Natural Selection, then, is only another way of saying "Nature." Mr. Darwin seems to be aware of this when he writes, "Nature, if I may be allowed to personify the natural preservation or survival of the fittest." And again, at the bottom of the same page, "It may metaphorically be said that natural selection is daily and hourly scrutinizing throughout the world the slightest variations." It may be metaphorically said that Nature is daily and hourly scrutinizing, but it cannot be said consistently with any right use of words, metaphorical or otherwise, that natural selection scrutinizes, unless natural selection is merely a somewhat cumbrous synonym for Nature. When, therefore, Mr. Darwin says that natural selection is the "most important, but not the exclusive means" whereby any modification has been effected, he is really saying that Nature is the most important means of modification—which is only another way of telling us that variation causes variations, and is all very true as far as it goes.
I did not read Professor Mivart's 'Lessons from Nature,' until I had written all my own criticism on Mr. Darwin's position. From that work, however, I now quote the following:—
"It cannot then be contested that the far-famed 'Origin of Species,' that, namely, by 'Natural Selection,' has been repudiated in fact, though not expressly even by its own author. This circumstance, which is simply undeniable, might dispense us from any further consideration of the hypothesis itself. But the "conspiracy of silence," which has accompanied the repudiation tends to lead the unthinking many to suppose that the same importance still attaches to it as at first. On this account it may be well to ask the question, what, after all, is 'Natural Selection'?
"The answer may seem surprising to some, but it is none the less true, that 'Natural Selection' is simply nothing. It is an apparently positive name for a really negative effect, and is therefore an eminently misleading term. By 'Natural Selection' is meant the result of all the destructive agencies of Nature, destructive to individuals and to races by destroying their lives or their powers of propagation. Evidently, the cause of the distinction of species (supposing such distinction to be brought about in natural generation) must be that which causes variation, and variation in one determinate direction in at least several individuals simultaneously." I should like to have added here the words "and during many successive generations," but they will go very sufficiently without saying.
"At the same time," continues Professor Mivart, "it is freely conceded that the destructive agencies in nature do succeed in preventing the perpetuation of monstrous, abortive, and feeble attempts at the performance of the evolutionary process, that they rapidly remove antecedent forms when new ones are evolved more in harmony with surrounding conditions, and that their action results in the formation of new characters when these have once attained sufficient completeness to be of real utility to their possessor.
"Continued reflection, and five years further pondering over the problems of specific origin have more and more convinced me that the conception, that the origin of all species 'man included' is due simply to conditions which are (to use Mr. Darwin's own words) 'strictly accidental,' is a conception utterly irrational."
. . . . . .
"With regard to the conception as now put forward by Mr. Darwin, I cannot truly characterize it but by an epithet which I employ only with much reluctance. I weigh my words and have present to my mind the many distinguished naturalists who have accepted the notion, and yet I cannot hesitate to call it a 'puerile hypothesis.'"
I am afraid I cannot go with Professor Mivart farther than this point, though I have a strong feeling as though his conclusion is true, that "the material universe is always and everywhere sustained and directed by an infinite cause, for which to us the word mind is the least inadequate and misleading symbol." But I feel that any attempt to deal with such a question is going far beyond that sphere in which man's powers may be at present employed with advantage: I trust, therefore, that I may never try to verify it, and am indifferent whether it is correct or not.
Again, I should probably differ from Professor Mivart in finding this mind inseparable from the material universe in which we live and move. So that I could neither conceive of such a mind influencing and directing the universe from a point as it were outside the universe itself, nor yet of a universe as existing without there being present—or having been present—in its every particle something for which mind should be the least inadequate and misleading symbol. But the subject is far beyond me.
As regards Professor Mivart's denunciations of natural selection, I have only one fault to find with them, namely, that they do not speak out with sufficient bluntness. The difficulty of showing the fallacy of Mr. Darwin's position, is the difficulty of grasping a will-o'-the-wisp. A concluding example will put this clearly before the reader, and at the same time serve to illustrate the most tangible feature of difference between Mr. Darwin and Lamarck.
 'Origin of Species,' p. 62.
 'Origin of Species,' p. 49.
 'Origin of Species,' p. 63.
 'Nature,' March 14 and 21, 1878.
 'Origin of Species,' p. 65.
 'Lessons from Nature,' p. 300.
THE CASE OF THE MADEIRA BEETLES AS ILLUSTRATING THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE EVOLUTION OF LAMARCK AND OF MR. CHARLES DARWIN—CONCLUSION.
An island of no very great extent is surrounded by a sea which cuts it off for many miles from the nearest land. It lies a good deal exposed to winds, so that the beetles which live upon it are in continual danger of being blown out to sea if they fly during the hours and seasons when the wind is blowing. It is found that an unusually large proportion of the beetles inhabiting this island are either without wings or have their wings in a useless and merely rudimentary state; and that a large number of kinds which are very common on the nearest mainland, but which are compelled to use their wings in seeking their food, are here entirely wanting. It is also observed that the beetles on this island generally lie much concealed until the wind lulls and the sun shines. These are the facts; let us now see how Lamarck would treat them.
Lamarck would say that the beetles once being on this island it became one of the conditions of their existence that they should not get blown out to sea. For once blown out to sea, they would be quite certain to be drowned. Beetles, when they fly, generally fly for some purpose, and do not like having that purpose interfered with by something which can carry them all-whithers, whether they like it or no. If they are flying and find the wind taking them in a wrong direction, or seaward—which they know will be fatal to them—they stop flying as soon as may be, and alight on terra firma. But if the wind is very prevalent the beetles can find but little opportunity for flying at all: they will therefore lie quiet all day and do as best they can to get their living on foot instead of on the wing. There will thus be a long-continued disuse of wings, and this will gradually diminish the development of the wings themselves, till after a sufficient number of generations these will either disappear altogether, or be seen in a rudimentary condition only. For each beetle which has made but little use of its wings will be liable to leave offspring with a slightly diminished wing, some other organ which has been used instead of the wing becoming proportionately developed. It is thus seen that the conditions of existence are the indirect cause of the wings becoming rudimentary, inasmuch as they preclude the beetles from using them; the disuse however on the part of the beetles themselves is the direct cause.
Now let us see how Mr. Darwin deals with the same case. He writes:—
"In some cases we might easily set down to disuse, modifications of structure which are wholly or mainly due to natural selection." Then follow the facts about the beetles of Madeira, as I have given them above. While we are reading them we naturally make up our minds that the winglessness of the beetles will prove due either wholly, or at any rate mainly, to natural selection, and that though it would be easy to set it down to disuse, yet we must on no account do so. The facts having been stated, Mr. Darwin continues:—"These several considerations make me believe that the wingless condition of so many Madeira beetles is mainly due to the action of natural selection," and when we go on to the words that immediately follow, "combined probably with disuse," we are almost surprised at finding that disuse has had anything to do with the matter. We feel a languid wish to know exactly how much and in what way it has entered into the combination; but we find it difficult to think the matter out, and are glad to take it for granted that the part played by disuse must be so unimportant that we need not consider it. Mr. Darwin continues:—
"For during many successive generations each individual beetle which flew least, either from its wings having been ever so little less perfectly developed, or from indolent habit, will have had the best chance of surviving from not having been blown out to sea; and on the other hand those beetles which most readily took to flight would oftenest be blown out to sea and perish."
So apt are we to believe what we are told, when it is told us gravely and with authority, and when there is no statement at hand to contradict it, that we fail to see that Mr. Darwin is all the time really attributing the winglessness of the Madeira beetles either to the qua him unknown causes which have led to the "ever so little less perfect development of wing" on the part of the beetles that leave offspring—that is to say, is admitting that he can give no account of the matter—or else to the "indolent habit" of the parent beetles which has led them to disuse their wings, and hence gradually to lose them—which is neither more nor less than the "erroneous grounds of opinion," and "well-known doctrine" of Lamarck.
For Mr. Darwin cannot mean that the fact of some beetles being blown out to sea is the most important means whereby certain other beetles come to have smaller wings—that the Madeira beetles in fact come to have smaller wings mainly because their large winged uncles and aunts—go away.
But if he does not mean this, what becomes of natural selection?
For in this case we are left exactly where Lamarck left us, and must hold that such beetles as have smaller wings have them because the conditions of life or "circumstances" in which their parents were placed, rendered it inconvenient to them to fly, and thus led them to leave off using their wings.
Granted, that if there had been nothing to take unmodified beetles away, there would have been less room and scope for the modified beetles; also that unmodified beetles would have intermixed with the modified, and impeded the prevalence of the modification. But anything else than such removal of unmodified individuals would be contrary to our hypothesis. The very essence of conditions of existence is that there shall be something to take away those which do not comply with the conditions; if there is nothing to render such and such a course a sine qua non for life, there is no condition of existence in respect of this course, and no modification according to Lamarck could follow, as there would be no changed distribution of use.
