shelter, but while villages assist in the Delaying Action they are liable to become "shell traps" in a prolonged defence, unless there is good cellarage accommodation, while the local effect of a bursting shell is also increased.

There are certain principles common to all defensive action in village fighting:—

(1) The garrison should consist of a definite unit or formation under a definite commander.

(2) The forward troops should be posted in front of the edge of the village, partly because of the vulnerability of the actual edge to artillery fire but mainly to prevent the attack from establishing itself in the forward buildings. In the case of a small village it will often be advantageous to occupy positions on the flanks commanding the edge by fire, with a view to enticing the attack into the "funnel" thus provided.

(3) Supports and Reserves must be centralised in order that they may be readily available for instantaneous local counter-attacks, by which means alone a village can be defended against a determined enemy.

(4) Houses should be loopholed and windows sand-bagged, while house-to-house communication must be improvised to increase the defenders' power of manoeuvre.

(5) The interior of the village should be defended by the cross fire of machine guns and Lewis guns, but while churches and halls, and the inner edge of village greens and of squares, should be prepared for determined resistance, such places should not be occupied as billets, owing to the risk of loss from artillery bombardment.

(6) The natural difficulties of maintaining control in village fighting require to be counteracted by increased effort and vigilance on the part of all leaders, and special arrangements must be made for collecting information in report centres, the position of which must be made known to all ranks in the defending force.



"The full power of an army can be exerted only when all its parts act in close combination, and this is not possible unless the members of each arm understand the characteristics of the other arms. Each has its special characteristics and functions, and is dependent on the co-operation of the others" ("Field Service Regulations," vol. ii. (1921)).

"An intelligent understanding of 'the other man's job' is the first essential of successful co-operation."—MARSHAL HAIG.


"Infantry is the arm which in the end wins battles" ("Field Service Regulations," vol. ii. (1921)). The speed with which infantry can advance, and the distance which can be covered in one day, are the only limits to the striking power of well-trained infantry. In the Great War these limits were largely removed by the use of Mechanical Transport, and this means of transportation will be used increasingly in Modern Warfare, in order to bring fresh troops into or near the scene of action, or to expedite the removal of exhausted troops from the battlefield. Against these natural limits to mobility are the compensating advantages of the power of infantry to move into and over almost any ground by day or by night, and the rapidity with which trained infantrymen can find or improvise cover.

The main object of battle is to close with the enemy and to destroy him by killing or capture, and it is this power to close with the enemy which makes infantry the decisive arm in battle.

THE RIFLE AND BAYONET.—The rifle is the principal infantry weapon, and the British "Short-magazine {165} Lee-Enfield" rifle is the best rifle in action. A trained rifleman can fire 15 aimed shots in a minute, reloading with the butt in the shoulder and eyes on the mark. With the bayonet affixed the rifle is the principal weapon of close combat for delivering or repelling an assault, and in Night Assaults infantry depend entirely upon the bayonet.

THE ENTRENCHING TOOL, carried by all other ranks, is an invaluable adjunct to the rifle bullet and to the bayonet. In a War of Manoeuvre, when infantry are frequently compelled to improvise defences on the field of battle, by night as well as by day, the value of the Entrenching Tool can scarcely be exaggerated. In Position Warfare, and in the organisation of an area for prolonged defence in a War of Manoeuvre, heavier tools and materials of all kinds are available for the consolidation of the defences, but for the rapid construction of temporary defences by day or by night the Entrenching Tool alone has been proved to be highly effective. When troops are "digging themselves in" at night with this weapon care must be taken that some system is adopted to obtain a more or less regular line facing in the right direction. By the extension of the men of an infantry section at arm's length facing the enemy, and by moving the two men on each flank two paces outwards, and the two centre men two paces backwards, and then causing the section to dig "on the line of their toes," there will result (even on the darkest night) a short fire trench with a central traverse. This sectional trench can be connected at the first opportunity with trenches dug by other sections similarly extended. During the Retreat from Mons (August-September, 1914) the "Contemptible Little Army," under Marshal French, frequently obtained, by means of the Entrenching Tool alone, shelter from bullets, and a system of fire trenches which cost the pursuing Germans hundreds of lives and materially delayed their movements.


THE LEWIS GUN.—The Lewis gun is an automatic rifle, firing the same ammunition as the S.-M.-L.-E. rifle, and two Lewis-gun sections are included in each infantry platoon. The rate of fire is increased by the automatic action of the gun, the maximum rate permitting a drum of 47 rounds to be fired in less than ten seconds, while one or two rounds only may be fired if so required. The mobility of the Lewis-gun sections is the same as that of other sections of the infantry platoon.


Close range. Up to 800 yards. Effective range. Over 800 yards up to 2,000 yards. Long range. Over 2,000 yards up to 2,900 yards.

GRENADES.—Hand grenades and rifle grenades are adjuncts to the rifle and bayonet and the Lewis gun. Their principal use is in clearing fortified posts, especially in Position Warfare. The hand grenade, or bomb thrown by hand, is limited in range by the skill and strength of the thrower, and 30 to 40 yards may be regarded as the maximum distance. The rifle grenade is effective up to about 400 yards, and is generally employed to provide a local barrage or to search cover. In the latter case, a high angle of descent is used as with mortars or howitzers.

LIGHT MORTARS.—The Light Mortar Section is an integral part of every infantry battalion, and although sometimes brigaded for special purposes the sections normally work with their own battalions. A section of 2 light mortars, firing 11-lb. bombs, consists of 1 officer and 20 other ranks, and requires 2 horses and 1 G.S. limbered wagon. Owing to the high angle of descent the bombs can be fired behind, and can search, high cover, while the mortars themselves are not very conspicuous objects and can be {167} readily moved for short distances, while they "come into action" in 30 seconds. The comparatively slow flight of the bombs, however, enables the enemy to discover the location of the mortars, and necessitates the use of expedients to avoid counter-artillery fire. A maximum rate of 30 to 40 rounds a minute can be maintained for two or three minutes, if ammunition is available, and at an angle of 45 degrees a range of 700 yards can be obtained.

