Dio's Rome
by Cassius Dio
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[-50-] As a consequence of this, conflicts and killings in plenty began again, so that the senate ratified the aforementioned measures, summoned Pompey, allowed him to make fresh levies, and changed their garments. Not long after his arrival they assembled under guard near his theatre outside the pomerium and resolved that the bones of Clodius should be taken up, and assigned the rebuilding of the senate-house to Faustus, son of Sulla. It was the Curia Hostilia which had been remodeled by Sulla. Wherefore they came to this decision about it and ordered that when repaired it should receive again the former's name. The city was in a fever of excitement about the magistrates who should rule it, some talking to the effect that Pompey ought to be chosen dictator and others that Caesar should be elected consul. They were so determined to honor the latter for his achievements that they voted to offer sacrifices over them sixty[66] days. Fearing both of the men the rest of the senate and Bibulus, who was first to be asked and to declare his opinion, anticipated the onset of the masses by giving the consulship to Pompey to prevent his being named dictator, and to him alone in order that he might not have Caesar as his colleague. This action of theirs was strange; it had been taken in no other case, and yet they seemed to have done well. For since he favored the masses less than Caesar, they hoped to detach him from them altogether and to make him their own. This expectation was fulfilled. Elated by the novelty and unexpectedness of the honor, he no longer formed any plan to gratify the populace but was careful to do everything that pleased the senate.

[-51-] He did not, however, wish to hold office alone. Possessing the glory that lay in such a vote having been passed he was anxious to divert the envy that arose from it. Also he felt afraid that, as the field was vacant, Caesar might be given him as colleague through the enthusiasm of the powerful classes and the populace alike. First of all, therefore, in order that his rival might not think he had been entirely neglected and therefore show some just displeasure, he arranged through the tribunes that he should be permitted even in absence to be a candidate for the office, when the proper time came according to law. Pompey himself then chose as assistant Quintus Scipio, who was his father-in-law and had incurred a charge of bribery. This man, by birth son of Nasica, had been transferred by the lot of succession to the family of Metellus Pius, and for that reason bore the latter's name. He had given his daughter in marriage to Pompey, and now received in turn from him the consulship and immunity from accusation.[-52-] Very many had been examined in the complaint above mentioned, especially because the courts, by Pompey's laws, were more carefully constituted. He himself selected the entire list of names from which drawings for jurors had to be made, and he limited the number of advocates on each side, in order that the jurymen might not be confused and disturbed by the numbers of them. He ordered that the time allotted to the plaintiff be two hours, and to the defendant three. And what grieved many most of all, he revised the custom of eulogizers being presented by those on trial (for great numbers kept escaping the clutches of the law because commended by persons worthy of confidence); and he had a measure passed that such prisoners should in future be allowed no one whomsoever to eulogize them. These and other reforms he instituted in all the courts alike; and against those who practiced bribery for office he raised up as accusers those who had formerly been convicted of some such offence, thus offering the latter no small prize. For if any one secured the conviction of two men on charges equal to that against himself, or even on smaller charges, or if one man on a greater charge, he went scot free.

[-53-] Among many others who were thus convicted was Plautius Hypsaeus, who had been a rival of Milo and of Scipio for the consulship. Though all three had been guilty of bribery he alone was condemned. Scipio was indicted, and by two persons at that, but was not tried, on account of Pompey: and Milo was not charged with this crime (for the murder formed a greater complaint against him), but being brought to trial on the latter charge he was convicted, as he was not able to use any violence. Pompey kept the city in general well under guard and himself with armed soldiers entered the court. When some raised an outcry at this, he ordered the soldiers to drive them out of the Forum by striking them with the side, or the flat, of their swords. When they would not yield, but showed defiance as if the broadsides were being used for mere sport, some of them were wounded and killed.

[-54-] After this, the courts being convened in quiet, many were condemned on various charges, and, for the murder of Clodius, Milo among others though he had Cicero as a defender. That orator, seeing Pompey and the soldiers contrary to custom in the court, was alarmed and overwhelmed with dread, so that he did not deliver any of the speech he had prepared, but after saying a few words with effort in a half-dead voice, was glad to retire. This speech which is now supposed to have been delivered at that time in behalf of Milo he wrote some time later and at leisure, when he had recovered his courage. There is also the following story about it. When Milo, in banishment, made the acquaintance of the speech sent to him by Cicero, he wrote back saying that it was lucky for him those words had not been spoken in that form in the court; for he would not be eating such fine mullets in Massilia (where he was passing his exile), if any such defence had been made. This he wrote, not because he was pleased with his circumstances,—he made many ventures to secure his return,—but as a joke on Cicero, because after saying nothing important at the time of the defence he later both practiced and sent to him these fruitless words, as if they could now be of any service to him.

[-55-] In this way Milo was convicted; and so were Rufus and Plancus, as soon as they had finished their term of office, together with numerous others on account of the burning of the senate-house. Plancus was not even benefited by Pompey, who was so earnest in his behalf that he sent to the court a volume containing both a eulogy of the prisoner and a supplication for him. Marcus Cato, who was eligible to sit as a juryman, said he would not allow the eulogizer to destroy his own laws. But he got no opportunity to cast his vote; for Plancus rejected him, feeling sure that he would give his voice for condemnation: (by the laws of Pompey each of the parties to a suit was allowed to set aside five out of the number that were to judge him;) the other jurors, however, voted against him, especially as it did not seem right to them after they had condemned Rufus to acquit Plancus, who was on trial on the same charge. And when they saw Pompey cooeperating with him, they showed the more zeal against him, for fear they might be thought to be absolute slaves of his rather than jurymen. It should be said that on this occasion, too, Cicero accused Plancus no better than he had defended Milo: for the appearance of the courtroom was the same, and Pompey in each case was planning and acting against him,—a circumstance that naturally led to a second collision between them.

[-56-] After attending to these matters Pompey revived the law about elections (which had fallen somewhat into disuse) commanding those who seek an office to present themselves without fail before the assembly, so that no one who is absent may be chosen. He also confirmed the ordinance, passed a short time previously, that those who had held office in the city should not be allotted to foreign governorships before five years had passed. He was not ashamed at this time to record such measures, although a little later he himself took Spain for five years more and granted Caesar, whose friends were in a terrible state of irritation, the right to canvass for the consulship (as had been decreed), even in his absence. He amended the law to read that only those should be permitted to do it who were granted the privilege by name and without disguise; but of course this was no different from its not being prohibited at all, for men who had any influence were certainly going to manage to get the right voted to them.

[-57-] Such were the political acts of Pompey. Scipio without enacting any new laws abolished the measures emanating from Clodius, with regard to the censors. It looked as though he had done this out of favor to them since he restored to them the authority which they formerly had: but it turned out to be the opposite. For in view of the fact that there were many worthless men both in the equestrian and in the senatorial orders, so long as it had not been permitted them to expel any one, either accused or convicted, no fault was found with them on account of those whose names were not expunged. But when they got back their old power and were allowed to do this and to examine the life of each man separately, they had not the hardihood to come to an open break with many and did not wish to incur any censure for not expelling those guilty of improper conduct, and for this reason no sensible person had any desire for the office any longer.

[-58-] This was the vote passed with regard to the censors. Cato on the whole did not wish any office, but seeing Caesar and Pompey outgrowing the system of government, and surmising that they would either get control of affairs between themselves or would quarrel with each other and create a mighty strife, the victor in which would be sole ruler, he wished to overthrow them before they became antagonists, and hence sought the consulship to use it against them, because as a private citizen he was likely to wield no influence.

[B.C. 51 (a.u. 703)]

His designs were guessed, however, by the adherents of the two men and he was not appointed, but instead Marcus Marcellus and Sulpicius Rufus were chosen, the one on account of his acquaintance with the law and the other for his ability in speaking. One special reason was that they, even if they did not employ bribes or violence, yet showed deference to all and were wont to exhort people frequently, whereas Cato was deferential to no one. He never again became a candidate for the office, saying that it was the duty of an upright man not to avoid the leadership of the commonwealth if any person wished him to enjoy it, nor yet to pursue it beyond the limits of propriety. [-59-] Marcellus at once directed all his efforts to compass the downfall of Caesar,—for he was of Pompey's party,—and among the many measures against him that he proposed was one to the effect that a successor to him should be sent before the appointed time. He was resisted by Sulpicius and some of the tribunes,—by the latter out of good will toward Caesar. Sulpicius made common cause with them and with the multitude, because he did not like the idea of a magistrate who had done no wrong being stopped in the middle of his term. Pompey was starting from the city with the avowed intention of leading an expedition into Spain, but he did not at this time even leave the bounds of Italy, and after assigning to his lieutenants the entire business abroad he himself kept close watch on the city. Now when he heard how things were going, he pretended that the plan of having Caesar detached from his command did not please him either, but he arranged matters so that when Caesar should have served out the time allowed him, an event not of the distant future, but due to occur the following year,—he should lay down his arms and return home to be a private citizen. In pursuance of this object he made Gaius Marcellus, a cousin of Marcus,[67] or a brother (both traditions are current), obtain the consulship, because although allied to Caesar by marriage he was hostile to him; and he made Gaius Curio, who was also an oldtime foe of his rival, receive the tribuneship.