I think that if I were to leave this matter here I should have said enough to make the reader feel that Lamarck's system is direct, intelligible and sufficient—while Mr. Darwin's is confused and confusing. I may however quote Mr. Darwin himself as throwing his theory about the Madeira beetles on one side in a later passage, for he writes:—
"It is probable that disuse has been the main agent in rendering organs rudimentary," or in other words that Lamarck was quite right—nor does one see why if disuse is after all the main agent in rendering an organ rudimentary, use should not have been the main agent in developing it—but let that pass. "It (disuse) would at first lead," continues Mr. Darwin, "by slow steps to the more and more complete reduction of a part, until at last it became rudimentary—as in the case of the eyes of animals inhabiting dark caverns, and of the wings of birds inhabiting oceanic islands, which have seldom been forced by beasts of prey to take flight, and have ultimately lost the power of flying. Again, an organ useful under certain conditions, might become injurious under others, as with the wings of beetles living on small and exposed islands;" so that the rudimentary condition of the Madeira beetles' wings is here set down as mainly due to disuse—while above we find it mainly due to natural selection—I should say that immediately after the word "islands" just quoted, Mr. Darwin adds "and in this case natural selection will have aided in reducing the organ, until it was rendered harmless and rudimentary," but this is Mr. Darwin's manner, and must go for what it is worth.
How refreshing to turn to the simple straightforward language of Lamarck.
"Long continued disuse," he writes, "in consequence of the habits which an animal has contracted, gradually reduces an organ, and leads to its final disappearance....
"Eyes placed in the head form an essential part of that plan on which we observe all vertebrate organisms to be constructed. Nevertheless the mole which uses its vision very little, has eyes which are only very small and hardly apparent.
"The aspalax of Olivier, which lives underground like the mole, and exposes itself even less than the mole to the light of day, has wholly lost the use of its sight, nor does it retain more than mere traces of visual organs, these traces again being hidden under the skin and under certain other parts which cover them up and leave not even the smallest access to the light. The Proteus, an aquatic reptile akin to the Salamander and living in deep and obscure cavities under water, has, like the aspalax, no longer anything but traces of eyes remaining—traces which are again entirely hidden and covered up.
"The following consideration should be decisive.
"Light cannot penetrate everywhere, and as a consequence, animals which live habitually in places which it cannot reach, do not have an opportunity of using eyes, even though they have got them; but animals which form part of a system of organization which comprises eyes as an invariable rule among its organs, must have had eyes originally. Since then we find among these animals some which have lost their eyes, and which have only concealed traces of these organs, it is evident that the impoverishment, and even disappearance of the organs in question, must be the effect of long-continued disuse.
"A proof of this is to be found in the fact that the organ of hearing is never in like case with that of sight; we always find it in animals of whose system of organization hearing is a component part; and for the following reason, namely, that sound, which is the effect of vibration upon the ear, can penetrate everywhere, and pass even through massive intermediate bodies. Any animal, therefore, with an organic system of which the ear is an essential part, can always find a use for its ears, no matter where it inhabits. We never, therefore, come upon rudimentary ears among the vertebrata, and when, going down the scale of life lower than the vertebrata, we come to a point at which the ear is no longer to be found; we never come upon ears again in any lower class.
"Not so with the organ of sight: we see this organ disappear, reappear, and disappear again with the possibility or impossibility of using eyes on the part of the creature itself.
"The great development of mantle in the acephalous molluscs has rendered eyes, and even a head, entirely useless to them. These organs, though belonging to the type of the organism, and by rights included in it, have had to disappear and become annihilated owing to continued default of use.
. . . . . .
"Many insects which, by the analogy of their order and even genus, should have wings, have nevertheless lost them more or less completely through disuse. A number of coleoptera, orthoptera, hymenoptera, and hemiptera give us examples, the habits of these animals never leading them to use their wings."
* * * * *
I will here bring this present volume to a conclusion, hoping, however, to return to the same subject shortly, but to that part of it which bears upon longevity and the phenomena of old age. In 'Life and Habit' I pointed out that if differentiations of structure and instinct are considered as due to the different desires under different circumstances of an organism, which must be regarded as a single creature, though its development has extended over millions of years, and which is guided mainly by habit and memory until some disturbing cause compels invention—then the longevity of each generation or stage of this organism should depend upon the lateness of the average age of reproduction in each generation; so that an organism (using the word in its usual signification) which did not upon the average begin to reproduce itself till it was twenty, should be longer lived than one that on the average begins to reproduce itself at a year old. I also maintained that the phenomena of old age should be referred to failure of memory on the part of the organism, which in the embryonic stages, infancy, youth, and early manhood, leans upon the memory of what it did when it was in the persons of its ancestors; in middle life, carries its action onward by means of the impetus, already received, and by the force of habit; and in old age becomes puzzled, having no experience of any past existence at seventy-five, we will say, to guide it, and therefore forgetting itself more and more completely till it dies. I hope to extend this, and to bring forward arguments in support of it in a future work.
Of the importance of the theory put forward in 'Life and Habit'—I am daily more and more convinced. Unless we admit oneness of personality between parents and offspring, memory of the often repeated facts of past existences, the latency of that memory until it is rekindled by the presence of the associated ideas, or of a sufficient number of them, and the far-reaching consequences of the unconsciousness which results from habitual action, evolution does not greatly add to our knowledge as to how we shall live here to the best advantage. Add these considerations, and its value as a guide becomes immediately apparent; a new light is poured upon a hundred problems of the greatest delicacy and difficulty. Not the least interesting of these is the gradual extension of human longevity—an extension, however, which cannot be effected till many many generations as yet unborn have come and gone. There is nothing, however, to prevent man's becoming as long lived as the oak if he will persevere for many generations in the steps which can alone lead to this result. Another interesting achievement which should be more quickly attainable, though still not in our own time, is the earlier maturity of those animals whose rapid maturity is an advantage to us, but whose longevity is not to our purpose.
* * * * *
The question—Evolution or Direct Creation of all species?—has been settled in favour of Evolution. A hardly less interesting and important battle has now to be fought over the question whether we are to accept the evolution of the founders of the theory—with the adjuncts hinted at by Dr. Darwin and Mr. Matthew, and insisted on, so far as I can gather, by Professor Hering and myself—or the evolution of Mr. Darwin, which denies the purposiveness or teleology inherent in evolution as first propounded. I am assured that such of my readers as I can persuade to prefer the old evolution to the new will have but little reason to regret their preference.
* * * * *
P.S.—As these sheets leave my hands, my attention is called to a review of Professor Haeckel's 'Evolution of Man,' by Mr. A. E. Wallace, in the 'Academy' for April 12, 1879. "Professor Haeckel maintains," says Mr. Wallace, "that the struggle for existence in nature evolves new forms without design, just as the will of man produces new varieties in cultivation with design." I maintain in preference with the older evolutionists, that in consequence of change in the conditions of their existence, organisms design new forms for themselves, and carry those designs out in additions to, and modifications of, their own bodies.
"The science of rudimentary organs," continues Mr. Wallace, "which Haeckel terms 'dysteleology, or the doctrine of purposelessness,' is here discussed, and a number of interesting examples are given, the conclusion being that they prove the mechanical or monistic conception of the origin of organisms to be correct, and the idea of any 'all-wise creative plan an ancient fable.'" I see no reason to suppose, or again not to suppose, an all-wise creative plan. I decline to go into this question, believing it to be not yet ripe, nor nearly ripe, for consideration. I see purpose, however, in rudimentary organs as much as in useful ones, but a spent or extinct purpose—a purpose which has been fulfilled, and is now forgotten—the rudimentary organ being repeated from force of habit, indolence, and dislike of change, so long as it does not, to use the words of Buffon, "stand in the way of the fair development" of other parts which are found useful and necessary. I demur, therefore, to the inference of "purposelessness" which I gather that Professor Haeckel draws from these organs.
In the 'Academy' for April 19, 1879, Mr. Wallace quotes Professor Haeckel as saying that our "highly purposive and admirably-constituted sense-organs have developed without premeditated aim; that they have originated by the same mechanical process of Natural Selection, by the same constant interaction of Adaptation and Heredity [what is Heredity but another word for unknown causes, unless it is explained in some such manner as in 'Life and Habit'?] by which all the other purposive contrivances of the animal organization have been slowly and gradually evolved during the struggle for existence."
I see no evidence for "premeditated aim" at any modification very far in advance of an existing organ, any more than I do for "premeditated aim" on man's part at any as yet inconceivable mechanical invention; but as in the case of man's inventions, so also in that of the organs of animals and plants, modification is due to the accumulation of small, well-considered improvements, as found necessary in practice, and the conduct of their affairs. Each step having been purposive, the whole road has been travelled purposively; nor is the purposiveness of such an organ, we will say, as the eye, barred by the fact that invention has doubtless been aided by some of those happy accidents which from time to time happen to all who keep their wits about them, and know how to turn the gifts of Fortune to account.
 'Origin of Species,' p. 109.
 'Origin of Species, p. 401.
 'Phil. Zool.,' tom. i. p. 242.
 'Phil. Zool.,' tom. i. p. 244.
 'Phil. Zool.,' tom. i. p. 245.
REVIEWS OF 'EVOLUTION, OLD AND NEW.'
Those who have been at the pains to read the foregoing book will, perhaps, pardon me if I put before them a short account of the reception it has met with: I will not waste time by arguing with my critics at any length; it will be enough if I place some of their remarks upon my book under the same cover as the book itself, with here and there a word or two of comment.
The only reviews which have come under my notice appeared in the 'Academy' and the 'Examiner,' both of May 17, 1879; the 'Edinburgh Daily Review,' May 23, 1879; 'City Press,' May 21, 1879; 'Field,' May 26, 1879; 'Saturday Review,' May 31, 1879; 'Daily Chronicle,' May 31, 1879; 'Graphic' and 'Nature,' both June 12, 1879; 'Pall Mall Gazette,' June 18, 1879; 'Literary World,' June 20, 1879; 'Scotsman,' June 24, 1879; 'British Journal of Homoeopathy' and 'Mind,' both July 1, 1879; 'Journal of Science,' July 18, 1879; 'Westminster Review,' July, 1879; 'Athenaeum,' July 26, 1879; 'Daily News,' July 29, 1879; 'Manchester City News,' August 16, 1879; 'Nonconformist,' November 26, 1879; 'Popular Science Review,' Jan. 1, 1880; 'Morning Post,' Jan. 12, 1880.