MACHINE GUNS.—"The principal characteristic of the machine gun is its power of delivering a concentrated volume of fire which can be sustained almost indefinitely, subject to limitations of ammunition supply. The ease with which the gun can be concealed in action and its fire controlled enable advantage to be taken of surprise effect" ("Field Service Regulations," vol. ii. (1921)). The Machine-gun Platoon is an integral part of every infantry battalion, but in Attack machine guns are frequently grouped for the purpose of providing overhead or other covering fire, while in Defence they form, with the artillery, the framework into which the defensive dispositions are fitted, and by reason of their fire-power machine guns enable a commander to economise in the number of infantry allotted to a purely defensive role. The ranges are those given above for rifles and Lewis guns, and the rate of fire is about 20 times that of a rifle, while 1,500 to 2,000 rounds may be fired continuously at a moment of need.


CAVALRY.—The principal characteristic of cavalry is its mobility. This enables it to attack unexpectedly; to defend with determination while retaining the power to break off an action more easily than infantry; to gain information and to afford protection at a considerable distance from the force protected; and to confirm {168} and exploit the success obtained in battle. "Cavalry is capable, if required, of undertaking most operations for which infantry would usually be employed, but the demands made by the care of horses reduce the number of rifles which can actually be placed in action; and it therefore lacks depth in comparison with similar infantry formations" ("Field Service Regulations," vol. ii. (1921)). The cavalry arms are the lance and sword for mounted action; horse artillery usually work with cavalry, and the arms employed by cavalry for dismounted action are the rifle, the machine gun, and the Hotchkiss rifle. Examples of the employment of cavalry in modern warfare are given throughout the "Lectures."

MOUNTED RIFLES.—The characteristics and methods of employment of mounted rifles are similar to those of cavalry, with the exception that they are not equipped for mounted action. Mounted rifles, like cavalry, enable a commander to extend his attack or defence in a manner that is most bewildering to infantry, and attempts by infantry to outflank a defending force of mounted rifles are generally frustrated by the mobility of the defending force, as was exemplified in the South African War of 1899-1902.

CYCLISTS.—Under favourable conditions cyclists possess greater mobility than cavalry, and they can develop greater fire-power, as no horse-holders are required. They are, however, dependent upon roads, they are vulnerable on the move, they cannot fight without dismounting, and they must return to their bicycles after action; whereas cavalry horse-holders can meet dismounted troopers at a prearranged spot.


"The role of artillery is to assist the other arms in breaking down opposition, and to afford all possible {169} support to the infantry, with whom the eventual decision rests" ("Field Service Regulations," vol. ii. (1921)).

All classes of artillery are included in modern military operations. Motor traction enables the heaviest guns to be brought to the battlefield and to be removed when a commander decides to withdraw from battle, while the increase in the defensive power of obstacles and small arms fire, combined with the increase in mobility afforded by motor traction, enables all but super-heavy artillery (which require a railway mounting) to be placed close behind the infantry in Attack and Defence. It is, however, obvious that the closest support can be given by the guns that are weakest in shell-power, on account of the superiority in mobility possessed by the lighter guns.

In Modern Warfare a great proportion of the work of artillery is carried out, of necessity, in the hours of darkness, owing to the frequency of movement by night to avoid aerial observation, and to the consequent use of indirect artillery fire to inflict losses during such movements. The artillery personnel therefore requires to be relieved with greater frequency than in the days before the use of aircraft.

The growth of artillery during the war was symbolical of the continual changes in the methods of warfare, its numbers and power increasing out of all proportion to the experience of previous wars. "The 486 pieces of light and medium artillery with which we took the field in August, 1914, were represented at the date of the Armistice by 6,437 guns and howitzers of all natures, including pieces of the heaviest calibre" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatches). "From the commencement of our offensive in August, 1918, to the conclusion of the Armistice some 700,000 tons of artillery ammunition were expended by the British Armies on the Western Front. For the fortnight from August 21 to September 3, our daily average expenditure exceeded {170} 11,000 tons, while for the three days of the crucial battle on September 27, 28, and 29 (Second Battle of Cambrai) nearly 65,000 tons of ammunition were fired by our artillery" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatches).

In the Table of Artillery Ranges on p. 173, the effective ranges of light artillery firing H.E. shell are based on the use of No. 106 fuse. "The invention of a new fuse known as '106,' which was first used at the Battle of Arras (April 9-June 7, 1917), enabled wire entanglements to be easily and quickly destroyed, and so modified our methods of attacking organised positions. By bursting the shell the instant it touched the ground, and before it had become buried, the destructive effect of the explosion was greatly increased. It became possible to cut wire with a far less expenditure of time and ammunition, and the factor of surprise was given a larger part in operations" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatches).

Artillery is classed under the designations Light, Medium, Heavy, and Super-Heavy.

LIGHT GUNS.—Pack Guns, with a calibre of 2.75 inches, are weakest in shell-power, but they possess a mobility greater than any other artillery and can be moved in country which would present insuperable obstacles to wheeled traffic. Pack Howitzers, with a calibre of 3.7 inches, are particularly valuable in close country, the high angle of descent enabling the attack or defence to search the steepest cover. Horse Artillery Guns, firing a 13-pound shell, are the most mobile of all wheeled artillery and are normally employed with mounted troops. All ranks of the Royal Horse Artillery are mounted, and its mobility is scarcely less than that of cavalry. Field Guns, with a calibre of 3 inches, firing an 18-pound shell, are the principal artillery weapon of a field army. Although inferior in mobility to Pack or Horse Artillery, they have greater shell-power and afford the principal support to infantry in closing with or repelling the enemy. Their power to inflict casualties {171} by enfilade fire with shrapnel makes them specially suitable in the defence, and the accuracy of modern weapons enables them to co-operate in the Attack with covering fire, under the protection of which infantry may advance unimpeded to the assault. In addition to their normal functions, and to their employment in counter-battery work, they can be employed in the reduction of defences by bombardment with High Explosive shells, in neutralising an area by the use of gas shells, or in providing artificial cover by the production of Smoke. Field Howitzers, with a calibre of 4.5 inches, have increased offensive power and practically the same mobility as field guns.

Light guns are the principal weapons for protection against Aircraft and for defence against Tanks. The Tank is powerless against artillery, and its most effective enemy is light artillery. During the First Battle of the Somme a new terror was added to the British attack by the introduction of the Tank, which surmounted inequalities in the ground, crushed the wire defences, and crossed the trenches. Although accompanied by infantry, it was regarded as an all-conquering and decisive factor. At one period of the battle, however, a number of Tanks were placed out of action by a single field gun, manned and fired with the greatest gallantry by a single German artillery officer, who fired point-blank at each Tank as it surmounted the crest of a rise. Infantry were in close support, and a single Lewis-gun section could have prevented the use of the field gun.