[B.C. 50 (a.u. 704)]

[-60-] Caesar was on no account inclined to become a private citizen after so great a command and one of such long standing, and was afraid that he might fall into the power of his enemies. Therefore he made preparations to stay in office in spite of them, collected additional soldiers, gathered money, manufactured arms, and conducted himself to please all. Meanwhile, desiring to settle matters at home somewhat beforehand, so as not to seem to be gaining all his ends by violence, but some by persuasion, he decided to effect a reconciliation with Curio. For the latter belonged to the family of the Curiones, had a keen intelligence, was eloquent, was greatly trusted by the populace and absolutely unsparing of money for all purposes by which he could either benefit himself or hoped to gain benefit for others. So, by buoying him up with many hopes and releasing him from all his debts which on account of his great expenditures were numerous, Caesar attached him to himself. In view of the present importance of the objects for which he was working he did not spare money, since he could collect it from the people themselves, and he also promised various persons large sums, of which he was destined to give them not the smallest particle. He courted not only the free but the slaves who had any influence whatever with their masters, and as a result a number of the knights and the senators, too, joined his party.

[-61-]Thus Curio began to espouse Caesar's cause; not immediately, however, did he begin to show open activity, because he was seeking an excuse of fair semblance and was trying to appear to have transferred his allegiance not willingly, but under compulsion. He also took into consideration that the more he should associate with his patron's enemies in the guise of their friend the more and the greater secrets of theirs he would learn. For these reasons he dissimulated for a very long time, and to prevent any suspicion of his having changed sides and not maintaining and representing still at this time an attitude of unqualified opposition to Caesar as one of the leading spirits in the movement, he even made a public harangue against him, as a result of which he gained the tribuneship and prepared many unusual measures. Some bills he offered against the senate and its most powerful members, who were especially active in Pompey's behalf, not because he either wished or expected that any one of them would be passed, but in order that, as they did not accept them, so no measure might be passed against Caesar (for many motions to his detriment were being offered by many persons), and that he himself might transfer his support on this excuse.

[-62-]After this, having used up considerable time at various occasions on various pretexts, not a single one of which met with favor, he pretended to be vexed and asked that another month be inserted for the legislation that resulted from his measures. This practice was followed at regular periods, established by custom, but not for any such reason as his, and he himself, being pontifex, understood that fact. Nevertheless he said that it ought to be done and made a fine show of forcing his fellow-priests. At last not being able to persuade them to assent to his proposal (of which he was very glad), he would not permit any other matter for this reason to voted upon. On the contrary he already began openly to justify Caesar's actions, since, as he said, he was unable to accomplish anything against him, and brought forward every possible proposition which was sure of not being accepted. The chief of these was that all persons in arms must lay these down and disband their legions, or else they should not strip Caesar of his weapons and expose him to the forces of his rivals. This he said, not because he wished Caesar to do it, but because he well understood that Pompey would not yield obedience to it, and thus a plausible excuse was offered the former for not dismissing his soldiers.

[-63-] Pompey, accordingly, as he could effect nothing in any other way, proceeded without any further disguise to harsh measures and openly said and did everything against Caesar. He failed, however, to accomplish aught. Caesar had many followers, among them Lucius Paulus, colleague of Marcellus, and Lucius Piso, his father-in-law, who was censor. For at this time Appius Claudius and Piso (though the latter did not desire it), were made censors. So Piso on account of his relationship belonged to Caesar, while Claudius opposed him, espousing Pompey's cause, yet quite involuntarily he rendered Caesar very efficient aid. He expelled very many both of the knights and the senators, overpowering his colleague, and in this made them all favor Caesar's aspirations. Piso on every account wished to avoid trouble and to maintain friendship with his son-in-law paid court to many people, being himself responsible for none of the above acts, but he did not resist Claudius when he drove from senate all the freedmen and numbers of the real nobility, among them Sallustius Crispus who wrote the History. When Curio, however, was about to have his name expunged, Piso, with the help of Paulus (whose kinsman he was), did beg him off. [-64-] Consequently Claudius did not expel him but made public in the senate the opinion that he had of him, so that he, indignant, rent his clothes. Marcellus followed him, and thinking that the senate would pass some severe vote against Curio and, because of him, against Caesar, brought forward propositions about him. Curio at first opposed any decision being rendered regarding him; but on coming to realize that of the majority of the senators then present some really were attached to Caesar's cause and others thoroughly feared him, he allowed them to decide, saying incidentally only this: "I am conscious of doing what is best and most advantageous for my country: to you, however, I surrender both my body and soul to treat as you please." Marcellus accordingly accused him, thinking that he would certainly be convicted, and then when he was acquitted by the majority the accuser took it greatly to heart: rushing out of the assembly he came to Pompey, who was in the suburbs, and on his own responsibility, without the formality of a vote, gave him charge to keep guard over the city along with two legions of civilians. These soldiers were then present, having been collected in the following way and for the following purpose. [-65-] Pompey before this, while he was still on friendly terms with Caesar, had given him one legion composed of those troops which according to the register belonged to him, inasmuch as he was not conducting any war and Caesar had need of soldiers. When they fell out with each other, in his desire to get this back from him and to deprive him of yet another he delivered a speech, stating that Bibulus required soldiers against the Parthians; and in order that no new levies should be raised,—for the matter was urgent, he said, and they had an abundance of legions,—he got it voted that each of them, himself and Caesar, must send one to him. Thereupon he failed to despatch any of those engaged in warfare under his own command, but ordered those whose business it was to demand that legion which he had given to Caesar. So nominally both of them contributed, but in reality Caesar alone sent the two. He knew what was being done, but complied with the demand, not wishing to incur the charge of disobedience, particularly because on this excuse he intended to raise in turn many more soldiers.

[-66-] These legions, therefore, were apparently made ready to be sent against the Parthians, but when there proved to be no need of them, (there was really no use to which they could be put,) Marcellus, fearing that they might be restored to Caesar, at first declared that they must remain in Italy, and then, as I have said, gave them into Pompey's charge. These proceedings took place near the close of the year and were destined not to be in force for long, since they had been approved neither by the senate nor by the populace: accordingly, he brought over to Pompey's side Cornelius Lentulus and Gaius Claudius, who were to hold the consulship the next year, and caused them to issue the same commands. Since they were allowed to give out letters to men appointed to office and to perform even so early some other functions belonging to the highest post in the state before they assumed it, they believed that they had authority also in this matter. And Pompey, although he was very exact in all other details, nevertheless on account of his need of soldiers did not investigate this action at all, nor the sources from which he was getting them, nor in what way, but accepted them very gratefully. Yet no such result was accomplished as one would have expected to come from so great a piece of audacity: they merely displayed their enmity toward Caesar, as a consequence of which they could not gather any further formidable equipment, and furnished to him a plausible excuse for retaining the troops that were with him. For Curio using the acts mentioned as his text delivered before the populace a violent arraignment both of the consuls and of Pompey, and when he had finished his term he at once set out to join Caesar.



The following is contained in the Forty-first of Dio's Rome.

How Caesar came into Italy, and how Pompey, leaving it, sailed across to Macedonia (chapters 1-17).

How Caesar subjugated Spain (chapters 18-37).

How Caesar sailed across to Macedonia to encounter Pompey (chapters 38-46).

How Caesar and Pompey fought at Dyrrachium (chapters 47-51).

How Caesar conquered Pompey at Pharsalus (chapters 52-63).

Duration of time, two years, in which there were the following magistrates, here enumerated.

L. Cornelius P.F. Lentulus, C. Claudius M.F. Marcellus. (B.C. 49 = a.u. 705.)

C. Iulius C.F. Caesar (II), P. Servilius P.F. Isauricus. (B.C. 48 = a.u. 706.)


[B.C. 49 (a.u. 705)]

[-1-] This is what he (sc. Curio) did then: later he came to Rome with a letter to the senate from Caesar on the very first day of the month on which Cornelius Lentulus and Gains Claudius entered upon office; and he would not give it to the consuls until they reached the senate-house, for fear that if they received it outside they might conceal it. Even as it was they waited a long time, not wishing to read it, but at last they were compelled by Quintus Cassius Longinus and Mark Antony, the tribunes, to make it public. Now Antony for the favor he did Caesar at the time in this matter was destined to receive a great return and to be raised himself to heights of power. In the letter was contained a list of the benefits which Caesar had conferred upon the commonwealth and a defence of the charges which were brought against him. He promised that he would disband his legions and give up his office if Pompey would also do the same: for while the latter bore arms, he said, it was not just for him to be compelled to part with his and so be exposed to his enemies.