Some of the most hostile passages in the reviews above referred to are as follows:—
"From beginning to end, our eccentric author treats us to a dazzling flood of epigram, invective, and what appears to be argument; and finally leaves us without a single clear idea as to what he has been driving at."
. . . . . .
"Mr. Butler comes forward, as it were, to proclaim himself a professional satirist, and a mystifier who will do his best to leave you utterly in the dark with regard to his system of juggling. Is he a teleological theologian making fun of evolution? Is he an evolutionist making fun of teleology? Is he a man of letters making fun of science? Or is he a master of pure irony making fun of all three, and of his audience as well? For our part we decline to commit ourselves, and prefer to observe, as Mr. Butler observes of Von Hartmann, that if his meaning is anything like what he says it is, we can only say that it has not been given us to form any definite conception whatever as to what that meaning may be."—'Academy,' May 17, 1879, Signed Grant Allen.
* * * * *
Here is another criticism of "Evolution, Old and New"—also, I believe I am warranted in saying, by Mr. Grant Allen. These two criticisms appeared on the same day; how many more Mr. Allen may have written later on I do not know.
We find the writer who in the 'Academy' declares that he has been left without "a single clear idea" as to what 'Evolution, Old and New,' has been driving at saying on the same day in the 'Examiner' that 'Evolution, Old and New,' "has a more evident purpose than any of its predecessors." If so, I am afraid the predecessors must have puzzled Mr. Allen very unpleasantly. What the purpose of 'Evolution, Old and New,' is, he proceeds to explain:—
"As to his (Mr. Butler's) main argument, it comes briefly to this: natural selection does not originate favourable varieties, it only passively permits them to exist; therefore it is the unknown cause which produced the variations, not the natural selection which spared them, that ought to count as the mainspring of evolution. That unknown cause Mr. Butler boldly declares to be the will of the organism itself. An intelligent ascidian wanted a pair of eyes, so set to work and made itself a pair, exactly as a man makes a microscope; a talented fish conceived the idea of walking on dry land, so it developed legs, turned its swim bladder into a pair of lungs, and became an amphibian; an aesthetic guinea-fowl admired bright colours, so it bought a paint-box, studied Mr. Whistler's ornamental designs, and, painting itself a gilded and ocellated tail, was thenceforth a peacock. But how about plants? Mr. Butler does not shirk even this difficulty. The theory must be maintained at all hazards.... This is the sort of mystical nonsense from which we had hoped Mr. Darwin had for ever saved us."—'Examiner,' May 17, 1879.
* * * * *
In this last article, Mr. Allen has said that I am a man of genius, "with the unmistakable signet-mark upon my forehead." I have been subjected to a good deal of obloquy and misrepresentation at one time or another, but this passage by Mr. Allen is the only one I have seen that has made me seriously uneasy about the prospects of my literary reputation.
I see Mr. Allen has been lately writing an article in the 'Fortnightly Review' on the decay of criticism. Looking over it somewhat hurriedly, my eye was arrested by the following:—
"Nowadays any man can write, because there are papers enough to give employment to everybody. No reflection, no deliberation, no care; all is haste, fatal facility, stock phrases, commonplace ideas, and a ready pen that can turn itself to any task with equal ease, because supremely ignorant of all alike."
. . . . . .
"The writer takes to his craft nowadays, not because he has taste for literature, but because he has an incurable faculty for scribbling. He has no culture, and he soon loses the power of taking pains, if he ever possessed it. But he can talk with glib superficiality and imposing confidence about every conceivable subject, from a play or a picture to a sermon or a metaphysical essay. It is the utter indifference to subject-matter, joined with the vulgar unscrupulousness of pretentious ignorance, that strikes the keynote of our existing criticism. Men write without taking the trouble to read or think."
* * * * *
The 'Saturday Review' attacked 'Evolution, Old and New,' I may almost say savagely. It wrote: "When Mr. Butler's 'Life and Habit' came before us, we doubted whether his ambiguously expressed speculations belonged to the regions of playful but possibly scientific imagination, or of unscientific fancies; and we gave him the benefit of the doubt. In fact, we strained a point or two to find a reasonable meaning for him. He has now settled the question against himself. Not professing to have any particular competence in biology, natural history, or the scientific study of evidence in any shape whatever, and, indeed, rather glorying in his freedom from any such superfluities, he undertakes to assure the overwhelming majority of men of science, and the educated public who have followed their lead, that, while they have done well to be converted to the doctrine of the evolution and transmutation of species, they have been converted on entirely wrong grounds."
. . . . . .
"When a writer who has not given as many weeks to the subject as Mr. Darwin has given years [as a matter of fact, it is now twenty years since I began to publish on the subject of Evolution] is not content to air his own crude, though clever, fallacies, but presumes to criticize Mr. Darwin with the superciliousness of a young schoolmaster looking over a boy's theme, it is difficult not to take him more seriously than he deserves or perhaps desires. One would think that Mr. Butler was the travelled and laborious observer of Nature, and Mr. Darwin the pert speculator, who takes all his facts at secondhand."
. . . . . .
"Let us once more consider how matters stood a year or two before the 'Origin of Species' first appeared. The continuous evolution of animated Nature had in its favour the difficulty of drawing fixed lines between species and even larger divisions, all the indications of comparative anatomy and embryology, and a good deal of general scientific presumption. Several well-known writers, and some eminent enough to command respect, had expressed their belief in it. One or two far-seeing thinkers, among whom the place of honour must be assigned to Mr. Herbert Spencer, had done more. They had used their philosophic insight, which, to science, is the eye of faith, to descry the promised land almost within reach; they knew and announced how rich and spacious the heritage would be, if once the entry could be made good. But on that 'if' everything hung. Nature was not bound to give up her secret, or was bound only in a mocking covenant with an impossible condition: Si caelum digito tetigeris; if only some fortunate hand could touch the inaccessible firmament, and bring down the golden chain to earth! But fruition seemed out of sight. Even those who were most willing to advance in this direction, could only regret that they saw no road clear. There was a tempting vision, but nothing proven—many would have said nothing provable. A few years passed, and all this was changed. The doubtful speculation had become a firm and connected theory. In the room of scattered foragers and scouts, there was an irresistibly advancing column. Nature had surrendered her stronghold, and was disarmed of her secret. And if we ask who were the men by whom this was done, the answer is notorious, and there is but one answer possible: the names that are for ever associated with this great triumph are those of Charles Darwin and Wallace."
I gave the lady or gentleman who wrote this an opportunity of acknowledging the authorship; but she or he preferred, not I think unnaturally, to remain anonymous.
The only other criticism of 'Evolution, Old and New,' to which I would call attention, appeared in 'Nature,' in a review of 'Unconscious Memory,' by Mr. Romanes, and contained the following passages:—
"But to be serious, if in charity we could deem Mr. Butler a lunatic, we should not be unprepared for any aberration of common sense that he might display.... A certain nobody writes a book ['Evolution, Old and New'] accusing the most illustrious man in his generation of burying the claims of certain illustrious predecessors out of the sight of all men. In the hope of gaining some notoriety by deserving, and perhaps receiving a contemptuous refutation from the eminent man in question, he publishes this book which, if it deserved serious consideration, would be not more of an insult to the particular man of science whom it accuses of conscious and wholesale plagiarism [there is no such accusation in 'Evolution, Old and New'] than it would be to men of science in general for requiring such elementary instruction on some of the most famous literature in science from an upstart ignoramus, who, until two or three years ago, considered himself a painter by profession."—'Nature,' Jan. 27, 1881.
* * * * *
In a subsequent letter to 'Nature,' Mr. Romanes said he had been "acting the part of policeman" by writing as he had done. Any unscrupulous reviewer may call himself a policeman if he likes, but he must not expect those whom he assails to recognize his pretensions. 'Evolution, Old and New,' was not written for the kind of people whom Mr. Romanes calls men of science; if "men of science" means men like Mr. Romanes, I trust they say well who maintain that I am not a man of science; I believe the men to whom Mr. Romanes refers to be men, not of that kind of science which desires to know, but of that kind whose aim is to thrust itself upon the public as actually knowing. 'Evolution, Old and New,' could be of no use to these; certainly, it was not intended as an insult to them, but if they are insulted by it, I do not know that I am sorry, for I value their antipathy and opposition as much as I should dislike their approbation: of one thing, however, I am certain—namely, that before 'Evolution, Old and New,' was written, Professors Huxley and Tyndall, for example, knew very little of the earlier history of Evolution. Professor Huxley, in his article on Evolution in the ninth edition of the 'Encyclopaedia Britannica,' published in 1878, says of the two great pioneers of Evolution, that Buffon "contributed nothing to the general doctrine of Evolution," and that Erasmus Darwin "can hardly be said to have made any real advance on his predecessors."
Professor Haeckel evidently knew little of Erasmus Darwin, and still less, apparently, about Buffon. Professor Tyndall, in 1878, spoke of Evolution as "Darwin's theory"; and I have just read Mr. Grant Allen as saying that Evolutionism "is an almost exclusively English impulse."