MEDIUM GUNS.—Medium guns, firing a 60-pound shell, are principally employed in counter-battery work and in fulfilling the functions of 18-pound field guns at a greater range and with greater force. Medium Howitzers occupy the same relative position, their offensive power being greater than that of the Field Howitzer.


HEAVY GUNS.—Heavy guns of 6-inch calibre, firing a shell of 100 pounds, are used against targets beyond the range of light and medium guns, and with greater effect. Heavy Howitzers, of 8-inch or 9.2-inch calibre, are principally employed against covered batteries and strong defences, or for destroying wire entanglements with instantaneous fuses.

SUPER-HEAVY GUNS.—Super-heavy guns of a calibre of 9.2 inches and upwards are usually carried on railway mountings, and while they possess a high muzzle velocity, considerable shell-power, and a high degree of mobility (which enables them to come into action in any part of the battlefield where suitable rails have been laid), their arc of fire is very restricted and their "life" is short. Super-Heavy Howitzers, of 12-inch or 18-inch calibre, possess similar advantages and disadvantages to super-heavy guns. Their normal use is the destruction of permanent defences, the breaking down of bridges, etc. The 12-inch weapon is also used on tractor-drawn mountings and is highly effective in counter-battery work.

The table on p. 173 is based upon particulars given on p. 26 of "Field Service Regulations," vol. ii. (1921).


"All arms are responsible for the construction of their own works of defence. It is the duty of the Royal Engineers to assist them by engineer reconnaissances, plans, advice, technical supervision, provision of materials and the construction of works requiring special technical skill. . . . Although trained as fighting troops, engineers should be regarded as reserves to be used only as a last resource; casualties in their ranks are not easy to replace, and they may become needlessly involved in the fighting and lost for work which may have an important bearing on the operations" ("Field Service Regulations," vol. ii. (1921)).



Weapon Effective Range (Yds.)

Light Artillery H.E. Shell Shrapnel Pack Guns (2.75 in.) 5,800 4,000 Pack Howitzers (3.7 in.) 5,900 Horse Artillery Guns (13 pr.) 8,500 5,000 Field Guns (18 pr.) 9,500 5,500 Field Howitzers (4.5 in.) 7,000

Medium Artillery Medium Guns (60 pr.) 15,500 — Medium Howitzers (6 in.) 10,000

Heavy Artillery Heavy Guns (6 in.) 19/20,000 Heavy Howitzers (8 in.) 12,300 — " " (9.2 in) 13,000

Super-Heavy Artillery Super-Heavy Guns (9.2 in.) 24,500 — " " (12 in.) 28,200 — " " (14 in.) 35,600 — Super-Heavy Howitzers (12 in.) 14,300 " " (18 in) 23,000

Weapon Maximum Range (Yds.)

Light Artillery H.E. Shell Shrapnel Pack Guns (2.75 in.) 5,800 5,500 Pack Howitzers (3.7 in.) 5,900 Horse Artillery Guns (13 pr.) 8,500 6,400 Field Guns (18 pr.) 9,500 6,500 Field Howitzers (4.5 in.) 7,000

Medium Artillery Medium Guns (60 pr.) 15,500 15,300 Medium Howitzers (6 in.) 10,000

Heavy Artillery Heavy Guns (6 in.) 19/20,000 19/20,000 Heavy Howitzers (8 in.) 12,300 " " (9.2 in) 13,000

Super-Heavy Artillery Super-Heavy Guns (9.2 in.) 24,500 24,500 " " (12 in.) 28,200 26,100 " " (14 in.) 35,600 — Super-Heavy Howitzers (12 in.) 14,300 " " (18 in) 23,000

The maximum range of Medium Mortars is 1,500 yards; of Light Mortars 700 yards.


CAREY'S FORCE.—During the Second Battle of the Somme "a mixed force, including details, stragglers, schools personnel, tunnelling companies, army troops companies, field survey companies, and Canadian and American Engineers, had been got together and organised by Major-Gen. P. G. Grant, the Chief Engineer to the V. Army. On March 26 these were posted by General Grant, in accordance with orders given by the V. Army commander, on the line of the old Amiens defences between Mezieres, Marcelcave, and Hamel. Subsequently, as General Grant could ill be spared from his proper duties, he was directed to hand over command of his force to Major-Gen. G. G. S. Carey. Except for General Carey's force there were no reinforcements of any kind behind the divisions, which had been fighting for the most part since the opening of the battle. . . . On March 28 our line from Marcelcave to the Somme was manned by Carey's Force, with the 1st Cavalry Division in close support. . . . On March 29 the greater part of the British front south of the Somme was held by Carey's Force, assisted by the 1st Cavalry Division and such troops of the divisions originally engaged as it had not yet been found possible to withdraw. In rear of these troops, a few of the divisions of the V. Army were given a brief opportunity to reassemble" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatches).


Tanks are moving fortresses containing light artillery, machine guns, and rifles, and while capable of inflicting heavy losses by fire they can also destroy obstacles, weapons, and personnel. Their garrisons are protected against the fire of small arms and from shrapnel bullets, but they are very vulnerable to other forms of artillery fire. Their mobility and radius of action are governed by the amount of petrol carried and by the physical endurance of the crew, but except over deep cuttings, {175} broad streams, swamps, very heavily shelled ground, rocky and mountainous country, or in thick woods they can move without difficulty. "The power of delivering successful surprise attacks against almost any type of defences is one of the most important advantages of the use of Tanks in large numbers" ("Field Service Regulations," vol. ii. (1921)).

During the First Battle of the Somme (September 1-November 18, 1916) "Our new heavily armoured cars, known as 'Tanks,' now brought into action for the first time, successfully co-operated with the infantry, and coming as a surprise to the enemy rank and file, gave valuable help in breaking down their resistance. . . . These cars proved of great value on various occasions, and the personnel in charge of them performed many deeds of remarkable valour" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatches).


Two classes of Aircraft are used in the field. Aeroplanes, which are self-propelled and have an almost unlimited radius of action; and Kite Balloons, which, in favourable weather, can be towed by a lorry and can be moved frequently without loss of efficiency.

AEROPLANES are of the greatest value for reconnaissance and inter-communication, and not only obtain, and return to their base with, information of the highest value, but facilitate personal reconnaissance of the battlefield by commanders and staff officers. Their offensive and defensive action is also very great and the moral effect of their offensive action is of the highest value. Although aeroplane squadrons are mobile units they lose efficiency if the units are moved too frequently. The action of aircraft in various phases of fighting is dealt with throughout the Lectures.