[-2-] The vote on this proposition was taken not individually for fear that through having respect to others or some element of fear the senators might express the opposite of their true opinion; but it was done by their taking their stand on this side or on that of the senate-chamber. No one voted that Pompey should cease to bear arms (for he had his troops in the suburbs), but all, except one Marcus Caelius and Curio, who had carried his letter, decided that Caesar must. About the tribunes I say nothing because no necessity was laid upon them to separate into two different groups; for they had authority to contribute their vote if they wished, or otherwise not. This, then, was the decision made, but Antony and Longinus did not allow any point in it to be ratified either on that day or the next. [-3-] The rest, indignant at this, voted to change their garb, but through the intervention of the same men did not obtain ratification of this measure either. Their opinion, however, was recorded and the appropriate action followed: namely, all straightway left the senate-house, and after changing their clothes came in again and proceeded to deliberate about vengeance to be taken on the obstructionists. They, seeing this, at first resisted but later became afraid, especially when Lentulus advised them to get out of the way before the votes should be cast: hence after many remarks and protestations they set out with Curio and with Caelius to Caesar, little heeding that they had been expelled from the senate. This was the determination reached at that time, and the care of the city was committed to the consuls and to the other magistrates, as had been the custom. Afterward the senators went outside the pomerium to Pompey himself, declared that there was a state of disorder, and gave to him both the money and soldiers. They voted that Caesar should surrender his office to his successors and send away his legions by a given day, or else be considered an enemy, because acting contrary to the interests of the country.

[-4-] When he was informed of this he came to Ariminum, then for the first time overstepping the confines of his own province, and after collecting his soldiers he bade Curio and the others who had come with him relate what had been done by them. After this was finished he inspirited them by adding such words as the occasion demanded. Next he set out and marched straight upon Rome itself, taking possession of all the intervening cities without a conflict, since the garrisons of some abandoned them by reason of weakness and others espoused his cause. Pompey, perceiving this, was frightened, especially when he learned all his intentions from Labienus. The latter had abandoned Caesar and come as a deserter, and he announced all the latter's secrets to Pompey. One might feel surprise that after having always been honored by Caesar in the highest degree, to the extent of governing all the legions beyond the Alps whenever their head was in Italy, he should have done this. The reason was that when he had clothed himself with wealth and fame he began to conduct himself more haughtily than his position warranted, and Caesar, seeing that he put himself on the same level with his master, ceased to be so fond of him. As he could not endure this changed attitude and was at the same time afraid of suffering some harm, he transferred his allegiance.

[-5-]Pompey as a result of what was told him about Caesar and because he had not yet prepared a force to cope with him changed his plans: for he saw that the dwellers in the city, yes, the members of the sedition themselves, even more than the others, shrank from the war through remembrance of the deeds of Marius and Sulla and wished to escape it in safety. Therefore he sent as envoys to Caesar, Lucius Caesar, a relative of his, and Lucius Roscius, a praetor,—both of them volunteering for the service,—to see if he could avoid his open attack and then make an agreement with him on some fair terms. The other replied to the same effect as in his letter, previously forwarded, and said also that he wished to converse with Pompey: but the people were displeased to hear this, fearing that some measures might be concerted against them. When, however, the envoys uttered many words in praise of Caesar, and finally promised besides that no one should suffer any harm at his hands and that the legions should immediately be disbanded, they were pleased and sent the same envoys to him again, and besought both of the opposing leaders with shouts, calling upon them everywhere and always to lay down their arms at the same time. [-6-] Pompey was frightened at this, knowing well that he would be far inferior to Caesar if they should both have to depend on the clemency of the populace, and betook himself to Campania before the envoys returned, with the idea that there he could more easily make war. He also commanded the whole senate together with those who held the offices to accompany him, granting them permission by a decree of absence, and telling them in advance that whoever remained behind he should regard as equal and alike to those were working against him. Furthermore he enjoined them to vote that all the public moneys and the votive offerings in the city be removed, hoping that from this source he could gather a vast number of soldiers. For practically all the cities of Italy felt such friendliness for him that when a short time before they had heard he was dangerously ill, they vowed they would offer public sacrifices for his preservation. That this was a great and brilliant honor which they bestowed upon him no one could gainsay; there is no one in whose behalf such a vote has been passed, except those who later assumed absolute sovereignty: nevertheless he had not a sure ground of confidence that they would not abandon him under the influence of fear of a stronger power. The recommendation about the moneys and the votive offerings was allowed, but neither of them was touched; for having ascertained meanwhile that Caesar's answer to the envoys had been anything but peaceful and that he also reproached them with having made some false statements about him, that his soldiers were many and bold and liable to do any kind of mischief (such reports, tending to greater terror, as are usually made about such matters), the senators became frightened and hastily took their departure before they could lay a finger on any of the objects.

[-7-] For reason their removal was equally in all other respects of a tumultuous and confused appearance. The departing citizens, practically all of whom were the foremost men of the senate and of the knights and of the populace, nominally were setting out for war, but really were undergoing the experiences of captives. They were terribly distressed at being compelled to abandon their country and their pursuits there, and to consider foreign walls more native than their own. Such as removed with their entire household said farewell to the temples and their houses and their paternal threshold with the feeling that these would straightway become the property of their opponents: they themselves, not being ignorant of Pompey's intention, had the purpose, in case they should survive, of establishing themselves in Macedonia or Thrace. And those who left behind on the spot their children and wives and their other most valued possessions appeared to have some little hope of their country but really fared much worse than the others, since being sundered from their dearest treasures they exposed themselves to a double and most hostile fortune. For in delivering their closest interests to the power of their bitterest foes they were destined to play the coward and yet themselves encounter danger, to show zeal and yet to be deprived of what they prized: moreover they would find a friend in neither rival, but an enemy in both,—in Caesar because they themselves did not remain behind, and in Pompey because they did not take the others with them. Hence they assumed a twofold attitude in their decisions, in their prayers, and in their hopes: with their bodies they were being drawn away from those nearest to them, and their souls they found cleft in twain.

[-8-] These were the feelings of the departing throng: and those left behind had to face a different, but equally unpleasant situation. Bereft of the association of their nearest relatives, deprived, as it were, of their guardians and far from able to defend themselves, exposed to the enemy and about to be subject to the authority of him who should make himself master of the city, they were themselves distressed by fear both of outrages and of murders as if they were already taking place. In view of these same possibilities such as were angry at the fugitives, because they themselves had been left in the lurch, cursed them for it, and those who condoned their action because of the necessity still felt consequent fears. The rest of the populace entire, even if they possessed not the least kinship with those departing, were nevertheless grieved at their fate, some expecting that their neighbors, and others that their comrades would go far away from them and do and suffer many unusual things. Most of all they bewailed their own lot, seeing the magistrates and the senate and all the rest who had any power,—they were not sure whether a single one of them would be left behind,—cast out of their country and away from them. They reflected how those men, had not many altogether dreadful calamities fastened themselves upon the State, would never have wished to flee, and they likened themselves, made destitute of allies, in every conceivable respect to orphaned children and widow women. Being the first to await the wrath and the lust of the oncoming foe, they remembered their former sufferings, some by experience and others by hearing it from the victims, all the outrages that Marius and Sulla had committed, and they therefore did not look to Caesar for moderate treatment.[68] On the contrary, because his army was constituted very largely of barbarians, they expected that their misfortunes would be far more in number and more terrible than those of yore.

[-9-] Since, then, all of them were in this condition, and no one except those who appeared to be good friends of Caesar made light of the situation, and even they, in consideration of the change of character to which most men are subject according to their circumstances, were not courageous enough to think that the source of their confidence was reliable, it is not easy to conceive how great confusion and how great grief prevailed at the departure of the consuls and those who set out with them. All night they made an uproar in packing up and going about, and toward dawn great sorrow fell upon them, induced by the action of the priests, who went about offering prayers on every side. They invoked the gods, showered kisses on the floors, enumerated how many times and from what perils they had survived, and lamented that they were leaving their country,—a venture they had never made before. Near the gates, too, there was much wailing. Some took fond leave at once of each other and of the city as if they were beholding them for the last time: others bewailed their own lot and joined their prayers to those of the departing: the larger number, on the ground that they were being betrayed, uttered maledictions. The whole population, even those that stayed behind, were there with all the women and all the children. Then the one group set out on their way and the other group escorted them. Some interposed delays and were detained by their acquaintances: others embraced and clung to each other for a long time. Those that remained accompanied those setting out, calling after them and expressing their sympathy, while with invocations of Heaven they besought them to take them, too or to remain at home themselves. Meanwhile there were shrill sounds of wailing over each one of the exiles even from outsiders, and insatiate floods of tears. Hope for the best they were scarcely at all inclined to entertain in their condition; it was rather suffering which was expected, first by those who were left and subsequently by those who were departing. Any one that saw them would have guessed that two peoples and two cities were being made from one and that one was being driven out and was fleeing, whereas the other was being left to its fate and was being captured.