Since 'Evolution, Old and New,' was published, I have observed several of the so-called men of science—among them Professor Huxley and Mr. Romanes—airing Buffon; but I never observed any of them do this till within the last three years. I maintain that "men of science" were, and still are, very ignorant concerning the history of Evolution; but, whether they were or were not, I did not write 'Evolution, Old and New,' for them; I wrote for the general public, who have been kind enough to testify their appreciation of it in a sufficiently practical manner.
The way in which Mr. Charles Darwin met 'Evolution, Old and New,' has been so fully dealt with in my book, 'Unconscious Memory;' in the 'Athenaeum,' Jan. 31, 1880; the 'St. James's Gazette,' Dec. 8, 1880; and 'Nature,' Feb. 3, 1881, that I need not return to it here, more especially as Mr. Darwin has, by his silence, admitted that he has no defence to make.
I have quoted by no means the moat exceptionable parts of Mr. Romanes' article, and have given them a permanence they would not otherwise attain, inasmuch as nothing can better show the temper of the kind of men who are now—as I said in the body of the foregoing work—clamouring for endowment, and who would step into the Pope's shoes to-morrow if we would only let them.
 See p. 44, and the whole of chap. v., where I say of this supposition, that "nothing could be conceived more foreign to experience and common sense."
 'Fortnightly Review,' March 1, 1882, pp. 344, 345.
 'Saturday Review,' May 31, 1879, pp. 682-3.
 P. 748.
 See pp. 71-73.
 'Nineteenth Century' for November, pp. 360, 361.
 'Fortnightly Review,' March, 1882.
ROME AND PANTHEISM.
Evolution would after all be a poor doctrine if it did not affect human affairs at every touch and turn. I propose to devote the second chapter of this Appendix to the consideration of an aspect of Evolution which will always interest a very large number of people—the development of the relation that may exist between religion and science.
If the Church of Rome would only develop some doctrine or, I know not how, provide some means by which men like myself, who cannot pretend to believe in the miraculous element of Christianity, could yet join her as a conservative stronghold, I, for one, should gladly do so. I believe the difference between her faith and that of all who can be called gentlemen to be one of words rather than things. Our practical working ideal is much the same as hers; when we use the word "gentleman" we mean the same thing that the Church of Rome does; so that, if we get down below the words that formulate her teaching, there are few points upon which we should not agree. But, alas! words are often so very important.
How is it possible for myself, for example, to give people to understand that I believe in the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception or in the Lourdes miracles? If the Pope could spare time to think about so insignificant a person, would he wish me to pretend such beliefs or think better of me if I did pretend them? I should be sorry to see him turn suddenly round and deny his own faith, and I am persuaded that, in like manner, he would have me continue to hold my own in peace; nevertheless, the duty of subordinating private judgment to the avoidance of schism is so obvious that, if we could see a practicable way of bridging the gulf between ourselves and Rome, we should be heartily glad to bridge it.
I speak as though the Church of Rome was the only one we can look to. I do not see how it is easy to dispute this. Protestantism has been tried and failed; it has long ceased to grow, but it has by no means ceased to disintegrate. Note the manner in which it is torn asunder by dissensions, and the rancour which these dissensions engender—a rancour which finds its way into the political and social life of Europe, with incalculable damage to the health and well-being of the world. Who can doubt but that there will be a split even in the Church of England ere so many years are over? Protestantism is like one of those drops of glass which tend to split up into minuter and minuter fragments the moment the bond that united them has been removed. It is as though the force of gravity had lost its hold, and a universal power of repulsion taken the place of attraction. This may, perhaps, come about some day in the material as well as in the spiritual and political world, but the spirit of the age is as yet one of aggregation; the spirit of Protestantism is one of disintegration. I maintain, therefore, that it is not likely to be permanent.
All the great powers of Europe have from numberless distinct tribes become first a few kingdoms or dukedoms, then two or three nations, and now homogeneous wholes, so that there is no chance of their further dismemberment through internal discontent; a process which has been going on for so many hundreds of years all over Europe is not likely to be arrested without ample warning. True, during the Roman Empire the world was practically bonded together, yet broke in pieces again; but this, I imagine, was because the bonding was prophetic and superficial rather than genuine. Nature very commonly makes one or two false starts, and misses her aim a time or two before she hits it. She nearly hit it in the time of Alexander the Great, but this was a short-lived success; in the case of the Roman Empire she succeeded better and for longer together. Where Nature has once or twice hit her mark as near as this she will commonly hit it outright eventually; the disruption of the Roman Empire, therefore, does not militate against the supposition that the normal condition of right-minded people is one which tends towards aggregation, or, in other words, towards compromise and the merging of much of one's own individuality for the sake of union and concerted action.
See, again, how Rome herself, within the limits of Italy, was an aggregation, an aggregation which has now within these last few years come together again after centuries of disruption; all middle-aged men have seen many small countries come together in their own lifetime, while in America a gigantic attempt at disruption has completely failed. Success will, of course, sometimes attend disruption, but on the whole the balance inclines strongly in favour of aggregation and homogeneity; analogy points in the direction of supposing that the great civilized nations of Europe, as they are the coalition of subordinate provinces, so must coalesce themselves also to form a larger, but single empire. Wars will then cease, and surely anything that seems likely to tend towards so desirable an end deserves respectful consideration.
The Church of Rome is essentially a unifier. It is a great thing that nations should have so much in common as the acknowledgment of the same tribunal for the settlement of spiritual and religious questions, and there is no head under which Christendom can unite with as little disturbance as under Rome. Nothing more tends to keep men apart than religious differences; this certainly ought not to be the case, but it no less certainly is, and therefore we should strain many points and subordinate our private judgment to a very considerable extent if called upon to do so. A man, under these circumstances, is right in saying he believes in much that he does not believe in. Nevertheless there are limits to this, and the Church of Rome requires more of us at present than we can by any means bring ourselves into assenting to.
It may be asked, Why have a Church at all? Why not unite in community of negation rather than of assertion? When I wrote 'Evolution, Old and New,' three years ago, I thought, as now, that the only possible Church must be a development of the Church of Rome; and seeing no chance of agreement between avowed free-thinkers, like myself, and Rome (for I believed Rome immovable), I leaned towards absolute negation as the best chance for unity among civilized nations; but even then, I expressed myself as "having a strong feeling as though Professor Mivart's conclusion is true, that 'the material universe is always and everywhere sustained and directed by an infinite cause, for which to us the word mind is the least inadequate and misleading symbol.'"
I had hardly finished 'Evolution, Old and New,' before I began to deal with this question according to my lights, in a series of articles upon God which appeared in the 'Examiner' during the summer of 1879, and I returned to the same matter more than once in 'Unconscious Memory,' my next succeeding work. The articles I intend recasting and rewriting, as they go upon a false assumption; but subsequent reflection has only confirmed me in the general result I arrived at—namely, the omnipresence of mind in the universe.
I have therefore come to see that we can go farther than negation, and in this case—a positive expression of faith as regards an invisible universe of some sort being possible—a Church of some sort is also possible, which shall formulate and express the general convictions as regards man's position in respect of this faith. I think the instinct which has led so many countries towards a double legislative chamber, and ourselves, till at any rate quite recently, to a double system of jurisprudence, law and equity, was not arrived at without having passed through the stages of reason and reflection. There are a variety of delicate, almost intangible, questions which belong rather to conscience than to law, and for which a Church is a fitter tribunal—at any rate for many ages hence—than a parliament or law court. There is room, therefore, for both a State and a Church, each of which should be influenced by the action of the other.
I do not say that I personally should like to see the Church of Rome as at present constituted in the position which I should be glad to see attained by an ideal Church. If it were in that position I would attack it to the utmost of my power; but I have little hesitation in thinking that the world with a very possible feasible Church, would be better than the world with no Church at all; and, if so, I have still less hesitation in concluding, for the reasons already given, that it is to Rome we must turn as the source from which the Church of the future is to be evolved, if it is to come at all.
For the new, if it is to strike deep root and be permanent, must grow out of the old, without too violent a transition. Some violence there will always be, even in the kindliest birth; but the less the better, and a leap greater than the one from Judaism to Christianity is not desirable, even if it were possible. As a free-thinker, therefore, but also as one who wishes to take a practical view of the manner in which things will, and ought to go, I neither expect to see the religions of the world come once for all to an end with the belief in Christianity—which to me is tantamount to saying with Rome—nor am I at all sure that such a consummation is more desirable than likely to come about. The ultimate fight will, I believe, be between Rome and Pantheism; and the sooner the two contending parties can be ranged into their opposite camps by the extinction of all intermediate creeds, the sooner will an issue of some sort be arrived at. This will not happen in our time, but we should work towards it.
When it arrives, what is to happen? Is Pantheism to absorb Rome, and, if so, what sort of a religious formula is to be the result? or is Rome so to modify her dogmas that the Pantheist can join her without doing too much violence to his convictions? We who are outside the Church's pale are in the habit of thinking that she will make little if any advances in our direction. The dream of a Pantheistic Rome seems so wild as hardly to be entertained seriously; nevertheless I am much mistaken if I do not detect at least one sign as though more were within the bounds of possibility than even the most sanguine of us could have hoped for a few years back. We do not expect the Church to go our whole length; it is the business of some to act as pioneers, but this is the last function a Church should assume. A Church should be as the fly-wheel of a steam-engine, which conserves, regulates and distributes energy, but does not originate it. In all cases it is more moral and safer to be a little behind the age than a little in front of it; a Church, therefore, ought to cling to an old-established belief, even though her leaders know it to be unfounded, so long as any considerable number of her members would be shocked at its abandonment. The question is whether there are any signs as though the Church of Rome thought the time had come when she might properly move a step forward, and I rejoice to think, as I have said above, that at any rate one such sign—and a very important one—has come under my notice.