KITE BALLOONS carry two observers, who can remain in telephonic communication with the ground up to a {176} height of 5,000 feet. Inflated balloons can be moved in favourable weather at a maximum speed of 8 miles an hour while at a height of about 500 feet. Their extreme vulnerability to artillery fire prevents their use close to the battle front.


"The advisability of employing gas as a military weapon is a matter for consideration by the authorities concerned before a campaign begins. Once authorised, however, and assuming that weather conditions are favourable, gas may be expected to play a part in every action. . . . The different methods in which gas can be employed make it a weapon which can be used by all arms, thus Artillery deal with gas shells, Infantry with light mortar gas bombs, Aircraft with aerial gas bombs, and Engineers with all methods of use that call for special manipulation" ("Field Service Regulations," vol. ii. (1921)).

Gas was introduced by the Germans during the Second Battle of Ypres (April 22-May 18, 1915), and the numerous experiments and trials necessary before gas can be used, and the great preparations which have to be made for its manufacture, show that its employment was not the result of a desperate decision, but had been prepared for deliberately. During the First Battle of the Somme (September 1-November 18, 1916) "the employment by the enemy of gas and liquid flame as weapons of offence compelled us not only to discover ways to protect our troops from their effects, but also to devise means to make use of the same instruments of destruction. . . . Since we have been compelled, in self-defence, to use similar methods, it is satisfactory to be able to record, on the evidence of prisoners, of documents captured, and of our own observation, that the enemy has suffered heavy casualties from our gas attacks, while the means of protection adopted by us {177} have proved thoroughly effective" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatches).


Smoke can be discharged from Artillery shells, Artillery or infantry mortar bombs, Infantry rifle grenades, smoke candles, Aircraft bombs, Engineers' stationary generators, or the exhaust pipe of Tanks. It is used to conceal movement for the purposes of surprise or for reducing casualties, and can be so employed as to impose night conditions on the enemy while one's own troops retain the natural visibility; but while the weight and direction of an intended blow may thus be hidden from the enemy a warning is given of the time of its delivery. It is possible, however, to mystify, as well as to surprise, the enemy by the use of smoke, and its strategical and tactical value will ensure its adoption in Modern Warfare. In the closing battles of the Great War "the use of smoke shells for covering the advance of our infantry and masking the enemy's positions was introduced and employed with increasing frequency and effect" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatches).



Combatant officers of every rank are required to issue orders of some kind or other, and orders for operations should always be committed to paper when circumstances permit. The object of an operation order is to bring about a course of action in accordance with the intentions of the commander, and with full co-operation between all units.

Operation orders of a complicated nature are unlikely to be required from the pen of infantry officers in the junior ranks, and the rules for drafting orders are stated in detail in the official text-books, for the use of officers of the ranks that will be required to issue them.

The general principles underlying orders of all kinds are that they should be "fool proof," and it has been remarked that the writer of orders should always remember that at least one silly ass will try to misunderstand them. They must, therefore, be void of all ambiguity, and while containing every essential piece of information, and omitting everything that is clearly known already to the recipients, they should be confined to facts, and conjecture should be avoided.

"An operation order must contain just what the recipient requires to know and nothing more. It should tell him nothing which he can and should arrange for himself, and, especially in the case of large forces, will only enter into details when details are absolutely necessary. Any attempt to prescribe to a subordinate at a distance anything which he, with a fuller knowledge of local conditions, should be better able to decide on the spot, is likely to cramp his initiative in dealing with unforeseen developments, and will be avoided. In {179} particular, such expressions as 'Will await further orders' should be avoided" ("Field Service Regulations," vol. ii. (1921)).

Apart from the standing rules as to the printing of names of places in block type, including a reference to the map used, dating and signing the orders, numbering the copies, and stating the time and method of issue, etc., the general tenour of all operation orders will always be: The enemy are. . . . My intention is. . . . You will. . . . In other words, all that is known about the enemy, and of our own troops, that is essential for the purposes of the order, should be revealed; then the general intention of the commander who issues the orders; then the part in the operations that is to be played by the recipient. But the method of attaining the object will be left to the utmost extent possible to the recipient, with due regard to his personal characteristics. "It is essential that subordinates should not only be able to work intelligently and resolutely in accordance with brief orders or instructions, but should also be able to take upon themselves, whenever necessary, the responsibility of departing from, or of varying, the orders they may have received" ("Field Service Regulations," vol. ii. (1921)).



Active defence, the, 86-91 Adowa, battle of, (note) 22 Advanced guard, the, 102-113 distance, 103 information, 107-108 in advances, 103 in retreats, 104-105, 124 main guard, 105-106 Nachod, 77 night, 145 problems, 110-113 strategical, 103 strength of, 102-103 tactical, 103 tactics of, 103-104, 105-113 training, 105 vanguard, 105-106 Advances, night, 147-148 Advancing under fire, 39-44 Aerial observation, (note) 22, 98-99 photographs, 99 Aircraft, characteristics of, 169, 171, 175-176 advanced guard, 107 communication by, 37, 107, 115 flank guard, 115 gas, 176 outposts, 129-130, 137 position warfare, 81-82 protection by, 81, 98-99 protection from, 100 pursuit by, 67, 69 rear guard, 20, 120 reconnaissance by, 8, 26, 30, 36, 98-99, 100, 141 smoke, 177 Alexander the Great, 32 Allenby, General Viscount, G.C.B., 87, 96 America and the Great War, 17 American attack at Fossoy, 49 American Civil War, 3, 82 (See also Battles by name.) Amiens, battle of, 21, 52, 66 Antietam, battle of, 14, 15, 48 Appomattox, battle of, 15, 64 "Appreciation of the Situation," 72 Arabi Pasha, 151 Arbela, battle of, 32 Archangel Province, 66-67 Archduke Charles, 128 Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, 42-43 Armandvillers-Folie, 63 Armies, the new, 19-22 Arminius, victory of, 156-157 Armistice Day, 1918, 65 Army, Contemptible Little, 18-19 of North Virginia, 25, 65-66 of the Cumberland, 15 of the Potomac, 3, 14-15, 25 Arras, battle of, 170 Art of warfare, 1-5 Artillery, characteristics of, 168-173 barrage, 71 development of, 21-22 effective range, 132 escorts, 63-64 gas shells, 176 growth of, 169-170 heavy, 172, 173 in attack, 62-64, in defence, 83, 89 in retreat, 120, 123 light, 170-171 medium, 171 mobility of, 63-64 outpost, 131, 134 pack, 170 positions, 94 ranges, 173 smoke shells, 177 super-heavy, 172, 173 Ashby, Gen. Turner, C.S.A., 117 Assaults by night, 148-154 Assembly, position of, 58-59, 147 Attack, the, 51-75 aircraft in, 67 artillery in, 62-64 battalion in, 73-75 cavalry, 64-67 close country, 155-156 company in, 72-73 co-operation, 25-26, 35-37, 39 decisive, 56-57, 60-62 disposition of troops, 55 engineers, 67 fire, 62 flank, 61 formation for, 70-75 forward body, 55-56 frontal, 60-61 general reserve, 56-57 holding, 12, 30, 48, 59, 62, 76, 95, 117 local reserve, 55-56 medical arrangements, 67 methods of, 53 opening fire, 37-38 platoon in, 70-72 reconnaissance for, 141-142 smoke, 177 strength of, 54-55 supply, 67-68 supports, 55-56 two plans of, 54 villages, 162 woods, 159-161 Attacking force, the, 59-60 Austerlitz, battle of, 9-10, 47, 76 Australians at Morlancourt, 149 Avenues, communicating, 143