[-10-] Pompey thus left the city drawing many of the senators after him; some remained behind, either attached to Caesar's cause or maintaining a neutral attitude toward both. He hastily raised levies from the cities, collected money, and sent garrisons to almost every point. Caesar, when he learned this, did not hurry to Rome: it, he knew, was offered as a prize to the victors, and he said that he was not marching against that place as hostile to him but against his political opponents in its behalf. And he sent a letter throughout all Italy in which he summoned Pompey to a kind of trial, encouraged all to be of good cheer, bade them remain in their places, and made them many promises. He set out next against Corfinium, which, being occupied by Lucius Domitius, had not joined his adherents, and after conquering in battle a few who met him he shut up the rest in a state of siege. Pompey, inasmuch as these citizens were being besieged and many of the others were falling off to Caesar, had no further hope of Italy but resolved to cross over into Macedonia, Greece, and Asia. He derived much encouragement from the remembrance of what he had achieved there and from the friendship of the people and the princes. (Spain was likewise devoted to him, but he could not reach it safely because Caesar had possession of both the Gauls.) Moreover he calculated that if he should sail away, no one would pursue him on account of the lack of boats and on account of the winter,—the late autumn being far advanced,—and meanwhile he would at leisure amass both money and troops, much of them from subject and much from allied territory. [-11-] With this design, therefore, he himself set out for Brundusium and bade Domitius abandon Corfinium and accompany him. In spite of the large force that Domitius had and the hopes he reposed in it—for he had courted the favor of the soldiers in every way and had won some of them by promises of land (having belonged to Sulla's veterans he had acquired a large amount in that reign)—he nevertheless obeyed orders. Meanwhile Pompey proceeded with his preparations to evacuate the country in safety: his associates learning this shrank from the journey abroad, because it seemed to them a flight, and attached themselves to Caesar. So these joined the invader's army: but Domitius and the other senators after being censured by Caesar for arraying themselves in opposition, were released and came to Pompey.

[-12-]Caesar now was anxious to join issue with him before he sailed away, to fight it out with him in Italy, and to overtake him while he was still at Brundusium; for since there were not sufficient boats for them, Pompey had sent forward the consuls and others, fearing that they might begin some rebellion if they stayed on the spot. Caesar, seeing the difficulty of capturing the place, urged his opponent to accede to some agreement, assuring him that he should obtain both peace and friendship again. When Pompey made no further response than that he would communicate to the consuls what Caesar said, the latter, inasmuch as they had decided to receive no citizen in arms for a conference, assaulted the city. Pompey repelled him for some days until the boats came back. Having meanwhile barricaded and obstructed with fortifications the roads leading to the harbor so that no one should attack him while sailing off, he then set sail by night. Thus he crossed over to Macedonia in safety and Brundusium was captured as well as two boats full of men.

[-13-] Pompey accordingly deserted in this way his country and the rest of Italy, choosing and carrying out quite the opposite of his former course, when he sailed back to it from Asia; wherefore he obtained the reverse fortune and the reverse reputation. Formerly he broke up his legions at Brundusium, in order not to cause the citizens any solicitude, but now he was leading away through the town to fight against them other forces gathered from Italy. Whereas he had brought the wealth of the barbarians to Rome, he had now conveyed away from it all that he possibly could to other places. And of all those at home he was in despair, but purposed to use against his country foreigners and the allies once enslaved by him, and he put far more hope in them both of safety and of power than in those who had been benefited. Instead of the brilliance, therefore, which, acquired in those wars, had marked his arrival, he set out with humiliation as his portion in return for his fear of Caesar: and instead of fame which he had had for exalting his country, he became most infamous for his desertion of her.

[-14-] At the very moment of coming to land at Dyrrachium he learned that he should not obtain a prosperous outcome. Thunderbolts destroyed soldiers even as the ships were approaching; spiders occupied the army standards; and after he had left the vessel serpents followed and obliterated his footprints. These were the portents which he encountered in person, but before the whole capital others had occurred both that year and a short time previously. For there is no doubt about the fact that in seditions the state is injured by both parties. Hence many wolves and owls were seen in the City itself and continual earthquakes with bellowings took place, fire shot down from the west to the east, and other fires burned both the temple of Quirinus and a second. The sun, too, suffered a total eclipse, and thunderbolts damaged a sceptre of Jupiter, a shield and a helmet of Mars that were votive offerings on the Capitol, and furthermore the tablets which contained the laws. Many animals brought forth creatures outside of their own species, certain oracles purporting to be those of the Sibyl were made known, and some men becoming inspired practiced numerous divinations. No praefectus urbi was chosen for the Feriae, as had been the custom, but the praetors, at least according to some accounts, performed all his duties; others say they did this only in the next year. If the former are right it happened twice; and the first season Perperna who had once been censor with Philippus died, being the last, as I stated, of all the senators who had been alive in his censorship. This event, too, seemed likely to cause political confusion. The people were, then, naturally disturbed at the portents, but as both sides thought and hoped that they could lay them all on their opponents, they offered no expiatory sacrifices.

[-15-] Caesar at this time did not even attempt to sail to Macedonia, because he was short of boats and had fears for Italy, dreading that the lieutenants of Pompey from Spain might assail and occupy it. He put Brundusium under guard for the purpose that no one of those departed should sail back again, and went to Rome. There the senate had been assembled for him outside the pomerium by Antony and Longinus: they, who had been expelled from it, now convened that body. He accordingly made a speech of some length and of a temperate character, so that they might experience good-will toward him at the present and feel an excellent hope for the future. And since he saw them displeased at what was going on and suspicious of the multitude of soldiers, he wished to encourage and to conciliate them somewhat, to the end that quiet might prevail in their quarter while he was conducting the war. Therefore he censured no one and delivered no threat against any person, but made an attack not without imprecations upon those who wished to war against citizens, and at last moved that ambassadors be sent immediately in behalf of peace and harmony to the consuls and to Pompey. [-16-] He made these same statements also to the populace, when that body had likewise assembled outside the pomerium, and he sent for corn from the islands and promised each one of them seventy-five denarii. He hoped to tempt them with this bait. The men, however, reflected that those who are pursuing certain ends and those who have attained them do not think or act alike: at the start of their operations they make all the most delightful offers to such as can work against them in any way, but when they succeed in what they wish, they remember nothing at all about it and use against those very persons the power which they have received from them. They remembered also the behavior of Marius and Sulla,—how many kind things they had often told them, and then what treatment they had given them in return for their confidence,—and furthermore perceiving Caesar's necessity and seeing that his armed followers were many and were everywhere in the city, they were unable either to trust or to be cheered by his words. On the contrary, as they had fresh in their memory the fear caused by former events, they suspected him also, particularly because the ambassadors apparently intended to initiate a reconciliation were chosen, to be sure, but did not go out. Indeed, for even making mention of them once Piso, his father-in-law, was severely rebuked. [-17-] The people, far from getting at that time the money which he had promised them, had to give him all the rest that remained in the public coffers for the support of his soldiers, whom they feared. Amid all these happenings, as being favorable, they wore the garb of peace, which they had not as yet put off. Lucius Metellus, a tribune, opposed the proposition about the money, and when his efforts proved ineffectual went to the treasury and kept watch of its doors. The soldiers, paying little heed to either his guarding or his outspokenness, cut through the bar,—for the consuls had the key, as if it were not possible for persons to use axes in place of it,—and carried out all the money. In fact, Caesar's other projects also, as I have often stated, he both brought to vote and carried out in the same fashion, under the name of democracy,—the most of them being introduced by Antony,—but with the substance of despotism. Both men named their political rivals enemies of their country and declared that they themselves were fighting for the public interests, whereas each really ruined those interests and increased only his own private possessions.