In his Encyclical of August 4, 1879, the Pope desires the Bishops and Clergy to restore the golden wisdom of St. Thomas Aquinas, and to spread it far and wide. "Vos omnes," he writes, "Venerabiles Fratres, quam enixe hortamur ut ad Catholicae fidei tutelam et decus, ad societatis bonum, ad scientiarum omnium incrementum auream Sancti Thomae sapientiam restituatis, et quam latissime propagetis." He proceeds then with the following remarkable passage: "We say the wisdom of St. Thomas. For whatever has been worked out with too much subtleness by the doctors of the schools, or handed down inconsiderately, whatever is not consistent with the teachings of a later age, or finally, is in any way NOT PROBABLE, We in no wise intend to propose for acceptance in these days."
It would be almost possible to suppose that these words had been written inadvertently, so the Pope practically repeats them thus: "We willingly and gratefully declare that whatsoever can be excepted with advantage, is to be excepted, no matter by whom it has been invented."
The passage just quoted is so pregnant that a few words of comment may be very well excused. In the first place, I cannot but admire the latitude which the Pope not only tolerates, but enjoins: he defines nothing, but declares point blank that if we find anything in St. Thomas Aquinas "not consistent with the assured teachings of a later age, or finally IN ANY WAY NOT PROBABLE"—(what is not involved here?)—we are "in no wise to suppose" that it is being proposed for our acceptance. But it is a small step from allowing latitude in accepting or rejecting the parts of St. Thomas Aquinas which conflict with the assured result of later discoveries to allowing a similar latitude in respect, we will say, of St. Jude; and if of St. Jude, then of St. James the Less; and if of St. James the Less, then surely ere very long of St. James the Greater and St. John and St. Paul; nor will the matter stop there. How marvellously closely are the two extremes of doctrine approaching to one another! We, on the one hand, who begin with tabulae rasae having made a clean sweep of every shred of doctrine, lay hold of the first thing we can grasp with any firmness, and work back from it. We grope our way to evolution; through this to purposive evolution; through this to the omnipresence of mind and design throughout the universe; what is this but God? So that we can say with absolute freedom from equivoque that we are what we are through the will of God. The theologian, on the other hand, starts with God, and finds himself driven through this to evolution, as surely as we found ourselves driven through evolution to the omnipresence of God.
Let us look a little more closely at the ground which the Church of Rome and the Evolutionist hold in common. St. Paul speaks of there being "one body and one spirit," and of one God as being "above all, and through all, and in you all." Again, he tells us that we are members of God's body, "of his flesh and of his bones;" in another place he writes that God has reconciled us to himself, "in the body of his flesh," and in yet another of the Spirit of God "dwelling in us." St. Paul indeed is continually using language which implies the closest physical as well as spiritual union between God and those at any rate of mankind who were Christians. Then he speaks of our "being builded together for an habitation of God through the spirit," and of our being "filled with the fulness of God." He calls Christian men's bodies "temples of the Holy Spirit," in fact it is not too much to say that he regarded Christian men's limbs as the actual living organs of God himself, for the expressions quoted above—and many others could be given—come to no less than this. It follows that since any man could unite himself to "the flesh and bones" of God by becoming a Christian, Paul had a perception of the unity at any rate of human life; and what Paul admitted I am persuaded the Church of Rome will not deny.
Granted that Paul's notion of the unity of all mankind in one spirit animating, or potentially animating the whole was mystical, I submit that the main difference between him and the Evolutionist is that the first uses certain expressions more or less prophetically, and without perhaps a full perception of their import; while the second uses the same expressions literally, and with the ordinary signification attached to the words that compose them. It is not so much that we do not hold what Paul held, but that we hold it with the greater definiteness and comprehension which modern discovery has rendered possible. We not only accept his words, but we extend them, and not only accept them as articles of faith to be taken on the word of others, but as so profoundly entering into our views of the world around us that that world loses the greater part of its significance if we may not take such sayings as that "we are God's flesh and his bones" as meaning neither more nor less than what appears upon the face of them. We believe that what we call our life is part of the universal life of the Deity—which is literally and truly made manifest to us in flesh that can be seen and handled—ever changing, but the same yesterday, and to-day, and for ever.
So much for the closeness with which we have come together on matters of fact, and now for the rapprochement between us in respect of how much conformity is required for the sake of avoiding schism. We find ourselves driven through considerations of great obviousness and simplicity to the conclusion that a man both may and should keep no small part of his opinions to himself, if they are too widely different from those of other people for the sake of union and the strength gained by concerted action; and we also find the Pope declaring of one of the brightest saints and luminaries of the Church that we need not follow him when it is plainly impossible for us to do so. Is it so very much to hope that ere many years are over the approximation will become closer still?
I have sometimes imagined that the doctrine of Papal Infallibility may be the beginning of a way out of the difficulty, and that its promoters were so eager for it, rather for the facilities it afforded for the repealing of old dogmas than for the imposition of new ones. The Pope cannot, even now, under any circumstances, declare a dogma of the Church to be obsolete or untrue, but I should imagine he can, in council, ex cathedra, modify the interpretation to be put upon any dogma, if he should find the interpretation commonly received to be prejudicial to the good of the Church: and if so, the manner in which Rome can put herself more in harmony with the spirit of recent discoveries, without putting herself in an illogical position, is not likely to escape eyes so keen as those of the Catholic hierarchy. No sensible man will hesitate to admit that many an interpretation which was natural to and suitable for one age is unnatural to and unsuitable for another; as circumstances are always changing, so men's moods and the meanings they attach to words, and the state of their knowledge changes; and hence, also, the interpretation of the dogmas in which their conclusions are summarized. There is nothing to be ashamed of or that needs explaining away in this; nothing can remain changeless under changed conditions; and that institution is most likely to be permanent which contains provision for such changes as time may prove to be expedient, with the least disturbance. I can see nothing, therefore, illogical or that needs concealment in the fact of an infallible Pope putting a widely different interpretation upon a dogma now, to what a no less infallible Pope put upon the same dogma fifteen hundred, or even fifteen years ago; it is only right, reasonable, and natural that this should be so. The Church of England may have made no provision for the virtual pruning off of dogmas that have become rudimentary, but the Encyclical from which I have just quoted leads me to think that the Church of Rome has found one, and, in her own cautious way, is proceeding to make use of it. If so, she may possibly in the end get rid of Protestantism by putting herself more in harmony with the spirit of the age than Protestantism can do. In this case, the spiritual reunion of Christendom under Rome ceases to be impossible, or even, I should think improbable. I heartily wish that my conjecture concerning future possibilities is not unfounded.
Scientists have been right in preaching evolution, but they have preached it in such a way as to make it almost as much of a stumbling-block as of an assistance. For though the fact that animals and plants are descended from a common stock is accepted by the greater and more reasonable part of mankind, these same people feel that the evidence in favour of design in the universe is no less strong than that in favour of evolution, and our scientists, for the most part, uphold a theory of evolution of which the cardinal doctrine is that design and evolution have nothing to do with one another; the jar they raise, therefore, is as bad as the jar they have allayed.
It has been the object of the foregoing work to show that those who take this line are wrong, and that evolution not only tolerates design, but cannot get on without it. The unscrupulousness with which I have been attacked, together with the support given me by the general public, are sufficient proofs that I have not written in vain.
 P. 371.
 Published as "God the Known and God the Unknown" in 1909. (Fifield.)
 "Sapientiam Sancti Thomae dicimus: si quid enim est a doctoribus scholasticis vel nimia subtilitate quaesitum, vel parum considerate traditum, si quid cum exploratis posterioris aevi doctrinis minus cohaerens, vel denique quoque modo non probabile, id nullo pacto in animo est aetate nostra ad imitandum proponi."
 "Edicimus libenti gratoque animo excipiendum esse quidquid utiliter fuerit a quopiam inventum atque excogitatum."
 Eph. iv. 3, 4, 5.
 Eph. v. 30.
 Col. i. 22.
 Rom. viii. 2.
 Eph. ii. 22.
 Eph. iii. 19.