Baccarat, battle of, 28 Bagdadieh, battle of, 64-65 Balaclava Charge, 96 Balloons, observation by, 22, 175-176 Banks, Gen., U.S.A., 59 Bapaume, battle of, 21 Barrage, the, 71 Base, the, 90, 118 Battalion in attack, 73-75 Battle, the, 24-50 characteristics of, 24-26 decisive blow, 31-32 development of the, 29-31 influences on the, 33-44 information, 26-28 initiative, 26-28 outposts, 138-140 phases of the, 26-29 position, the, 84-85 reports, 68 the defensive, 45-46 the defensive-offensive, 47-49 the encounter, 58 the offensive, 46-47 types of, 45-50 Bavaria, Elector of, 46 Bayonet, the, 164-165 in night operations, 154 Bazaine, Marechal, 158 Bazeilles, defence of, 159 Benedek, Marshal, 96 Bernadotte, Marshal, 10 Blenheim, battle of, 46-47 Bluecher, Marshal, 8, 41, 48, 78 Bluff, the (Ypres), 39 Boer War, (note) 21 Bois de Vaux, 158 Bombs, light mortar, 166-167 (See also Grenades.) Border Regiment, 75 Bourlon Village, 42 Bristow Station, 128 British efforts, 1914-1918, 16-17 moral, 16-22 Broenbeek, 139 Bromhead, Lieut., 77 Buelow, General von, 78 Bunker Hill, battle of, 38 Burnside, Gen., U.S.A., 14, 46, 108, 139-140 Byng of Vimy, Gen. Lord, G.C.B., 7, 52

Cambrai, first battle of, 7, 30-31, 52, 66, 75, 160 second battle of, 21, 170 Camouflage, 100 Canadian cavalry, 66 engineers, 174 infantry at Vimy, 149 Canadians at Ypres, 42 Cannae, battle of, 14 Carey, Maj.-Gen. G. G. S., C.B., 174 Carey's force, 174 Cattigny Wood, 66 Cavalry, characteristics of, 167-168 cossack posts, 137 in attack, 64-67 in defence, 95-96 in pursuit, 64-65, 69 in retreat, 95-96, 120, 123-124 Mesopotamian campaign, 64-65 outposts, 137 protection by, 98-99, 110 raids by, 117-118 reconnaissance by, 8, 26, 32, 65-66, 106, 112-113 vedettes, 137 Cetewayo, 77-78 Chambord, Chateau de, 138 Chancellorsville, battle of, 12, 30, 48, 76, 95, 117 Changes in warfare, 21-23 Characteristics of the various arms, 164-177 Chard, Lieut., 77 Charleroi, battle of, 88 Chattanooga, battle of, 61-62 Chemin des Dames, 16 Civilised warfare, 157-158 Clery, Lieut.-Gen. Sir C. F. (quoted): advanced guard tactics, 109-110 Close country, fighting in, 155-163 Coldstream Guards, 75 Colenso, battle of, 63 Colombey, battle of, 109 Combe, Capt. E. P., M.C., 78 Commander, battalion, 74-75 company, 72-73 outpost company, 134-137 piquet, 135-136 platoon, 71-72, 135-136 Commander's influence, 33-35 orders, 178-179 plans, 57-58 position, 68 "Common Sense" fallacy, 1, 3 Communication, 31, 35, 107-108 Communications, lateral, 89 lines of, 116-118 Company in attack, 72-73 outpost, 134-137 Conde-Mons-Binche line, 87 Connection by night, 146 "Contemptible Little Army," the, 18-19, 165 Convoys, 116-118 Co-operation, 35-37, 164 Coruna, 127-128 Cossack posts, 137 Counter attack, 123 decisive, 79, 84, 92-94 local, 56, 75, 79, 161, 163 Cover, 88-89, 155 Covering fire, 43-44 Cronje, Gen. (Paardeberg), 16 Cross Keys, battle of, 117 Crown Prince of Prussia (1870), 109 (1914), 28 Crozat Canal, 77 Cugny, 96 Cumberland, army of the, 15 Cyclists, characteristics of, 168

Davis, Jefferson, 3 Day outposts, 137-138 Daylight and night attacks, 148 Decisive attack, the, 31-32, 60-62 counter attack, 79, 84, 92-94 Defence in close country, 155-156 of villages, 163 of woods, 161 Defensive action, 76-97, 163 battle, 45-46 flank, 86 system, 83 Defensive-offensive battle, 47-49 Defiles, 124 Definitions, 6-8 Delaborde, General, 95, 127 Delaying action, 118, 121-128, 158-159 Deployment, position of, 147-148 Depth of a position, 89 Detached posts, 134, 135 De Wet, 118, 138 Diamond formation, 70 Direction by night, 145 Discipline, value of, 11-12 Dresden, battle of, 47, 89

Early, General., C.S. Army, 7 East Surrey Regiment, 42 Embussing point, 69 Encounter battle, 58, 64 Engineers, Royal, characteristics, 172 gas, 176 smoke, 177 Entrenching tool, 165 Entrenchments, 82-83, 100, 135 Epehy, battle of, 21 Ettlingen, battle of, 128 Eugene of Savoy, 46 Evelington Heights, 112-113