[-18-] After taking these steps Caesar occupied Sardinia and Sicily without a battle, as the governors there at that time withdrew. Aristobulus he sent home to Palestine to accomplish something against Pompey. He also allowed the children of those proscribed by Sulla to canvass for office, and arranged everything else both in the city and in the rest of Italy to his own best advantage, so far as circumstances permitted. Affairs, at home he now committed to Antony's care and himself set out for Spain which distinctly chose to follow Pompey and caused him some uneasiness lest his rival should induce the Gallic countries to revolt. Meantime Cicero and other senators did not appear in Caesar's sight, but retired to join Pompey, who, they believed, had more justice on his side and would conquer in the war. For the consuls before setting sail and Pompey using the authority of proconsul had ordered them all to accompany him to Thessalonica on the general ground that the capital was being held by certain enemies but that they themselves were the senate and would maintain the form of the government wherever they should be. For this reason most of the senators and the knights, some of them immediately and others later, and all the cities that were not subdued by Caesar's arms, embraced his cause.

[-19-]The Massilians, however, alone of the peoples who dwell in Gaul, refused to cooeperate with Caesar, and would not receive him into their city, but made a noteworthy answer to him. They said they were allies of the Roman people and were favorably disposed toward both generals, and they could not go into details and were not competent to judge which of the two was in the wrong: consequently, in case of friendly overtures being made they would receive them both, they said, without their arms, but on a war basis neither of them. On being placed in a state of siege they repulsed Caesar himself and held out for a very long time against Trebonius and Decimus Brutus, who subsequently besieged them. Caesar contended stoutly for some time, thinking to capture them easily, and regarding it as ridiculous that after vanquishing Rome without a battle he was not received by the Massilians; but later, when their resistance proved stubborn, he committed them to the care of others and himself hastened to Spain. [-20-] He had sent thither already Gaius Fabius, but fearing he would fail while contending by himself, he too began a campaign. Afranius and Petreius at this time had charge of affairs in the vicinity of the Iber and had posted a guard over the pass in the mountains, but chiefly they had gathered their forces in Ilerda, and there awaited the attackers. Fabius repulsed the hostile garrison at the Pyrenees but as he was crossing the river Sicoris they fell upon him suddenly and killed many of his men who were cut off. The bridge assisted them materially by breaking before all had crossed. When Caesar came up not much later, he crossed the river by another bridge and challenged them to battle; but they did not dare to try conclusions with him for a very considerable number of days, and remained quietly encamped opposite him. Encouraged from this cause he undertook to seize the ground, a strong position, between their rampart and the city, with the intention of shutting them off from the walls. Afranius and his followers on perceiving this occupied it first, repulsed their assailants, and pursued them when they fled. Then when others came out against them from the fortress they first resisted, then yielded purposely, and so enticed the sallying party into positions which ere favorable to themselves, where they slew many more of them. After this they took courage, attacked Caesar's foraging parties and harassed the scattered members. And on one occasion when some soldiers had crossed to the other side of the river and meantime a great storm had come up and the bridge which they had used was destroyed, they crossed over also by the other bridge, which was near the city, and annihilated them all, as no one was able to come to their assistance.

[-21-] Caesar, when this continued to happen, fell into desperate straits: none of his allies rendered him assistance, for his opponents met and annihilated[69] them as fast as they heard that each one was approaching, and it was with difficulty that he managed to obtain provisions, inasmuch as he was in a hostile territory and unsuccessful in his operations. The Romans at home, when they ascertained it, renounced all hopes of him, and believing that he would survive but a short time longer fell off to Pompey. Some few senators and others set out to join the latter even so late as this. It happened just at this time that the Massilians were defeated in a naval battle by Brutus through the size of his ships and the strength of his marines, although they had Domitius as an ally and surpassed in their experience of naval affairs; they were subsequently shut in entirely. But for this nothing would have prevented Caesar's projects from being ruined. As it was, however, the victory by preconcerted arrangement was announced to the Spaniards with so many embellishments that it led some of them to change and follow the fortunes of Caesar. When he had obtained these as adherents, he secured plenty of food, constructed bridges, harassed his opponents, and once intercepted suddenly a number of them who were wandering about the country and destroyed them.

[-22-] Afranius was disheartened at these results, and seeing that affairs in Ilerda were not safe or satisfactory for a prolonged delay, he determined to retire to the Iber and to the cities there. He set out on this journey by night, intending to escape the enemy's notice or at least get the start of them. His departure proved no secret, yet he was not immediately pursued, for Caesar did not think it safe in the darkness to follow up with men who were strangers to the place an enemy that was well acquainted with the country. When, however, day dawned, he hastened forward and overtaking them in the middle of their journey he encompassed them suddenly on all sides from a distance; for he was much superior in numbers and found the bowl-shaped character of the country a help. He did not wish to come into close quarters with the enemy, partly because he was afraid that they might become frenzied and accomplish some desperate undertaking, and partly again because he hoped to win them over without conflict. This also took place. They tried to break through at many points, but were unable to do so anywhere: they were wearied from loss of sleep and from their march; they had no food, since, expecting to finish their journey the same day, they had brought none, and were not well supplied with water, for that region is notably waterless: for these reasons they surrendered themselves, on condition that they should not be maltreated nor compelled to join his expedition against Pompey. [-23-]Caesar kept each of his promises to them scrupulously He killed not a single man captured in this war in spite of the fact that his foes had once, during a kind of truce, destroyed some of his own men who were in an unguarded position; and he did not force them to fight against Pompey, but released the most eminent and employed the rest as voluntary allies induced by the prospect of gains and honors. By this act he grew very greatly both in reputation and prosperity, and attached to his cause all the cities in Spain and all the soldiers who were in them (some of whom were in Baetica and others, quite a number, with Marcus Terentius Varro, the lieutenant). [-24-] In taking charge of these and arranging their affairs he pursued his course as far as Gades, injuring no one except so far as a collection of money was concerned,—for of this he levied very large amounts. Many of the natives he honored both privately and publicly and to all the people of Gades he granted citizenship, in which the people of Rome later confirmed them. This kindness he did them in return for the vision of his dream at the time that he was quaestor there, wherein he seemed to have intercourse with his mother and had received the hope of sole rulership, as I have stated.[70] After this act he assigned that nation to Cassius Longinus because the latter was accustomed to the inhabitants from his quaestorship which he had served under Pompey. Caesar himself proceeded by boat to Tarraco. Thence he advanced across the Pyrenees, but did not set up any trophy on their summits because he understood that not even Pompey was well spoken of for so doing; but he erected a great altar constructed of polished stones not far from his rival's trophies.

[-25-] While this was going on the Massilians, as ships had again been sent them by Pompey, faced danger afresh. They were defeated, to be sure, on this occasion also, but held their ground even though they learned that Caesar was already master of Spain. All attacks they vigorously repulsed and made a truce, pretendedly for the purpose of arranging terms with Caesar, when he should come. Then they sent out Domitius secretly and wrought such havoc among the soldiers who had attacked them in the midst of the truce and by night, that these ventured to make no further attempts. With Caesar, however, when he came himself, they made terms: he at that time deprived them of their arms, ships and money, and later of everything else except the name of freedom. To counterbalance this misfortune Phocaea, their mother city, was made independent by Pompey.

[-26-] At Placentia some soldiers mutinied and refused to accompany Caesar longer, under the pretext that they were exhausted, but really because he did not allow them to plunder the country nor to do all the other things on which their minds were set; they were hoping to obtain anything whatever of him, inasmuch as he stood in such tremendous need of them. Yet he did not yield, but, with a view to being safe from them and in order that after listening to his address and seeing the persons punished they should feel no wish in an way to transgress the established rules, he called together both the mutinous body and the rest, and spoke as follows:—[-27-] "Fellow soldiers, I desire to have your love, and still I should not choose on that account to participate in your errors. I am fond of you and should wish, as a father might for his children, that you should be preserved, be prosperous, and have a good repute. Do not think it is the duty of one who loves to assent to things which ought not to be done, and for which it is quite inevitable that dangers and ill-repute should fall to the lot of his beloved, but rather he must teach them the better way and keep them from the worse, both by advising and by disciplining them. You will recognize that I speak the truth if you do not estimate advantage with reference to the pleasure of the moment but instead with reference to what is continually beneficial, and if you will avoid thinking that gratifying your desires is more noble than restraining them. It is disgraceful to take pleasure temporarily in something of which you must later repent, and it is outrageous after conquering the enemy to be vanquished by some pleasure or other.