 1 Cor. vii. 19.
ABORTION, neutralization of working bees an act of, 250
Accessory touches, varying Buffon on, 92
Accident, many of our best thoughts come thoughtlessly, 48, 384
—— profiting by, 51, 53
—— and discovery of theory connecting meteors with comets, 53
—— shaking the bag to see what will come out, 53
—— effects of, transmitted to offspring, Dr. Erasmus Darwin, 224
—— and design, the line between these hard to draw, 384
Accidental variations thrown for as with dice, 3
Accumulation of variations, C. Darwin deals with the, and not with the origin of, 340, 341
—— of small divergencies, Buffon on the, 103
Accurate, survival of fittest more accurate than Nat. Sel. and sometimes equally convenient, 9, 354, 365
Act of Parliament, Natural Selection compared to a certain kind of, 358
Age, old, the phenomena of, 67, 204, 381
Aggregation, the spirit of the age tends towards, 397, 398
Ahead, no organism sees very far, 44, 48, 54, 384
Aldrovandus, Buffon on the learned, 93
Alive, when we must not say that an animal is alive (to be retracted), 279
Allen, Grant, on 'Evolution, Old and New,' 386-388
—— on the decay of criticism, 388
—— calls Evolutionism "an almost exclusively English impulse," 393
Alternations of fat and lean years, Buffon on, 125
Amoeba, the, did not conceive the idea of an eye and work towards it, 43, 44, 384
Analogies, false, all words are apt to turn out to be, 365
Animals, contracts among, Dr. E. Darwin on, 205
Ape, the, and man, 90
Apes and monkeys, Buffon on, 153
—— and children fall on all-fours at the approach of danger, 312
Apparentibus, de non, et non existentibus, &c., 36
Appearances, rather superficial, our only guide to classification, 34, 35, 36, 198, 204
Appetency, Paley's argument against the view that structures have been developed through, 22, 45
Aristides, C. Darwin as just as, 363
Aristotle denied teleology, 4
Artificial and real foot, differences between, 25
Asceticism, virtue errs on the side of excess rather than on that of, 35
Ass, the, and horse, Buffon's pregnant passage on their relationship, 80, 90, 91, 100, 101, 142, 143, 155, 164, 311
Authority, a hard thing to weigh, 253
BACON, F., on evolution, 69
Balzac, quotation from, on memory and instinct, 67
Bark, Erasmus Darwin's theory of, 208
Beaver, trowel incorporated into the beaver's organism, 8
Bees, neutralization of working, an act of abortion, 250
Beetles, Madeira, Lamarck and C. Darwin's views of their winglessness compared, 373, 380
Begin, How could the eye begin? 46, 47
Beginnings, of complex structures, a difficulty in the way of natural selection, 21, 22
—— difficulty of accounting for, 46, 47
—— a matter of conjecture and inference, 48
Behind, more moral to be behind the age than in front of it, 401
Best, making the best of whatever power one has, 50
Bird, how birds became web-footed, 48, 49, 51
—— a, will modify its nest a little, under altered circumstances, 55
—— Buffon on, 170, &c.
—— nests, Dr. Erasmus Darwin's failure to connect the power to make them with memory, 201, 203
—— aquatic and wading, Lamarck on, 305
Bishop, and Eveque, common derivation of, 355
Blindfolded, we are so far, that we can see a few steps in front, but no more, 44
—— us, C. Darwin has almost ostentatiously, 346
Blindly, forces interacting blindly, 59
Body and mind, Lamarck on, 338, 339, 341
Brain, Lamarck had brain upon the brain, 36
—— Buffon on the, 131, 133, &c.
Brevity may be the soul of wit, but, &c., 315
Breeding, and feeding, 222
Brown-Sequard, his experiments on guinea-pigs' legs, 303
Buds, individuality of, Dr. Erasmus Darwin on the, 207, 208
Buffalo, Buffon on the, 148, &c.
Buffon, profoundly superficial, 34
—— plus il a su, plus il a pu, &c., 44
—— dans l'animal il y a moins de jugement que de sentiment, 51
—— ignorance concerning, 61
—— memoir of, 74, &c.
—— on glory, genius, and style, 76, 77
—— ironical character of his work and method (see Irony), 78, &c., 171
—— on the ass, horse, and zebra, 80, 90, 91, 100, 101, 142, 143, 155, 164, 311
—— would not play the part of Rousseau or Voltaire, 81
—— Sir W. Jardine on, and the Sorbonne, 82
—— regards all animal and vegetable life as from one common source, 90
—— if a single species has ever been found under domestication, &c., 91
—— on plaisanterie, and the learned Aldrovandus, 93, &c.
—— his compromise, 92
—— accessory touches, 92
—— "especially" the same, 96
—— fluctuation of opinion an unfounded charge, 97, &c., 164
—— on the accumulation of small divergencies, 103
—— began preaching evolution almost on his first page, 104
—— chapter on the degeneration des animaux, equivalent to "on descent with modification," 104, &c.
—— difference of opinion between him and Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck, 105
—— probably did not differ from Lamarck, 105
—— on direct action of changed conditions, 105, 145, 147
—— on man and the lower animals, 108
—— on classification, 108, 109, 141
—— on animals and plants, 109, 110
—— on reason and instinct, 110, 115
—— on final causes (the pig), 118, &c.
—— on hybridism, 117, 118
—— rudimentary organs, 120
—— on animals under domestication, 121, &c., 148
—— deals with these early, as giving him the best opportunities for illustrating the theory of evolution, 276
—— approaches natural selection in his "by some chance common enough in Nature," 122
—— preaching on the hare when he should have preached on the rabbit out of pure love of mischief, 123
—— resumption of feral characteristics, 123
—— on the geometrical ratio of increase, 123, &c.
—— alternation of fat and lean years, 125
—— equilibrium of Nature, 125
—— "au reel," 126
—— on violent death, 126
—— on sensation, 126, &c.
—— on the interaction of organ and sense, 127
—— the carnivora, 126
—— his criterion of what name a thing is to bear, 127
—— his criterion of perception and sensation, 127
—— on the unity of the individual, 127, 128
—— satirizes our habit of judging all things by our own standards, 129
—— the diaphragm, 129
—— on the stock and the diaphragm, 130
—— distinction between perception and sensation, 129, 130
—— on the meninges, 132
—— on the brain, 131, 133, &c.
—— on scientific orthodoxy and mystification, 138
—— on the relativity of science, 140
—— on nomenclature and knowledge, 141
—— on the genus felis, 143
—— on the lion and the tiger, 143, 145
—— on the animals of the old and new world, 145, &c.
—— on changed geographical distribution of land and water, 145, 164
—— on extinct species, 146
—— hates the new world, 146
—— on heredity and habit, 148, 159, 160, 161, 162
—— approaches Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck, re the Buffalo, Camel, and Llama, 148, 160, 161
—— on oneness of personality between parents and offspring, 151
—— on the organic and inorganic, 153, &c.
—— on apes and monkeys, 153, &c.
—— on the causes or means of the transformation of species, 159, &c.
—— on generic (as well as specific) differences, 164
—— on plants under domestication, 167
—— on pigeons and fowls, 169
—— on birds, 170, &c.
—— the assistance he rendered to Lamarck, 237, 258
—— Isidore Geoffroy's failure to understand, 328
—— Colonel, 75
Bulk, a sine qua non for success in literature or science, 315
Bull running, Tutbury, and Erasmus Darwin, 187
CAMEL, Buffon on the hereditary ills of the, 161
Cant, and rudimentary organs, 38
Captandum, all good things are done ad, 85
Carnivora, Buffon on the, 126
Carriage, Dr. Erasmus Darwin's, 181
Cat, family, Buffon on the, 142, &c.
—— with a mane and long tail, 143
Cataclysms, the good cells that get exterminated during the cataclysms of our own development, 75
Catastrophes, Lamarck on, 277
Causes, or "means," of modification, 301
—— C. Darwin says that Buffon has not entered on the, 104, &c.
—— C. Darwin gets us into a fog about, 345, &c.
Change, under changed circumstances, Mr. Patrick Matthew on, 318
Charity, the greatest of these is, 77
Church, a, like a second chamber, 400
—— the world better with than without, 400
—— should be like the fly-wheel of a steam engine, 104
Circonstances (see Conditions of Existence), Lamarck on, 268, 281
Circumstance, suiting power, a, Mr. Patrick Matthew on, 318-321
Classification, rather superficial appearances our best guide to, 34, 35, 36, 198, 204
—— Buffon on, 108, 109, 141
Clear, an ineradicable tendency to make things, 92
Clifford, Professor, on "Design," 6, 7
Climbing plants, the movements of, Dr. Erasmus Darwin on, 209
Coherency, the persistency of ideas the best argument in support of their legitimate connection, 23
Coleridge, on "Darwinising," 21
Common terms, our, involve the connection between memory and heredity, 201, 205
—— descent, the "hidden bond" of Lamarck, as also of C. Darwin, 271
Comparative anatomy, Lamarck on, 266, &c.
Complex structures, the incipiency of, a difficulty in the way of the natural selection view of evolution, 21, 22
Compromise, Buffon's, 92
Conditions of existence, the very essence of condition involves that there shall be penalty in case of non-fulfilment, 352, 376, 377
—— and the winglessness of Madeira beetles, 373, &c.
—— according to C. Darwin, "include" and yet "are fully embraced by" natural selection, 355
—— identical with "natural selection," 351-354
—— Etienne Geoffroy, and Lamarck on, 326, 327, 328
—— Buffon on the, 103; difference between Buffon's and Lamarck's view of their action, 105
—— direct action of changed, Buffon on the, 145, 147, 160
—— Lamarck on, 105, 268, 270, 271, 275, 277, 278, 281, 291, 292, 294, 295, 298, 299, 300, &c.