Fabius Maximus, 14, 102 Fallacies exposed, 1-5 Fanny's Farm, 160 Field artillery, characteristics of, 170-171 of battle, 6-7 of fire, 88 Fighting in close country, 155-163 Fire attack, 59-60 and movement, 44 covering, 43-44 opening, 31, 37-38, 146, 154 overhead, 44 tactics, 37-39 Flame projectors, 176 Flanders, battle of, 21 Flank attacks, 61, 114-118 guard tactics, 115 guards, 114-118, 145 scouts, 71 Flanks in defence, 86 security of, 88 Fletcher, Col. Sir R., Bart., 82 Foch, Marechal, 47, 48-50, 53 (quoted):— advanced guard tactics, 106, 113 art of war, 1 British victories in 1918, 20-21 defence in modern warfare, 80 definitions, 6 fully equipped mind, 2-3 human factor in war, 10-11 moral, 9 Nachod, 18 outflanking a rear guard, 121 principles of war, 1-2 protection by attack, 98 soul of the defence, 76 subordinate commanders, 34 surprise, 30-31, 98 well conducted battle, 24 Fog of battle, 34 Fontenoy-Belleau attack, 49 Formations for the attack, 70-75 Forrest, General, C. S. Army, 18, 59 Fort Garry Horse, 66 Forward body, the, 55-56 Fossoy, American attack at, 49 France, spirit of, 16 Franco-Prussian War, 84, 158-159 (See also Battles by name.) Frederick the Great, 11, 46, 144 Fredericksburg, battle of, 14, 22, 38, 46, 92, 108, 139 French of Ypres, Field-Marshal Earl, K.P., 15-16, 87-88, 90, 126, 165 (quoted):— "Contemptible Little Army," 19 defence in modern warfare, 80 necessity for study, 2 Frontage of outpost company, 135 Frontal attack, 60-61

Gaines's Mill, battle of, 14, 65 Gallieni, General, 28, 37 Gas, 42, 81, 100, 176-177 Gatacre, Maj.-Gen. Sir W. F., K.C.B., 152 Gaugamela, (note) 32 General reserve, in attack, 33-34 in defence, 91-92, 94-95 George, Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd-, O.M. (quoted): British efforts, 1914-1918, 16-17 Gette River, 91 Gettysburg, battle of, 15, 45, 61, 65-66, 95-96, 117, 128 Gheluvelt, 42, 88 Gifert Wood, 158 Givenchy, 43 Grant, Maj.-Gen. P. G., C.B., 174 Grant, General U. S., U.S.A., 3, 7, 15, 46, 60-62, 90, 117, 149-150 Gravelotte, battle of, 158 "Green Curve," the, 9, 34 Grenades, hand and rifle, 166 Grenfell, Gen. Sir F. W., K.C.B., 156 Grouchy, Marechal, 7-8, 90-91 Ground, eye for, 125-126 scouts, 71 Guards' division, 43, 75, 160 Gueudecourt, 37

Haerincourt and Epehy, battle of, 21 Haig of Bemersyde, Field-Marshal Earl, K.T., 53 (quoted):— artillery, 169-170 canal bridges, 77 Carey's force, 174 cavalry in defence, 96 cavalry in the war, 66-67 fuse No. 106, 170 gas, 176-177 hang on! 43 health and moral, 13 infantry the backbone, 22 New Armies, 19-22 "Other Man's Job," 164 principles of war, 2 rearward services, 13 reserves in 1918, 95 rifle and bayonet, 70 smoke, 177 surprise, 7 tanks, 175 Haking, Lieut.-Gen. Sir R. C. B., G.B.E. (quoted):— advanced guards, 104 rear guards, 123 Hal and Tubize, 78 Hamley, Gen. Sir E. B., K.C.B. (quoted):— communications, 31 co-operation, 35-36 courage, 14 definitions, 6 "Higher Ranks" fallacy, 4 mobility, 11 study required, 2 Hancock, Gen., U.S.A., 93 Hand grenades, 166 Hannibal, 47 Harold II., king, 11-12 Harrison's Landing, 65 Hastings, battle of, 11-12 Health and moral, 13 Heavy artillery, 172, 173 Heights of Abraham, 38 Henderson, Col. G. F. R., C.B. (quoted):— Abraham Lincoln, 14 atmosphere of battle, 29-30 British and American troops, 17-18 cavalry, 64 "Common Sense" fallacy, 3 co-operation, 35-37 discipline, 11 eye for ground, 125-126 flank attacks, 114 Grant's bases, 90 soldiers' battles, 9 sound system of command, 33 Spottsylvania, 93-94 study necessary, 4-5 value of text-books, 23 Hennechy, 66 "Higher Ranks" fallacy, 4 Hill, Gen. D. H., C.S. Army, 25-26 Hindenburg, Marshal von, 52 Hindenburg Line, battle of the, 21, 30 Hohenlinden, battle of, 128 Hood, Gen. J. B., C.S. Army, 45 Hooker, Gen., U.S.A., 3, 48, 76, 117 Horatius Cocles, 77 Horse artillery, characteristics of, 168, 170 Hotchkiss rifles, 168 Howitzers, 170, 171, 172, 173 Human nature in war, 13-16 Hunter, Gen., U.S.A., 7

Infantry, characteristics of, 164-167 Information in battle, 26-28, 35, 107-108 Initiative, the, 26-28, 178-179 Intelligence officers, 141-142 Isandhlwana, 77-78, 156 Italo-Turkish campaign, (note) 22

Jackson, Gen. T. J., C.S. Army, ("Stonewall" Jackson), 4, 10, 12, 69, 76, 117 Joffre, Marechal, 28, 108 Jourdan, Marechal, 128

Kimberley, relief of, 6 Kite balloons, 175-176 Koeniggratz, battle of, 96 Koorn Spruit, 118, 124

Ladysmith, relief of, 6 La Fere, 52 Lancashire territorials, 43 Le Cateau, first battle of, 96, 126 second battle of, 21, 66 Lee, General R. E., C.S. Army, 10, 45, 46, 48, 61, 65, 76, 93-94, 97, 108, 113, 117, 125-126, 128, 139-140, 149-150 Leonidas, 77 Le Quesnoy, 78 Les Boeufs, 126-127 Leuthen, battle of, 46 Lewis guns, characteristics of, 166 Liberty of manoeuvre, 26-28, 39, 43-44, 71, 126-127, 132, 139 Light Mortars, 166-167, 173 Ligny, battle of, 8, 47, 90-91 Lincoln, Abraham, 3, 10, 14 Lines of communications, 116-118 of observation, 130, 133 of resistance, 84, 134 Local reserves, attack, 55-56 defence, 92, 95 outposts, 130, 134 rear guards, 125 Logan, Gen. J. A., U.S.A., 15 London Regiment, 75 Longstreet, Gen. J., C.S. Army, 45 Losses reduced by movement, 39-40 Ludendorff, 52 Lys, attack on the, 43, 56