[-28-] "To what do the words I speak apply? To the fact that you have provisions in abundance,—I am going to speak right out with no disguise: you do get your pay in full and on time and you are always and everywhere supplied with plenty of food—that you endure no inglorious toil nor useless danger; furthermore that you gather many great prizes for your bravery and are rebuked little or not at all for your errors, and yet you do not see fit to be satisfied with these things. I am speaking not of all of you, for you are not all such men, but only to those who for their own gain are casting reproach on the rest. Most of you obey my orders very scrupulously and satisfactorily, abide by your ancestral customs, and in that way have acquired so much land and wealth and glory; some few, however, are attaching much disgrace and disrespect to all of us. Though I understood clearly before this that they were that sort of persons,—for there is none of your interests that I fail to notice,—still I pretended not to know it, thinking that they might become better if they believed they were not observed in some of their evil deeds and had the fear that if they ever presumed too far they might be punished for the guilt of which they were conscious. Since they, however, proceeding on the ground that they may do whatever they wish because they were not brought to book at the very start, are overbold and are trying to make the rest of you, who are guilty of no irregularity, likewise mutinous, it becomes necessary for me to devote some care to them and to give them my attention. [-29-] In general, no society of men can preserve its unity and continue to exist, if the criminal element be not disciplined: if the part afflicted does not receive proper medicine, it causes all the rest, as in fleshly bodies, to be sick at the same time. And least of all in armies can discipline be relaxed, because when the wrongdoers have strength they become more daring and corrupt the excellent also by causing them to grow dejected and to believe that they will obtain no benefit from right behavior. Wherever the insolent element has the advantage, there inevitably the decent element has the worst of it: and wherever injustice is unpunished, there uprightness also goes without reward. What is there you could assert is doing right, if these men are doing no wrong? How could you logically desire to be honored, if these men do not endure their just punishment? Are you ignorant of the fact that if one class is freed from the fear of retribution and the other is deprived of the hope of prizes, no good is brought about, but only numberless ills? Hence if you really practice valor and excellence, you should detest these men as enemies. What is friendly is not distinguished from what is hostile by any characteristic of birth, but is determined by habits and actions, which if they are good can make the alien intimate, but if they are bad can alienate everything, even kindred. [-30-] And you should speak in your own defence, because by the behavior of these few we must all inevitably fall into disrepute, even if we have done no wrong. Every one who is acquainted with our numbers and progress refers the errors of the few to us all; and thus though we do not share in their gains, we bear an equal share of their reproach. Who would not be indignant at hearing that we had the name of Romans, but did deeds of the Celtae? Who would not lament the sight of Italy ravaged like Britain? Is it not outrageous for us to cease injuring the possessions of the Gauls, because they are subdued, and then to devastate the property of dwellers south of the Alps, as if they were some Epirots, or Carthaginians, or Cimbi? Is it not disgraceful for us to give ourselves airs and say that we were the first of the Romans to cross the Rhine and to sail the ocean, and then to plunder our native land which is safe from harm at the hands of foes and to receive blame instead of praise, dishonor in place of honor, loss instead of gain, punishment instead of prizes?[-31-] Do not think that because you are in the army, that makes you stronger than the citizens at home. You are both Romans, and they like you both have been and will be soldiers. Nor yet again that because you have arms, it is permitted you to injure. The laws have more authority than you, and some day you will without fail lay down these weapons. Do not, again, rely on your numbers. Those capable of being wronged are, if they unite, more than you. And they will unite, if you do wrong. Do not, because you have conquered the barbarians, despise these citizens also, from whom you differ not the slightest either in birth or in education, in the matter of food or in customs. Instead, as is proper and advantageous for you, use no violence and wrong no one of them, but receive provisions from their willingness to provide, and accept rewards from their willing hands. [-32-] In addition to what I have just said and other considerations that one might cite who should enter upon a long discussion of such questions, you must also take account of the following fact,—that we have come here now to assist our country under oppression and to ward off those that are harming her. If she were in no danger, we should neither have come into Italy with arms,—since it is unlawful,—nor should we have left unfinished the business of the Celts and Britons, when we might have subjugated those regions too. Then is it not remarkable if we who are here for vengeance upon the evildoers should show ourselves no less greedy of gain than they? Is it not inconceivable that when we have arrived to aid our country we should force her to require other allies against us? And yet I think my claims so much better warranted than Pompey's that I have often challenged him to a trial; and since he by reason of his guilty conscience has refused to have the questions peaceably decided, I hope by this act of his to attach to my cause all the allies and the entire people. But now, if we also shall take up a course similar to his, I shall not have any decent excuse to offer nor be able to charge my opponents with any unbecoming conduct. You must also look ahead very carefully to the justice of your cause. If you have this, the strength that arms afford is full of hope, but without it nothing remains sure, though for the moment a man may be successful.

[-33-] "That nature has ordained this most of you understand, and you fulfill all your duties without urging. That is why I have convened you,—to make you both witnesses and spectators of my words and acts. But you are not of such a character as some men I have been mentioning and therefore it is that you receive praise. Only some few of you observe how, in addition to working many injuries and paying no penalty at all for them hitherto, these malcontents are also threatening us. However, as a general principle, I do not think it well for any ruler to be subdued by his subjects, nor do I believe that any safety could possibly result, if the class appointed to assist a person should attempt to overcome him. Consider what sort of order could exist in a house where those in the prime of youth should despise their elders, or what order in schools, if the students should pay no heed to their instructors? What health would there be for the sick, if those indisposed should not obey their physicians in all points, or what safety for the navigators if the sailors should turn a deaf ear to their pilots? It is by a natural law both necessary and salutary that the principle of ruling and again that of being ruled have been placed among men, and without them it is impossible for anything to continue to exist for ever so short a time. Now it belongs to him who is stationed over another both to think out and to command the requisite course, and to him who is made subservient to obey without questioning and to put the order into action. By this the sensible element is distinguished from the senseless and the understanding element from the ignorant in all matters.

[-34-] "Since these things are so I would never under compulsion assent to these brawlers nor give them my permission perforce. Why am I sprung from Aeneas and Iulus, why have I been praetor, why consul, for what end have I led some of you out from home and gathered others later, for what end have I received and held the authority of a proconsul now for so long a time, if I am to be a slave to any one of you and conquered by any one of you here in Italy and near to Rome,—I, to whom you owe your subjection of the Gauls and your conquest of Britain? What should I fear or dread? That some one of you will kill me? Nay, but if you all had this mind, I would voluntarily choose to die rather than to give up the dignity of my position as leader or to abandon the attitude of mind befitting the head of an enterprise. For a far greater danger than the unjust death of one man confronts the city, if the soldiers shall become accustomed to issue orders to their generals and to take the justice of the law into their own hands.[-35-] No one of them, however, has so much as made this threat: if he had, I am sure he would have been slain forthwith by the rest of you. But they are withdrawing from the campaign on the pretence of being wearied and are laying down their arms because (they say) they are worn out, and certainly if they do not obtain my consent to this wish of theirs, they will leave their ranks and go over to Pompey: some of them make this perfectly evident. Who would not be glad to be deprived of such men, and who would not pray that such soldiers might belong to his rival, seeing that they are not content with what is given and are not obedient to orders, but that simulating old age in the midst of youth and in strength simulating weakness they claim the right to lord it over their rulers and to tyrannize over their leaders? I had ten thousand times rather be reconciled with Pompey on any terms whatever or suffer any other conceivable fate than do anything unworthy of my native thought or of my own deliberate policy. Are you unaware that it is not sovereignty or gain that I desire and that I am not bent upon accomplishing anything absolutely, an at any cost, so that I would lie and flatter and fawn upon people to this end? Will you give up, then, for these reasons the campaign, O what can I call you? Yet still it shall be not as you yourselves desire and say but as is profitable for the commonwealth and for myself."

After this speech he distributed lots among them for the infliction of the death penalty, and the most audacious,—for these, as was previously arranged, drew the lots,—he condemned, and the rest he dismissed, saying he had no further need of them. And they repented of what they had done and were ready to renew the campaign.

[-36-] While he was still on the way Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, the man who later became a member of the triumvirate, in his capacity of praetor took counsel with the people to elect Caesar dictator and immediately moved his nomination, contrary to ancestral custom. The latter accepted the office as soon as he entered the city, but committed no act of terror while in it. On the contrary he granted a return to all the exiles except Milo, and filled the offices for the ensuing year: at that time they had chosen no one temporarily in place of the absentees, and whereas there was no aedile in town, the tribunes exercised all the functions pertaining to the aedileship: moreover he set up priests in the places of those who were lost (though not observing all the detailed ceremonies that were customary for them at such a juncture), and to the Gauls who live this side of the Alps and beyond the Po he gave citizenship because he had once governed them. After effecting this he resigned the name of dictator, for he had quite all the power and functions of the position constantly in his grasp. He employed the strength that is afforded by arms, and also got in addition a quasi-legal authority from the senate that was on the spot; for he was permitted to do with impunity whatever he might wish.