Continuity in discontinuity, and vice versa, 47
Contracts of animals, Dr. E. Darwin on the, 205
Contrivance, does organism show signs of this? 2
Convenient, not only sometimes, but always, more, 365
Corkscrew for corks, and lungs for respiration, Prof. Clifford on, 7. See also p. 58
—— we should have grown a, if drawing corks had been important to us, 7
Creator, a, who is not an organism, unintelligible, 6, 11, 24
Criticising, difficulty of, without knowing more than the mere facts which are to be criticised, 172
Criticism, Miss Seward's, on Dr. Darwin's "Elegy," 189
—— Grant Allen on the decay of, 388
Crux, the, of the early evolutionist, 35
Cuttle-fish, natural selection like the secretion of a, 332
DAMNATION, praising with faint, 111
Darwin, Charles, on the eye, denies design, 8
—— declares variation to be the cause of variation, 8, 347, 369
—— and blind chance working on whither; the accumulation of innumerable lucky accidents, 41, 42
—— our indebtedness to, 62, 66, 335
—— has adopted one half of Isidore Geoffroy's conclusion without verifying either, 83
—— on Buffon's fluctuation of opinion, 97
—— on Isidore Geoffroy, 97
—— his assertion that Buffon has not entered on the "causes or means" of transformation, 104
—— his meagre notice of his grandfather, 196
—— his treatment of the author of the "Vestiges of Creation," 65, 247, 248
—— attributes the characteristics of neuter insects to natural selection, 249
—— his treatment of Lamarck, 249, 250, 251, 298, 314, 376
—— "great is the power of steady misrepresentation," 251
—— his "happy simplicity" about animals and plants under domestication, 276
—— his notice of Mr. Patrick Matthew in the imperfect historical sketch which he has prefaced to the "Origin of Species," 315, 316
—— points of agreement between him and Lamarck, 335-337
—— sees no broad principle underlying variation, 339
—— dwells on the accumulation of variations, the origination of which he leaves unaccounted for, 340, 341
—— his variations being due to no general underlying principle, will not tend to appear in definite directions, nor to many individuals at a time, nor to be constant for long together, 342
—— speaks of natural selection as a cause of modification, while declaring it to be a means only, 345, &c.
—— his explanation of this, 384, &c.
—— his dilemma, as regards the "Origin of Species," 346
—— declares the fact of variation to be the cause of variation, 8, 347, 369
—— if he had told us more of what Buffon, &c., said, and where they were wrong, he would have taken a course, &c., 357
—— on the ease with which we can hide our ignorance under a cloud of words, 358
—— apologizes for having underrated the frequency and importance of variation due to spontaneous variability, 358
—— his "Origin of Species" like the opinion of a lawyer who wanted to leave loopholes, or an Act of Parliament full of repealed and inserted clauses, 358
—— accused of confusion and inaccuracy of thought, 359
—— as just as Aristides himself, 364
—— most candid literary opponent in the world, 364
—— declares Nature to be the most important means of modification, and variation to be the cause of variations, 369
—— like a will-o'-the-wisp, 372
—— disuse, the main agent in reducing wings of Madeira beetles, 377
—— how he and Lamarck treat the winglessness of Madeira beetles respectively, 373-380
—— an example of his "manner," 378
—— the way in which he met "Evolution, Old and New," 393
Darwin, Erasmus, never quite recognized design, 39
—— ignorance concerning, 61
—— on reason and instinct, 115, &c.
—— life of, 173, &c.
—— in Nottingham market-place, 182, 184, 197
—— and Dr. Johnson, 184, 185
—— and Tutbury bull running, 187
—— his poetry about the pump, and illustration, 84, 193
—— should have given his evolution theory a book to itself, 197
—— had no wish to see far beyond the obvious, 197
—— must be admitted to have missed detecting Buffon's humour, 83, 84, 197
—— did not attribute instincts and structures to memory pure and simple, 198
—— on the reasoning powers of animals, and on instinct, 201, 205
—— his failure to connect memory and instinct, as with birds' nests, 201-203
—— failed to see the four main propositions which I contended for in "Life and Habit," 37, 203, 204
—— on the analogies between animal and vegetable life, 206, &c.
—— on sensitive plants, 206, 210
—— on the individuality of buds, and his theory of bark, 207, 208
—— on the movements of climbing plants, 209
—— on the oneness of personality between parents and offspring, 214; the embryo not a new animal, 215
—— on animals under domestication, 223
—— on the effects of accidents transmitted to offspring, 224
—— sees struggle, and hence modification, turn mainly round three great wants, 226, 229, 257, 279
—— on desire as a means of modification, 226, 228, 259
—— by a slip approaches the error of his grandson, 227, 228
—— on embryonic metamorphoses, 230, 231
—— believed animals and plants to be descended from a common stock, 233
—— and Lamarck compared, 257
—— on the struggle of existence, and the survival of the fittest, 227, 232, 259
Darwin, Mrs. Erasmus, death-bed of, 178
Darwin, Francis, mentioned, 109
—— his interesting lecture, 206
—— does not use the expression "natural selection," 368
Darwinising, Coleridge on, 21
Darwinism, the old Darwinism involves desire, invention, and design, 58
—— modern, falling into disfavour, 60
—— and evolution not to be confounded, 360, 361
Day, the portrait of, by Wright of Derby, 180
Death, violent, Buffon on, 126
—— of Dr. Erasmus Darwin, 193, 194
Death-bed of Mrs. Erasmus Darwin, 178
Deed, illustration drawn from a very intricate, 28
Definite, with Lamarck the variations are, 341, 344
Demand and supply, like power and desire, 222, 300
Demonstrative case, "this demonstrative case of neuter insects, &c.," 249, 298, 314
Descent, with modification, spoken of as though synonymous with natural selection, 248, 356
Design, and organism, shall we or shall we not connect these ideas? 2
—— Aristotle denied, Plato upheld, Haeckel on, 4
—— Prof. Clifford's denial of, 6, 7
—— does certainly involve a designer who has an organism, who can think, and make mistakes, 6, 24
—— a belief in both design and evolution, commonly held to be incompatible, 9
—— Sir W. Thomson and Sir J. Herschel on, 11
—— Paley on, 12, &c.
—— light thrown by embryology on the method of, 25
—— G. H. Lewes opposes, 26
—— the three positions in respect to, taken by Charles Darwin, Paley, and the earlier evolutionists, 31
—— the first evolutionists did not see that their view of evolution involved design, 34
—— from within as much design as from without, 36
—— was equivalent to theological design, with the early evolutionists, 36
—— if each step is taken designedly, the whole is done designedly, 52, 384
—— and accident, the line between them hard to draw; shaking the bag, &c., 53, 384
—— instinct originated in, 54
—— as much lost sight of with old-established forms of the steam-engine as with birds' nests or the wheel, 55
—— Dr. E. Darwin's failure to see that evolution involves design, 195
—— we feel the want of, as much as we do of evolution, 407
—— evolution not only tolerates, but cannot get on without, 408
Designer, "I believe in an organic and tangible designer of every complex structure," 6
—— "where is he? show him to us," &c., 29, 30
—— the, of any organism, the organism itself, 30, 31, 40
Desire and power, interaction of, 44, 45, 47, 127, 217, 221, 300, 322
—— and power, like wealth, 222
—— as a means of modification, Dr. Erasmus Darwin on, 226, 228, 259
Development, the history of organic, the history of a moral struggle, 45
—— always due to making the best of the present, 50
Devils, 20,000, dancing a saraband on the point of a needle, 216
Dew drop, or lens, the, and Lord Rosse's telescope, 44, 47
Diaphragm, Buffon on the, 129
Dice, accidental variations thrown for as with, 3
Difference between animal and ordinary mechanism, 24
—— the main, between the manufacture of tools and that of organs, 39
Dilemma, C. Darwin's, 346
Direct action of changed conditions, Buffon on the, 105, 145, 147, 160
Discontinuity in continuity, 47
Disease, accidents followed by, 303
Disintegration, Protestantism tends towards, 397
Distribution, geographical, changed, Buffon on, 145, 164
Disuse, and the winglessness of Madeira beetles, we are almost surprised to find that they are connected at all, 375
—— the main agent in reducing the wings of Madeira beetles, 377
—— some examples of the effect of, adduced by Lamarck, 378
Dog, Buffon on the, 120
—— Lamarck on the various breeds of the, 297
Domestication, a single case of a species formed under domestication sufficient to remove the a priori difficulty from a comprehensive theory of evolution, 90, 91, 311
—— plants under, Buffon on, 167, &c.
—— Buffon on animals under, 103, 120, &c., 148, &c., 159, &c., 276
—— animals under, Dr. Erasmus Darwin on, 223
—— animals under, Buffon on, 121, &c., 148, 276
—— C. Darwin on, 276
—— animals and plants under, Lamarck on, 275, 293, 296, 297, 300
—— animals and plants under, Mr. Patrick Matthew on, 324
Door, the doing anything well will open the door for doing something else, 51
Ducks, our domesticated, why they cannot fly like wild ones, 296, 309
EARN, "you are but doing your best to earn an honest living," 29
Ears are never found in a rudimentary condition, 379
Eat, or be eaten, 177
Effort, Paley's argument that structures have not been developed through, 22, 45
—— too much, as vicious as indolence, 35
—— "neither too much nor too little," 50
—— Herculean, condemned, 197
Egyptian mummies, Lamarck on, 274, 275
Embryology, the light it throws upon the mode in which organisms have been designed, 25
Embryonic metamorphoses, Erasmus Darwin on, 230, 231
Embryonic development, Lamarck on, 289
Encyclical, the Pope's, on St. Thomas Aquinas, 402, &c.
Endeavour, Paley's argument against the view that structures have been developed through, 22, 45
Endowment, the new orthodoxy, which is clamouring for, 360
English wines, Dr. Erasmus Darwin's preference for, 175
Environment. See Conditions of Existence
Equilibrium, the, of Nature, Buffon on the, 125
Err, the power to, rated highly, 29
—— "it is on this margin that we may err or wander," 50
—— virtue ever errs on the side of excess, 35
Error, importance of, dependent on the distance, rather than the direction, 50
"Especially" the same, 92, 96
Ethiopian, the, can change his skin, if it becomes worth his while to try long enough, 40
Eveque and bishop, common derivation of, 355
Everlasting, God, how far, 32
Evolution, commonly held incompatible with design, 9
—— Paley, its first serious opponent in England, 21
—— Sir Walter Raleigh on, 21, 70
—— must stand or fall according as it rests on a purposive foundation or no, 60
—— brief summary of its six principal stages, 62, &c.