McClellan, Gen. J. B., U.S.A., 14-15, 25-26, 48, 65, 90, 112 Machine guns, characteristics of, 167 in attack, 43-44, 56 in close country, 159-160 in defence, 55-56, 83 in outposts, 131, 134 in retreats, 126-127 range of, 132 McNeill, Maj.-Gen. Sir J., K.C.B., 156 Madritov, Colonel, 117-118 Magersfontein, battle of, 152 Mahdist Arabs, 156 Main guard (advanced guard), 105 (rear guard), 120-121 Maistre, General (quoted):— British valour, 20 Malplaquet, battle of, 46 Malvern Hill, battle of, 15, 25-26, 65, 112-113, 117 Manassas, battles of, 12 Manoeuvre, liberty of, 25-28 Manoury, General, 37 Map reading, 124, 135, 136 Marches, night, 144-147 Marching power of troops, 11-12 Marengo, battle of, 47, 76 Marlborough, Duke of, 46-47, 91 Marmont, Marechal, 27, 78 Marne, first battle of the, 27-29, 36-37, 52, 53, 108 second battle of the, 49-50 Marshall, Gen. Sir W. R., K.C.B., 64-65 Marye's Hill, 38 Massena, Marechal, 82 Maude, Gen. Sir S., K.C.B., 64 McDowell, battle of, 12 Meade, Gen., U.S.A., 15, 45, 46, 61, 92, 128 Meagher's Irish brigade, 38 Mechanical transport, 21-22, 69, 164 Medical arrangements (attack), 67 Mesopotamia, 32, 64-65 Message cards, 68 Messines, battle of, 149, 160 Methods of attack, 53 Methuen, Field-Marshal Lord, G.C.B., 152 Mobility, value of, 11-12, 168 Monchy-le-Preux, 75 Monocacy, battle of, 7 Mons, retreat from, 19, 38, 87-88, 90, 96, 126-128, 165 Moore, Gen. Sir J., K.C.B., 127-128 Moral, 8-22 Moreau, Brig.-Gen., 41 General J. V., 128 Morlancourt, 149 Mortars, 85, 159, 166-167, 173 Mounted troops, characteristics of, 167-168 Movement and fire, 39-44 in close country, 155 Murat, Marechal, 10 Musketry, 37-39, 126-128

Nachod, battle of, 77, 110 Napier, Sir W. F. P. (quoted):— rear guards, 127-128 Torres Vedras, 82-83 Napoleon, Emperor, 5, 8, 9-10, 46, 47, 89, 91, 109, 125, 127 (quoted):— Caesar and Turenne, 9 C'est les Prussiens, 8 moral force, 8-9 read and re-read, 3 to cover Turin, 87 Nashville, battle of, 15 National moral, 10-11 New Armies, the, 19-22 Newfoundland Regiment, the Royal, 75, 139 Niederwald, 158-159 Night advances, 147-148 assaults, 148-154 entrenching, 165 marches, 144-147 operations, 144-154 outposts, 137-138 Nile valley, 151 Noisseville, 159 Norman conquest, 11-12

Observation, line of, 84, 130 posts, 99 Obstacles, 80 Offensive battle, the, 46-47 spirit, 79 Operation orders, 178-179 Orders, 178-179 Orthez, battle of, 47 Osman Pasha, 60 Outpost zone, the, 84, 134 Outposts, 129-140 aircraft, 137 artillery, 131 battle outposts, 138-140 cavalry, 130, 137 commander, 132-134 company, 134-137 day, 137-138 distance, 131 frontage, 135 information, 133-134 line of observation, 84, 130 line of resistance, 84, 134 machine guns, 131, 132 night, 137-138 observation by, 84, 130 orders, 133-134 outpost company, 134-137 outpost zone, 134 patrols, 130, 137-138 piquets, 131 position warfare, 134, 138 reconnaissance by, 130 reserves, 131 resistance by, 84, 131 sentry groups, 136-137 strength, 130 withdrawal of, 146

Paardeberg, battle of, 16, 64 Pack artillery, characteristics of, 170, 173 Passive defence, 79 Patrols, fighting, 161 from outposts, 130, 137-138 raiding, 99 Peiwar Kotal, battle of, 151 Penetration by attack, 51-52 Petain, Marechal, 53 Pfaffen Wood, 158 Phalanx, the, 32 Photographs, aerial, 99 Piave line, the, 7 Pill-box forts, 85-86 Pioneer infantry, 153 Piquets, 131 Platoon in attack, 70-72 in defence, 131 Pleasant Hill, 59 Plevna, battle of, 60 Plumer, Field-Marshal Lord, G.C.B., 149 Polygon Wood, 42-43 Position, choice of a, 83-84 defensive, 86-91 warfare, 79-82, 99-100, 134, 138, 141-142, 165, 166 Potomac, Army of the, 14-15, 25-26, 45, 46 Principles of warfare, 1-5 Protection and reconnaissance, 98-101 by night, 145 Pulteney, Gen. Sir W. P., K.C.B., 88 Pursuit, 64, 69