[-37-] Having obtained this he at once set aright an affair of great moment and necessity. The money lenders had exacted money quite relentlessly from some, who needed large funds on account of the political disputes and the wars. Many of the debtors by reason of the same events were not able, even if they wished it, to pay back anything; for they did not find it easy to sell anything or to borrow more. Hence the mutual dealings of the two classes were ofttimes marked by deceit and ofttimes by treachery, so that there was fear of the matter progressing till it became an incurable evil. Certain modifications in regard to interest had been made even before this by some of the tribunes, but since even so payment was not secured, but the one class kept forfeiting its securities and the other demanding the principal in money, Caesar now came to the aid of both so far as he could. He ordered that securities should have a fixed valuation according to their worth, and to decide that point he assigned arbiters to be allotted to persons disputing any point. [-38-] Since also many were said to possess large properties but to be concealing all their wealth, he forbade any one to have more than fifteen thousand denarii in silver or gold: this law, he alleged, he did not enact himself, but he was simply enforcing a measure some time previously introduced. His object was either that those who owed should make good some of their debt to the lenders and the rest lend to such as needed, or else that the well-to-do might be clearly apparent and no one of them keep his property all together, for fear some political change might take place in his absence. When the populace, elated at this, asked that in addition to it rewards be offered to servants for information against their masters, he refused to add such a clause to the law and furthermore called down dire destruction upon himself if he should ever trust a slave speaking against his master.

[-39-] Caesar after doing this and removing all the Capitoline offerings and others hastened to Brundusium toward the close of the year and before entering upon the consulship to which he had been elected. And as he was attending to the details of his departure a kite in the Forum let fall a sprig of laurel upon one of his companions. Later, while he was sacrificing to Fortuna, the bull escaped before being wounded, rushed out of the city, and coming to a kind of pond swam across it. As a consequence he continued his preparations with greater courage and especially because the soothsayers declared that destruction should be his if he remained at home, but if he crossed the sea salvation and victory. When he had gone, the boys in the city spontaneously divided into two classes, one side calling itself Pompeiians and the other Caesarians, and they fought one another after a fashion without arms, and those conquered who used Caesar's name.

[-40-] While such was the progress of events in Rome and in Spain, Marcus Octavius and Lucius Scribonius Libo by using Pompey's fleet expelled from Dalmatia Publius Cornelius Dolabella, who was there attending to Caesar's interests. After this they shut up Gaius Antonius, who was desirous of aiding him, in a little islet and there, abandoned by the natives and oppressed by hunger, they captured him with all his force save a few; some of them had escaped in season to the mainland, and others who were sailing across on rafts and were caught made away with themselves. [-41-] Curio had meanwhile reduced Sicily without a battle; for Cato, the governor of it, being no match for him and not wishing idly to expose the cities to danger, withdrew beforehand to Pompey; afterward, however, the conqueror passed over to Africa and perished. At his approach by sea Lucius Caesar abandoned the city of Aspis in which he merely happened to be staying, and Publius Attius Varus, then in charge of the affairs of that region, was defeated by him and lost many soldiers and a few cities. Juba, however, son of Hiempsus and king over the Numidians, esteemed the interests of Pompey as those of the people and the senate, and hated Curio both for this reason and because the latter when tribune had attempted to take away his kingdom from him and confiscate the land: therefore he vigorously prosecuted the war against him. He did not wait for him to invade his home country of Numidia but assailed him with something less than his entire force at the siege of Utica, for fear that the Roman, being previously informed, might retire; and he was rather more anxious to take vengeance on him than to repulse him. Accordingly, Juba sent forward a few men who reported that the king had departed in some other direction and to a distance: he himself followed after these and did not miss the results he had hoped for. [-42-] Before this Curio with the idea that his enemy was approaching had transferred his men to the camp near the sea and had framed an intention, in case he were hard pushed, of embarking on the ships and leaving Africa altogether. But when he ascertained that only a few men were arriving and these without Juba, he took courage and started out that very night as if to a victory waiting for him, and fearing only that they should escape him. In his advance he destroyed some of the van who were sleeping on the road and became much emboldened. Next, about dawn, he encountered the rest who had started out ahead from the camp; and without any delay, in spite of the fact that his soldiers were exhausted both by the march and by loss of sleep, he at once joined battle with them. At this juncture, while matters were at a standstill and they were fighting rather evenly, Juba suddenly appeared upon the scene and by his unexpected coming as well as by his numbers overwhelmed him. Curio and most of the others he killed on the spot by means of this surprise, and the rest he pursued as far as the ditch, after which he confined them to their ships and in the midst of the confusion got possession of large amounts of money and destroyed many men. Numbers of them perished when they seemed to have escaped, some being knocked down in the melee while boarding the boats, and others drowned while in the ships themselves by the overloading of the vessels. During these occurrences some being afraid they might suffer the same fate went over to Varus expecting that their lives would be spared, but received no benefit from it. For Juba asserted that it was he who had conquered them and so slaughtered them all except a few. Thus Curio died after rendering most valuable assistance to Caesar upon whom he had founded many hopes. Juba found honors at the hands of Pompey and the senators who were in Macedonia and was saluted as king: but on the part of Caesar and those in the city he was censured and declared an enemy, while Bocchus and Bogud were named kings because they were hostile to him.

[B.C. 48 (a.u. 706)]

[-43-] The ensuing year the Romans had two sets of magistrates, contrary to custom, and a mighty conflict was engendered. The people of the city had chosen as consuls Caesar and Publius Servilius, together with praetors, and everything else according to law: the party in Thessalonica had made no such preparations although they had by some accounts about two hundred of the senate and the consuls and had appropriated a small piece of land for divinations to the end that their proceedings might seem to take place under a certain form of law. Wherefore they regarded the people and the entire city as present there (the reason being that the consuls had not introduced the lex curiata), and they employed those same officials as formerly, only changing their names and calling some proconsuls, others propraetors, and others pro-quaestors. For they were very careful about ancestral customs even though they had raised their arms against their country and abandoned their native shores, and were anxious to perform all necessary acts not merely with a view to temporary demands or contrary to the exact wording of the ordinances. It is quite time that nominally these officials ruled the two parties, but in reality it was Pompey and Caesar who were supreme, bearing, for the sake of good repute, the legal titles,—one that of consul and the other that of proconsul,—and doing not what the magistrates allowed but whatever they themselves pleased.

[-44-] Under these conditions, with the government divided in twain, Pompey wintered in Thessalonica and did not keep a very careful guard of the coast. He did not think that Caesar had yet arrived in Italy from Spain, and even if he were there he did not suspect that his rival, in winter, at least, would venture to cross the Ionian sea. Caesar was in Brundusium, waiting for spring, but when he ascertained that Pompey was some distance off and that Epirus just opposite was rather heedlessly guarded, he seized the opportunity of the war to attack him while in a state of relaxation. When the winter was about half gone he set out with a portion of his army,—there were not enough ships to carry them all across at once,—escaped the attention of Marcus Bibulus to whom the guarding of the sea had been committed, and crossed to the so-called Ceraunian Headlands, a point in the confines of Epirus, near the opening of the Ionian gulf. Having reached there before it became noised abroad that he would sail at all, he despatched the ships to Brundusium for the rest: but Bibulus damaged them on the return voyage and actually took some in tow, so that Caesar learned by experience that he had enjoyed a more fortunate than prudent voyage.

[-45-]During this delay, therefore, he acquired Oricum and Apollonia and other points there which had been abandoned by Pompey's garrisons. This "Corinthian Apollonia" is well situated as regards the land and as regards the sea, and excellently in respect to rivers. What I have remarked, however, above all else is that a huge fire issues from the ground near the Aoeus river and neither spreads to any extent over the surrounding land nor sets on fire that very place where it is located nor even makes the ground dry and brittle, but leaves the grass and trees flourishing very near it. In pouring rains it increases and rises high. For this reason it is called Nymphaeum[71] and affords a kind of oracle. You take a grain of incense and after making whatever prayer you wish throw it carrying the prayer. At this the fire, if your wish is to be fulfilled, receives it very readily and in case the grain falls somewhere outside, darts forward, snatches it up and consumes it. But if the wish is not to be fulfilled, the fire does not go to it, and if it is carried into the flame, the latter recedes and flees before it. These two actions it performs in this way in all matters save those of death and marriage: about these two it is not granted any one to learn anything whatever from it.

[-46-] Such is the nature of this marvel. Now as Antony, to whom had been assigned the duty of conveying those that remained at Brundusium, proved slow, and no message came about them on account of the winter and of Bibulus, Caesar suspected that they had adopted a neutral attitude and were watching the course of events, as often happens in political disputes. Wishing therefore, to sail himself to Italy, and alone, he embarked on a small boat as some one else, saying that he had been sent by Caesar; and he forced the captain, although there was a wind, to set sail. When, however, they were away from land, the gale came sweeping violently down upon them and the billows rocked them terribly, so that the captain not even under compulsion dared any longer sail on, but undertook to return even without his passenger's consent. Then the latter revealed himself, as if by this act he should stop the storm, and said, "Be of good cheer: you carry Caesar." Such a disposition and such a hope he had, either accidentally or as the result of some oracle, that he felt a secure trust in safety even contrary to the appearance of things. Nevertheless, he did not get across, but after struggling for a long time in vain sailed back.