—— Bacon on, 69
—— the theory of, as apart from the evidence in support of it, 332
—— C. Darwin and Lamarck are equally intent upon establishing the same theory of evolution, 335-337
—— and Darwinism, not to be confounded, 360, 361
—— Rome and Pantheism meet in, 403
Evolutionists, the early, did not know that they accepted teleology, 34
—— the early, saw design, only as design by the God of theologians, 36
Experience and instinct, Mr. Patrick Matthew on, 322
Extinct species, Lamarck on, 277
—— Buffon on, 146, 277
Eye, no creature that had nothing like an eye ever set itself to conceive one and grow one, 44, 387
—— Paley asks "how will our philosopher get an eye?" 46
—— of flat fish, Lamarck on the, 307
—— Lamarck on the, of underground and cave-inhabiting animals, 378
—— disappear and reappear in the scale of organism according to the power of using them, 379
FAITH, forms of, or faiths of form, &c., 339
Familiarity, with a little, such superficial objections will be forgotten, 367
Far ahead, no organism ever saw an improvement a long way off and made towards it, 43, 44, 48, 49, 54, 384
Father, the man who could be father of such a son and retain his affection, &c., 76
Factors, there have been two, of modification, one producing and the other accumulating variations, 227
Fecundity, alternate years of, Buffon on, 125
Feeding and breeding, 222
Feel, if plants and animals look as if they feel, let us say they feel, 198
Feeling, there is more feeling than reason in animals, 51
Feral characteristics, resumption of, Buffon on, 123
Final causes, the doctrine of, as commonly held in the time of the early evolutionists, 34, 36
—— Buffon on, 118, &c.
Fitness, the cause of, more important than the fact that fitness is commonly fit, and therefore successful, 351
Flat fish, Lamarck on the eyes of, 307
Fluctuation of opinion, C. Darwin on Buffon's, the charge refuted, 97, &c., 164, 166
Fontenelle, on theories, 22
Foot, and model of foot, differences between, 24
Forms of faith, or faiths of form, &c., 339
Four main points which the early evolutionists failed to see in their connection and bearing on each other, 37, 203
Four main principles, the, which I contended for in "Life and Habit," 37, 203, 380, 381
Fowls and pigeons, Buffon on, 169
GARNETT, Mr. R., and "Darwinising," 21
Genius, Mr. Allen says I am a, 388
Gentleman, the Church of Rome means the same by the word as we do, 395
Geoffroy, Etienne, how small a way he goes, 196
—— and Isidore, trimmers, 328
—— on Buffon, 328
—— on conditions of existence, 326, 327
—— declares against Lamarck's hypothesis, 328
—— his position, 325-328
Geoffroy, Isidore, on evolution and final causes, 9
—— on Buffon's fluctuation of opinion, 98, &c., 164, 166
—— points out the difference between the views of Buffon and Lamarck, 105
—— statement that Buffon's opinions fluctuated again refuted, 166
—— and Lamarck's hypothesis, 244-246, 329
—— on Buffon, 328
—— his position, 329
Genealogical order, Lamarck on, 264
—— C. Darwin on, 265
Generation more remarkable than reason, Hume on, 233
Generic differences (as well as specific), Buffon on, 164
Genius, a supreme capacity for taking pains, 76
Geographical distribution, changed, Buffon on, 145, &c., 164
Geometrical ratio of increase, Buffon on, 123
—— Lamarck, on, 280
—— Patrick Matthew on, 320, 321
Germ of oak indistinguishable from that of a man, 334
Germans, Buffon on the, 93
Glory "comes after labour if she can," &c., 76
Go away, because their uncles, aunts, 376
God, embodied in living forms, and dwelling in them, 31
—— how far everlasting, invisible, imperishable, omnipotent, &c., 32
—— the unseen parts of, are as a deep-buried history, 33
Goethe, as an evolutionist, 71
Gradations infinitely subtle, 87
Grant Allen, on "Evolution, Old and New," 386-388
—— on the decay of criticism, 388
—— says that "Evolutionism is an almost exclusively English impulse," 393
Greyhound or racehorse, the well-adapted form of the, 359
Growth attended at each step by a felicitous tempering of two antagonistic principles, 35
Gueneau de Montbeillard, 172, 173
HABIT," "Life and. See "Life and Habit."
—— rudimentary organs repeated through mere force of, 38, 39
—— Buffon on, 148, 159, 160, 161, 162
—— a second Nature, Lamarck on, 300
Habits, or use, and organ, Lamarck on the interaction of, 292, 311
Haeckel, on design, 4, 5
—— on Goethe as an evolutionist, 71
—— does not appear to know of Buffon as an evolutionist, 71, 393
—— his surprising statement concerning Lamarck, 73
—— his ignorance concerning Erasmus Darwin, 73, 393
—— on Lamarck, 246, 247
—— A. R. Wallace's review of his "Evolution of Man," 382, 384
Hamlet, the "Origin of Species" like "Hamlet" without Hamlet, 363
Handiest, a man should do whatever comes handiest, 51, 52
Hare, Buffon on the, 123, &c.
Hartmann's philosophy of the unconscious, and "Life and Habit," 56, 57
Hearing, when we once reach animals so low as to have no organ of, we lose this organ for good and all, 379
Heredity and habit, Buffon on, 148, 159, 160, 161, 162
—— only another term for unknown causes, unless the "Life and Habit" theory be adopted, 384
Hering, Professor, referred to, 66, 67
—— his theory as given in "Nature" by Ray Lankester, 198-200
Herschel, Sir John, compares natural selection to the Laputan method of making books, 10
Higgling and haggling of the market, 50
History of the universe, each organism is a, from its own point of view, 31
Horse and ass, Buffon's most pregnant passage on the, 80, 90, 91, 100, 101, 142, 143, 155, 164, 311
—— and man, skeleton of the, 88, 89
—— and zebra, Buffon on the, example of irony, 80, 155, 164
Hume, his saying that generation is more remarkable than reason, 233
Huxley, Professor, referred to, 93
—— pointed out to Professor Mivart the difficulty in the way of natural selection, 344
—— his ignorance concerning the earlier history of evolution, 392, 393
Hybridism, Buffon on, 117, 118
Hybrids, sterility of, Lamarck on, and C. Darwin on, 272, 273
IDEAS, the bond or nexus of our, 23, 29, 30
Ignorance, the prevailing, concerning the earlier evolutionists, 61
—— it is easy to hide our, under such expressions as "plan of creation," or natural selection, 358
Imitation, instinct not referable to, as maintained by Erasmus Darwin, 202
Immutability of species and design commonly accepted together, 9, 10
Improvements, small successive, in man's inventions, 44, 46, 47, 54, 55, 384
Inaccuracy of thought, C. Darwin accused of, 359
Incipiency, of complex structures, a difficulty in the way of the Natural selection view of evolution, 21, 22
Incorporate, the designer is, with the organism, 30
Increase, geometrical ratio of Buffon on the, 123
—— Lamarck on, 280
—— Patrick Matthew on, 320, 321
Indefinite, with C. Darwin the variations are, 342, 344
Indifference, I say I am more indifferent than I think I am, whether mind is or is not the least misleading symbol for the cause that sustains the universe, 371
Indirect action of conditions of existence according to Lamarck, 294, 299, 306. (See "Conditions of Existence")
Individuality, Buffon on, 128
—— of buds, Erasmus Darwin on the, 207, 208
—— our, a consensus, or full-flowing river, 318
Infallibility, possible results of the doctrine of Papal, 406
Insectivorous plants, Erasmus Darwin on, 206
Instep, ligament that binds the tendons of the, Paley on the, 22
Instinct, present, does not bar its having arisen in reason and reflection, 53, 54
—— returns to its earlier phase, i. e. to reason on the presence of the unfamiliar, 54, 55, 56
—— and reason, Buffon on, 110-116
—— Darwin, Erasmus, on, 115, 116, 204
—— not referable to imitation, as maintained by Erasmus Darwin, 202
—— is reason become habitual, 203
—— reason perfected and got by rote, 256
—— and reason, Lamarck on, 256, 257, 274
—— referred to experience and memory, by Patrick Matthew, 322
Insult, "Evolution, Old and New," not intended as an insult to men of science, 392
Interaction of want and power, 44, 45, 47, 217, 218, 221, 300, 323
—— of body and mind, Lamarck on the, 338, 339, 341
Interesting, the more interesting the animal the more evolution Buffon puts into his account of it, 84
Intermediate forms, Lamarck on, 283, 286
—— C. Darwin, 284, 285
Inventions, small successive improvements in man's, and development of, analogous to that of organism, 44, 46, 47, 54, 55, 384
Irony, good-natured and the reverse, 91
—— an apology for, and explanation how far it is legitimate, 111, 112
—— Buffon's, 78, &c., 91, 92, 93, 155, 157, 163, 164
JARDINE, Sir W., on Buffon's character, 82
Johnson, Dr., and Erasmus Darwin, 184, 185
Joints, Paley on the human, 19, 20
Juggle, Paley's argument a juggle, unless man has had a bona fide personal, and therefore organic designer, 14, 16