Quatre Bras, battle of, 48 Quebec, 38 Queen's Regiment, 42

Raids, 82, 141, 142 Rallying place, 97 Ramadie, battle of, 64 Ramdam, 118 Ramillies, battle of, 46, 91 Range cards, 135 Ranges of artillery, 173 of small arms, 166 of mortars, 173 Rappahannock Station, 161 Rastatt, 128 Rear guard, 119-128 aircraft, 120 artillery, 120 cavalry, 120 composition, 120 distance, 121 distribution, 120-121 examples, 126-128 infantry, 120 main guard, 120-121 machine guns, 120 mechanical transport, 120 medical arrangements, 120 night, 145 positions, 121-124 rear party, 120-121 Royal Engineers, 120 strength, 119-120 tactics, 79, 119, 121-128 training, 124-125 Reconnaissance and protection, 98-101, 175 by raids, 142 during battle, 36 for attack, 141-142 for defence, 142-143 intelligence officers, 141-142 tactical, 141-143 Reorganisation after attack, 97 and pursuit, 69 Report centres, 163 Reports, battle, 68 on positions, 141-143 Reserve, general, in attack, 56-57 in defence, 94-95 outposts, 131 local, 55-56, 92, 95, 125, 130, 134 Resistance, line of, 84, 134 Retiring under fire, 40-41 Retreat from Mons, 38, 87-88, 90, 96, 126-128, 165 lines of, 89-90 tactics in, 104-105 Reumont, 66 Rezonville, 96 Rifle, the British, 38, 164-165 Rifle grenade, the, 166 Roberts, Field-Marshal Earl, K.G., 15-16, 151 (quoted):— "Germany Strikes," 17 Rolica, combat at, 95, 127 Roman walls, 82 Rorke's Drift, 77-78, 156 Royal Engineers, characteristics of, 172, 174 defence, 172 Horse Artillery, 170 in attack, 67, 153 outposts, 137 retreats, 120 West Kent Regiment, 42 Runners, 35 Russia, collapse of, 52 North (Campaign), 66-67 Russian War of 1854-1855, 82 Russo-Japanese War, 82, 117-118 Russo-Turkish War, 18, 82

Sadowa, battle of, 96 St. Privat, battle of, 60 Salamanca, battle of, 27, 78 Salient, the (1864), 97, 149 (Ypres), 39 Sambre, battle of the, 21 Sannah's Post, 118, 124 Sarrail, General, 37 Sauroren, battle of, 10 Savage warfare, 156-157 Scarpe, battle of the, 21 Scouts (platoon), 71 Secrecy, 25, 29-31, 51, 102, 144, 145-146, 153-154 Sectors of defence, 94 Sedan, battle of, 159 Selle, battle of the, 21 Semi-permanent defences, 85-86 Seneca quoted: (Surprise), 102 Sentry groups, 131, 136-137 Serre Hill, 148-149 Seven Days' Battle, the, 14, 90 Sharpsburg, battle of, 14, 15, 48 Shenandoah Valley campaign, 4, 7, 12, 117 Signals, 35, 107 "Silence is golden," 113 Skobeleff, General Michael Dimitrievitch, 18 Smith-Dorrien, Gen. Sir H. L., G.C.B., 87, 126 Smoke, 56, 150-151, 171, 177 Snipers, 81 Soissons, Fortress of, 41, 78 Soldiers' battles, 9 Somme, first battle of the, 7, 13, 37, 42-43, 148, 171, 176-177 second battle of the, 33-34, 43, 51-52, 56, 66, 77, 78, 126-127, 174 Soult, Marechal, 10, 127 South African War, 6-7. (See also Battles by name.) Spicheren, battle of, 108-109, 158 Spottsylvania, battle of, 93-94, 117, 149-150 Square formation in attack, 70 Stafford Heights, 139 Stamford Bridge, battle of, 12 Stormberg, 152 Strategical advanced guard, 103 Strategy defined, 6, 8 and tactics, 6-23 Stuart, Gen. J. E. B., C.S. Army ("Jeb" Stuart), 65, 112-113, 117, 128. Study, necessity for, 1-3, 4-5 Sublician Bridge, 77 Sulphur Springs, 108 Super-heavy artillery, 172, 173 Supply, 13, 67 Supports in attack, 55-56, 169 in close country, 159 defence, 92 outposts, 134-137 Surprise, value of, 25, 29-31, 51, 175 fire, 31, 38 historical examples, 12, 30, 63, 77-78, 118, 124, 138

Tactical advanced guard, 103 reconnaissance, 140-143 Tactics and strategy, 6-23 definition of, 6, 8 subservient to strategy, 6-8 Tadpole Copse, 75 Talavera, battle of, 92 Tallard, Marechal, 46 Tanks, characteristics of, 171, 174-175 in close country, 22, 160, 162, 177 Taube Farm, 139 Taylor, Gen. R., C.S. Army (quoted):— cardinal principles, 1 discipline, 11 Tel-el-Kebir, battle of, 151-152 Territorial troops, 19, 43 Teutoberger Wald, 156-157 Text-books, value of, 23 Theatre of operations, 6-7 Thermopylae, battle of, 77 Thielmann's Corps (Wavre), 8 Thomas, Gen. G. H., U.S.A., 15 Time, value of, 12 Tofrik, battle of, 156 Torres Vedras, lines of, 82-83 Toski, battle of, 156 Toulouse, battle of, 47 Trench warfare, 81-82 Trenches, fire, 165 Troisvilles, 66 Trones Wood, 42 Tubize and Hal, 78 Tweefontein, 138 Types of battle action, 45-50

Valley campaign, the, 4, 7, 12, 117 Vanguard, the, 105-106 Varus, defeat of, 156-157 Vedettes, 137 Verdun, defence of, 16 Verneville, battle of, 63 View, in close country, 155 Village fighting, 157-159, 162-163 Balan, 159 Bazeilles, 159 Bourlon, 42 Givenchy, 43 Noisseville, 159 Villers-Guislain, 160 Villers-Bretonneux, 149 Villages, attack on, 162 defence of, 163 Vimy Ridge, 149 Visibility from air, 100 Vittoria, battle of, 47, 83 von Below, General, 127 von Bredow's "Todtenritt," 96 von Kluck, General, 28

Wallace, Gen. Lew, U.S.A., 7 Warfare, art of, 1-5 savage, 156-157 Warren, Gen., U.S.A., 128 Watchword at night, 153 Waterloo, battle of, 8, 47-48, 76, 78-79, 90-91 Wauchope, Brig-Gen. A. G., 152 Wavre, battle of, 8, 91 Weather, 13 Wellington, Field-Marshal Duke of, K.G., 5, 10, 46, 47, 78-79, 82-83, 127 Wilderness, battle of the, 93-94, 117, 149-150, 158 William the Conqueror, 12 Wire, 80 Wolfe, Gen. James, 38 Wolseley, Field-Marshal Viscount, K.P., 151-152 Wood fighting, 155-161 Bois de Vaux, 158 Elsasshausen Copse, 158 Gauche, 160 Gifert, 158 Niederwald, 158-159 Pfaffen, 158 Polygon, 42-43 Tadpole Copse, 75 Trones, 42 Woods, attack on, 159-161 defence of, 161 Worcestershire Regiment, 42 Worth, battle of, 109, 158-159 Wytschaete Ridge, 20, 149

Yalu, battle of the, 118 Ypres, first battle of, 19, 20, 41-42, 88 second battle of, 19, 20, 42, 176 third battle of, 39, 139

Zero hour, 74 Zulu War, 77-78


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