[-47-]After this he encamped opposite Pompey, near Apsus. The latter as soon as he had heard of his rival's advent had made no delay, but hoping to quell him easily before he secured the presence of the rest who were with Antony, he marched in haste and in some force toward Apollonia. Caesar advanced to meet him as far as the river, thinking that even as he was he would prove a match for the troops then approaching: but when he learned that he was actually far inferior in numbers, he halted. In order that this action should not seem due to fear, and he not be thought to be opening the war, he submitted some conciliatory proposals to the opposing body and continued his abode in that place. Pompey, knowing this, wished to try conclusions with him as soon as possible and for this reason undertook to cross the river. But the bridge on receiving the weight broke down and some of the advance guard being isolated, perished. Then he desisted in dejection that he had failed in his first recourse to hostile action. Meanwhile Antony had arrived, and Pompey in fear retired to Dyrrachium. [-48-] While Bibulus lived, Caesar's lieutenant had not dared even to set out from Brundusium, so close was the guard kept over it. But when that officer, worn out by hard work, had died and Libo succeeded him as admiral, Antony despised him and set sail with the evident intention of forcing the passage. Driven back to land he repelled the other's vigorous attack upon him and later, when Libo was anxious to disembark somewhere, he allowed him to find anchorage nowhere near that part of the mainland. The admiral being in need of anchorage and water, since the little island in front of the harbor, which was the only place he could approach, is destitute of water and harbor alike, sailed off to some distant point where he was likely to find both in abundance. In this way Antony was enabled to set sail, and later when the foe attempted to assail them on the high seas he suffered no damage at his hands: a violent storm came up which prevented the attack, but caused injuries to both sides.

[-49-] When the soldiers had come safely across, Pompey, as I have said, retired to Dyrrachium, and Caesar followed him, encouraged by the fact that he had survived his previous experiences with the number of followers he now had. Dyrrachium is situated in the land formerly belonging to the tribe of Illyrians called Parthini, but now and even at that time regarded as a part of Macedonia; and it is very favorably placed, whether it be the Epidamnus of the Corcyraeans or some other. Those who record this fact also refer its founding and its name to a hero Dyrrachus. The other authorities have declared that the place was renamed by the Romans with reference to the difficulties of the rocky shore, because the term Epidamnus has in the Latin tongue the meaning "loss," and so seemed to be very ill-omened for their crossing over to it.

[-50-] Pompey after taking refuge in this Dyrrachium built a camp outside the city and surrounded it with deep ditches and stout palisades. Caesar encamped over against it and made assaults, in the hope of shortly capturing the palisades by the number of his soldiers: when, however, he was repulsed, he attempted to wall it off. While he was at that work, Pompey fortified some points by stakes, cut off others by a wall, and fortified still others with a ditch, establishing towers and guards on the high places, so as to render the circuit of the encompassing wall necessarily infinite and to render an approach impossible to the foe, even if they conquered. There were meanwhile many battles between them, but brief ones, in which now one party, now the other, was victorious or beaten, so that a few were killed on both sides alike. Upon Dyrrachium itself Caesar made an attempt by night, between the marshes and the sea, in the expectation that it would be betrayed by its defenders. He passed inside the narrows, but at that point was attacked by many in front and many behind, who were conveyed along the shore in boats and suddenly fell upon him; thus he lost numerous men and very nearly perished himself. After this occurrence Pompey took courage and concerted a plan for a night assault upon the circumvallation; as he was unexpected he captured a portion of it by storm and caused a great slaughter among the men encamped near it.

[-51-] Caesar in view of this event and because the grain had failed him,—the entire sea and land in the vicinity being hostile,—and because for this reason some had deserted, feared that he might either be overcome while watching his adversary or be abandoned by his other followers. Therefore he leveled all the works that had been constructed, destroyed also all the parallel walls, and thereupon made a sudden start and set out for Thessaly. During this same time that Dyrrachium was being besieged Lucius Cassius Longinus and Gnaeus Domitius Calvinus had been sent by him into Macedonia and into Thessaly. Longinus was disastrously defeated by Scipio and by Sadalus, a Thracian; Calvinus was repulsed from Macedonia by Faustus, but on receiving accessions from the Locrians and Aetolians he invaded Thessaly with these troops, and after being ambushed and then again laying counter-ambuscades conquered Scipio in battle, and by that act gained a few cities. Thither, accordingly, Caesar hastened, thinking that by combining with these officers he could more easily get an abundance of food and continue the prosecution of the war. When no one would receive him, because he had had bad luck, he reluctantly held aloof from the larger settlements, but assaulted Gomphi, a little city of Thessaly, took it, killed many and plundered all its inhabitants in order that by this act he might inspire the rest with terror. Metropolis, at any rate, another town, would have no conflict with him but forthwith capitulated without a struggle: and as he did no harm to its citizens he more easily won over some other places by his display of equal readiness in opposite contingencies.

[-52-] So he became strong again. Pompey did not institute an immediate pursuit, for his antagonist had withdrawn suddenly by night and had hastily crossed the Genusus river: however, he was strongly inclined to think that he had subdued him completely. Consequently he assumed the name of imperator, though he made no boast of it and did not even wind laurel about his fasces, disliking to show such exultation over the downfall of citizens. Consistently with this same attitude he neither sailed to Italy himself nor sent any others there, though he might easily have reduced the whole peninsula. As regards a fleet he was absolute master, for he had five hundred swift ships and could touch at many points at once: and the sentiment of that country was not opposed to him, nor, if it had been ever so hostile, could the people have been a match for him in war. But he wished to remain at a distance, so as to get the reputation of fighting for his land, and did not see fit to cause any fear to the persons who then in Rome. Hence he made no attempt on Italy, not even sending to the government any despatch about his successes. But after this he set out against Caesar and came to Thessaly.

[-53-] As they lay opposite each other the appearance of the camps bore, indeed, some resemblance of war, but the use of arms was suspended as in time of peace. As they reviewed the greatness of the danger and foresaw the obscurity and uncertainty of the issue, and still stood in some awe of their common ancestry and kinship, they were led to delay. Meanwhile they exchanged propositions about friendship and appeared to some likely to become reconciled without accomplishing anything. This was due to the fact that they were both reaching out for supreme dominion and were influenced by a great deal of native ambition and a great deal of acquired rivalry,—for men can least endure to be outdone by their equals and intimates; they were not willing to make any concessions to each other, since each felt that he might win, nor could they feel any confidence, if they did come to terms, that they would not be always yearning for the advantage and fall into strife again over complete control. [-54-] In temper they differed from each other to this extent,—that Pompey desired to be second to no man and Caesar to be first of all, and the former was anxious to be honored by willing subjects and to preside over and be loved by a people fully consenting, whereas the latter cared not at all if he ruled over an unwilling nation and issued orders to men that hated him, and bestowed the honors with his own hand upon himself. The deeds, however, through which they hoped to accomplish all that they wished, were perforce common to both alike. For it was impossible that either one of them should succeed without fighting against his countrymen, leading foreigners against kindred, obtaining much money by unjust pillage, and killing unlawfully many of his dearest associates. Hence, even though they differed in their desires, yet in their acts, by which they hoped to fulfill those desires, they were alike. Consequently they would not yield to each other on any point, in spite of the many just grounds that they alleged, and finally came into collision.

[-55-] The struggle proved a mighty one, and resembled no other conflict. The leaders believed themselves to be the most skilled in all matters of warfare and clearly the most distinguished not only of the Romans but also of the remainder of mankind then in existence. They had practiced those pursuits from boyhood, had constantly been connected with them, had exhibited deeds worthy of note, had been conspicuous for great valor and great good fortune, and were therefore most worthy of commanding and most worthy of victory. As to forces, Caesar had the largest and the most genuinely Roman portion of the citizen-army and the most warlike men from the rest of Italy, from Spain, and the whole of Gaul and the islands that he had conquered: Pompey had attracted many from the senatorial and the equestrian order and from the regular enrollment and had gathered a vast number from subject and pacified peoples and kings. Aside from Pharnaces and Orodes,—the latter, indeed, although an enemy because of his having killed the Crassi, he tried to win over,—all the rest who had ever had even the smallest dealings with Pompey gave him money and either sent or led auxiliaries. The Parthian king promised to be his ally if he should take Syria: but as he did not get it, the prince did not help him. While Pompey decidedly excelled in numbers, Caesar's followers were equal to them in strength, and so, the advantage being even, they just balanced each other and were equally prepared for danger.

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